In re Change of Name of Slingsby

I n re C hange of name of SlIngSby.
hunter Wade SlIngSby, a mInor , by and through
hIS mother and next frIend, JeSSIe m. WattS,
appellant, v. devIn W. oxford,
Intervenor-appellee .
752 N.W.2d 564
Filed July 18, 2008. 	No. S-06-817.
1. Minors: Names: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews a trial court’s
decision concerning a requested change in the surname of a minor de novo on
the record and reaches a conclusion independent of the findings of the trial court.
Provided, however, that where credible evidence is in conflict on a material issue
of fact, the appellate court considers and gives weight to the fact that the trial
judge heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather
than another.
2. Minors: Names. The question of whether the name of a minor child should be
changed is determined by what is in the best interests of the child.
3. Minors: Names: Proof. The party seeking the change in surname of a minor
child has the burden of proving that the change in surname is in the child’s
best interests.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: thomaS
a. otepka, Judge. Affirmed.
Marc J. Odgaard, Amy L. Parker, and Larry W. Beucke,
of Parker, Grossart, Bahensky, Beucke & Odgaard, L.L.P.,
for appellant.
Jay A. Ferguson for intervenor-appellee.
heavICan, 	C.J., 	W rIght, 	C onnolly, 	gerrard, 	S tephan,
mCC ormaCk, and mIller -lerman, JJ.
mCC ormaCk, J.
NATURE OF CASE
Jessie M. Watts, mother of Hunter Wade Slingsby, filed a peti-
tion seeking to change Slingsby’s surname from Slingsby, Watts’
maiden name, to her married name, Watts. Slingsby’s biological
father, Devin W. Oxford, intervened in the action and filed an
objection to the name change. The district court found that Watts
failed to meet her burden of proof and denied the requested
name change. We affirm.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:53 AM CST

BACkGROUND
Slingsby was born out of wedlock on November 10, 2000, to
Watts and Oxford. Oxford acknowledged paternity of Slingsby,
but was not listed on Slingsby’s birth certificate. Oxford testified
that at the time of Slingsby’s birth, he agreed that Slingsby’s
surname would be Slingsby. In September 2002, Watts, Oxford,
and the State of Nebraska entered into a stipulation regarding
paternity, custody, support, and daycare expenses. Watts was
given custody of Slingsby subject to Oxford’s right to reasonable
visitation. Oxford was ordered to pay child support, one-half of
uninsured medical costs, and one-half of daycare expenses.
In July 2003, Watts and Slingsby moved from kearney,
Nebraska, to Omaha, Nebraska. In July 2004, Watts got married.
At that time, her new spouse was attending pharmacy school
at the University of Nebraska Medical Center in Omaha. Watts
testified that she and her new spouse planned to move back to
kearney in June 2006.
In October 2005, Watts filed a petition seeking to change
Slingsby’s surname from Slingsby to Watts. Oxford filed an
objection to the name change. Trial on the matter was held in
March and May 2006.
With regard to the name change, Watts testified she wanted
to change Slingsby’s surname to Watts because she and her
new spouse were planning on having children and she did not
want Slingsby to feel as though he was not part of the family.
She also wants Slingsby to be closer to her new husband. Watts
further testified that she did not want Slingsby to suffer embar-
rassment at school because his current surname is not the same
as either of his biological parents’ surnames. In addition, Watts
testified that Slingsby had begun to tell his preschool teachers
that his name was Watts and had been using the name Watts
at school.
Oxford testified that he is concerned that Watts and her family
are trying to substitute Watts’ new spouse for him as Slingsby’s
father. Oxford testified that Watts had asked that Oxford relin-
quish his rights to Slingsby for adoption purposes, which he
refused to do. Oxford further testified that he was concerned
about the name change because Slingsby is his son and he is try-
ing to have a relationship with Slingsby. Oxford acknowledged,
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however, that he may have visitation with Slingsby despite a
name change.
Testimony was also received at trial from Dr. Thomas Haley, a
clinical psychologist. Haley testified that 2 days prior to trial, he
met with Watts for approximately 1 hour, but did not meet with
Slingsby regarding this matter. Based upon information provided
to him during his meeting with Watts and what he heard in
court, Haley opined that in light of the pattern of Slingsby’s life
thus far and Slingsby’s relationship with his parents, changing
Slingsby’s surname to Watts would be in Slingsby’s best inter-
ests. With regard to Slingsby’s relationship with Watts, Haley
testified that not allowing the change in surname would likely
introduce a pattern of alienation on Slingsby’s part. On cross-
examination, however, Haley testified that this alienation was a
possibility and that he could not state whether a refusal on the
court’s part to change Slingsby’s surname to Watts would have
a positive or negative effect on Slingsby as he grows up. Haley
further testified that in the 11⁄2 years that Watts had been married
to her new husband, Slingsby had suffered no ill effects from
having the surname Slingsby, that Haley was aware of. With
regard to Slingsby’s relationship with Oxford, Haley testified
that changing Slingsby’s surname from Slingsby to Watts would
be a “non-event.” Haley also testified that changing Slingsby’s
surname to Watts would not necessarily result in Slingsby’s
more closely identifying Watts’ new husband as his father rather
than Oxford.
In June 2006, the district court entered an order denying
Watts’ petition to change Slingsby’s surname. The court noted
that the burden is to prove that the name change is in the child’s
best interests, not the parents’, and determined that Watts had
failed to meet that burden. The court noted that the factors to be
considered in determining whether a change in name is in the
child’s best interests include whether there has been any miscon-
duct by the parent toward the child. The court found that in this
case, there is neither evidence of such misconduct nor evidence
of Oxford’s failure to maintain contact with Slingsby to any seri-
ous degree. The court also noted that Haley could not opine with
reasonable certainty that changing Slingsby’s surname would
have any positive or negative effect. Watts now appeals.
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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Watts asserts that the district court erred in failing to find that
she met her burden of proof and in failing to grant her request to
change Slingsby’s surname from Slingsby to Watts.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] An appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision con-
cerning a requested change in the surname of a minor de novo
on the record and reaches a conclusion independent of the find-
ings of the trial court. Provided, however, that where credible
evidence is in conflict on a material issue of fact, the appellate
court considers and gives weight to the fact that the trial judge
heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of
the facts rather than another.1
ANALySIS
[2,3] The sole issue in this appeal is whether the district court
erred in denying the petition to change Slingsby’s surname. The
question of whether the name of a minor child should be changed
is determined by what is in the best interests of the child.2 The
party seeking the change in surname has the burden of proving
that the change in surname is in the child’s best interests.3 We
have noted that cases considering this question have granted a
change of name only when the substantial welfare of the child
requires the name to be changed.4
In In re Change of Name of Andrews,5 we set forth a list
of nonexclusive factors upon which the question of whether
a change of a minor’s surname is in the best interests of the
child may depend. These factors are (1) misconduct by one of
the child’s parents; (2) a parent’s failure to support the child;
(3) parental failure to maintain contact with the child; (4) the
length of time that a surname has been used for or by the child;
1 See In re Change of Name of Andrews, 235 Neb. 170, 454 N.W.2d 488
(1990).
2 See id.
3 See Lancaster v. Brenneis, 227 Neb. 371, 417 N.W.2d 767 (1988).
4 See Spatz v. Spatz, 199 Neb. 332, 258 N.W.2d 814 (1977).
5 In re Change of Name of Andrews, supra note 1.
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Cite as 276 Neb. 114

(5) whether the child’s surname is different from the surname
of the child’s custodial parent; (6) a child’s reasonable prefer-
ence for one of the surnames; (7) the effect of the change of
the child’s surname on the preservation and development of the
child’s relationship with each parent; (8) the degree of commu-
nity respect associated with the child’s present surname and the
proposed surname; (9) the difficulties, harassment, or embar-
rassment that the child may experience from bearing the present
or proposed surname; and (10) the identification of the child as
a part of a family unit.6
In In re Change of Name of Andrews and other cases before
this court and the Nebraska Court of Appeals, these factors have
been applied in determining whether a name change is in a
minor’s best interests in situations where the minor’s surname is
the same as one of his or her parents’.7 The present case, how-
ever, presents a situation factually distinct from prior cases. Here,
Slingsby’s surname is different from both his parents’ surnames.
This difference is of paramount importance in this case.
Watts testified at trial that she wanted to change Slingsby’s
surname because she was concerned about Slingsby’s potential
embarrassment at having a surname different from Watts’ and
Oxford’s, because she desired Slingsby to feel closer to her
new husband, because she wanted Slingsby to feel as though he
was part of her and her husband’s family, and because Slingsby
had begun telling his teachers at preschool that his surname
is Watts.
We have recognized that factors in allowing or denying a pro-
posed name change include the difficulty, harassment, or embar-
rassment that a child may experience from bearing the present or
proposed surname, and a child’s identification as part of a family
unit is a factor to be considered.8
The evidence presented at trial, however, does not support
Watts’ concerns. Aside from Watts’ and Oxford’s testimony,
6 See id.
7 See, e.g., In re Change of Name of Davenport, 263 Neb. 614, 641 N.W.2d
379 (2002); In re Change of Name of Andrews, supra note 1; Minnig v.
Nelson, 9 Neb. App. 427, 613 N.W.2d 24 (2000).
8 See, e.g., In re Change of Name of Andrews, supra note 1.
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the only evidence presented at trial regarding Watts’ concerns
was the testimony of Haley. Haley testified, however, that he
was unaware of any ill effects suffered by Slingsby by having a
surname different from either of his parents’. As for Slingsby’s
identification with a family unit, there was no evidence pre-
sented that Slingsby would be more or less likely to identify
himself with a family unit with or without a change in his
surname. Another factor which we have identified as relevant
to a court’s determination regarding a change in name is the
child’s preference.9 The only evidence presented at trial regard-
ing Slingsby’s preference was Watts’ unsubstantiated testimony
that Slingsby has been using the name Watts in preschool and
telling his teachers that his surname is Watts. Watts’ testimony
does not, in and of itself, indicate Slingsby’s preference. As for
Watts’ desire that Slingsby feel closer to her new husband, we do
not believe that this is a relevant factor to be considered.
In her brief on appeal, Watts discusses each of the remain-
ing factors set forth in In re Change of Name of Andrews.10 She
contends in her brief that each of those factors supports a finding
that a change in surname is in Slingsby’s best interests. We dis-
agree. Upon our review of the record in this case, we conclude
that the evidence presented at trial does not support a finding
that it is in Slingsby’s best interests to change his surname to
Watts. We, therefore, conclude that the district court did not err
by denying Watts’ petition for a change in Slingsby’s surname.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the decision of the
district court.
affIrmed .
9 Id.
10 Id.
gerrard, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, based on the evidence
presented at trial, Watts has proved that it would be in the minor
child’s best interests to have his name changed from Slingsby
to Watts.
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Cite as 276 Neb. 114

I agree that the principles set forth in In re Change of Name
of Andrews1 govern our disposition of this appeal. And the
majority correctly notes that this case involves the unique cir-
cumstance where the minor child’s surname is different from
both of his biological parents’. The majority explains that
“[t]his difference is of paramount importance in this case.” yet,
despite this difference, the majority concludes that Slingsby’s
name should remain unchanged—thus leaving Slingsby with
a surname that is different from not only one, but both, of his
natural parents’.
A child with a surname that is different from both parents’
surnames is a significant factor that must be considered when
determining whether a name change is appropriate. For example,
in R.W.B. v. T.W. ex rel. K.A.W.,2 the father of a minor child
sought to have the minor child’s surname changed from the natu-
ral mother’s maiden name to the father’s surname. At the time of
trial, the mother had remarried, and as a result, the minor child’s
surname was neither the mother’s nor the father’s. The trial
court denied the father’s request. The Missouri Court of Appeals
reversed that decision, noting that “in denying [the] Father’s
request to change [the child’s] surname to that of [the] Father,
the trial court has countenanced a situation in which [the child]
now bears neither his mother’s new surname nor the surname of
his father.”3 The court further explained that it “fail[ed] to see
how the best interest of this child is served by setting him apart
from other children in the community who may carry either their
father’s or mother’s surname.”4 I agree, as have several other
courts to have considered comparable circumstances.5 Indeed,
1 In re Change of Name of Andrews, 235 Neb. 170, 454 N.W.2d 488 (1990).
2 R.W.B. v. T.W. ex rel. K.A.W., 23 S.W.3d 266 (Mo. App. 2000).
3 Id. at 268.
4 Id.
5 See, e.g., Ostermiller v. Spurr, 968 P.2d 940 (Wyo. 1998); Carter v. Reddell,
75 Ark. App. 8, 52 S.W.3d 506 (2001); Daniel v. Moats, 718 So. 2d 949
(Fla. App. 1998); Montgomery v. Wells, 708 N.W.2d 704 (Iowa App. 2005);
M.L.M. ex rel. Froggatte v. Millen, 28 kan. App. 2d 392, 15 P.3d 857
(2000); Learn by Houck v. Haskell, 194 A.D.2d 859, 598 N.y.S.2d 595
(1993).
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where the child bears neither the mother’s new surname nor the
biological father’s surname, the child will likely be questioned
in the future as to why he does not carry the last name of either
his mother or his father.
Furthermore, nothing in the record before us indicates that
the proposed name change would in any way be harmful to
Slingsby. In essence, the only argument presented by Oxford as
to why he opposes the requested name change is that he is wor-
ried his relationship with Slingsby will somehow be affected.
Specifically, when asked what his concerns were, Oxford testi-
fied, “He’s my son. I am the father, it’s been proven.” Oxford
further testified, “I’d like my right of visitation” and “I’m trying
to have a relationship with my son.” Later, Oxford explained
that he was worried that Watts was trying to substitute her new
husband for Oxford as Slingsby’s father.
However, the record does not support Oxford’s contention
that his relationship with Slingsby will somehow be affected if a
name change were to occur. I first note that the appropriate con-
sideration here is what is in the minor child’s best interests—not
Oxford’s. But, while maintaining Slingsby’s relationship with
Oxford is in Slingsby’s best interests, there is a complete lack
of evidence to support Oxford’s argument that a name change
would harm this relationship. Rather, the evidence indicates
that both Oxford’s rights to visitation and his relationship with
Slingsby would not be harmed. Obviously, a court’s determina-
tion of Oxford’s visitation rights would not be affected by the
child’s surname. And Dr. Thomas Haley testified that, as to the
effect the change would have on Slingsby’s relationship with
Oxford, it would be “neutral” or a “non-event.” Haley further
testified that a name change would not “drive a wedge” between
Slingsby and Oxford or “alienate” Slingsby from Oxford.
Watts testified that she is not seeking to change Slingsby’s
name in an attempt to distance Slingsby from Oxford and that
it has nothing to do with Oxford’s relationship with Slingsby.
Watts agreed that Slingsby and Oxford should maintain a rela-
tionship with each other. Furthermore, Oxford and the minor
child, Slingsby, have never shared the same surname, and there
is no evidence in the record to indicate that this difference has
had an adverse impact on their relationship to this point. Nor
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Cite as 276 Neb. 114

is there evidence in the record to suggest that Oxford cannot
maintain a positive relationship with his son without the benefit
of the name Slingsby, a name that was never associated with
Oxford in the first place. Accordingly, Oxford’s concerns relat-
ing to the impact a name change would have on his relationship
with Slingsby are not supported by the record.
Finally, the evidence indicates that changing Slingsby’s name
to Watts would help Slingsby identify as a part of a family unit,
including potential siblings. In this regard, Watts testified that
she and her husband are planning on having children, and Watts
does not want Slingsby to feel that he is not part of the family
because his surname is different from his siblings’. There is no
question that sharing the same surname within a family unit
provides security, stability, and a feeling of identity and limits
the potential difficulties, confusion, and embarrassment that may
arise relating to the paternity of the child.6 On this note, Haley
opined that if Slingsby’s name is not changed, it is likely that
“a pattern of alienation” might be introduced and “depression
or anxiety or forms of acting-out behavior” may result in the
future. Haley testified, to a reasonable degree of professional
certainty, that he believed changing Slingsby’s name to Watts
was in Slingsby’s best interests.
On the record before us, the evidence establishes that the
requested name change is in Slingsby’s best interests. Watts
presented competent evidence relevant to the factors set forth
in In re Change of Name of Andrews,7 and Oxford presented
no evidence to substantiate his claims to the contrary. I would
reverse the judgment and remand the cause with directions to
grant Watts’ petition.
mIller -lerman, J., joins in this dissent.
6 See, In re M.C.F., 121 S.W.3d 891 (Tex. App. 2003); Learn by Houck
v. Haskell, supra note 5; Hamby v. Jacobson, 769 P.2d 273 (Utah App.
1989).
7 In re Change of Name of Andrews, supra note 1.
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