Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev.

B ecton , D ickinson anD company , a new J ersey corporation ,
anD B ecton D ickinson infusion therapy systems , inc .,
a D elaware corporation , appellants , v . neBraska
D epartment of revenue et al ., appellees .
756 N.W.2d 280
Filed October 10, 2008. 	No. S-07-844.
1. Administrative Law: Judgments: Appeal and Error. A judgment or final order
rendered by a district court in a judicial review pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act may be reversed, vacated, or modified by an appellate court for
errors appearing on the record.
2. ____: ____: ____. When reviewing an order of a district court under the
Administrative Procedure Act for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is
whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence,
and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.
3. Equity: Estoppel. Six elements must be satisfied for the doctrine of equitable
estoppel to apply: (1) conduct which amounts to a false representation or conceal-
ment of material facts or, at least, which is calculated to convey the impression
that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party
subsequently attempts to assert; (2) the intention, or at least the expectation, that
such conduct will be acted upon by, or influence, the other party or other persons;
(3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts; (4) lack of knowledge and
the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; (5) reliance, in
good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and (6)
action or inaction based thereon of such a character as to change the position or
status of the party claiming the estoppel.
4. Administrative Law. Agency regulations properly adopted and filed with the
Secretary of State of Nebraska have the effect of statutory law.
Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: paul
D. merritt , J r ., Judge. Affirmed.
Nicholas K. Niemann, Thomas O. Kelley, and Matthew R.
Ottemann, of McGrath, North, Mullin & Kratz, P.C., L.L.O.,
for appellants.
Jon 	Bruning, Attorney 	General, 	and 	L. 	Jay 	Bartel 	for
appellees.
heavican , 	c.J., 	wright , 	connolly , 	gerrarD, 	stephan ,
mccormack , and miller -lerman , JJ.
stephan , J.
Becton, Dickinson and Company and Becton Dickinson
Infusion Therapy Systems, Inc., which we shall refer to jointly
640 	276 NeBRASKA RePORTS
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:53 AM CST

as “Becton,” appeal from an order of the district court for
Lancaster County affirming the state Tax Commissioner’s denial
of a claim for a refund of sales and use taxes under Nebraska’s
employment and Investment Growth Act,1 commonly referred
to as “L.B. 775.”2 The claim was denied as time barred because
it was filed beyond the limitations period specified in Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 77-2708(2)(b) (Reissue 2003), as extended by agree-
ment of the parties. The primary issue in this appeal is whether
the late filing can be excused on equitable grounds.
BACKGROUND
L.B. 775 grants various tax benefits to qualified businesses
meeting certain new job and new investment thresholds in
Nebraska. A business that creates at least 30 new jobs and
invests at least $3 million within Nebraska may receive a
refund of Nebraska income or sales and use taxes paid on
qualified property purchased for use at the L.B. 775 project
site.3 A business that invests at least $10 million in qualified
property and creates at least 100 new jobs is eligible to receive
those same benefits, plus a 15-year exemption from personal
property tax on certain classes of personal property.4
In its L.B. 775 application, Becton indicated its intent to
qualify for L.B. 775 incentives based on the investment of $10
million in qualified property and the hiring of at least 100 new
employees by September 30, 2006. L.B. 775 requires a party
applying for incentives to enter into a written agreement with
the Tax Commissioner setting forth the specific terms of the
incentive plan.5 Becton and the Tax Commissioner entered into
such an agreement on February 21, 2001. The agreement stated
that it was the intent of Becton to complete the project as it
was described in the application, i.e., to invest $10 million and
1 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 77-4101 to 77-4112 (Reissue 2003 & Cum. Supp.
2004).
2 See 1987 Neb. Laws, L.B. 775.
3 See §§ 77-4104 through 77-4106.
4 See § 77-4105.
5 § 77-4104(4).
BeCTON, DICKINSON & CO. v. NeBRASKA DePT. OF Rev. 	641
Cite as 276 Neb. 640

create 100 new jobs. The agreement also stated, however, that
the required levels of investing were
the hiring of at least thirty (30) new employees in
Nebraska and the investment in qualified property in
Nebraska of at least $3,000,000 for all incentives herein,
except they shall be one hundred (100) new employees
and $10,000,000 of investment for the personal property
tax exemption incentive. These levels must be met prior to
September 30, 2006.
The agreement required Becton to provide specific docu-
mentation demonstrating that it had met the requirements of
L.B. 775. The agreement stated that the Nebraska Department
of Revenue (Department) would review the documentation
in order to verify that Becton had met the minimum employ-
ment and investment levels. The parties generally refer to this
review as the “qualification audit.” The agreement also spe-
cifically provided that when the qualification audit satisfied
the Department that Becton had met the minimum employment
and investment levels required by L.B. 775, the Department
would issue a letter to Becton acknowledging its attainment of
the required levels. The agreement stated that a copy of this
letter “must accompany” any claim Becton made for incentives
allowed under L.B. 775.
In May 2001, the Department notified Becton that it would
commence the qualification audit in October. The audit began
at approximately that time, and the record reflects voluminous
e-mail correspondence between the parties regarding the audit
process. Becton contends that it had invested over $3 million
and created 30 new jobs by September 30, 2000, and that it
had provided sufficient documentation to the Department to
demonstrate it had met these thresholds by November 14,
2002. Becton did not request a qualification letter at that time,
however, and the Department continued its audit until it had
verified that Becton met the $10-million and 100-job thresh-
olds. The Department issued a qualification letter to Becton on
July 20, 2005, stating that Becton had attained the “minimum
levels of $10,000,000 in investment and an increase of 100 full
time equivalent employees in the tax year ended September 30,
2000 as required by [L.B. 775].”
642 	276 NeBRASKA RePORTS

L.B. 775 provides that “[n]o refund claims [for sales and use
tax] shall be filed until after the required levels of employment
and investment have been met.”6 Claims for sales and use tax
refunds under L.B. 775 must be filed “within three calendar
years from the end of the year the required levels of employ-
ment and investment are met or within the period set forth in
section 77-2708.”7 Section 77-2708(2)(b) provides:
No refund shall be allowed unless a claim therefor is
filed with the Tax Commissioner by the person who
made the overpayment or his or her attorney, executor,
or administrator within three years from the required
filing date following the close of the period for which
the overpayment was made, within six months after any
determination becomes final under section 77-2709, or
within six months from the date of overpayment with
respect to such determinations, whichever of these three
periods expires later, unless the credit relates to a period
for which a waiver has been given. Failure to file a claim
within the time prescribed in this subsection shall consti-
tute a waiver of any demand against the state on account
of overpayment.
Between September 18, 2001, and July 28, 2005, the Department
and Becton entered into 14 written agreements to extend the
limitations period for filing Becton’s claims for refund of sales
and use taxes under L.B. 775, utilizing a standard form fur-
nished by the Department and signed by representatives of the
Department and Becton. The final extension agreement, exe-
cuted on July 28, 2005, extended the limitations period from
that date until September 15, 2005. In an exchange of e-mail
correspondence on August 24, 2005, Becton verified with the
Department that the statute of limitations for filing its refund
claims had been extended until September 15. On September 7,
the Department asked if Becton would require another exten-
sion, and a representative of Becton replied that it would not.
On November 29, 2005, approximately 21⁄2 months after
the extended limitations period had expired, Becton filed 14
6 § 77-4106(2)(a).
7 § 77-4106(2)(d).
BeCTON, DICKINSON & CO. v. NeBRASKA DePT. OF Rev. 	643
Cite as 276 Neb. 640

sales and use tax refund claims for the period of October
2001 to September 2002. The total amount of the claims was
$2,370,840.91. The claims were submitted on forms created
and provided by the Department. None of the claims included
a request for an administrative hearing.
On February 10, 2006, the Tax Commissioner summarily
denied the claims because the statute of limitations for filing
them had expired on September 15, 2005, the date specified in
the most recent extension agreement. The Tax Commissioner
did not address the substantive merits of the claims.
Pursuant 	to 	the 	Administrative 	Procedure 	Act 	(APA),8
Becton filed a petition in the district court for Lancaster
County against the Department, the Tax Commissioner, and
the State of Nebraska (collectively appellees) for review of the
Tax Commissioner’s decision. Then, before the district court
acted, Becton filed a motion requesting that it remand the case
back to the Tax Commissioner for a formal administrative
hearing. The district court refused to remand the action, and
ultimately, it determined that the Tax Commissioner correctly
found that Becton’s refund claims were barred by the statute
of limitations.
Becton filed this timely appeal, which we moved to our
docket pursuant to our statutory authority to regulate the case-
loads of the appellate courts of this state.9
ASSIGNMeNTS OF eRROR
Becton assigns, renumbered and restated, that the district
court erred in (1) ruling that the statute of limitations was
not tolled during the qualification audit; (2) not ruling that
the Department was estopped from asserting the statute of
limitations because it should have issued Becton a qualifica-
tion letter within the original limitations period; (3) failing to
remand the case to the Department for a formal administra-
tive hearing; and (4) ruling that exhibit 10, the Department’s
instructions for filing refund claims, was not properly received
into evidence.
8 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 84-901 to 84-920 (Reissue 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
9 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Reissue 1995).
644 	276 NeBRASKA RePORTS

STANDARD OF RevIeW
[1,2] A judgment or final order rendered by a district court
in a judicial review pursuant to the APA may be reversed,
vacated, or modified by an appellate court for errors appearing
on the record.10 When reviewing an order of a district court
under the APA for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry
is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported
by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious,
nor unreasonable.11
ANALYSIS
equitaBle tolling
Becton contends that it could not file its refund claims until
the Tax Commissioner completed the qualification audit and
issued a qualification letter, that the Tax Commissioner was lax
in conducting the audit and issuing the letter, and that the limi-
tations period should therefore be deemed tolled until the issu-
ance of the qualification letter on July 20, 2005. Becton argues
that it should have 3 years from that date in which to file its
claims. The district court rejected this argument, reasoning that
“[e]quitable tolling . . . is neither consistent with the statutory
scheme nor with the action of the parties in entering into agree-
ments extending the statute of limitations for definite periods
of time.” Relying upon the decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in United States v. Brockamp,12 the appellees argue that
equitable tolling can never be employed to extend a statute of
limitation for the filing of tax refund claims. Alternatively, the
appellees argue that the district court correctly determined that
the doctrine of equitable tolling could not be applied to the
facts of this case.
Becton’s equitable tolling argument is based upon the prin-
ciple that a statute of limitations can be equitably tolled when
a paramount authority prevents the claimant from filing a
10 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. State, 275 Neb. 594, 748 N.W.2d 42
(2008); Farmland Foods v. State, 273 Neb. 262, 729 N.W.2d 73 (2007).
11 Id.
12 United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 117 S. Ct. 849, 136 L. ed. 2d
818 (1997).
BeCTON, DICKINSON & CO. v. NeBRASKA DePT. OF Rev. 	645
Cite as 276 Neb. 640

claim.13 But the cases upon which it relies involve circum-
stances which are distinguishable from the facts of this case.
For example, in Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank v. Barnes,14
an appeal from a mortgage foreclosure, this court rejected an
argument that the claim was time barred. For approximately
9 years, the plaintiff was subject to a restraining order issued
by a federal court which enjoined prosecution of the fore-
closure action. This court noted the general rule that “‘during
[a] period of . . . restraint, incident to other legal proceedings
which are of such a character that the law forbids one of the
parties to exercise a legal remedy against another, the running
of the statute of limitations is postponed, or, if it has com-
menced to run, is suspended.’”15 The opinion also noted the
holding of other courts that “‘[w]henever a person is prevented
from exercising his legal remedy by some paramount authority,
the time during which he is thus prevented is not to be counted
against him in determining whether the statute of limitations
has barred his right.’”16 The instant case differs significantly
from Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank in that no judicial action
prevented the filing of Becton’s refund claim. Rather, the
parties contractually agreed that no tax refund claim would
be filed until the Department had completed its qualification
audit and that the limitations period would be extended for a
specific period of time after the audit was completed and the
qualification letter was issued.
Becton also relies upon Bauers v. City of Lincoln.17 In that
case, former Lincoln firefighters filed an action against the
city seeking reimbursement for amounts paid to pension funds,
13 See, Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corporation, 145 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1944);
Bauers v. City of Lincoln, 245 Neb. 632, 514 N.W.2d 625 (1994); Lincoln
Joint Stock Land Bank v. Barnes, 143 Neb. 58, 8 N.W.2d 545 (1943).
14 Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank v. Barnes, supra note 13.
15 Id. at 64, 8 N.W.2d at 551, quoting 34 Am. Jur. Limitation of Actions § 237
(1941).
16 Id. at 65, 8 N.W.2d at 551, quoting St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba
Ry. C. v. Olson, 87 Minn. 117, 91 N.W. 294 (1902). Accord Johnson v.
Johnson, 182 Okla. 293, 77 P.2d 745 (1938).
17 Bauers v. City of Lincoln, supra note 13.
646 	276 NeBRASKA RePORTS

recovery of deductions made because of workers’ compensa-
tion payments, and compensation for claims of federal civil
rights violations. We held that the first two claims had to be
filed with the city within 1 year of accrual pursuant to Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 15-840 (Reissue 1991). Because the firefighters
had missed that deadline, those claims were barred. We noted,
however, that the federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1988) were not subject to the notice and time limita-
tions of § 15-840. Reasoning that if the city had honored the
claims the federal action would not have been necessary, we
held that the 4-year statute of limitations for filing the § 1983
actions was tolled during the time those claims were pending
before the city pursuant to § 15-840 and that thus, the civil
rights claims were timely asserted. Bauers did not involve the
circumstance presented in this case where the parties agreed in
writing to a specific extension of the statute of limitations as a
result of protracted administrative proceedings.
Becton’s reliance upon Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corporation18 is
likewise misplaced. In that case, the plaintiffs brought a cause
of action based upon fraud. The defendant removed the case
to federal court and then sought to have the action dismissed
because it had ceased to do business in Nebraska. Based on a
controlling Nebraska Supreme Court case, the eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals dismissed the action. The plaintiffs returned
to state court and succeeded in persuading this court to over-
rule the controlling case. The plaintiffs then refiled the fraud
action in federal court. By that time, however, the statute of
limitations on the claim had run. Based upon the general prin-
ciples cited by this court in Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank, the
eighth Circuit held that because the plaintiffs’ ability to resort
to the courts had been taken away, the statute of limitations
was tolled during the time period between the dismissal of
their first action and the overruling of the controlling case by
the Nebraska Supreme Court.
The key factor distinguishing Yoder, Bauers, and Lincoln
Joint Stock Land Bank from this case is the fact that Becton
was not prevented by any paramount governmental authority
18 Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corporation, supra note 13.
BeCTON, DICKINSON & CO. v. NeBRASKA DePT. OF Rev. 	647
Cite as 276 Neb. 640

from asserting its refund claim in a timely manner. To the
contrary, Becton’s ability to do so was specifically preserved
by the parties’ multiple written agreements to extend the limi-
tations period. After the Department issued its qualification
letter on July 20, 2005, Becton had until the agreed upon date
of September 15, 2005, to file its claim, but it did not do so.
The record even reflects that the Department inquired whether
Becton would need an additional extension, and Becton replied
that it would not.
These circumstances are analogous to the facts of two cases
in which we have held the doctrine of equitable tolling to be
inapplicable. In Brodine v. Blue Cross Blue Shield,19 an insured
was denied coverage in July 1999 for services provided dur-
ing the previous months of January through May. She filed
suit against her insurer in federal court in April 2002, seeking
recovery under the employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974. That action was dismissed in November 2002. On
December 22, 2003, she filed suit against the insurer in state
court, alleging breach of contract. Because the insurance con-
tract contained a 3-year statute of limitations for such claims,
the insurer moved for and was granted summary judgment. On
appeal, the insured argued that the statute of limitations was
tolled during the pendency of her federal lawsuit, based upon
equitable principles. We rejected this argument, reasoning that
the state court action was not dependent upon the resolution of
any issues in the federal lawsuit and that the federal court did
not enjoin or restrain her from proceeding further against the
insurer. We also stated: “More important, the limitations period
had not run by the time the federal action was dismissed.
Rather . . . more than 11 months remained still to run on the
limitations period.”20
Also pertinent is our decision in National Bank of Commerce
v. Ham.21 There, a borrower defaulted in 1989 on a promissory
19 Brodine v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 272 Neb. 713, 724 N.W.2d 321
(2006).
20 Id. at 724, 724 N.W.2d at 329.
21 National Bank of Commerce v. Ham, 256 Neb. 679, 592 N.W.2d 477
(1999).
648 	276 NeBRASKA RePORTS

note issued by a bank. The borrower then filed for bankruptcy,
and the bank was subject to an automatic stay enjoining it from
commencing any lawsuit on the note. On December 28, 1994,
the bankruptcy petition was dismissed and the stay lifted. On
July 14, 1995, the bank sued, seeking to recover on the note.
The district court found in favor of the bank. In doing so, it
reasoned that the 5-year statute of limitations for suit on a
contract was tolled by the 774 days during which the bank was
subject to the bankruptcy stay. Reversing that determination,
this court relied on a bankruptcy statute22 which provided that
if a statute of limitations ran during the time of a bankruptcy
stay, the creditor had 30 days after notice of the termination of
the bankruptcy to file its action. We noted that the common-law
doctrine of tolling was based in equity and that there was no
inequity in limiting the bank’s right to file suit to 30 days after
the termination of the bankruptcy stay, especially when there
was no evidence that the debtor was responsible for the bank’s
late filing. We specifically held:
[W]e find no inequity in requiring [the bank] to com-
mence its action within 30 days following the termina-
tion or dismissal of the bankruptcy. Unlike situations
which might require an equitable tolling of the statute of
limitations, such as fraudulent concealment or equitable
estoppel, the creditor subject to the bankruptcy stay is, by
definition, aware of its potential claim against the debtor.
At the very least, the creditor can prepare to file the suit
during the pendency of the stay.23
In this case, Becton knew and agreed that it could not file its
refund claims until after receiving the qualification letter from
the Department. After receipt of the letter dated July 20, 2005,
Becton knew and agreed that it had until September 15 to file
its claims, but it failed to do so. On these facts, the district
court did not err in concluding that the doctrine of equitable
tolling was inapplicable. We need not and, therefore, do not
22 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) (1994).
23 National Bank of Commerce v. Ham, supra note 21, 256 Neb. at 691, 592
N.W.2d at 484.
BeCTON, DICKINSON & CO. v. NeBRASKA DePT. OF Rev. 	649
Cite as 276 Neb. 640

reach the appellees’ contention that the doctrine could never
apply to a tax refund claim.
equitaBle estoppel
In a somewhat related equitable argument, Becton contends
that by November 14, 2002, it had provided the Department with
sufficient data to prove that Becton had met the $3-million and
30-job thresholds. Becton thus contends that the Department
could have issued a qualification letter at that time. All of the
refunds Becton seeks in this action are incentives based on
the $3-million and 30-job requirements. Becton contends that
if the qualification letter had issued in November 2002, then
it could have timely filed its claims within the general 3-year
statute of limitations set forth in § 77-4106(2)(d). Becton
asserts that because the Department failed to issue the quali-
fication letter in November 2002, the Department now should
be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations
as a defense.
[3] Six elements must be satisfied for the doctrine of equi-
table estoppel to apply: (1) conduct which amounts to a false
representation or concealment of material facts or, at least,
which is calculated to convey the impression that the facts are
otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party
subsequently attempts to assert; (2) the intention, or at least the
expectation, that such conduct will be acted upon by, or influ-
ence, the other party or other persons; (3) knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the real facts; (4) lack of knowledge and the
means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; (5)
reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the
party to be estopped; and (6) action or inaction based thereon
of such a character as to change the position or status of the
party claiming the estoppel.24
The record simply does not support these elements. Pursuant
to the terms of its agreement with the Department, Becton was
aware that no qualification letter would be issued until the
entire audit was complete. There is no showing of any false
24 Capitol City Telephone v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev., 264 Neb. 515, 650
N.W.2d 467 (2002).
650 	276 NeBRASKA RePORTS

representation or concealment of material facts on the part of
the Department or the Tax Commissioner. The record reflects
that Becton was fully aware of the audit process and of the
agreements to extend the limitations period. Indeed, by execut-
ing the extension agreements and verifying the final exten-
sion date in subsequent correspondence with the Department,
Becton demonstrated its knowledge that the limitations period
was running.
We note the appellees’ argument that equitable estoppel
can never be applied in tax refund cases under Brockamp.25
Because we conclude that the elements of equitable estoppel
are not established on the facts of this case, we do not reach
this broader issue.
D enial of motion to remanD anD
reJection of exhiBit 10
[4] Becton contends that the district court erred in denying
its motion to remand the case to the Department for a formal
administrative hearing prior to reaching the merits. A regulation
promulgated by the Department states in relevant part that
[a] claim for refund . . . shall not be presumed to be
a request for an oral hearing. The Tax Commissioner
shall grant a taxpayer or his authorized representative an
opportunity for an oral hearing if the taxpayer so requests.
In this latter case, the request for an oral hearing should
be made at the time of filing the claim . . . .26
Agency regulations properly adopted and filed with the Secretary
of State of Nebraska have the effect of statutory law.27 Becton
was therefore on notice of the regulatory requirement.
Becton acknowledges that it did not request an oral hear-
ing when it filed its refund claims. However, it argues that
its failure to do so was the result of the Department’s fail-
ure to explain, in the filing instructions for a refund claim,
that an oral hearing must be specifically requested. Becton
further argues that the Department was required to do so by
25 United States v. Brockamp, supra note 12.
26 316 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 33, § 003.01A (1986).
27 Robbins v. Neth, 273 Neb. 115, 728 N.W.2d 109 (2007).
BeCTON, DICKINSON & CO. v. NeBRASKA DePT. OF Rev. 	651
Cite as 276 Neb. 640

§ 84-909(2), which states: “To assist interested persons dealing
with it, each [state] agency shall so far as deemed practicable
supplement its rules and regulations with descriptive state-
ments of its procedures.” The Department’s instructions for
filing refund claims are not included in the record transmitted
by the Department to the district court. The instructions are
included in exhibit 10 offered by Becton, which the district
court first received but then rejected based upon our holding
in Wolgamott v. Abramson,28 that in reviewing a final decision
of an administrative agency in a contested case pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act, a court may not take judicial
notice of the adjudicative fact which was not presented to the
agency, because the taking of such evidence would impermis-
sibly expand the court’s statutory scope of review de novo on
the record of the agency. Becton also assigns error with respect
to this ruling.
We need not decide whether the district court erred in
not receiving exhibit 10 or whether § 84-909(2) required the
Department to inform taxpayers of the requirement to request
an administrative hearing. Becton argues that the remedy for
any error would be a remand for an administrative hearing
so that it could present evidence “demonstrating how the
Department’s mismanagement of the L.B. 775 program was
the cause of the present case.”29 Such a hearing would serve
no purpose. Regardless of what evidence of “mismanagement”
Becton might present at an administrative hearing, it could not
change three basic facts which are undisputed from the record:
(1) Becton knew and agreed that it could not submit refund
claims until it received a letter from the Department certify-
ing that it had met the investment and employment thresh-
olds of L.B. 775, (2) after Becton received the Department’s
letter to this effect dated July 20, 2005, it knew and agreed
that the limitations period for filing its refund claims was
extended to September 15, 2005, and (3) Becton did not file
its refund claims until November 29, 2005. As we have noted,
these straightforward facts preclude any equitable grounds for
28 Wolgamott v. Abramson, 253 Neb. 350, 570 N.W.2d 818 (1997).
29 Brief for appellants at 30.
652 	276 NeBRASKA RePORTS

avoiding the bar of the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we
conclude that the district court did not err in denying Becton’s
motion for remand.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, we conclude that the order of the
district court affirming the decision of the Tax Commissioner
conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and
is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. We affirm.
affirmeD.
BeCTON, DICKINSON & CO. v. NeBRASKA DePT. OF Rev. 	653
Cite as 276 Neb. 640