Allen v. Immanuel Med. Ctr.

Sharon h. allen, appellant, v.
I mmanuel medIcal center , appellee .
767 N.W.2d 502
Filed July 2, 2009. 	No. S-08-996.
1. Statutes. Statutory interpretation is a question of law.
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing questions of law, an appellate
court has an obligation to resolve the questions independently of the conclusions
reached by the trial court.
3. Courts: Workers’ Compensation: Jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the compen-
sation court over issues ancillary to a workers’ compensation claim is not exclu-
sive and thus does not prevent a district court from exercising its jurisdiction over
such matters.
4. Workers’ Compensation: Judgments. The dormancy provisions of Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 25-1515 (Reissue 2008) apply to an award of the Workers’ Compensation
Court which is filed in a district court pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-188 (Cum.
Supp. 2008).
5. Workers’ Compensation: Judgments: Time. The date on which a workers’ com-
pensation award is filed in a district court pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-188
(Cum. Supp. 2008) is the date of judgment for purposes of computing when the
judgment becomes dormant under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1515 (Reissue 2008).
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: G reGory
m. Schatz, Judge. Affirmed.
Jerold V. Fennell and Michael J. Dyer, of Dyer Law, P.C.,
L.L.O., for appellant.
Patrick 	R. 	Guinan, 	of 	Erickson 	Sederstrom, 	P.C., 	for
appellee.
heavIcan, c.J., connolly, G errard, Stephan, mccormack,
and mIller-lerman, JJ.
Stephan, J.
The issue presented by this appeal is whether an award of
the Workers’ Compensation Court providing for periodic dis-
ability payments which is filed in a district court pursuant to
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-188 (Cum. Supp. 2008) may become dor-
mant. We conclude that it may and that the date on which the
award becomes dormant is computed from the date it is filed
in district court.
ALLEN v. iMMANuEL MED. CTR. 	41
Cite as 278 Neb. 41
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
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BACKGROuND
Sharon H. Allen injured her back in 1985 during the course
and scope of her employment with immanuel Medical Center
(iMC). The Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court entered
an award in Allen’s favor, and it was modified on rehearing on
November 5, 1987. The award on rehearing provided in rele-
vant part that Allen would recover indemnity benefits of $200
per week for temporary total disability from July 15, 1985, to
October 1, 1987, and “thereafter and in addition thereto the
sum of $200.00 per week for so long in the future” as she
remained totally disabled. The award further provided that “[i]f
[Allen’s] total disability ceases, she shall be entitled to the
statutory amounts of compensation for any residual permanent
partial disability . . . .”
On December 10, 1987, Allen filed a certified copy of the
compensation award on rehearing with the clerk of the district
court for Douglas County. On June 26, 2008, Allen refiled the
award in the district court and subsequently commenced gar-
nishment proceedings against a bank, claiming that the bank
held funds belonging to iMC and that iMC owed her $203,000
on the workers’ compensation judgment.
iMC contested the garnishment by filing a motion to dismiss.
in its motion, iMC raised nine defenses: (1) The judgment was
dormant and could not be revived; (2) Allen’s claim was barred
by estoppel, laches, acquiescence, inexcusable neglect, and
unclean hands; (3) Allen’s claim was barred by waiver and
estoppel; (4) Allen’s claim was barred by accord and satisfac-
tion; (5) the compensation award was a conditional judgment
and thus wholly void; (6) iMC had complied with all the terms
of the compensation award; (7) Allen’s claim was barred by
the statute of limitations; (8) Allen’s claim was barred by res
judicata and collateral estoppel; and (9) Allen’s claim violated
iMC’s due process rights.
An evidentiary hearing was held on the motion. The record
establishes that iMC paid Allen disability benefits pursuant
to the award, with the final payment being made on April 25,
1991. On May 24, 1988, Allen was given a permanent disabil-
ity rating by her physician. She returned to full-time employ-
ment in February 1989 and continued to work full time until
42 	278 NEBRASKA REPORTS

she retired in December 2006. it is undisputed that iMC has
never filed an application in the Workers’ Compensation Court
to modify the terms of the original compensation award.1 Allen
made no attempt to execute on the award until commencement
of the garnishment proceedings in July 2008.
The district court dismissed the garnishment action, reason-
ing that the award became dormant pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 25-1515 (Reissue 2008) in April 1996, 5 years after the date
Allen last received a benefit payment, and that because 10
years had passed, it could no longer be revived.2 The order did
not address any of the other defenses asserted in the motion
to dismiss.
Allen perfected this timely appeal, and we granted her peti-
tion to bypass the Court of Appeals.
ASSiGNMENT OF ERROR
Allen assigns, restated and consolidated, that the district
court erred as a matter of law when it held that the compensa-
tion award became dormant pursuant to § 25-1515.
STANDARD OF REViEW
[1,2] Statutory interpretation is a question of law.3 When
reviewing questions of law, an appellate court has an obliga-
tion to resolve the questions independently of the conclusions
reached by the trial court.4
ANALYSiS
The 	issue 	presented 	in 	this 	case 	involves 	the 	inter-
play between certain provisions of the Nebraska Workers’
Compensation Act and statutory provisions pertaining to the
enforcement of district court judgments. Although the case
spans a time period of more than 20 years, the relevant
statutory provisions have remained the same or substantially
1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-141 (Reissue 2004).
2 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1420 (Reissue 2008).
3 In re Estate of Chrisp, 276 Neb. 966, 759 N.W.2d 87 (2009); In re Interest
of Devin W. et al., 270 Neb. 640, 707 N.W.2d 758 (2005).
4 Gavin v. Rogers Tech. Servs., 276 Neb. 437, 755 N.W.2d 47 (2008); New
Tek Mfg. v. Beehner, 275 Neb. 951, 751 N.W.2d 135 (2008).
ALLEN v. iMMANuEL MED. CTR. 	43
Cite as 278 Neb. 41

similar. Accordingly, we will refer to the current versions of
the applicable statutes.
Our starting point is § 48-188, the provision in the Nebraska
Workers’ Compensation Act which permits a party to file and
enforce a compensation award in the district court. Section
48-188 provides in relevant part:
Any 	order, 	award, 	or 	judgment 	by 	the 	Nebraska
Workers’ Compensation Court . . . may, as soon as the
same becomes conclusive upon the parties at interest,
be filed with the district court . . . . upon filing, such
order, award, or judgment shall have the same force and
effect as a judgment of such district court . . . and all
proceedings in relation thereto shall thereafter be the
same as though the order, award, or judgment had been
rendered in a suit duly heard and determined by such
district court . . . .
Judgments of a district court may be enforced through the
procedures set forth in chapter 25, article 15, of the Nebraska
Revised Statutes. Section 25-1515 provides:
if execution is not sued out within five years after
the date of entry of any judgment that now is or may
hereafter be rendered in any court of record in this state,
or if five years have intervened between the date of the
last execution issued on such judgment and the time of
suing out another writ of execution thereon, such judg-
ment, and all taxable costs in the action in which such
judgment was obtained, shall become dormant and shall
cease to operate as a lien on the estate of the judg-
ment debtor.
A dormant judgment may be revived, but only if the action to
revive is “commenced within ten years after such judgment
became dormant.”5
Allen argues that a periodically payable workers’ compen-
sation award can never become dormant. Her argument rests
primarily on § 48-141 and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-161 (Reissue
2004), two provisions of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation
Act. Essentially, she argues that § 48-161 vests the Workers’
5 § 25-1420.
44 	278 NEBRASKA REPORTS

Compensation Court with exclusive jurisdiction over any com-
pensation claim and that under § 48-141, a compensation award
payable periodically continues indefinitely unless modified by
the Workers’ Compensation Court. She argues that because
§ 25-1515 is not a listed exclusion in § 48-161 from the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the compensation court, the Legislature has
made it clear that compensation judgments payable periodically
are to continue indefinitely and are not subject to the dormancy
requirements of § 25-1515.
Allen’s argument relies on a misinterpretation of § 48-161
and fails to consider the effect of § 48-188. The first sentence
of § 48-161 confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Workers’
Compensation Court by providing: “All disputed claims for
workers’ compensation shall be submitted to the Nebraska
Workers’ Compensation Court for a finding, award, order, or
judgment.” Here, the compensation court exercised its exclu-
sive jurisdiction to determine Allen’s entitlement to benefits
when it issued the 1987 award on rehearing. The action pres-
ently before us, however, is a proceeding to enforce that com-
pensation award, and thus, it would fall within the second sen-
tence of § 48-161; that sentence gives the compensation court
jurisdiction “to decide any issue ancillary to the resolution of
an employee’s right to workers’ compensation benefits,” with
certain exceptions not applicable here.
[3,4] 	Contrary 	to 	Allen’s 	argument, 	the 	Workers’
Compensation Court’s jurisdiction to decide ancillary issues
is not exclusive. We held in Schweitzer v. American Nat. Red
Cross6 that the jurisdiction of the compensation court over
issues ancillary to a workers’ compensation claim is not exclu-
sive and thus does not prevent a district court from exercis-
ing its jurisdiction over such matters. Allen’s argument that
§ 48-161 fails to list § 25-1515 as an “exclusion” to the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of § 48-161 is thus without merit. in addition,
§ 48-188 clearly provides that a compensation court award can
be filed in the district court and that when it is, it has “the same
force and effect as a judgment of such district court” and “all
6 Schweitzer v. American Nat. Red Cross, 256 Neb. 350, 591 N.W.2d 524
(1999).
ALLEN v. iMMANuEL MED. CTR. 	45
Cite as 278 Neb. 41

proceedings in relation thereto” shall be the same as if it were
a district court judgment. When the compensation statutes are
read as a whole, it is clear that even though § 48-141 gives the
compensation court indefinite jurisdiction to modify a periodi-
cally payable compensation award, if such an award is filed in
district court pursuant to § 48-188, it is subject to all statutes
that would affect its enforcement as a district court judgment,
including § 25-1515. We thus conclude that the dormancy
provisions of § 25-1515 apply to an award of the Workers’
Compensation Court which is filed in a district court pursuant
to § 48-188.
The next step in our analysis is to determine the commence-
ment date of the 5-year period designated in § 25-1515. The
district court held that this period began to run in April 1991,
when the last payment was made to Allen pursuant to the
award. We find no statutory basis for calculating the dormancy
period from the date of the last payment, and the parties appear
to agree that the district court was incorrect. iMC argues that
the 5-year period began to run on November 5, 1987, when the
award was entered by the compensation court. Allen argues
that if the district court filing subjects the award to dormancy,
the 5-year period should run from the date each separate peri-
odic payment is due. Alternatively, she argues that only the
amount of periodic payments due on the date of filing should
be affected.
iMC’s argument that computation of the dormancy period
should begin on the date the award was entered by the com-
pensation court is based in part upon our opinion in Koterzina
v. Copple Chevrolet.7 in that case, we held that prejudgment
interest on a workers’ compensation award filed in district
court is payable from the date that the award was entered by
the compensation court. The majority reasoned that § 48-188
has a “nunc pro tunc” effect requiring the award to be treated
as if it had been entered by the district court on the date it was
entered by the compensation court. The dissent interpreted the
statute differently, disputing the nunc pro tunc effect relied
upon by the majority. The dissent concluded that “[i]t is only
7 Koterzina v. Copple Chevrolet, 249 Neb. 158, 542 N.W.2d 696 (1996).
46 	278 NEBRASKA REPORTS

upon filing of the workers’ compensation award in the district
court that interest commences.”8
[5] The plain language of § 48-188 gives a workers’ com-
pensation award the legal effect of a district court judgment
“[u]pon filing” in the district court. until that point, the award
is governed solely by the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation
Act, which contains no provisions for execution or dormancy.
it is only “[u]pon filing” of the award in district court that “all
proceedings in relation thereto shall thereafter be the same” as
though the award had been originally entered by the district
court.9 We read § 48-188 to subject a compensation award to
the provisions of the execution and dormancy statutes only
after it is filed in the district court. We therefore disapprove
Koterzina and hold that the date on which a workers’ compen-
sation award is filed in a district court pursuant to § 48-188
is the date of judgment for purposes of computing when the
judgment becomes dormant under § 25-1515. We note that this
holding is consistent with the rule that because a foreign judg-
ment becomes the functional equivalent of a Nebraska judg-
ment on the date it is registered in Nebraska pursuant to the
uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, the dormancy
period runs from the date of registration.10
We are not persuaded by Allen’s argument that if the fil-
ing of an award in the district court subjects the award to
dormancy, then the dormancy period should run from the date
each payment is due. The argument is based upon Kansas and
Georgia cases which have adopted such a rule in jurisdictions
where, unlike Nebraska, periodic awards in family law cases
are subject to dormancy statutes in the same manner as other
judgments.11 The Georgia Court of Appeals has extended this
8 Id. at 168, 542 N.W.2d at 703 (Wright, J., dissenting; Connolly, J., joins).
9 § 48-188.
10 St. Joseph Dev. Corp. v. Sequenzia, 7 Neb. App. 759, 585 N.W.2d 511
(1998), overruled on other grounds, Breeden v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp.,
257 Neb. 371, 598 N.W.2d 441 (1999).
11 See, Bryant v. Bryant, 232 Ga. 160, 205 S.E.2d 223 (1974); Wichita Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. North Rock Rd. Ltd. Partnership, 13 Kan. App. 2d
678, 779 P.2d 442 (1989). But see Miller v. Miller, 153 Neb. 890, 46
N.W.2d 618 (1951).
ALLEN v. iMMANuEL MED. CTR. 	47
Cite as 278 Neb. 41

reasoning to periodic obligations under workers’ compensation
awards.12 But we find no language in either § 48-188 or the
Nebraska execution statutes which would permit us to fashion
such a rule. Section 48-188 refers to the filing of a single judg-
ment or award which, upon filing in the district court, “shall
have the same force and effect as a judgment” of the district
court. (Emphasis supplied.) Section 25-1515 begins the dor-
mancy clock on “the date of entry of any judgment.” This statu-
tory language does not permit the judicial crafting of a rule
which would treat a single workers’ compensation award filed
in district court as multiple judgments which become dormant
on different dates. For similar reasons, we reject Allen’s argu-
ment that only the amount of periodic payments due at the time
of filing would be affected by § 25-1515.
For these reasons, we conclude that under § 25-1515, Allen’s
award became dormant in December 1992, 5 years after it was
first filed in the district court in December 1987. Because
the judgment was not revived within 10 years after it became
dormant, it could not thereafter be revived13 and the refiling
of the award in 2008 was a nullity. Although our reasoning
differs somewhat from that of the district court, we agree that
the judgment had become dormant prior to the commencement
of the garnishment proceedings, and those proceedings were
therefore properly dismissed.
CONCLuSiON
For the reasons discussed, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
affIrmed.
WrIGht, J., participating on briefs.
12 See Taylor v. Peachbelt Properties, Inc., 293 Ga. App. 335, 667 S.E.2d 117
(2008).
13 See § 25-1420.
48 	278 NEBRASKA REPORTS