In re Interest of Dakota M.

approval). I would affirm that power of the county officer to
run his or her office as he or she sees fit, with that power
subject to legitimate budgetary constraints encountered by the
county board.
I n re I nterest of Dakota M.,
a chIlD unDer 18 years of age .
state of nebraska , appellee ,
v. Dakota M., appellant.
781 N.W.2d 612
Filed April 29, 2010. 	No. S-09-989.
1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews juvenile cases
de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juvenile
court’s findings.
2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. To the extent an appeal calls for statutory interpre-
tation or presents questions of law, an appellate court must reach an independent
conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below.
3. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Statutes. As a statutorily created court of limited
and special jurisdiction, a juvenile court has only such authority as has been con-
ferred on it by statute.
4. Juvenile Courts: Probation and Parole. Absent specific authority under the
juvenile code, the juvenile courts do not have the authority to order the confine-
ment of a juvenile as a condition of probation in the dispositional portion of
a proceeding.
Appeal from the County Court for Madison County: D onna
f. taylor, Judge. Reversed and vacated.
Melissa A. Wentling, Madison County Public Defender, for
appellant.
Gail E. Collins, Deputy Madison County Attorney, for
appellee.
WrIght, connolly, gerrarD, stephan, MccorMack, and
MIller-lerMan, JJ.
stephan, J.
In this appeal, Dakota M. contends that the juvenile court
did not have the statutory authority to impose detention as
802 	279 NEbRASkA REPoRTS
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www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
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a condition of his probation. based on our holding in In re
Interest of Dustin S.,1 we conclude that he is correct.
bACkGRoUND
on March 30, 2009, the county court for Madison County,
sitting as a juvenile court, adjudicated Dakota as a child
within the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(1) (Reissue
2008). Following a dispositional hearing on July 13, the
court placed Dakota on supervised probation for a period of
6 months. As a condition of probation, the court ordered that
Dakota “[a]ttend school, obey all school rules . . . not quit
school, be absent or tardy . . . and . . . receive passing grades
in all subjects.”
on September 16, 2009, the State filed a motion for revoca-
tion of probation, alleging that Dakota had violated his proba-
tion by receiving a 5-day out-of-school suspension. Dakota
appeared with his mother on September 29 and requested court-
appointed counsel. The juvenile court granted Dakota’s request
and continued the hearing until counsel could be appointed.
The juvenile court then included a “condition of release”
to Dakota’s probation, now requiring Dakota to serve any
future out-of-school suspensions at a juvenile detention facil-
ity. The juvenile court specifically did not rule on the motion
for revocation.
Dakota received another out-of-school suspension on october
6, 2009. The next day, Dakota’s court-appointed counsel filed
an objection to the detention order and argued that the juvenile
court did not have the statutory authority to order detention
and that the detention was contrary to this court’s holding in
In re Interest of Dustin S.2 At a hearing on the motion, the
State conceded that the court did not have the authority under
the Nebraska Juvenile Code3 but suggested that such authority
might be found in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2270 (Reissue 2008),
which authorizes the court to enforce, modify, or revoke an
existing probation order if the juvenile does not regularly
1 In re Interest of Dustin S., 276 Neb. 635, 756 N.W.2d 277 (2008).
2 Id.
3 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-245 to 43-2,129 (Reissue 2008 & Supp. 2009).
IN RE INTEREST oF DAkoTA M. 	803
Cite as 279 Neb. 802

attend school. The juvenile court overruled Dakota’s objection,
distinguishing his case from In re Interest of Dustin S. by stat-
ing, “I’m not even punishing him for a school rule violation.
The Court’s purpose of ordering children who are in out of
school suspension is for their own protection.”
Dakota timely appealed and also filed a motion to stay the
juvenile court’s order. The Court of Appeals granted the motion
to stay on october 9, 2009. We subsequently moved the case
to our docket on our own motion, pursuant to our statutory
authority to regulate the caseloads of the appellate courts of
this state.4
ASSIGNMENT oF ERRoR
Dakota assigns, consolidated and restated, that the juvenile
court erred in imposing detention as a condition of probation
because (1) it lacked statutory authority to do so and (2) it vio-
lated his right to due process.
STANDARD oF REVIEW
[1,2] An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on
the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the
juvenile court’s findings.5 To the extent an appeal calls for
statutory interpretation or presents questions of law, an appel-
late court must reach an independent conclusion irrespective of
the determination made by the court below.6
ANALYSIS
[3] The issue in this case is whether a court may order a
juvenile adjudicated under § 43-247(1) to serve an out-of-
school suspension in a juvenile detention center as a condi-
tion of probation. Section 43-247(1) gives juvenile courts
original jurisdiction over “[a]ny juvenile who has committed
an act other than a traffic offense which would constitute a
misdemeanor or an infraction under the laws of this state, or
4 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Reissue 2008).
5 In re Interest of C.H., 277 Neb. 565, 763 N.W.2d 708 (2009); In re Interest
of Dustin S., supra note 1.
6 In re Interest of Dustin S., supra note 1; In re Interest of Markice M., 275
Neb. 908, 750 N.W.2d 345 (2008).
804 	279 NEbRASkA REPoRTS

violation of a city or village ordinance.” As a statutorily cre-
ated court of limited and special jurisdiction, a juvenile court
has only such authority as has been conferred on it by statute.7
Section 43-286(1) permits several dispositions with respect to
a juvenile adjudicated under § 43-247(1), including restitution,
community service, probation, or placement of the juvenile in
a suitable family home or institution.
[4] We held in In re Interest of Dustin S.8 that § 43-286(1)
does not authorize juvenile courts to order confinement of a
juvenile as a condition of probation. In that case, the court
ordered the juvenile to complete 6 months of probation for
secretly placing a video camera inside his neighbor’s bedroom
closet. The court included a 6-day detention as one of the con-
ditions of probation, stating that its purpose in requiring the
detention was to make the victim feel like the juvenile did not
get off “‘scott free [sic].’”9 Although we noted that punish-
ment was not a purpose of detention in the juvenile setting,
our holding was clearly based upon the juvenile court’s lack of
statutory authority to order the detention. Specifically, we con-
cluded that “absent specific authority under the juvenile code,
the juvenile courts of this state do not have the authority to
order the confinement of a juvenile as a condition of probation
in the dispositional portion of the proceeding.”10
In this case, the court attempted to distinguish its action
from the detention order in In re Interest of Dustin S. by not-
ing that the detention was for Dakota’s own protection, not
for purposes of punishment. but that is a distinction without
a difference. Just as there was no statutory authority for the
detention order in In re Interest of Dustin S., there was none
here. At the time of the detention order, there was a pending
motion to revoke Dakota’s probation, but revocation had not
yet occurred. Dakota remained on probation. And there is noth-
ing in the juvenile code which permitted the court to order that
7 In re Interest of Dustin S., supra note 1.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 637, 756 N.W.2d at 279.
10 Id. at 639, 756 N.W.2d at 280.
IN RE INTEREST oF DAkoTA M. 	805
Cite as 279 Neb. 802

out-of-school suspensions be served in a detention center as a
condition of probation. Regardless of the court’s intentions, it
simply did not have the legal authority under the juvenile code
to order detention while Dakota remained on probation.
Nor does § 29-2270 authorize the detention order. That
statute provides that a person who is less than 19 years of age
and is subject to the supervision of a juvenile or adult proba-
tion officer shall, as a condition of probation, be required to
attend school or vocational training, and it authorizes a district,
county, or juvenile court to “take appropriate action to enforce,
modify, or revoke its order granting probation” in the event of
noncompliance with this condition.11 but “appropriate action”
for a juvenile court is limited to that which is authorized by the
juvenile code, and it does not include detention of a juvenile
who is on probation.12
CoNCLUSIoN
For the reasons discussed, we reiterate our prior holding that
juvenile courts do not have the statutory authority to impose
detention as a condition of probation. Accordingly, we reverse
and vacate the juvenile court’s detention order in this case.
because this resolves the appeal, we do not address Dakota’s
due process argument.
reverseD anD vacateD.
heavIcan, C.J., not participating.
11 § 29-2270.
12 See In re Interest of Dustin S., supra note 1.
I n re I nterest of tyler t., a chIlD unDer 18 years of age .
state of nebraska , appellee , v.
tyler t., appellant.
781 N.W.2d 922
Filed April 29, 2010. 	Nos. S-09-631 through S-09-633.
1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews juvenile cases
de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juvenile
court’s findings.
806 	279 NEbRASkA REPoRTS