Hooper v. Freedom Fin. Group

Because a PBT is quick and minimally intrusive, and because
the State has a compelling interest in removing drunk drivers
from its highways, we find that an officer is reasonable in
administering a PBT if he can point to specific, articulable
facts indicating that an individual has been driving under the
influence of alcohol. Prescott’s sixth and final assignment of
error is without merit.
CONCLUSION
We find no merit to Prescott’s assignments of error. The
decision of the district court is affirmed.
A ffirmed.
hOOPer v. freedOm fIN. grOUP 	111
Cite as 280 Neb. 111
donAld Hooper And mArilyn Hooper , HusbAnd
And wife , Appellees , v. freedom finAnciAl
G roup, inc., et Al ., AppellAnts.
784 N.W.2d 437
filed June 25, 2010. 	No. S-09-796.
1. Trial: Witnesses. In a bench trial of an action at law, the trial court is the
sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony.
2. Witnesses: Evidence: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not reevaluate
the credibility of witnesses or reweigh testimony but will review the evidence for
clear error.
3. Judgments: Appeal and Error. The trial court’s factual findings in a bench trial
of an action at law have the effect of a jury verdict and will not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous.
4. ____: ____. In reviewing a judgment awarded in a bench trial of a law action, an
appellate court does not reweigh evidence, but considers the evidence in the light
most favorable to the successful party and resolves evidentiary conflicts in favor
of the successful party, who is entitled to every reasonable inference deducible
from the evidence.
5. Judgments: Statutes: Appeal and Error. When an appeal calls for statutory
interpretation or presents questions of law, an appellate court must reach an
independent, correct conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the
court below.
6. Securities Regulation. The Securities Act of Nebraska should be liberally con-
strued to afford the greatest possible protection to the public.
Appeal from the district Court for douglas County: JoHn d.
HArtiGAn, Jr ., Judge. Affirmed.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:47 AM CST

Jerry W. 	Katskee 	and 	rubina 	S. 	Khaleel, 	of 	Katskee,
henatsch & Suing, for appellants.
Clifford T. Lee, of rasmussen & mitchell, for appellees.
H eAvicAn, 	c.J., 	wriGHt, 	connolly, 	G errArd, 	stepHAn,
mccormAck , and miller-lermAn, JJ.
stepHAn, J.
following a bench trial, the district court for douglas
County found freedom financial group, Inc. (ffg), J. Patrick
Pierce (Pierce), Carolyn K. Pierce (Carolyn), and Westley m.
Pierce (Westley) jointly and severally liable to donald hooper
and marilyn hooper for violations of the Securities Act of
Nebraska.1 ffg and the Pierces appeal from that judgment.
We affirm.
I. BACKgrOUNd
Prior to 2003, Pierce; his wife, Carolyn; and their son,
Westley, were principals in a group of interrelated corpora-
tions which included freedom group, Inc., and its six sub-
sidiaries, two of which were freedom financial, Inc., and
ffg. These companies were headquartered on a multiacre
tract in Omaha which also included the residence of Pierce
and Carolyn, as well as an equestrian center which Pierce and
Carolyn operated.
freedom financial was a Nebraska corporation registered
with the Securities and exchange Commission (SeC) as a
broker-dealer of securities. It sold various financial products
to the public through registered representatives located in 125
offices. As a broker-dealer, freedom financial was responsible
for performing the due diligence process for financial products
to be sold by its registered representatives. The Pierces were
all directors of freedom financial and were responsible for
establishing the policies and procedures of the company and
for ensuring general compliance with such policies. Pierce was
the president of freedom financial.
1 Neb. rev. Stat. §§ 8-1101 to 8-1123 (reissue 2007).
112 	280 NeBrASKA rePOrTS

ffg was formed in february 2001 as a holding company for
the purpose of acquiring a trust company and other financial
entities. Pierce was an officer and director of ffg, and Westley
was a director.
michael Casper was the owner and president of Capital
equity fund, Inc. (Cef), and a principal in other companies.
The freedom group entities began a relationship with Casper
in 2001, in connection with a stock offering by a company in
which Casper had an interest. Although freedom financial was
initially involved in the offering, it withdrew its participation
due to concerns about the offering’s compliance with securi-
ties regulations.
Around the same time, ffg announced a private placement
stock offering in which it sought $10 million in capital to
acquire a trust company and other financial entities. After some
ffg stock had been sold, Olde South Trust, Inc., in which
Casper had an ownership interest, made an offer to purchase
$15 million of ffg stock under a new private offering. ffg
and Olde South Trust signed a funding agreement in June 2001.
But in August 2001, ffg signed a new funding agreement with
Ambassador Trust, Inc., in which Casper also had an interest.
Ambassador Trust agreed to provide ffg with $15 million in
capital prior to the end of 2001 so that ffg could acquire a
bank and a trust company. ffg and Ambassador Trust also
entered into a separate funding agreement whereby Ambassador
Trust agreed to provide ffg with an additional $10.5 million
so that ffg could acquire a second financial company to oper-
ate as a clearing broker-dealer. These agreements replaced the
original ffg agreement with Olde South Trust. By the end of
2001, Ambassador Trust had not provided any of the promised
funds, and ffg used other funds to complete its acquisition of
a South dakota trust company, which became Presidents Trust
Company, LLC. In 2002, Ambassador Trust provided ffg and
Presidents Trust Company with $310,000 pursuant to addi-
tional funding agreements executed in march, April, and may
of that year.
In late 2001, freedom financial entered into an agree-
ment with Casper regarding the private placement offering
for preferred stock of Cef, a Tennessee corporation organized
hOOPer v. freedOm fIN. grOUP 	113
Cite as 280 Neb. 111

in 2001 to engage primarily in the business of charged-off
consumer debt receivables. Casper held 80 percent of the
common stock of Cef and served as its president and one of
its directors. freedom financial served as the “Broker/dealer
manager” for the offering. The Cef preferred stock was not
registered with the SeC or any state securities commission.
Pierce testified that there are specific requirements for this
type of offering, including that all investors be accredited,
meaning that each investor had $1 million in net worth or met
other specified criteria.
In its role as the managing broker-dealer for the Cef offer-
ing, freedom financial was responsible for (1) approving
broker-dealers involved with the sale, including reviewing
representatives to make sure they had the necessary license to
sell the Cef stock; (2) reviewing advertising and promotional
literature used to market the Cef offering; and (3) review-
ing information on proposed investors to ensure they met the
requirements necessary to purchase the Cef stock. Pierce
testified that freedom financial exercised due diligence in
reviewing the Cef offering prior to agreeing to be the man-
aging broker-dealer. While the record suggests that Cef was
responsible for preparing its marketing brochure and private
placement memorandum, Pierce or other representatives of
freedom financial reviewed the materials prior to their use
in the Cef offering. The Cef offering became effective in
October 2001.
At the time of the Cef offering, heartland financial group
was an Omaha investment and insurance firm, whose employ-
ees, Carl Wyllie and Jerry dickinson, were also registered
representatives of freedom financial. The hoopers purchased
Cef stock through Wyllie and dickinson on march 28, 2002.
Prior to the sale, the hoopers provided Wyllie with information
about their finances and their past experience with investing,
which was mostly limited to donald’s retirement fund. That
fund, then valued at $105,000, represented approximately 25
percent of the hoopers’ combined net worth. After review-
ing the financial information, Wyllie ultimately recommended
that the hoopers invest donald’s retirement fund account in
Cef stock.
114 	280 NeBrASKA rePOrTS

Wyllie gave the 	hoopers 	a 	marketing brochure which
described the Cef stock as having “[n]o stock market risk”;
as being “[s]uitable for investing by qualified and retirement
plans, including IrA, 401(k), and 403(b)”; and as a “great
investment vehicle for seniors.” Wyllie told the hoopers that
they were getting “beat up” in the stock market and that
Cef provided a more stable, safer investment and a better
return than their previous investments. Wyllie also stated
that the Cef stock would provide a guaranteed 11-percent
rate of return over a 3-year period, and a 9-percent return
if the stock were sold earlier. dickinson was present during
this discussion.
Wyllie also provided the hoopers with the private placement
memorandum for Cef. donald testified that he did not read
the materials but stated that Wyllie reviewed the documents
with him. marilyn testified that she reviewed the information
on the risk factors associated with the Cef stock as described
in the private placement memorandum but relied on Wyllie,
who equated the risk with that of a savings account. There
was never any discussion between the hoopers and Wyllie or
dickinson about the connection between freedom financial,
ffg, Presidents Trust Company, or Cef. The hoopers autho-
rized Wyllie to transfer the entire balance of $105,000 from
donald’s existing retirement account to invest in the Cef
stock. due to a surrender fee in connection with the transfer,
the hoopers’ initial investment was reduced to $94,000.
In conjunction with the investment, dickinson asked donald
to sign numerous documents, including a “Prospective Investor
Questionnaire.” donald signed or initialed the documents
where dickinson had indicated, despite the fact that the ques-
tionnaire had not been completed. dickinson told the hoopers
that he would fill in the necessary information. The hoopers
did not review the completed application documents until after
they were notified about problems with the Cef stock in may
2003. At this time, they realized that information regarding
their net worth, investment experience, and risk tolerance was
misstated to make them appear to be accredited investors.
Pierce testified that the application documents were completed
when received by freedom financial and that the company
hOOPer v. freedOm fIN. grOUP 	115
Cite as 280 Neb. 111

had no reason to suspect that the hoopers had not completed
the application.
The hoopers did not receive dividends from the Cef stock
they purchased, nor did they receive regular financial reports.
They received a letter in January 2003 from Casper, which
stated that even though 2002 was a “difficult time for all par-
ticipants in the investment markets” and Cef “experienced [its]
share of disappointment,” the portion of Cef funds invested
in distressed debt portfolios had performed “pretty much
as expected.”
Sometime in 2002, freedom financial resigned as the man-
aging broker-dealer for the Cef stock offering. Pierce testi-
fied that freedom financial resigned in part because of sales
made by representatives not approved by freedom financial.
Pierce also testified that freedom financial stopped Cef sales
because of concerns that funds raised from the Cef offer-
ing were being sent to ffg through the funding agreement
and because freedom financial was concerned about sales to
unaccredited investors. Pierce initially claimed that on march
11, 2002, he sent a resignation letter and a cease-and-desist
order on all Cef sales by freedom financial representatives.
however, upon a review of telephone records, Pierce testified
the next day that freedom financial withdrew as managing
broker-dealer on march 11 but did not order Cef sales halted
until June 7. Pierce also claimed that he issued a disgorgement
order for all money invested in Cef so it could be returned
to investors.
In April 2003, freedom financial, ffg, and their parent,
freedom group, filed suit against Casper and his various
entities, including Cef, for breach of contract, common-law
fraud, and conversion. The hoopers received a letter from
heartland financial group, dated may 8, 2003, stating that
there was a potential problem with the Cef offering, including
“some alleged misconduct.” The letter indicated that freedom
financial had filed a lawsuit against Cef. In June, freedom
financial invited the hoopers to join the lawsuit by sign-
ing a participation agreement, which would have waived any
claim against any of the freedom group entities. The hoopers
116 	280 NeBrASKA rePOrTS

participated in a conference call with freedom financial’s legal
counsel, but they chose not to sign the agreement. Portions
of the suit were eventually dismissed by the court, and the
remaining portion was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs.
On or about August 18, Cef redeemed all of the hoopers’
stock for $44,810.70.
Also in 2003, the various freedom group companies were
the subjects of an investigation by the SeC which ultimately
led to the cessation of business by all freedom group com-
panies. At issue in the investigation was a product designed
and sold by Presidents Trust Company, known as the “fixed
Income Trust.” The SeC determined that the fixed Income
Trust was an unregistered security, sold in violation of federal
regulations, and began an investigation into all freedom group
entities and offerings. In 2004, as part of a settlement with the
SeC, Pierce consented to an order barring him from associat-
ing with any broker, dealer, or investment advisor.
The hoopers initiated an arbitration proceeding against
freedom 	financial, 	heartland 	financial 	group, 	Wyllie,
and dickinson with respect to their Cef investment. In
2004, they received an arbitration awarding the amount of
$83,214.70, allocated among the various parties to the arbitra-
tion proceeding.
In 2005, the hoopers filed the present action against ffg
and the Pierces. Other original defendants, including Cef,
were dismissed from the case and are not parties to the appeal.
The hoopers’ claim against ffg and the Pierces is based upon
alleged violations of the Securities Act of Nebraska in connec-
tion with the Cef stock transaction. following trial, the district
court found that ffg and the Pierces were jointly and sever-
ally liable to the hoopers under the provisions of § 8-1118.
The court further found that the hoopers sustained damages
in the amount of $88,942.39, calculated on the basis of the
initial investment of $105,000, less the redemption proceeds
of $44,810.70 plus interest. Judgment for this amount, together
with costs and attorney fees to be determined at a later date,
was entered against ffg and the Pierces. following addi-
tional hearings, pursuant to the hoopers’ request for attorney
hOOPer v. freedOm fIN. grOUP 	117
Cite as 280 Neb. 111

fees and posttrial motions filed by ffg and the Pierces, the
district court determined the hoopers’ attorney fees to be
$29,617.46 and entered judgment in this additional amount.
ffg and the Pierces (hereinafter appellants) then commenced
this timely appeal.
II. ASSIgNmeNTS Of errOr
Appellants generally assign, consolidated and restated, that
the trial court erred (1) in finding that appellants violated
§ 8-1118, (2) by not requiring the hoopers to provide expert
testimony, and (3) in its calculation of damages. Appellants
also assign as error various factual findings of the court.
III. STANdArd Of reVIeW
[1-4] In a bench trial of an action at law, the trial court is the
sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to
be given their testimony.2 An appellate court will not reevalu-
ate the credibility of witnesses or reweigh testimony but will
review the evidence for clear error.3 Similarly, the trial court’s
factual findings in a bench trial of an action at law have the
effect of a jury verdict and will not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous.4 In reviewing a judgment awarded in a bench trial of
a law action, an appellate court does not reweigh evidence, but
considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the suc-
cessful party and resolves evidentiary conflicts in favor of the
successful party, who is entitled to every reasonable inference
deducible from the evidence.5
[5] When an appeal calls for statutory interpretation or pre-
sents questions of law, an appellate court must reach an inde-
pendent, correct conclusion irrespective of the determination
made by the court below.6
2 Eicher v. Mid America Fin. Invest. Corp., 275 Neb. 462, 748 N.W.2d 1
(2008).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Pick v. Norfolk Anesthesia, 276 Neb. 511, 755 N.W.2d 382 (2008); Eicher
v. Mid America Fin. Invest. Corp., supra note 2.
6 Id.
118 	280 NeBrASKA rePOrTS

IV. ANALYSIS
1. liAbility under securities Act of nebrAskA
[6] The Securities Act of Nebraska (hereinafter the Act) is
modeled after the 1956 Uniform Securities Act.7 This court has
stated that the Act “should be liberally construed to afford the
greatest possible protection to the public.”8 The Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to offer or sell any
security in this state unless (1) such security is registered
by notification under section 8-1105, by coordination
under section 8-1106, or by qualification under section
8-1107, (2) the security is exempt under section 8-1110
or is sold in a transaction exempt under section 8-1111, or
(3) the security is a federal covered security.9
Civil liability for violation of the Act is governed by § 8-1118,
which provides in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who offers or sells a security in violation
of section 8-1104 or offers or sells a security by means of
any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made not misleading, the buyer not knowing of
the untruth or omission, and who does not sustain the
burden of proof that he or she did not know and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known of the
untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person buying
the security from him or her . . . .
We have interpreted the phrase “[a]ny person who . . . sells”
as used in § 8-1118(1) to include one who does not actually
transfer title to a security, but who solicits its purchase, “moti-
vated at least in part by desire to serve his or her own financial
interests or those of the securities owner.”10
7 See 7C U.L.A. app. I (2006). See, also, Knoell v. Huff, 224 Neb. 90, 395
N.W.2d 749 (1986) (grant, J., dissenting).
8 Labenz v. Labenz, 198 Neb. 548, 550, 253 N.W.2d 855, 857 (1977).
9 § 8-1104.
10 Wilson v. Misko, 244 Neb. 526, 538, 508 N.W.2d 238, 248 (1993).
hOOPer v. freedOm fIN. grOUP 	119
Cite as 280 Neb. 111

Although freedom financial is not a party to this case, the
district court found that it “offered or sold unregistered securi-
ties in Nebraska and sold securities by means of untrue state-
ments of material fact and omissions to state a material fact,”
in violation of § 8-1118(1). Appellants’ liability was predicated
on this finding pursuant to § 8-1118(3), which provides in per-
tinent part:
(3) every person who directly or indirectly controls a
person liable under subsections (1) and (2) of this sec-
tion, including every . . . director, or person occupying a
similar status or performing similar functions of a partner,
limited liability company member, officer, or director . . .
shall be liable jointly and severally with and to the same
extent as such person, unless able to sustain the burden of
proof that he or she did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of the existence
of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged
to exist.
The district court found that the Pierces were directors of
freedom financial and that they did not meet their burden
of proving that they did not know, and in the exercise of rea-
sonable care could not have known, of the facts upon which
freedom financial’s liability was based. The court further
determined that ffg directly or indirectly controlled freedom
financial and that it likewise did not meet its burden of prov-
ing that it did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of such facts.
(a) expert Testimony Not required
We find no merit in appellants’ argument that the district
court erred in not requiring proof by expert testimony regard-
ing the standard of care applicable to investment advisors. This
is not a professional negligence case, and the hoopers were
not required to prove a standard of care. To establish statutory
civil liability under the Act, the hoopers were required to prove
only that freedom financial violated § 8-1118(1) by offering
or selling an unregistered security which was required by law
to be registered, or by selling a security by means of an untrue
statement or omission of a material fact, and that appellants
120 	280 NeBrASKA rePOrTS

had derivative liability under § 8-1118(3). No expert testimony
was required to prove the facts necessary to establish this statu-
tory liability.
(b) Violation of § 8-1118(1)
by freedom financial
The district court found that freedom financial violated
§ 8-1118(1) in two ways: (1) by selling unregistered securities
and (2) by selling the Cef stock by means of untrue statement
of material facts and omissions of facts. Appellants do not
assign error to the finding that freedom financial “offered or
sold unregistered securities.” And the record supports the find-
ing. In their federal lawsuit against Casper and others, freedom
financial, ffg, and freedom group alleged that “freedom
financial sold $1,433,788.91 of the preferred stock of Cef to
its clients.” It is undisputed that the Cef stock was unregis-
tered, and there is no claim on appeal that the stock itself or
the transaction in which it was sold to the hoopers had retained
its purported exempt status.11 Likewise, there is undisputed
evidence that the Cef stock was recommended and sold to the
hoopers by registered representatives of freedom financial.
We note that the findings of the district court incorrectly
identify Wyllie and dickinson as registered representatives of
“freedom financial group, Inc.,” but it is clear from Pierce’s
testimony that they were, in fact, registered representatives of
freedom financial. There is evidence that freedom financial
had a financial interest in the transaction, in that it was to
receive a commission on the sale of the Cef preferred stock
and a related entity, ffg, received financing from Cef through
the proceeds of the offering.
We find no merit in appellants’ argument that the district
court erred in finding that the stock was sold by means of
“untrue statements of material facts and omissions of fact.”12
The evidence establishes that the stock was sold by means
of the untrue statements contained in the marketing brochure
approved by freedom financial and provided to the hoopers
11 See §§ 8-1104, 8-1110, and 8-1111.
12 Brief for appellants at 7.
hOOPer v. freedOm fIN. grOUP 	121
Cite as 280 Neb. 111

by Wyllie and dickinson, who reinforced the untrue state-
ments regarding risk, return, and suitability in the sales pitch
and recommendations they made to the hoopers. It is likewise
clear that the hoopers were unsophisticated investors who
relied upon Wyllie’s assurances that the Cef stock was as
described in the sales pamphlet, notwithstanding its inconsist-
encies with the offering memorandum. Thus, the evidence,
considered under our standard of review, is sufficient to sup-
port the finding that freedom financial violated § 8-1118(1)
both by selling unregistered securities in violation of § 8-1104
and by means of untrue statements and concealment of mate-
rial facts.
(c) Liability of directors and
ffg Under § 8-1118(3)
It is undisputed that at all relevant times, each of the three
Pierce defendants were directors of freedom financial, and
that Pierce served as president of the corporation. As such,
they were responsible for establishing the policies and pro-
cedures of the company and for ensuring general compliance
with such policies. Under Nebraska’s Blue-Sky Law,13 which
preceded the Act, we held that officers and directors of a cor-
poration which violated the law were subject to statutory civil
liability, regardless of their direct participation in the sale, if
they knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care could have
known, of the facts upon which liability was based.14 This
principle is now codified in § 8-1118(3). Although we have
not previously addressed the liability of officers and directors
under the Act, courts in other states have construed similar
adaptations of the Uniform Securities Act to impose strict
liability on officers and directors unless the statutory defense
of lack of knowledge is proved.15 We construe § 8-1118(3) in
the same manner.
13 Neb. rev. Stat. §§ 81-302 to 81-349 (reissue 1958).
14 See, Huryta v. White, 184 Neb. 24, 165 N.W.2d 354 (1969); Loewenstein
v. Midwestern Inv. Co., 181 Neb. 547, 149 N.W.2d 512 (1967); Davis v.
Walker, 170 Neb. 891, 104 N.W.2d 479 (1960).
15 See, e.g., Lean v. Reed, 876 N.e.2d 1104 (Ind. 2007); Taylor v. Perdition
Minerals Group, Ltd., 244 Kan. 126, 766 P.2d 805 (1988).
122 	280 NeBrASKA rePOrTS

There is ample evidence to support the district court’s find-
ing that, as directors, Pierce, Carolyn, and Westley did not
meet their burden of proving that they did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the facts
upon which freedom financial’s liability was based. Carolyn
and Westley did not testify and thus provided no evidence
on this point. There is nothing in the record to suggest that
they did not have access to information concerning freedom
financial’s involvement in the Cef offering. Pierce testified
that he was personally involved in the offering on behalf of
freedom financial, that he knew the stock was not registered,
and that his office reviewed the marketing brochure which con-
tained the untrue and misleading statements about the stock.
Pierce gave conflicting testimony about when he first learned
that ffg was receiving funds from the proceeds of the Cef
offering, and the district court found that his testimony on this
point was not credible.
Likewise, there is competent evidence to support the finding
of the district court that ffg controlled freedom financial by
ensuring its ongoing participation in the Cef offering which
was intended to provide financing for ffg’s planned acquisi-
tions and that ffg did not meet its burden of proving that it
did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not
have known, of the facts upon which freedom financial’s lia-
bility was based. ffg and freedom financial were subsidiaries
of the same parent corporation. Pierce served as an officer and
director of both subsidiary corporations as well as the parent
corporation. he was personally involved in the companies’
transactions involving Cef and other entities controlled by
Casper. The evidence supports a reasonable inference that ffg
was an active participant in a plan whereby freedom financial
would serve as managing broker-dealer of the Cef stock offer-
ing in order to generate funds through which Cef or other
Casper entities would provide financing for ffg.
2. dAmAGes
One who purchases securities sold in violation of the Act
may sue
to recover the consideration paid for the security, together
with interest at six percent per annum from the date of
hOOPer v. freedOm fIN. grOUP 	123
Cite as 280 Neb. 111

payment, costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees, less the
amount of any income received on the security, upon
the tender of the security, or for damages if he or she
no longer owns the security. damages shall be the
amount that would be recoverable upon a tender less (a)
the value of the security when the buyer disposed of it
and (b) interest at six percent per annum from the date
of disposition.16
Appellants contend that the district court erred in deter-
mining the amount of the hooper’s original investment to
be $105,000. They argue that the amount was less than that
amount because of a surrender fee incurred when donald’s
retirement account was liquidated in order to make the Cef
investment. But the district court’s finding is supported by
appellants’ responses to requests for admission which were
received in evidence. each of the appellants admitted that
the consideration paid by the hoopers for the Cef stock
was $105,000. The district court relied upon this evidence in
its finding.
Appellants also contend that the damage award should have
been reduced by amounts which Wyllie and dickinson paid to
the hoopers pursuant to the arbitration award. We conclude
that the record is insufficient to resolve this issue, and we
therefore do not address it.
V. CONCLUSION
We have considered each of the appellants’ assignments of
error directed to factual findings made by the district court,
and to the extent they are necessary to the determination
of liability or damages, we conclude that they are without
merit. for the reasons discussed herein, we conclude that the
district court did not err in finding Pierce, Carolyn, Westley,
and ffg liable to the hoopers in the amount of $88,942.39,
together with taxable costs and attorney fees. We affirm
the judgment.
A ffirmed.
16 § 8-1118(1).
124 	280 NeBrASKA rePOrTS