In re Interest of Gabriela H.

elsewhere that allows this as a sanction, we find the limitations
of the Legislature’s delegation clear. Therefore, in enacting
Regulation 2-020.09B2f, DHHS unlawfully enlarged upon the
authorizing statutes and violated the principles of separation of
powers. The district court was correct in declaring Regulation
2-020.09B2f invalid.
A ffirmed.
G errArd, J., not participating.
in re interest of GAbrielA H.,
A cHild under 18 yeArs of AGe .
stAte of nebrAskA, Appellee , v. nebrAskA depArtment
of H eAltH And HumAn services , AppellAnt.
785 N.W.2d 843
Filed July 23, 2010. 	No. S-09-1261.
1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews juvenile cases
de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juvenile
court’s findings.
2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. To the extent an appeal calls for statutory interpre-
tation or presents questions of law, an appellate court must reach an independent
conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below.
3. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Statutes. As a statutorily created court of limited
and special jurisdiction, a juvenile court has only such authority as has been con-
ferred on it by statute.
4. Juvenile Courts: Minors. The Nebraska Juvenile Code must be liberally con-
strued to accomplish its purpose of serving the best interests of the juveniles who
fall within it.
5. Juvenile Courts: Child Custody. Juvenile courts are accorded broad discre-
tion in their determination of the placement of children adjudicated abused or
neglected and to serve the best interests of the children involved.
6. Statutes. Statutes relating to the same subject matter will be construed so as to
maintain a sensible and consistent scheme, giving effect to every provision.
7. Juvenile Courts: Parental Rights: Adoption. Where a juvenile has been adju-
dicated pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 2008) and a perma-
nency objective of adoption has been established, a juvenile court has authority
under the Nebraska Juvenile Code to order the Nebraska Department of Health
and Human Services to accept a tendered relinquishment of parental rights.
Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Douglas County:
douGlAs f. JoHnson, Judge. Affirmed.
284 	280N eBRASkAR epoRTS
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:46 AM CST

Carla 	Heathershaw 	Risko, 	Special 	Assistant 	Attorney
General, for appellant.
Donald W.k leine, Douglas County Attorney, and Lindsey
Grove for appellee.
H eAvicAn, 	c.J., 	WriGHt, 	connolly, 	G errArd, 	stepHAn,
mccormAck , and miller-lermAn, JJ.
stepHAn, J.
This appeal requires an examination of the interplay between
Nebraska’s adoption statutes1 and the Nebraska Juvenile Code.2
The specific question presented is whether a juvenile court may
order the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) to accept a voluntary relinquishment of parental rights
when a child has been adjudicated pursuant to § 43-247(3)(a)
and adoption is the permanency objective. We conclude that a
juvenile court has authority to issue such an order.
BACkGRoUND
Gabriela H. was born in September 1997.o n or about
November 7, 2008, Gabriela’s biological mother left Gabriela
at ano maha hospital.o n November 7, the State filed a petition
in the separate juvenile court of Douglas County alleging that
Gabriela was a child under § 43-247(3)(a) because her mother
was “refusing to provide [her] with appropriate care, support
and/or supervision.” The petition alleged that Gabriela was
then in the custody of DHHS.
on February 23, 2009, the juvenile court adjudicated Gabriela
under § 43-247(3)(a) and ordered that she remain in the tem-
porary custody of DHHS. The court also ordered Gabriela’s
mother to pay child support.3 The record indicates that a
supplemental petition was also filed against Gabriela’s natural
father, which also resulted in an adjudication and a child sup-
port order. At a permanency planning hearing held on March
30, the court found that reunification efforts were not required
1 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-101 to 43-165 (Reissue 2008).
2 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-245 to 43-2,129 (Reissue 2008).
3 See § 43-290.
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Cite as 280 Neb. 284

because Gabriela’s parents did not wish to have a relationship
with her and were contemplating relinquishment.
At a subsequent permanency planning hearing held on
November 10, 2009, a representative of the State Foster
Care Review Board recommended adoption as the perma-
nency objective, noting that there had been no contact between
Gabriela and her biological parents during the 11 months that
she had been in foster care. The deputy county attorney and
the guardian ad litem agreed that the permanency objective
should be adoption, noting that both parents were willing to
relinquish parental rights but that DHHS was refusing to accept
relinquishment. Counsel for Gabriela’s mother confirmed that
he had informed DHHS of the mother’s decision to relinquish
her parental rights, but that DHHS was unwilling to accept
relinquishment. Counsel for Gabriela’s father also indicated
that he had informed DHHS that the father was willing to
relinquish his parental rights. But counsel for DHHS told the
court that DHHS “doesn’t like to accept relinquishments when
[it doesn’t] have a permanent home for the child yet” and
expressed concern over accepting relinquishment when a par-
ent was paying a “substantial amount” of child support. DHHS
requested that the court defer any action on the relinquishment
for 3 months while DHHS attempted to find an adoptive home
for Gabriela.
in an order entered on November 12, 2009, the juvenile
court found as follows:
. . . [N]o further reasonable efforts are required toward
reunification due to the lack of parental participation or
desire to parent [Gabriela], and the parents’ desire to
relinquish their rights.
. . . There is nothing in the law that prevents [DHHS]
from accepting relinquishment by the parents;
. . . The permanency objective is Adoption. Negative
reasonable efforts are being made to finalize the per-
manency objective, but [Gabriela] is in a foster/adop-
tive placement.
. . . [i]t is in the best interests and welfare of [Gabriela]
to remain as placed, in the custody of [DHHS], for appro-
priate care and placement.
286 	280N eBRASkAR epoRTS

Based upon these findings, the court ordered that Gabriela
remain in the custody of DHHS for appropriate care and
placement and that DHHS “shall accept relinquishment by the
parents.” DHHS perfected an appeal from this order, which
we moved to our docket pursuant to our statutory authority to
regulate the caseloads of the appellate courts of this state.4
ASSiGNMeNTo Fe RRoR
DHHS assigns, restated, that the juvenile court erred in
ordering it to accept the relinquishments of parental rights.
STANDARDo F ReVieW
[1,2] An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on
the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the
juvenile court’s findings.5 To the extent an appeal calls for
statutory interpretation or presents questions of law, an appel-
late court must reach an independent conclusion irrespective of
the determination made by the court below.6
ANALYSiS
Nebraska’s statutory procedures for adoption include the fol-
lowing provision:
When a child shall have been relinquished by written
instrument . . . to [DHHS] or to a licensed child place-
ment agency and the agency has, in writing, accepted
full responsibility for the child, the person so relinquish-
ing shall be relieved of all parental duties toward and all
responsibilities for such child and have no rights over
such child. Nothing contained in this section shall impair
the right of such child to inherit.7
DHHS contends that the decision to accept a relinquishment of
parental rights is within its sole discretion and that it cannot be
compelled by a juvenile court to do so.
4 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Reissue 2008).
5 In re Interest of C.H., 277 Neb. 565, 763 N.W.2d 708 (2009); In re Interest
of Dustin S., 276 Neb. 635, 756 N.W.2d 277 (2008).
6 In re Interest of Dustin S., supra note 5; In re Interest of Markice M., 275
Neb. 908, 750 N.W.2d 345 (2008).
7 § 43-106.01.
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Cite as 280 Neb. 284

stAtutory AutHority
[3-5] As a statutorily created court of limited and special
jurisdiction, a juvenile court has only such authority as has
been conferred on it by statute.8 But the Nebraska Juvenile
Code must be liberally construed to accomplish its purpose
of serving the best interests of the juveniles who fall within
it.9 This includes promoting “adoption, guardianship, or other
permanent arrangements for children in the custody of [DHHS]
who are unable to return home.”10 And juvenile courts are
accorded broad discretion in their determination of the place-
ment of children adjudicated abused or neglected and to serve
the best interests of the children involved.11
Although the juvenile code gives DHHS a certain degree of
discretion with respect to children placed in its custody, that
discretion is subject to the superior right of the juvenile court
to determine what is in the child’s best interests. For example,
§ 43-284 authorizes various placement options for adjudicated
children, including “some association willing to receive the
juvenile” or DHHS. This language indicates that while other
child placement agencies have a choice as to whether to take
placement, DHHS can be ordered by the court to accept the
juvenile’s placement. Additionally, if a juvenile is voluntarily
relinquished by his or her parents, § 43-284.01 requires that the
juvenile shall remain in the custody of DHHS or another autho-
rized placement agency unless the court finds by clear and con-
vincing evidence that such placement is not in the child’s best
interests. And the juvenile court is not bound by a placement
plan created by DHHS. Section 43-285(2) expressly autho-
rizes the court to reject a placement plan created by DHHS
8 In re Interest of Dustin S., supra note 5.
9 In re Interest of R.A. and V.A., 225 Neb. 157, 403 N.W.2d 357 (1987),
overruled on other grounds, State v. Jacob, 242 Neb. 176, 494 N.W.2d 109
(1993). See, also, In re Interest of Veronica H., 272 Neb. 370, 721 N.W.2d
651 (2006).
10 § 43-246(6).
11 In re Interest of Veronica H., supra note 9. See In re Interest of Amber G.
et al., 250 Neb. 973, 554 N.W.2d 142 (1996).
288 	280N eBRASkAR epoRTS

and implement an alternative plan based on the juvenile’s best
interests. These statutes clearly demonstrate that the juvenile
court has the authority to determine placement of a juvenile
under its jurisdiction even if such determination is contrary to
DHHS’ position.
Furthermore, pursuant to § 43-285(1), DHHS is expressly
limited in its authority over juveniles placed in its custody;
§ 43-285(1) provides that DHHS has “authority, by and with
the assent of the court, to determine the care, placement, medi-
cal services, psychiatric services, training, and expenditures
on behalf of each juvenile committed to it.” (emphasis sup-
plied.) We have recognized the authority of a juvenile court to
order the removal and replacement of a DHHS case manager,
noting that juvenile courts have been given the power by the
Legislature to assent and, by implication, to dissent from the
placement and other decisions of DHHS.12
DHHS argues that § 43-285(1) does not apply to Gabriela’s
case because the juvenile court did not award DHHS care
of Gabriela, but, rather, care was voluntarily relinquished by
the parents. This argument ignores the fact that the juvenile
court awarded DHHS temporary custody of Gabriela prior to
the November 2009 permanency hearing. DHHS also argues
that § 43-285(1) does not apply to Gabriela’s case because
§ 43-106.01, which authorizes DHHS to accept a volun-
tary relinquishment of parental rights, is not included in the
juvenile code. However, as Gabriela was adjudicated under
§ 43-247(3)(a), she is under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction,
and in determining its disposition, the court is guided by the
juvenile code.
[6] Finally, we note that the juvenile code also contains the
following provision:
if the return of the child to his or her parents is not likely
based upon facts developed as a result of the investiga-
tion, [DHHS] shall recommend termination of parental
rights and referral for adoption, guardianship, placement
12 In re Interest of Veronica H., supra note 9. See, also, In re Interest of
Crystal T. et al., 7 Neb. App. 921, 586 N.W.2d 479 (1998).
iNR e iNTeReST oFGABR ieLAH . 	289
Cite as 280 Neb. 284

with a relative, or, as a last resort, another planned perma-
nent living arrangement.13
Statutes relating to the same subject matter will be construed
so as to maintain a sensible and consistent scheme, giving
effect to every provision.14i t would violate the principle of
§ 43-1312 to conclude that DHHS is required to recommend
termination of parental rights in the case of an abandoned
child but, at the same time, has the authority to prevent such
termination by refusing to accept a tendered relinquishment of
parental rights.
sepArAtion of poWers
We also reject DHHS’ argument that permitting a juve-
nile court to order DHHS to accept a parent’s relinquish-
ment would be an infringement on the separation of powers
between the judicial and executive branches in violation of
art.ii , § 1, of the Nebraska Constitution. DHHS argues that
the court’s authority to enter an order relieving a parent of
his or her rights comes only after DHHS or another child
placement agency has accepted the relinquishment pursuant to
§ 43-106.01.i n support of its argument, DHHS relies upon its
own regulations as published in the Nebraska Administrative
Code. These regulations specify the process by which DHHS
accepts a relinquishment, including a determination by DHHS
as to whether relinquishment is in the best interests of the
child and family.15 But in the context of a juvenile proceeding
such as this, it is the court which must determine what is in the
best interests of the child, and we will not construe an admin-
istrative regulation as a limitation upon that judicial authority,
because to do so would indeed be contrary to separation of
powers principles.
resolution
it is clear from the record that DHHS declined to accept
the relinquishment of parental rights because one of the
13 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1312(2) (Reissue 2008) (emphasis supplied).
14 In re Estate of Reed, 271 Neb. 653, 715 N.W.2d 496 (2006); Curran v.
Buser, 271 Neb. 332, 711 N.W.2d 562 (2006).
15 See 390 Neb Admin. Code, ch. 8, § 004.02 (1998).
290 	280N eBRASkAR epoRTS

parents was paying a “pretty substantial amount” of child
support which partially offset DHHS’ cost with respect to
Gabriela’s care.16 While conservation of public resources is a
worthy objective, it cannot justify the legal perpetuation of a
parental relationship which no longer exists in fact, thereby
permitting an abandoned child to linger indefinitely in foster
care. We agree with the observation of the juvenile court
that the position taken by DHHS has made Gabriela a “de
facto orphan.”
[7] 	Accordingly, 	for 	the 	reasons 	discussed, 	we 	hold
that 	where 	a 	juvenile 	has 	been 	adjudicated 	pursuant 	to
§ 43-247(3)(a) and a permanency objective of adoption has
been established, a juvenile court has authority under the
juvenile code to order DHHS to accept a tendered relinquish-
ment of parental rights. Here, the juvenile court did not err in
exercising that authority.
CoNCLUSioN
For the reasons discussed, we affirm the judgment of the
separate juvenile court.
A ffirmed.
16 See § 43-290.
iNR e iNTeReST oFC oRNeLiUS k. 	291
Cite as 280 Neb. 291
in re interest of cornelius k.,
A cHild under 18 yeArs of AGe .
stAte of nebrAskA, Appellee , v. nebrAskA depArtment
of H eAltH And HumAn services , AppellAnt,
And lAurA k., Appellee .
785 N.W.2d 849
Filed July 23, 2010. 	No. S-09-1166.
1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews juvenile cases
de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juvenile
court’s findings.
2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. To the extent an appeal calls for statutory interpre-
tation or presents questions of law, an appellate court must reach an independent
conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below.