In re Interest of Cornelius K.

parents was paying a “pretty substantial amount” of child
support which partially offset DHHS’ cost with respect to
Gabriela’s care.16 While conservation of public resources is a
worthy objective, it cannot justify the legal perpetuation of a
parental relationship which no longer exists in fact, thereby
permitting an abandoned child to linger indefinitely in foster
care. We agree with the observation of the juvenile court
that the position taken by DHHS has made Gabriela a “de
facto orphan.”
[7] 	Accordingly, 	for 	the 	reasons 	discussed, 	we 	hold
that 	where 	a 	juvenile 	has 	been 	adjudicated 	pursuant 	to
§ 43-247(3)(a) and a permanency objective of adoption has
been established, a juvenile court has authority under the
juvenile code to order DHHS to accept a tendered relinquish-
ment of parental rights. Here, the juvenile court did not err in
exercising that authority.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, we affirm the judgment of the
separate juvenile court.
A ffirmed.
16 See § 43-290.
IN reIN tereStOFCO rNeLIUS k. 	291
Cite as 280 Neb. 291
in re interest of C ornelius K.,
A Child under 18 yeArs of Age .
stAte of nebrAsKA, Appellee , v. nebrAsKA depArtment
of heAlth And humAn serviCes , AppellAnt,
And lAurA K., Appellee .
785 N.W.2d 849
Filed July 23, 2010. 	No. S-09-1166.
1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews juvenile cases
de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juvenile
court’s findings.
2. Statutes: Appeal and Error.t o the extent an appeal calls for statutory interpre-
tation or presents questions of law, an appellate court must reach an independent
conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:47 AM CST

3. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Proof. At the adjudication stage, in order for
a juvenile court to assume jurisdiction of a minor child under Neb.r ev. Stat.
§ 43-247(3)(a) (reissue 2008), the State must prove the allegations of the petition
by a preponderance of the evidence, and the court’s only concern is whether the
conditions in which the juvenile presently finds himself or herself fit within the
asserted subsection of § 43-247.
Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Douglas County:
pAtriCK r. mCdermott, County Judge. Affirmed as modified,
and cause remanded for further proceedings.
Carla Heathershawr isko for appellant.
Debrat ighe-Dolan, of White, Wulff & Jorgensen, for appel-
lee Laurak .
heAviCAn, 	C.J., 	Wright, 	C onnolly, 	gerrArd, 	stephAn,
mCC ormACK, and miller-lermAn, JJ.
stephAn, J.
Corneliusk . was adjudicated pursuant to Neb.r ev. Stat.
§ 43-247(3)(a) (reissue 2008) by the separate juvenile court
of Douglas County.t he adjudication was based in part upon
his adoptive mother’s relinquishment of parental rights to the
Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS),
which 	relinquishment 	was 	accepted 	by 	the 	court. 	DHHS
appeals, arguing that the juvenile court did not have the statu-
tory authority to accept the relinquishment.
BACkGrOUND
Cornelius, born in May 1993, was adopted by Laurak . in
2003 after the termination of his biological mother’s paren-
tal rights. In August 2008, Laura moved tot exas and left
Cornelius in Omaha with a relative. On August 19, 2009, a
petition was filed in the juvenile court alleging that Cornelius
had been abandoned by Laura. Cornelius was placed in the
temporary custody of DHHS.
An adjudication hearing was scheduled for October 23,
2009. Appearing at the hearing were a deputy Douglas County
Attorney on behalf of the State, Laura and her counsel, and
the guardian ad litem appointed for Cornelius.t he record
indicates that two representatives of DHHS were present in
292 	280N eBrASkA repOrtS

the courtroom, but that no appearance was made on behalf
of DHHS.
On the day prior to the hearing, the court was advised that
Laura intended to relinquish her parental rights. At the begin-
ning of the hearing, Laura’s counsel confirmed that this was
the case. At that point, Laura’s counsel offered several exhibits,
including a “relinquishment of Child by Adoptivep arent” that
had been signed by Laura in the presence of a notary public.
the relinquishment provided in part:
I Laura . . . do hereby voluntarily relinquish to [DHHS]
all right to and custody of and power and control over
Cornelius . . . and all claims and interest in and to his
services and wages, to the end that [DHHS] may become
the legal guardian of said child and do hereby authorize
[DHHS] to place said child in a suitable family home and
to consent to and procure the adoption of said child.
After questioning Laura, the court found that she executed the
relinquishment and related documents freely, voluntarily, and
knowingly.t he court then accepted the relinquishment, dis-
missed Laura from the proceeding, and granted the State leave
to file an amended petition “alleging the current circumstances
of Cornelius.”
After a brief recess, during which the State filed an amended
petition alleging that Cornelius was a child within the mean-
ing of § 43-247(3)(a) in that he was homeless and destitute
because of Laura’s relinquishment, the court conducted an
adjudication hearing at which the guardian ad litem admit-
ted the allegations of the amended petition. Based upon this,
the court found the allegations of the amended petition to be
true and ordered DHHS to prepare a permanency plan for
Cornelius.t he court made a specific finding that reasonable
efforts to reunify Cornelius and Laura were not required pur-
suant to Neb.r ev. Stat. § 43-283.01(4) (Supp. 2009) because
“before the law, Cornelius stands as an abandoned child.”
the court ordered Cornelius to remain in the temporary cus-
tody of DHHS pending disposition and further ordered both
DHHS and the guardian ad litem to prepare and submit pre-
dispositional reports prior to a permanency planning hearing
scheduled for December 7, 2009.t he court also dismissed
IN reIN tereStOFCO rNeLIUS k. 	293
Cite as 280 Neb. 291

Laura from the proceeding, based upon her execution of
the relinquishment.
After counsel for DHHS perfected an appeal from the adju-
dication order, the juvenile court postponed the permanency
planning hearing pending disposition of the appeal. We moved
this appeal to our docket on our own motion pursuant to our
statutory authority to regulate the caseloads of the appellate
courts of this state.1
ASSIGNMeNtS OFerr Or
DHHS assigns, restated and consolidated, that the juvenile
court erred in (1) accepting Laura’s relinquishment of her
parental rights and (2) finding that relinquishment of Laura’s
parental rights was in Cornelius’ best interests.
StANDArD OFre VIeW
[1,2] An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on
the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the
juvenile court’s findings.2t o the extent an appeal calls for
statutory interpretation or presents questions of law, an appel-
late court must reach an independent conclusion irrespective of
the determination made by the court below.3
ANALYSIS
the initial question we must address is whether Laura’s
relinquishment of her parental rights was legally accepted.
Nebraska’s statutory procedures for adoption include the fol-
lowing provision:
When a child shall have been relinquished by written
instrument . . . to [DHHS] or to a licensed child place-
ment agency and the agency has, in writing, accepted
full responsibility for the child, the person so relinquish-
ing shall be relieved of all parental duties toward and all
responsibilities for such child and have no rights over
1 See Neb.r ev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (reissue 2008).
2 In re Interest of C.H., 277 Neb. 565, 763 N.W.2d 708 (2009); In re Interest
of Dustin S., 276 Neb. 635, 756 N.W.2d 277 (2008).
3 In re Interest of Dustin S., supra note 2; In re Interest of Markice M., 275
Neb. 908, 750 N.W.2d 345 (2008).
294 	280N eBrASkA repOrtS

such child. Nothing contained in this section shall impair
the right of such child to inherit.4
In In re Interest of Gabriela H.,5 we held that a juvenile court
may order DHHS to accept a relinquishment of parental rights
in the circumstance where a child has been adjudicated pur-
suant to § 43-247(3)(a) and a permanency objective of adop-
tion has been determined. But that is not what occurred here.
Although the relinquishment was directed to DHHS, it was
accepted by the court prior to any adjudication or permanency
plan. We conclude that this procedure is not authorized by
either the adoption statutes6 or the Nebraska Juvenile Code.7
the relinquishment has not been legally accepted, and there-
fore, Laura’s parental rights have not been terminated.
[3] But this does not invalidate the adjudication.t he pur-
pose of the adjudication phase is to protect the interests of the
child. At the adjudication stage, in order for a juvenile court to
assume jurisdiction of a minor child under § 43-247(3)(a), the
State must prove the allegations of the petition by a preponder-
ance of the evidence,8 and the court’s only concern is whether
the conditions in which the juvenile presently finds himself or
herself fit within the asserted subsection of § 43-247.9
One of the statutory grounds for adjudication is that the
juvenile is “homeless or destitute, or without proper support
through no fault of his or her parent, guardian, or custodian.”10
In its amended petition, the State alleged that this ground for
adjudication was met because Cornelius had no parent or legal
guardian to care for him.t he record fully supports this allega-
tion.t he fact that the relinquishment has not been accepted by
DHHS means that Laura’s parental rights have not been legally
extinguished pursuant to § 43-106.01. But it does not diminish
4 Neb.r ev. Stat. § 43-106.01 (reissue 2008).
5 In re Interest of Gabriela H., ante p. 284, 785 N.W.2d 843 (2010).
6 Neb.r ev. Stat. §§ 43-101 to 43-165 (reissue 2008).
7 Neb.r ev. Stat. §§ 43-245 to 43-2,129 (reissue 2008 & Supp. 2009).
8 In re Interest of Anaya, 276 Neb. 825, 758 N.W.2d 10 (2008).
9 In re Interest of Corey P. et al., 269 Neb. 925, 697 N.W.2d 647 (2005).
10 § 43-247(3)(a).
IN reIN tereStOFCO rNeLIUS k. 	295
Cite as 280 Neb. 291

the fact that Cornelius is a homeless and destitute child at risk
of harm because currently there is no parent or legal guardian
providing care for him. Cornelius is thus properly subject to
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under § 43-247(3)(a).
CONCLUSION
We conclude that because the relinquishment was not prop-
erly accepted, Laura’s parental rights have not been termi-
nated and the district court erred in dismissing her from the
proceedings. We vacate that portion of the adjudication order,
but affirm the order in all other respects and remand the cause
to the juvenile court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
A ffirmed As modified, And CAuse remAnded
for further proCeedings.
A rleen m. Weber , AppellAnt And Cross -Appellee ,
v. gAs ’n shop, inC., And employers mutuAl
C ompAnies , Appellees And Cross -AppellAnts.
786 N.W.2d 671
Filed July 23, 2010. 	No. S-09-1300.
1. Judgments: Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a matter of
law in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an
independent, correct conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the
trial court.
2. Workers’ Compensation: Garnishment. A garnishment action is an appropriate
proceeding to enforce an award of the Workers’ Compensation Court.
3. Garnishment: Notice. In a garnishment proceeding, the issue is whether the
garnishee is indebted to the garnishor or had property or credits of the garnishor
in its possession or under its control at the time it was served with notice of
the garnishment.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: mArlon
A. polK, Judge. Affirmed.
Jerold V. Fennell and Michael J. Dyer, of Dyer Law,p .C.,
L.L.O., for appellant.
tylerp . McLeod and Jeffrey J. Blumel, of Abrahams,k aslow
& Cassman, L.L.p., for appellees.
296 	280N eBrASkA repOrtS