In re Interest of Meridian H.

I n re I nterest of M erIdIan H., a cHIld
under 18 years of age .
state of nebraska and departMent of H ealtH and HuMan
servIces , appellees and cross -appellees , v. Jeffrey H. and
karen H., on beHalf of daMon H. and aleeaH H.,
MInor cHIldren, Intervenors-appellants , and
M ark H. and taMMy H., Intervenors-appellees
and cross -appellants , and sHane k. and
brandI k., Intervenors-appellees.
798 N.W.2d 96
Filed May 6, 2011. 	No. S-10-905.
1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. Juvenile cases are reviewed de novo on the
record, and an appellate court is required to reach a conclusion independent of the
juvenile court’s findings.
2. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question which does not
involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law,
which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion independent of the lower
court’s decision.
3. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. In a juvenile case, as in any
other appeal, before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty
of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter
before it.
4. Standing: Jurisdiction. Standing relates to a court’s power, that is, jurisdiction,
to address issues presented and serves to identify those disputes which are appro-
priately resolved through the judicial process.
5. Standing. Under the doctrine of standing, a court may decline to determine
merits of a legal claim because the party advancing it is not properly situated
to be entitled to its judicial determination. The focus is on the party, not the
claim itself.
6. Standing: Jurisdiction. Standing requires that a litigant have such a personal
stake in the outcome of a controversy as to warrant invocation of a court’s
jurisdiction and justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on the liti-
gant’s behalf.
7. Standing: Claims: Parties. To have standing, a litigant must assert the litigant’s
own rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim on the legal rights or interests of
third parties.
8. Child Custody. The effect of a particular placement on a child’s relationship with
siblings is but one factor, albeit an important one, which a court should consider
in determining whether the placement is in the child’s best interests.
Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Sarpy County:
lInda s. porter, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
Christine P. Costantakos for intervenors-appellants.
IN re INTereST oF MerIdIAN h. 	465
Cite as 281 Neb. 465
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:45 AM CST

Sandra K. Markley, deputy Sarpy County Attorney, for
appellee State of Nebraska.
Carla heathershaw risko, Special Assistant Attorney General,
for appellee department of health and human Services.
Karen 	S. 	Nelson, 	of 	Schirber 	& 	Wagner, 	L.L.P., 	for
intervenors-appellees Mark h. and Tammy h.
Patrick A. Campagna and Stephanie M. Nevins, Senior
Certified Law Student, of Lustgarten & roberts, P.C., L.L.o.,
for intervenors-appellees Shane K. and Brandi K.
daniel J. hill, of Stinson, Morrison & hecker, L.L.P., and
Sarah helvey for amicus curiae Nebraska Appleseed Center for
Law in the Public Interest.
Ann W. davis, P.C., guardian ad litem.
H eavIcan, c.J., connolly, gerrard, stepHan, MccorMack ,
and MIller-lerMan, JJ.
stepHan, J.
Meridian h. is a 3-year-old girl who was adjudicated pur-
suant to Neb. rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (reissue 2008) and
has been in foster care in Nebraska for all but a few weeks of
her life. her presumed biological father died before she was
born, and her biological mother’s parental rights have been
terminated. She has two older siblings, both minors, who were
adopted before her birth upon relinquishment of parental rights
by their biological parents. The adoptive parents, on behalf of
the siblings, intervened in the juvenile court proceedings and
requested that Meridian be placed in their home in the State of
Minnesota. The separate juvenile court of Sarpy County denied
the request, and the adoptive parents now appeal. Meridian’s
maternal grandparents, who also intervened in the juvenile pro-
ceedings, have filed a cross-appeal.
FACTS ANd ProCedUrAL BACKGroUNd
Tiffani h. is the biological mother of damon h., born in
2002, and Aleeah h., born in 2003. Their biological father was
466 	281 NeBrASKA rePorTS

Isaiah J. Upon relinquishment of parental rights, damon and
Aleeah were adopted in the State of Minnesota by Jeffrey h.
and Karen h. in december 2004. The family currently resides
in Minnesota.
Isaiah died in June 2007. Nine days later, Tiffani gave
birth to Meridian. Although Isaiah’s name did not appear on
the birth certificate, Tiffani “strongly believed” that he was
Meridian’s father. Paternity was never definitively established,
but genetic testing excluded another man who thought he might
be Meridian’s father. For purposes of this appeal, we assume
that Isaiah was Meridian’s father and that Meridian, damon,
and Aleeah are full biological siblings.
Although it is unclear from the record, the parties indicate
in their briefs that Tiffani resided in Nebraska at the time of
Meridian’s birth. When Meridian was approximately 2 weeks
old, Tiffani took her to Minnesota to visit Meridian’s siblings’
family and Meridian’s paternal grandmother.
on or about September 17, 2007, Tiffani was involved in
a motor vehicle accident in Nebraska and was cited for driv-
ing under the influence and several other offenses for which
she was jailed. Meridian, who was in the vehicle at the time
of the accident, was initially placed with a family member.
on September 20, Meridian was taken into the custody of the
Nebraska department of health and human Services (dhhS)
and placed in a foster home. When Jeffrey and Karen learned
of this development sometime during the fall of 2007, they
notified dhhS that they were willing and interested in provid-
ing a foster home for Meridian.
The State initiated abuse and neglect proceedings in the sep-
arate juvenile court for Sarpy County on September 26, 2007,
and on october 3, the court continued Meridian’s placement in
the temporary custody of dhhS and ordered that Tiffani have
supervised visitation. In december 2007, the State amended
its petition and Meridian was adjudicated a child pursuant to
§ 43-247(3)(a) based upon Tiffani’s admission of the allega-
tions of the amended petition.
After a disposition hearing on February 20, 2008, the juve-
nile court found that reasonable efforts had been made to
eliminate the need for Meridian’s removal from her home, but
IN re INTereST oF MerIdIAN h. 	467
Cite as 281 Neb. 465

that because Tiffani was incarcerated and unable to care for
Meridian, returning her to the parental home at that time was
contrary to her best interests. The tentative permanency plan
was for eventual reunification with Tiffani. Pursuant to that
plan, the court ordered Tiffani to complete a parenting program
and a chemical dependency evaluation.
After a brief placement in another foster home, on March
10, 2008, dhhS placed Meridian in the foster home of Shane
K. and Brandi K., who reside in La Vista, Nebraska. on April
10, noting that the tentative permanency plan was still reunifi-
cation, the juvenile court ordered Tiffani to complete a specific
residential chemical dependency treatment program, and it
placed Meridian in Tiffani’s custody at the treatment facility.
on May 13, dhhS returned Meridian to the foster parents’
home, and she has resided there continuously since then.
Following a hearing on July 23, 2008, the court ordered
Meridian to remain in the custody of dhhS, and Tiffani was
allowed supervised visitation. The court also ordered dhhS
to obtain a home study of Jeffrey and Karen’s home under
the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children.1 In an order
entered on September 11, the court noted that the permanency
plan for reunification with Tiffani continued to be appropri-
ate because Tiffani had entered a treatment program, but it
noted that the concurrent plan was adoption. The court ordered
custody to remain with dhhS, and again ordered Tiffani to
complete a parenting program and a residential chemical depen-
dency treatment program.
In december 2008, Tiffani informed a dhhS case manager
that she still desired reunification with Meridian. At about
the same time, a man contacted dhhS and stated that he
might be Meridian’s biological father. on december 17, the
court continued custody with dhhS and ordered it to con-
duct an expedited home study of Jeffrey and Karen’s home in
Minnesota.
In February 2009, dhhS arranged for paternity testing,
which results excluded the person who had indicated that
1 See Neb. rev. Stat. § 43-1101 (reissue 2008) (repealed by 2009 Neb.
Laws, L.B. 237, § 5, effective Aug. 30, 2009).
468 	281 NeBrASKA rePorTS

he might be Meridian’s father. In the same month, Tiffani
informed dhhS that she wished to relinquish parental rights
with respect to Meridian. The juvenile court ordered that
dhhS continue to have custody of Meridian and also ordered
an evaluation to determine her best interests with respect to
placement. At this point, dhhS considered both the foster
parents and Jeffrey and Karen to be potential adoptive families
for Meridian. In June, dhhS obtained the court-ordered home
study which “highly recommended” placement of Meridian
with Jeffrey and Karen.
In April 2009, dhhS retained Glenda Cottam, Ph.d., J.d., to
conduct a placement suitability assessment for Meridian. Based
upon this evaluation, Cottam concluded: “Although either the
[foster parents’] home or [Jeffrey and Karen’s] home would
be an excellent adoptive home for Meridian, the undersigned
psychologist believes that Meridian should grow up with the
opportunity to have a close and loving relationship with her
two biological siblings and extended family.” Cottam noted
that Meridian “could experience some difficulties in adjust-
ing/transitioning” to Jeffrey and Karen’s home, but that they
appeared “able and willing” to assist Meridian with respect to
“issues related to attachment problems.” on June 14, dhhS
advised the court that it agreed with Cottam’s recommendation.
It recommended that the permanency objective be changed to
adoption and that Meridian be placed in Jeffrey and Karen’s
home. The guardian ad litem approved this plan “reluctantly,”
noting that Meridian was “deeply bonded” to the foster parents
and that they would support an open adoption “giving Meridian
an opportunity to develop a relationship with her siblings.”
Beginning in June, dhhS arranged for the siblings’ family to
visit Meridian in Nebraska.
on June 19, 2009, the court ordered dhhS to engage Nancy
Thompson, M.S., to formulate a plan for Meridian to have
contact with the siblings’ family to determine the effect on
her if there was a change of placement. Thompson, a licensed
mental health practitioner, observed a visit by the siblings’
family to the foster parents’ home on August 1. In a report
to dhhS, Thompson noted that she was “impressed with the
respect and kindness both families showed to each other and
IN re INTereST oF MerIdIAN h. 	469
Cite as 281 Neb. 465

all the children.” While noting that both families demonstrated
“responsible parenting skills,” she recommended that Meridian
be allowed “to remain with her current foster family and to con-
tinue to form relationships with her biological family through
visits and other appropriate communication.” Thompson con-
cluded: “While Meridian shares a common genetic makeup
with the [siblings], there is no emotional bond built from
early-shared experience and common caretaking. At this criti-
cal stage of brain development, creating another attachment
break has significant negative implications for future emotional
and cognitive development.” Based in part upon Thompson’s
recommendations, dhhS changed its previous position and
recommended that it was in Meridian’s best interests to con-
tinue placement with and work toward eventual adoption by
the foster parents.
The State filed a motion for termination of Tiffani’s parental
rights on September 15, 2009, on grounds set forth in Neb. rev.
Stat. § 43-292(4) and (7) (Cum. Supp. 2010). Several parties
sought and were granted leave to intervene in the juvenile pro-
ceedings. These included Mark h. and Tammy h., Meridian’s
maternal grandparents; the foster parents, who claimed to stand
in loco parentis to Meridian and wished to be heard on the
issues of best interests and placement if termination of parental
rights occurred; and Jeffrey and Karen, in their capacities as
parents and guardians of damon and Aleeah. In their complaint
for leave to intervene, Jeffrey and Karen alleged that damon
and Aleeah knew and loved their sister Meridian and wished to
develop their relationship with her. They alleged that damon
and Aleeah have a fundamental liberty interest in the integrity
of the family unit under the due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, §§ 1 and
3, of the Nebraska Constitution. They requested that they be
allowed to adopt Meridian in the event of the termination of
Tiffani’s parental rights. Jeffrey and Karen further alleged that
because damon and Alleah were related to Meridian, they had
priority with respect to placement.
After obtaining leave to intervene, Jeffrey and Karen filed a
motion for change of placement in which they requested that
Meridian be placed in their home so that she could reside with
470 	281 NeBrASKA rePorTS

her siblings. They also filed an answer alleging that interven-
tion by the foster parents was legally improper and unneces-
sary because Meridian’s interests in placement and eventual
adoption were adequately represented by dhhS. They also
filed an objection to the dhhS case plan which called for
continued placement with and eventual adoption by the fos-
ter parents.
on March 15, 2010, Jeffrey and Karen filed an amended
motion for change of placement in which they alleged that
Tiffani, 	Meridian’s 	paternal 	grandmother, 	and 	Meridian’s
maternal grandparents all favored placement of Meridian with
Jeffrey and Karen so that she could reside with damon and
Aleeah. They further alleged that dhhS was engaging in
“active and systematic efforts” to break up Meridian’s biologi-
cal family in violation of state and federal law.
A trial was then conducted. Cottam and Thompson testified
regarding their opinions as previously set forth in their reports
discussed above. Meridian’s guardian ad litem testified that it
“may not be in Meridian’s best interest to be removed from
the only family that she’s known” and that it would be “better”
to continue Meridian’s placement with the foster parents. The
guardian ad litem further testified that if placement remained
with the foster parents, it would be important for Meridian to
develop a relationship with her siblings. Based on conversa-
tions with the foster parents, she believed that they sincerely
shared that view.
An employee of dhhS whose responsibilities include admin-
istration of foster care and adoption testified that under dhhS
policy and regulations, siblings should be placed together
whenever possible, provided such placement is in the best
interests of the child. She identified a dhhS administrative
memorandum dealing with actions required under the federal
Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions
Act of 2008 (Fostering Connections Act).2 The administrative
memorandum was received in evidence, and the court took
judicial notice of the federal statute.
2 Pub. L. No. 110-351, 2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. (122 Stat. 3949) (codified as
amended at scattered sections in title 42 of U.S. Code).
IN re INTereST oF MerIdIAN h. 	471
Cite as 281 Neb. 465

The court also received the parties’ stipulation that interve-
nors Mark and Tammy, Meridian’s maternal grandparents, have
periodically visited with Meridian during the pendency of the
juvenile proceedings, that they maintain contact with damon
and Aleeah, and that it is their desire that Meridian be placed
with damon and Aleeah in Jeffrey and Karen’s home.
on September 1, 2010, the juvenile court entered an order
overruling Jeffrey and Karen’s motion for change of place-
ment. The court first noted that in a separate order of the
same date, it had found by clear and convincing evidence that
Tiffani’s parental rights should be terminated and that termina-
tion of parental rights was in Meridian’s best interests. While
the separate order is not included in the record before us,
the parties do not dispute that Tiffani’s parental rights have
been terminated.
The juvenile court then noted that under Neb. rev. Stat.
§ 43-285(2) (reissue 2008), Jeffrey and Karen and others sup-
porting the change of placement had the burden to prove that
Meridian’s current placement with the foster parents was not in
her best interests. After reviewing the evidence, the court con-
cluded that the burden had not been met. The court determined
that the applicability of the federal Fostering Connections Act
was “less than clear in this case” due to the fact that Meridian
was born after damon and Aleeah were adopted by Jeffrey and
Karen and thus “never lived with or knew either of those chil-
dren as her siblings.” The court found that the “one certainty”
which would accompany a change in placement “would be
emotional harm to Meridian” and that whether such harm would
be of long- or short-term duration was speculative. The court
noted that the foster parents testified that if Meridian remained
in their home, they would be willing to foster a relationship
with Jeffrey and Karen so that Meridian could know her bio-
logical siblings as she grows up. The court acknowledged this
testimony may not be legally binding, but found it “sincere and
credible.” The court concluded that while it did not doubt the
motives of the grandparents or Jeffrey and Karen,
what they are seeking is an order . . . which would
remove Meridian from the only home she has known and
from foster parents who have loved and cared for her as if
472 	281 NeBrASKA rePorTS

she were their own child over the last two and a half years
of her life. While relatives are certainly to be given due
consideration in terms of placement decisions, it is not the
controlling factor as to a child’s best interests. The fact
that the [foster parents] have cared for and loved Meridian
with no certainty they would be able to keep her, with
limited support from [dhhS,] and with all indications of
a generous and selfless commitment to her, is something
this Court cannot discount or dismiss.
Jeffrey and Karen perfected a timely appeal from this order.
ASSIGNMeNTS oF error
Jeffrey and Karen assign the following errors: (1) The
juvenile court’s order contravenes the public policy of pre-
serving sibling relationships, state law, the federal Fostering
Connections Act, and dhhS’ regulations and administrative
policies; (2) the juvenile court erred in overruling the place-
ment motion and failing to order visitation between damon
and Aleeah and Meridian, as the evidence shows that it is in
Meridian’s best interests to be placed in the same home as
her siblings and to have visitation with them; (3) the juvenile
court’s finding that it is certain that Meridian will be emo-
tionally harmed if her placement is changed is not supported
by any competent evidence; (4) the juvenile court erred by
failing to find that damon and Aleeah have a fundamental
liberty interest in their relationship with their sister Meridian;
and (5) the juvenile court abused its discretion in its find-
ing that the foster parents stand in loco parentis in relation
to Meridian.
The maternal grandparents have filed a cross-appeal, in
which they assert that the juvenile court erred in (1) finding
that the foster parents stand in loco parentis to Meridian, (2)
failing to find that damon and Aleeah have a fundamental lib-
erty interest in their relationship and placement with Meridian,
(3) finding that Meridian would be emotionally harmed if her
placement was changed, and (4) failing to place Meridian
with her siblings and failing to find that the failure to place
Meridian with her siblings violated dhhS policy and state and
federal law.
IN re INTereST oF MerIdIAN h. 	473
Cite as 281 Neb. 465

STANdArd oF reVIeW
[1] Juvenile cases are reviewed de novo on the record, and
an appellate court is required to reach a conclusion indepen-
dent of the juvenile court’s findings.3
[2] A jurisdictional question which does not involve a fac-
tual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of
law, which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion
independent of the lower court’s decision.4
ANALYSIS
I ntroductIon
[3] In a juvenile case, as in any other appeal, before reach-
ing the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an
appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over
the matter before it.5 Two jurisdictional issues are presented in
this case. The first is whether the order denying the change in
placement is a final, appealable order. Under Neb. rev. Stat.
§ 25-1902 (reissue 2008), the three types of final orders which
may be reviewed on appeal are (1) an order which affects a
substantial right in an action and which in effect determines
the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order affecting a
substantial right made during a special proceeding, and (3) an
order affecting a substantial right made on summary applica-
tion in an action after a judgment is rendered.6 The first and
third types of final orders clearly are not present in this case.
But the second type may be, as a proceeding before a juvenile
court is a special proceeding for appellate purposes.7 To resolve
the final order issue, we must determine whether the denial of
3 In re Interest of Chance J., 279 Neb. 81, 776 N.W.2d 519 (2009).
4 Davio v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 280 Neb. 263, 786
N.W.2d 655 (2010).
5 In re Interest of Taylor W., 276 Neb. 679, 757 N.W.2d 1 (2008).
6 Kilgore v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 277 Neb. 456, 763
N.W.2d 77 (2009).
7 In re Interest of Anthony R. et al., 264 Neb. 699, 651 N.W.2d 231 (2002);
In re Interest of Clifford M. et al., 258 Neb. 800, 606 N.W.2d 743 (2000).
474 	281 NeBrASKA rePorTS

damon and Aleeah’s motion to change placement affected their
“substantial right.”
[4-6] The second jurisdictional issue is whether damon
and Aleeah have standing to appeal from the placement order.
Standing relates to a court’s power, that is, jurisdiction, to
address issues presented and serves to identify those disputes
which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process.8
Under the doctrine of standing, a court may decline to deter-
mine merits of a legal claim because the party advancing it is
not properly situated to be entitled to its judicial determina-
tion.9 The focus is on the party, not the claim itself.10 Standing
requires that a litigant have such a personal stake in the out-
come of a controversy as to warrant invocation of a court’s
jurisdiction and justify exercise of the court’s remedial pow-
ers on the litigant’s behalf.11 Thus, both the final order issue
and the standing issue require an analysis of the existence
and nature of any rights which damon and Aleeah may pos-
sess, and how such rights, if any, were affected by the place-
ment determination. We address these questions in the context
of standing.
daMon and aleeaH H ave no cognIzable rIgHts
WItH respect to M erIdIan’s placeMent
arIsIng under nebraska statutes ,
regulatIons , or coMMon laW
Neb. rev. Stat. § 43-2,106.01 (reissue 2008) provides that
an appeal from a final order or judgment entered by a juvenile
court may be taken by specified parties including “(a) The
juvenile; (b) The guardian ad litem; (c) The juvenile’s par-
ent, custodian, or guardian . . . or (d) The county attorney or
petitioner . . . .” Jeffrey and Karen acknowledge that damon
and Aleeah do not fall within any of these categories, but they
8 Central Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. North Platte NRD, 280 Neb. 533, 788
N.W.2d 252 (2010).
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
IN re INTereST oF MerIdIAN h. 	475
Cite as 281 Neb. 465

argue that the statutory list is not exclusive. They note that we
have reached the merits of appeals from juvenile court orders
brought by parties who are not specifically authorized by
statute to appeal. In those cases, however, the issue on appeal
was whether the court erred in denying leave to intervene.12
In holding that grandparents should have been permitted to
intervene in a juvenile case at a point where parental rights
had not been terminated, we noted that intervention enabled
interested grandparents to “receive notice and have an oppor-
tunity to be heard” with respect to actions which could affect
their relationship with their grandchildren, but did not confer
“any special entitlements or priorities . . . with respect to
temporary custody, placement, or any other issue before the
juvenile court.”13
here, the order from which Jeffrey and Karen seek to appeal
determined that a change in Meridian’s foster placement fol-
lowing termination of Tiffani’s parental rights was not in her
best interests. Assuming without deciding that a person who is
not statutorily authorized to appeal from such an order could
nevertheless do so, such person would be required to dem-
onstrate a personal stake in the controversy in order to have
standing necessary to invoke appellate jurisdiction.14
Jeffrey and Karen argue that damon and Aleeah have stand-
ing under Nebraska’s “public policy fostering the preserva-
tion of sibling relationships and the placement of siblings
together, where possible.”15 They rely upon Neb. rev. Stat.
§ 43-533(4)(b) (reissue 2008), which provides that “when a
child cannot remain with parents, [state agencies should] give
preference to relatives as a placement resource.” They also
argue that preservation of a sibling relationship is implicit in
12 See, In re Interest of Elias L., 277 Neb. 1023, 767 N.W.2d 98 (2009); In re
Interest of Destiny S., 263 Neb. 255, 639 N.W.2d 400 (2002); In re Interest
of Kayle C. & Kylee C., 253 Neb. 685, 574 N.W.2d 473 (1998).
13 In re Interest of Kayle C. & Kylee C., supra note 12, 253 Neb. at 693, 574
N.W.2d at 478.
14 See Central Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. North Platte NRD, supra note 8.
15 Brief for intervenors-appellants at 4.
476 	281 NeBrASKA rePorTS

provisions of the Nebraska Juvenile Code which require that
reasonable efforts be made to reunify families16 and is explicit
in dhhS administrative policies and regulations which encour-
age that siblings be placed together when possible.
This court stated in In re Interest of Aaron D.17 and In re
Interest of L.J., J.J., and J.N.J.18 that juvenile courts must
recognize, if possible, the interests of siblings. But we did so
in the context of determining the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a finding that termination of parental rights was in
the best interests of the adjudicated juvenile. In both cases,
we found the evidence on this issue to be insufficient. As part
of the analysis in In re Interest of Aaron D., we noted that
there was uncontradicted testimony that the juvenile would be
harmed by the termination of his relationship with his sister,
which we described as “a de facto result” of termination of
parental rights.19 We have never recognized a right on the part
of unadjudicated siblings to seek establishment or preservation
of a claimed sibling relationship in juvenile abuse and neglect
proceedings. But we have specifically held that a juvenile court
lacks jurisdiction to order visitation between an adjudicated
juvenile and an unadjudicated sibling against the wishes of
the parent.20
[7] The Nebraska statutes and regulations which reflect a
policy favoring preservation of a sibling relationship do so
only within the context of determining the best interests of a
juvenile who is subject to the jurisdiction of a juvenile court
or otherwise entrusted to the custody of dhhS. To have stand-
ing, a litigant must assert the litigant’s own rights and interests,
and cannot rest a claim on the legal rights or interests of third
16 See Neb. rev. Stat. § 43-283.01(2) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
17 In re Interest of Aaron D., 269 Neb. 249, 691 N.W.2d 164 (2005).
18 In re Interest of L.J., J.J., and J.N.J., 220 Neb. 102, 368 N.W.2d 474
(1985).
19 In re Interest of Aaron D., supra note 17, 269 Neb. at 265, 691 N.W.2d
at 176.
20 In re Interest of D.W., 249 Neb. 133, 542 N.W.2d 407 (1996).
IN re INTereST oF MerIdIAN h. 	477
Cite as 281 Neb. 465

parties.21 We conclude that under Nebraska law, damon and
Aleeah have no cognizable interest in the sibling relationship
separate and distinct from that of Meridian. here, the guardian
ad litem did not appeal on Meridian’s behalf and has joined in
the briefs of the appellees.
daMon and aleeaH H ave no constItutIonally
protected rIgHts WItH respect
to M erIdIan’s placeMent
In their motion for change of placement, Jeffrey and Karen
alleged that damon and Aleeah “have a fundamental liberty
interest in the integrity of the family unit,” including a relation-
ship with their biological sibling Meridian, which is protected
by the due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution and article I, §§ 1 and 3, of the Nebraska
Constitution. Although the juvenile court did not specifically
address this issue, Jeffrey and Karen and amicus curiae urge
this court to recognize the existence of the claimed constitu-
tional right as a matter of first impression. Because the issue
bears directly on the question of standing, we consider it.
The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that a parent has a
constitutional right to make decisions regarding custody and
control of his or her child,22 and based upon this precedent, this
court has recognized that “both parents and their children have
cognizable substantive due process rights to the parent-child
relationship.”23 These rights “‘protect[] not only the parent’s
right to the companionship, care, custody, and management of
his or her child, but also protects the child’s reciprocal right to
be raised and nurtured by a biological or adoptive parent.’”24
21 See Central Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. North Platte NRD, supra note 8.
22 See, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. ed. 2d 49
(2000) (plurality opinion); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.
Ct. 438, 88 L. ed. 645 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. ed. 1070 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. ed. 1042 (1923).
23 Amanda C. v. Case, 275 Neb. 757, 766, 749 N.W.2d 429, 438 (2008).
24 In re Guardianship of D.J., 268 Neb. 239, 246, 682 N.W.2d 238, 244
(2004), quoting Uhing v. Uhing, 241 Neb. 368, 488 N.W.2d 366 (1992).
478 	281 NeBrASKA rePorTS

But here, the parent-child relationship between the siblings
and their biological parents was extinguished by relinquish-
ment in the case of damon and Aleeah, and by termination of
Tiffani’s parental rights in the case of Meridian. The question
presented to us is whether the constitutionally protected parent-
child relationship which once existed between damon and
Aleeah and their biological parents and the entirely separate
parent-child relationship which once existed between Meridian
and her biological mother can be considered together as the
basis for a present constitutionally protected right of damon
and Aleeah to a relationship with Meridian, with whom they
have never resided.
Jeffrey and Karen acknowledge that no court has recognized
a constitutionally protected right of one sibling to a relation-
ship with another following termination or relinquishment of
parental rights. In In re Adoption of Pierce,25 a Massachusetts
appellate court held that a half sister could request visitation
with her half brother after his adoption under a state statute.
But, the court found she had no constitutional right to visita-
tion, reasoning “[t]he United States Supreme Court has never
concluded that there exists a fundamental liberty interest in the
sibling relationship.”26
[8] In the absence of precedent, and given the diverse and
complex nature of sibling relationships, we are not persuaded
that it would be logical or prudent to conclude that a consti-
tutionally protected sibling relationship somehow rises from
the ashes of a lawfully terminated or relinquished parent-child
relationship. We agree with other courts which have held that
the effect of a particular placement on a child’s relationship
with siblings is but one factor, albeit an important one, which
a court should consider in determining whether the placement
is in the child’s best interests.27 We therefore conclude that
damon and Aleeah have no state or federal constitutional right
which could be affected by Meridian’s placement.
25 In re Adoption of Pierce, 58 Mass. App. 342, 790 N.e.2d 680 (2003).
26 Id. at 347, 790 N.e.2d at 685.
27 See, e.g., Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. 219, 700 N.e.2d 516 (1998); State
ex rel. Treadway v. McCoy, 189 W. Va. 210, 429 S.e.2d 492 (1993).
IN re INTereST oF MerIdIAN h. 	479
Cite as 281 Neb. 465

daMon and aleeaH H ave no cognIzable rIgHts
WItH respect to M erIdIan’s placeMent arIsIng
under federal fosterIng connectIons act
Jeffrey and Karen and amicus curiae call our attention to
a specific section of the Fostering Connections Act,28 a fed-
eral statute enacted during the pendency of this proceeding
approximately 31⁄2 years after damon and Aleeah were adopted
by Jeffrey and Karen and approximately 1 year after Meridian
was removed from Tiffani’s home. The specific provisions of
the Fostering Connections Act they rely upon are codified at 42
U.S.C. § 671(a)(29) and (31). We note that § 671 was amended
in 2010 by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.29
recently, another provision of that statute was held unconstitu-
tional by a U.S. district court, which also held that § 671 was
not severable and was therefore unconstitutional as well.30 This
decision has been stayed pending appeal,31 so we assume for
purposes of this appeal that § 671 remains in effect.
The federal statute requires that in order for a State to be
eligible for certain federal funds, it must have a plan approved
by the Secretary of health and human Services which, inter
alia, provides that within 30 days after a child is removed from
a parent’s custody, the state shall “exercise due diligence to
identify and provide notice to all adult grandparents and other
adult relatives of the child” of the child’s removal from the
parent’s custody and certain other specified information.32 The
statute also requires that the state’s plan provides that reason-
able efforts shall be made
(A) to place siblings removed from their home in
the same foster care, kinship guardianship, or adoptive
placement, unless the State documents that such a joint
28 See 42 U.S.C. § 671 (Supp. III 2009).
29 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. (124 Stat. 119) (2010).
30 Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services,
No. 3:10-cv-91-rV/eMT, 2011 WL 285683 (N.d. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).
31 Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services,
No. 3:10-cv-91-rV/eMT, 2011 WL 723117 (N.d. Fla. Mar. 3, 2011).
32 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(29).
480 	281 NeBrASKA rePorTS

placement would be contrary to the safety or well-being
of any of the siblings; and
(B) in the case of siblings removed from their home
who are not so jointly placed, to provide for frequent visi-
tation or other ongoing interaction between the siblings,
unless that State documents that frequent visitation or
other ongoing interaction would be contrary to the safety
or well-being of any of the siblings[.]33
The juvenile court took judicial notice of the federal statute
and received in evidence a dhhS administrative memoran-
dum informing staff of the federal statutory requirements and
requiring their implementation.
We question the applicability of the federal statute to this
case, given the fact that all three children were removed from
parental custody prior to its enactment. But assuming without
deciding that it applies, we do not read the statute as creating
any substantive rights in damon and Aleeah which are cogni-
zable in this proceeding. The Fostering Connections Act was
intended “to connect and support relative caregivers, improve
outcomes for children in foster care, provide for tribal foster
care and adoption access, improve incentives for adoption, and
for other purposes.”34 Neither the foster parents nor Jeffrey
and Karen are “relative caregivers” of Meridian. The Fostering
Connections Act places certain responsibilities on a state with
respect to a child who it has removed from the custody of its
parents, but says nothing about minor siblings of the child
who are not in foster care. The statute requires notice to adult
relatives of children removed from parental custody, but does
not require notice to relatives who are minors or to the parents
or custodians of such minors. We conclude that the Fostering
Connections Act does not establish any legal interest on the
part of damon and Aleeah which could have been affected
by the juvenile court’s placement order or serve as the basis
for standing.
33 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(31).
34 Pub. L. No. 110-351, 2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. (122 Stat. 3949).
IN re INTereST oF MerIdIAN h. 	481
Cite as 281 Neb. 465

cross -appeal
Mark and Tammy, who were given leave to intervene in the
juvenile proceedings as Meridian’s maternal grandparents, have
filed a cross-appeal in which they contend that the juvenile
court erred in not placing Meridian with Jeffrey and Karen.
however, any interest or right which Mark and Tammy may
have had by virtue of their biological relationship to Meridian
ceased to exist when the parental rights of their daughter,
Tiffani, were terminated.35 Accordingly, they lack standing to
cross-appeal.
CoNCLUSIoN
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the intervenors-
appellants and cross-appellants lack standing, and we therefore
dismiss the appeal and the cross-appeal.
appeal dIsMIssed.
WrIgHt, J., not participating.
35 See, In re Interest of Destiny S., supra note 12; In re Interest of Kayle C. &
Kylee C., supra note 12; In re Interest of Ditter, 212 Neb. 855, 326 N.W.2d
675 (1982).
482 	281 NeBrASKA rePorTS