Cesar C. v. Alicia L.

five of the seven members of the tribal council in the
tribal meeting room at the Tribe’s headquarters, along
with the tribal council’s vote on resolution No. 08-74,
strongly suggest that the action of the chairman and the
vice chairman, both members of the tribal council, were,
on these facts, essentially the action of the tribal council
itself. Unlike those cases wherein the agent was a party
removed from the principal by time, place, and/or organi-
zational structure, the agent and the principal in this case,
if not actually one and the same, are very nearly one and
the same.
We conclude that based upon these undisputed facts,
the chairman and vice chairman had the requisite author-
ity to waive the Tribe’s sovereign immunity. The Tribe’s
first assignment of error is without merit.
The remainder of the opinion shall remain unmodified.
Former opinion modiFied.
motion For rehearing overruled.
Wright, J., not participating.
C esar C., appellant and Cross -appellee , v.
aliCia l., appellee and Cross -appellant.
800 N.W.2d 249
Filed July 22, 2011. 	No. S-10-924.
1. Paternity: Appeal and Error. In a filiation proceeding, questions concerning
child custody determinations are reviewed on appeal de novo on the record to
determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial court, whose
judgment will be upheld in the absence of an abuse of discretion. In such de novo
review, when the evidence is in conflict, the appellate court considers, and may
give weight to, the fact that the trial court heard and observed the witnesses and
accepted one version of the facts rather than another.
2. Judgments: Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a matter of
law in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an
independent, correct conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the
trial court.
3. Appeal and Error. Although an appellate court ordinarily considers only those
errors assigned and discussed in the briefs, the appellate court may, at its option,
notice plain error.
ceSAr c. v. AlIcIA l. 	979
cite as 281 Neb. 979
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:45 AM CST

4. ____. Plain error is error plainly evident from the record and of such a nature
that to leave it uncorrected would result in damage to the integrity, reputation, or
fairness of the judicial process.
5. Paternity: Words and Phrases. The provision in Neb. rev. Stat. § 43-1409
(reissue 2008) that the acknowledgment of paternity is a “legal finding” means
that it legally establishes paternity in the person named in the acknowledgment as
the father.
Appeal from the District court for Dawson county: James
e. 	doyle iv, 	Judge. 	reversed 	and 	remanded 	for 	further
proceedings.
Jeffrey M. Wightman and Jesus A. Tena, Jr., of Wightman &
Wightman, for appellant.
Bradley D. Holbrook and David H. Kalisek, of Jacobsen, Orr,
Nelson, lindstrom & Holbrook, P.c., l.l.O., for appellee.
heaviCan, c.J., C onnolly, gerrard, stephan, mCC ormaCk,
and miller-lerman, JJ.
miller-lerman, J.
NATUre OF cASe
The district court for Dawson county awarded Alicia l. cus-
tody of Jaime c. based on its application of the parental pref-
erence doctrine. cesar c. appeals and assigns various errors,
and Alicia cross-appeals. We conclude that the district court
erred when it failed to give proper legal effect to a notarized
acknowledgment of paternity signed by cesar and Alicia at the
time of Jaime’s birth. In the absence of a successful challenge
directed at the acknowledgment, the acknowledgment had the
effect of establishing that cesar was the legal father of Jaime
and matters of custody and child support should have been
considered within this legal framework. We therefore reverse
the decision of the district court and remand the cause for fur-
ther proceedings.
STATeMeNT OF FAcTS
cesar and Alicia lived together and had an intimate relation-
ship between 2004 and 2006. During that time, Alicia became
pregnant. cesar and Alicia are not married.
980 	281 NeBrASKA rePOrTS

Alicia gave birth to Jaime in 2006, and cesar was present at
the birth. On the day after Jaime’s birth, cesar and Alicia both
signed a form provided by the Nebraska Department of Health
and Human Services titled “Acknowledgement of Paternity,”
in which both cesar and Alicia acknowledged that cesar
was Jaime’s biological father. Their signatures were notarized.
cesar was named as the father on the birth certificate.
When Alicia and Jaime left the hospital, they returned to
a home cesar and Alicia had rented in lexington, Nebraska.
Shortly thereafter, Alicia learned that there was an outstanding
federal warrant for her arrest for conspiracy to deliver meth-
amphetamine. Without notifying cesar, Alicia fled lexington
and left Jaime with cesar. Alicia was arrested in colorado
on October 5, 2006, and was later convicted and sentenced to
imprisonment in a federal facility in Texas. She was in federal
custody until August 2008, when she was released to a halfway
house in Omaha, Nebraska, where she lived until she moved
into a house in February 2009. After arriving in Omaha, Alicia
resumed contact with cesar and Jaime, who for the last 2
years had been living together in lexington. The relationship
between cesar and Alicia did not resume.
On June 8, 2009, cesar filed a complaint in the district
court for Dawson county to establish paternity, custody, and
child support with respect to Jaime. cesar asserted that at all
times, Jaime had been in his physical care, custody, and control
and that they had lived in lexington Jaime’s entire life. cesar
sought an order declaring him to be Jaime’s father, granting
him custody of Jaime, and ordering Alicia to pay child sup-
port. cesar also filed a motion for temporary custody; in an
affidavit in support of the motion, he asserted that on June 7,
Alicia had taken Jaime to Omaha without cesar’s knowledge
or consent. The court granted cesar’s motion for temporary
custody of Jaime.
Although on June 9, 2009, Alicia filed a separate action in
the district court for Douglas county in which she asserted that
cesar was Jaime’s father, she answered cesar’s complaint in
this case with a countercomplaint for custody and child sup-
port in which she asserted that cesar was “potentially” Jaime’s
ceSAr c. v. AlIcIA l. 	981
cite as 281 Neb. 979

father. In a separate motion, Alicia asserted that it was possible
that cesar was not Jaime’s biological father and she requested
that the court order cesar to submit to genetic testing to deter-
mine paternity. The court granted the request. After the genetic
testing excluded cesar as being Jaime’s biological father, Alicia
filed a motion for summary judgment and motions to, inter
alia, grant her temporary custody of Jaime and vacate the order
directing her to pay child support.
cesar filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint
which alleged that immediately after Jaime’s birth, he asked
Alicia whether he was Jaime’s father; that Alicia told cesar
that he was Jaime’s father; and that at no time since, until the
present action, had Alicia indicated to cesar that he was not
Jaime’s father. cesar also alleged that Alicia was unfit to have
custody of Jaime for various reasons including, inter alia, her
involvement with drugs, her conviction “for one or more fed-
eral felonies,” and her abandonment of Jaime. cesar further
alleged that he was an “‘equitable parent’” to Jaime, that Alicia
should be equitably estopped from denying his paternity, and
that he had acted in loco parentis to Jaime.
The district court granted cesar leave to file the amended
complaint. The court overruled Alicia’s motion for summary
judgment and other motions after it determined that there
were genuine issues of material fact relating to the claims
raised by cesar in his amended complaint and that there was
legal authority to support cesar’s claims that he had the rights
of a parent. Alicia answered cesar’s amended complaint
by alleging, inter alia, that cesar was unfit to have custody
of Jaime.
At a final hearing on all pending matters in this case, cesar
offered into evidence the notarized acknowledgment of pater-
nity signed by cesar and Alicia at Jaime’s birth. Without objec-
tion by Alicia, the court received the acknowledgment into
evidence. Following the hearing, the court entered an order on
August 19, 2010, ruling on both parties’ various claims. The
court first determined that cesar had proved by clear and con-
vincing evidence each of the elements of equitable estoppel.
In making such determination, the court found as an incidental
matter that the acknowledgment of paternity had been signed;
982 	281 NeBrASKA rePOrTS

however, the court did not consider the legal effect of the
acknowledgment. The court concluded that cesar could use the
doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent Alicia from terminat-
ing the relationship between cesar and Jaime.
In its order, the court noted that genetic testing excluded
cesar as being Jaime’s biological father. The court therefore
applied the parental preference doctrine and concluded that
Alicia, as the biological parent of Jaime, had the superior right
to custody unless such custody would be detrimental to Jaime’s
welfare. The court found that cesar failed to establish that
Alicia was unfit to parent Jaime or that she had forfeited her
parental rights by substantial, continuous, and repeated neglect
of Jaime. The court awarded custody of Jaime to Alicia.
Despite its conclusion that cesar had not rebutted the pre-
sumption of custody in Alicia, the court found that cesar had
established that his relationship with Jaime was protected by
the in loco parentis doctrine and that therefore, cesar was enti-
tled to parenting time with Jaime. The court found that cesar
should have “extensive and liberal parenting time” with Jaime
and set forth a parenting plan to provide such time. Finally, the
court determined that because cesar stood in loco parentis to
Jaime, he had an obligation to support Jaime; the court there-
fore ordered cesar to pay monthly child support.
cesar filed a motion for a new trial or to reconsider or mod-
ify the August 19, 2010, order. The court granted a new trial
limited to a specific evidentiary issue. cesar noted that at the
prior hearing, the court did not explicitly rule on Alicia’s offer-
ing into evidence the results of the genetic testing that excluded
cesar as Jaime’s biological father. When Alicia again offered
the evidence at the new trial, cesar objected. cesar argued
that based on equitable estoppel, Alicia should not be allowed
to present evidence that he was not Jaime’s biological father.
The court overruled cesar’s objection, stating that equitable
estoppel did not prevent admission of the evidence. In an order
entered September 16, the court concluded that admission of
the evidence did not change the findings and conclusions it had
reached in its August 19 order.
cesar appeals the August 19 and September 16, 2010, orders.
Alicia cross-appeals.
ceSAr c. v. AlIcIA l. 	983
cite as 281 Neb. 979

ASSIGNMeNTS OF errOr
In his appeal, cesar claims that the district court erred when
it (1) found that Alicia was not equitably estopped from offer-
ing the results of genetic testing to establish that cesar was not
Jaime’s biological father, (2) found that Alicia was not unfit
to have custody of Jaime, and (3) did not order Alicia to pay
child support.
In her cross-appeal, Alicia claims that the district court erred
when it concluded that cesar had established the elements of
equitable estoppel by clear and convincing evidence.
STANDArDS OF reVIeW
[1] In a filiation proceeding, questions concerning child
custody determinations are reviewed on appeal de novo on
the record to determine whether there has been an abuse of
discretion by the trial court, whose judgment will be upheld in
the absence of an abuse of discretion. In such de novo review,
when the evidence is in conflict, the appellate court consid-
ers, and may give weight to, the fact that the trial court heard
and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the
facts rather than another. State on behalf of Pathammavong v.
Pathammavong, 268 Neb. 1, 679 N.W.2d 749 (2004).
[2] Statutory interpretation is a matter of law in connection
with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an
independent, correct conclusion irrespective of the determina-
tion made by the trial court. State ex rel. Wagner v. Gilbane
Bldg. Co., 280 Neb. 223, 786 N.W.2d 330 (2010).
ANAlYSIS
Before considering the assigned errors, we note plain error
which requires reversal: to wit, the district court failed to give
proper legal effect to the signed and notarized acknowledgment
of paternity. Because such error resolves the appeal, we need
not consider the errors assigned by cesar or those assigned
by Alicia in her cross-appeal. Instead, we reverse the August
19 and September 16, 2010, orders of the district court which
encompassed the court’s rulings on custody and the admission
of genetic testing, and remand the cause for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.
984 	281 NeBrASKA rePOrTS

[3,4] Although an appellate court ordinarily considers only
those errors assigned and discussed in the briefs, the appellate
court may, at its option, notice plain error. In re Interest of
Brandon M., 273 Neb. 47, 727 N.W.2d 230 (2007). Plain error
is error plainly evident from the record and of such a nature
that to leave it uncorrected would result in damage to the integ-
rity, reputation, or fairness of the judicial process. In re Interest
of Markice M., 275 Neb. 908, 750 N.W.2d 345 (2008). We note
plain error in the district court’s failure to give proper legal
effect to the notarized acknowledgment of paternity signed
by cesar and Alicia at Jaime’s birth, and we determine that to
leave the error uncorrected would result in damage to the integ-
rity, reputation, or fairness of the judicial process, because the
error affected cesar’s legal relationship to Jaime and beyond
doubt affected the court’s decisions with respect to evidentiary
matters and custody.
At Jaime’s birth, cesar and Alicia executed a notarized
acknowledgment of paternity in which they asserted that cesar
was Jaime’s biological father. cesar offered the notarized
acknowledgment into evidence at the hearing in this case, and
the court received the evidence without objection by Alicia.
The court noted in its August 19, 2010, order that the acknowl-
edgment was signed. However, the court failed to give proper
legal effect to the signed, unchallenged acknowledgment. As
explained below, the proper legal effect of a signed, unchal-
lenged acknowledgment of paternity is a finding that the indi-
vidual who signed as the father is in fact the legal father.
With regard to the legal effect of a notarized acknowledg-
ment of paternity, Neb. rev. Stat. § 43-1409 (reissue 2008)
provides as follows:
The signing of a notarized acknowledgment, whether
under section 43-1408.01 or otherwise, by the alleged
father shall create a rebuttable presumption of paternity as
against the alleged father. The signed, notarized acknowl-
edgment is subject to the right of any signatory to rescind
the acknowledgment within the earlier of (1) sixty days
or (2) the date of an administrative or judicial proceeding
relating to the child, including a proceeding to establish a
support order in which the signatory is a party. After the
ceSAr c. v. AlIcIA l. 	985
cite as 281 Neb. 979

rescission period a signed, notarized acknowledgment is
considered a legal finding which may be challenged only
on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact
with the burden of proof upon the challenger, and the
legal responsibilities, including the child support obliga-
tion, of any signatory arising from the acknowledgment
shall not be suspended during the challenge, except for
good cause shown. Such a signed and notarized acknowl-
edgment or a certified copy or certified reproduction
thereof shall be admissible in evidence in any proceeding
to establish support.
(emphasis supplied.)
[5] We also note that Neb. rev. Stat. § 43-1402 (reissue
2008), regarding the liability of parents to support a child,
refers to the “father of a child whose paternity is established
either by judicial proceeding or by acknowledgment as here-
inafter provided.” Section 43-1402 therefore contemplates that
paternity may be established by acknowledgment and that
establishment of paternity by acknowledgment is the equivalent
of establishment of paternity by a judicial proceeding. reading
these statutes together, we interpret the provision in § 43-1409
that the acknowledgment is a “legal finding” to mean that
it legally establishes paternity in the person named in the
acknowledgment as the father.
For completeness, we further note that Neb. rev. Stat.
§ 43-1412.01 (reissue 2008) provides in part as follows:
An individual may file a complaint for relief and
the court may set aside a final judgment, court order,
administrative order, obligation to pay child support, or
any other legal determination of paternity if a scientifi-
cally reliable genetic test performed in accordance with
sections 43-1401 to 43-1418 establishes the exclusion
of the individual named as a father in the legal deter-
mination. . . . A court shall not grant relief from deter-
mination of paternity if the individual named as father
(1) completed a notarized acknowledgment of paternity
pursuant to section 43-1408.01, (2) adopted the child, or
(3) knew that the child was conceived through artificial
insemination.
986 	281 NeBrASKA rePOrTS

The provision in § 43-1412.01 that a court shall not grant relief
if the father completed a notarized acknowledgment provides
further support for the conclusion that an acknowledgment
legally establishes paternity and grants the individual named
as father the legal status of a parent to the child regardless of
genetic factors.
Finally, we note that under § 43-1409, any signatory has
a right to rescind the acknowledgment within the earlier of
60 days or the date of a legal proceeding related to the child.
There is no indication in this case that either party rescinded
the acknowledgment within the statutory rescission period, and
no proceeding relating to the child was noted during the rescis-
sion period. Thus, the acknowledgment remained in full force
and effect.
Prior to 1994, § 43-1409 (reissue 1993) read as follows:
A person may state in writing that he is the father of
a child or perform acts, such as furnishing of support,
which reasonably indicate that he considers himself to be
the father of such child, and in such case he shall be con-
sidered to have acknowledged the paternity of such child.
A child whose parents marry is legitimate.
This court applied the pre-1994 version of § 43-1409 in
State on behalf of J.R. v. Mendoza, 240 Neb. 149, 163-64, 481
N.W.2d 165, 174 (1992), and held that “in a filiation proceed-
ing for support of a child born out of wedlock, evidence of
the performance of acts described in § 43-1409 is not con-
clusive on the trier of fact, but constitutes relevant evidence
of a biological relationship.” In reaching such conclusion,
this court noted that “some state legislatures do distinguish
between a formal written acknowledgment of paternity and
informal acknowledgment through the performance of certain
acts, according only the former the conclusive effect of a judg-
ment,” and this court concluded that “[i]n the absence of such
a distinction between formal and informal acknowledgments in
the Nebraska statutes, we do not think the legislature intended
to give either form of acknowledgment conclusive effect.” 240
Neb. at 162, 481 N.W.2d at 173-74.
The pre-1994 version considered in State on behalf of J.R.
v. Mendoza, supra, was replaced. Section 43-1409 as it now
ceSAr c. v. AlIcIA l. 	987
cite as 281 Neb. 979

exists resulted from legislative amendments in 1994 and 1997
and now gives conclusive effect to a notarized acknowledgment
of paternity. In 1994, the statute was amended by deleting the
entire statute and replacing it with the current first and last
sentences. See § 43-1409 (cum. Supp. 1996). The middle
sentences of the current version of § 43-1409, which version
includes provisions relating to rescission of the acknowledg-
ment and designating the acknowledgment as a “legal finding”
after the rescission period, were added as part of 1997 Neb.
laws, l.B. 752. See § 43-1409 (reissue 1998). The stated
purpose of l.B. 752 was to comply with federal requirements
relating to child support enforcement. Introducer’s Statement of
Intent, 95th leg., 1st Sess. (Feb. 26, 1997), and Floor Debate,
1st Sess. 67 (Feb. 26, 1997). See, also, Jeffrey A. Parness &
Zachary Townsend, For Those Not John Edwards: More and
Better Paternity Acknowledgments at Birth, 40 U. Balt. l. rev.
53 (2010) (regarding federal mandates on voluntary paternity
acknowledgments as condition of receiving federal aid).
The current version of § 43-1409 recognizes only a formal
written and notarized acknowledgment, and by designating
such acknowledgment as a “legal finding” after the rescission
period, the legislature indicated that under the current version,
as contrasted with the version at issue in State on behalf of
J.R. v. Mendoza, supra, an acknowledgment has the conclusive
effect of a judgment finding paternity.
In the present case, at the time cesar initiated the current
proceedings, the notarized acknowledgment signed by cesar
and Alicia legally established cesar’s paternity as to Jaime.
A judicial proceeding was not needed to establish cesar’s
paternity. The legal finding of paternity that is implicit in the
acknowledgment is made explicit by the terms of §§ 43-1402
and 43-1409. Upon finding that the notarized acknowledgment
of paternity had been signed, the court should have treated
cesar’s paternity as having been legally established and treated
this action as one solely to determine issues of custody and
support as between two legal parents, and not one to estab-
lish paternity.
In her answer, Alicia questioned cesar’s status as Jaime’s
father by alleging that another man might be the biological
988 	281 NeBrASKA rePOrTS

father and requested the court to order cesar to submit to
genetic testing. However, under the statutory scheme, before
Alicia could challenge paternity and subject cesar to genetic
testing, she needed to overcome the acknowledgment that she
and cesar had both signed which established that cesar was
Jaime’s legal father.
Section 43-1409 provides that an acknowledgment that has
become a legal finding of paternity “may be challenged only on
the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact with the
burden of proof upon the challenger.” Under § 43-1409, Alicia
had the burden to prove fraud, duress, or material mistake
of fact with regard to the execution of the acknowledgment.
Alicia made no allegation of fraud, duress, or material mistake
and therefore did not properly challenge the acknowledgment
under § 43-1409. The acknowledgment remained a legal find-
ing, and cesar had the legal status as father. Because such
legal status had been established and the acknowledgment was
unchallenged, the results of genetic testing were not relevant
to any issue properly raised in the case and the district court
should not have ordered or considered genetic testing. See
§ 43-1412.01.
courts in other states have similarly found that an acknowl-
edgment has the effect of a judgment and can only be chal-
lenged on the bases stated in the statutes. In Matter of Gendron,
157 N.H. 314, 318, 950 A.2d 151, 154 (2008), the New
Hampshire Supreme court applied Massachusetts law similar to
Nebraska statutes and concluded that under the Massachusetts
provisions, an acknowledgment signed by a child’s mother
and the purported father established paternity and had “the
same force and effect as a Massachusetts court judgment of
paternity.” The court concluded that the trial court erred when
it ordered genetic testing upon the mother’s request, because
“the acknowledgment established the father as the child’s legal
father.” Id. at 321, 950 A.2d at 156. The court reasoned that
“the unchallenged acknowledgement established the father’s
paternity, thus dispensing with the need for additional proof of
paternity. Therefore, genetic marker testing was irrelevant to
determining the father’s request for custody.” Id. at 320, 950
A.2d at 155. The court noted a case in which a father who had
ceSAr c. v. AlIcIA l. 	989
cite as 281 Neb. 979

acknowledged paternity was not allowed to rebut his paternity
by blood tests, and the court reasoned that “[a]lthough it is the
mother who is attempting to disprove the father’s paternity in
this instance, the mother has proffered, and we see, no reason
for reaching a different result. Whether the mother or father is
the petitioner, the paramount interests are certainty and final-
ity.” Id. at 320, 950 A.2d at 156.
In In re Parentage of G.E.M., 382 Ill. App. 3d 1102, 1110,
890 N.e.2d 944, 954-55, 322 Ill. Dec. 25, 35-36 (2008), the
Illinois court of Appeals stated that an acknowledgment of par-
entage, signed by the mother and the purported father and cer-
tified by a hospital representative, was an “admission of pater-
nity [that] operated as conclusively as a judicial determination
based on evidence or a judgment establishing paternity” under
Illinois law. The court cited an Illinois Supreme court case in
which that court held that a man who had acknowledged pater-
nity could challenge the voluntariness of the acknowledgment
if he could show that it was procured by fraud, duress, or mate-
rial mistake of fact, but that
“it would be unreasonable to allow a man in this position
to undo his voluntary acknowledgment years later on the
basis of DNA test results, when his paternity was based
not on a mere marital presumption that he was the child’s
father but on the conscious decision to accept the legal
responsibility of being the child’s father.”
382 Ill. App. 3d at 1111, 890 N.e.2d at 955-56, 322 Ill. Dec. at
36-37, quoting People ex rel. Dept. of Public Aid v. Smith, 212
Ill. 2d 389, 818 N.e.2d 1204, 289 Ill. Dec. 1 (2004). The court
of appeals in In re Parentage of G.E.M. noted that the volun-
tary acknowledgment was not rescinded or challenged based on
fraud, duress, or mistake and that therefore, the mother could
not extinguish the status of father conferred by the acknowl-
edgment. The court stated:
The permanent consequences of voluntary acknowledg-
ments of parentage extend to both the mother who gives
birth and the man who knowingly assumes the role of
father. 	By 	voluntarily 	acknowledging 	paternity, 	both
mother and [named father] accepted the legal consequences
990 	281 NeBrASKA rePOrTS

of the statutory presumption of paternity and waived their
option to request DNA testing.
Id. at 1116, 890 N.e.2d at 959, 322 Ill. Dec. at 40. The court
stated that “[i]n spite of mother’s change of heart, statutory
procedures control whether an acknowledgment of paternity
may be rescinded or whether the presumption arising from
the acknowledgment remains in full force and effect.” Id. at
1110, 890 N.e.2d at 955, 322 Ill. Dec. at 36. The court noted
“a strong judicial policy favoring the finality and stability of
judgments” and found such principles “particularly poignant
in the context of parentage determinations that become part of
a child’s personal history and sense of self.” Id. at 1118, 890
N.e.2d at 961, 322 Ill. Dec. at 42.
In In re Paternity of H.H., 879 N.e.2d 1175, 1178 (Ind.
App. 2008), the Indiana court of Appeals concluded that “once
a mother has signed a paternity affidavit, she may not use
the paternity statutes to deprive the legal father of his rights,
even if he is not the biological father.” The court reasoned that
“a woman always has the information necessary to question
paternity prior to signing the affidavit. A man, however, could
easily sign an affidavit without awareness of the questionable
nature of his paternity.” Id. The court noted that the legal father
was “the only father [the child] has ever known . . . was there
when she was born, [and] has provided for her financially
and emotionally since her birth,” and the court concluded that
“[c]hanging his legal status at this late date is not in the best
interests of” the child, the legal father, or the State. Id.
We agree with these authorities that not only do the appli-
cable statutes require that an unchallenged acknowledgment
have the effect of making the acknowledged father the legal
father but that the best interests of the child are ordinarily
served by certain parentage determinations and continuity in
the child’s life.
The court in this case committed plain error when it failed
to give proper legal effect to the acknowledgment. Such fail-
ure resulted in the court’s ordering cesar to submit to genetic
testing, which led to a determination that cesar was not
Jaime’s biological father, which in turn led the court to apply
ceSAr c. v. AlIcIA l. 	991
cite as 281 Neb. 979

the parental preference doctrine and conclude that Alicia had
a superior right to custody of Jaime. If the court had given
proper legal effect to the acknowledgment, the court would
have viewed both cesar and Alicia as legal parents to Jaime,
and the issues in this case would have, and should have, been
considered within this legal framework. The orders of August
19 and September 16, 2010, are reversed. Because our finding
of plain error resolves this appeal, we need not consider the
assignments of error raised by the parties.
cONclUSION
We conclude that the district court erred when it failed to
give proper legal effect to the acknowledgment of paternity
that was signed by cesar and Alicia and notarized at the time
of Jaime’s birth, named cesar as Jaime’s father, and was
not challenged by Alicia. The acknowledgment established
cesar as Jaime’s legal father. See § 43-1409. We reverse the
August 19 and September 16, 2010, orders regarding custody
and other issues, and remand the cause to the district court
for further proceedings. In the absence of a challenge to the
acknowledgment, the court should consider the issues raised
in this proceeding regarding custody and support within the
framework that under the applicable statutes, cesar is legally
Jaime’s father.
reversed and remanded For
Further proCeedings.
heaviCan, c.J., not participating in the decision.
Wright, J., not participating.
992 	281 NeBrASKA rePOrTS