In re Interest of Christopher T.

was awarded both postjudgment interest and earnings on her
awarded share of the profit-sharing plan. We find this argument
to be without merit.
CONCLUSION
The district court properly reopened the case and did not
err when it determined that Janet was entitled to postjudg-
ment interest from the date of the divorce decree until June 10,
2010, the date set forth in the QDRO at issue in this appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm the orders of the district court.
A ffirmed.
Wright, J., not participating.
in re interest of C hristopher t.,
A Child under 18 yeArs of Age .
stAte of nebrAskA, Appellee , v.
C hristopher t., AppellAnt.
801 N.W.2d 243
Filed July 29, 2011. 	No. S-10-1105.
1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. Juvenile cases are reviewed de novo on the
record, and an appellate court is required to reach a conclusion independent of the
juvenile court’s findings.
2. Statutes. In the absence of anything indicating to the contrary, statutory language
is to be given plain and ordinary meaning; when the words of a statute are plain,
direct, and unambiguous, no interpretation is necessary or will be indulged to
ascertain their meaning.
3. Due Process: Proof. The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is
embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to instruct
the fact finder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he or she
should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of
adjudication.
4. Courts: Expert Witnesses. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), and Schafersman v. Agland
Coop, 262 Neb. 215, 631 N.W.2d 862 (2001), require the trial court to act as a
gatekeeper to ensure that expert testimony is scientifically valid and can be prop-
erly applied to the facts in issue, and therefore helpful to the trier of fact.
5. Trial: Presumptions: Evidence. In a bench trial, there is a presumption that the
finder of fact disregards inadmissible evidence.
6. Trial: Expert Witnesses: Pretrial Procedure. To sufficiently call specialized
knowledge into question under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
1008 	281 NEbRASkA REPORTS
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:45 AM CST

509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), and Schafersman v.
Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215, 631 N.W.2d 862 (2001), is to object with enough
specificity so that the court understands what is being challenged and can accord-
ingly determine the necessity and extent of any pretrial proceeding.
7. Trial: Expert Witnesses: Pretrial Procedure: Evidence. Assuming that the
opponent to expert testimony has been given timely notice of the proposed testi-
mony, the opponent’s challenge to the admissibility of evidence under Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed.
2d 469 (1993), and Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215, 631 N.W.2d 862
(2001), should take the form of a concise pretrial motion. It should identify what
is believed to be lacking with respect to the validity and reliability of the evidence
and any challenge to the relevance of the evidence to the issues of the case. In
order to preserve judicial economy and resources, the motion should include or
incorporate all other bases for challenging the admissibility, including any chal-
lenge to the qualifications of the expert.
8. Malpractice: Physicians and Surgeons: Expert Witnesses: Words and
Phrases. Although expert medical testimony need not be couched in the magic
words “reasonable medical certainty” or “reasonable probability,” it must be
sufficient as examined in its entirety to establish the crucial causal link between
the plaintiff’s injuries and the defendant’s negligence. Medical expert testimony
regarding causation based upon possibility or speculation is insufficient; it must
be stated as being at least probable, in other words, more likely than not.
9. Mental Health. The nonexistence of an instrument which will perfectly predict
future conduct does not preclude the use of rationally based instruments devel-
oped and validated by mental health professionals.
Appeal from the County Court for Scotts bluff County:
JAmes m. Worden, Judge. Affirmed.
David S. MacDonald, Deputy Scotts bluff County Public
Defender, for appellant.
Tiffany 	A. 	Wasserburger, 	Deputy 	Scotts 	bluff 	County
Attorney, for appellee.
heAviCAn, 	C.J., 	Wright, 	C onnolly, 	gerrArd, 	stephAn,
mCC ormACk, and miller-lermAn, JJ.
heAviCAn, C.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Christopher T. appeals from the decision of the Scotts bluff
County Court, sitting as a juvenile court. Christopher was adju-
dicated under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(b) (Reissue 2008), in
that he deports himself so as to injure or endanger seriously the
morals or health of himself or others, and under § 43-247(3)(c),
IN RE INTEREST OF ChRISTOPhER T. 	1009
Cite as 281 Neb. 1008

in that he is a mentally ill and dangerous juvenile as defined by
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-908 (Reissue 2009). We affirm.
II. bACkGROUND
The State of Nebraska brought a petition before the county
court, sitting as a juvenile court, alleging that Christopher
was a juvenile within § 43-247(1), in that he committed two
law violations. Christopher was 15 years old at the time of
the petition. The State alleged that on or about January 1
through November 8, 2009, Christopher unlawfully subjected
his stepbrothers, J.P. and R.V., to sexual contact without con-
sent. The State later amended the charges to include an alle-
gation that Christopher was a juvenile within the meaning of
§ 43-247(3)(b) and (c).
Prior to the adjudication hearing, the State gave notice
that Dr. Alan Smith, a psychologist, would be testifying.
Christopher then filed a written objection, alleging that a
Daubert/Schafersman1 hearing ought to be held before Smith’s
testimony could be admitted. Christopher did not cite any spe-
cific reasons for challenging Smith’s testimony.
At the adjudication hearing on September 28, 2010, the State
called several witnesses, including Smith; Christopher’s step-
brother, R.V.; Monica bartling, a lieutenant with the Nebraska
State Patrol; and Christopher’s school counselor. The witness
testimony is discussed in detail in the analysis section, but is
briefly summarized here.
Smith 	testified 	regarding 	his 	diagnosis 	of 	Christopher,
including the psychological testing he used and his interviews
with staff at the Scotts bluff County juvenile detention center.
Christopher renewed his objection on Daubert/Schafersman
grounds at that time, and the juvenile court overruled the
objection, allowing Smith to testify as to the allegations that
Christopher was mentally ill and dangerous.
Christopher’s school counselor gave testimony regarding
Christopher’s actions at school, including actions that resulted
1 See, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113
S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993); Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262
Neb. 215, 631 N.W.2d 862 (2001).
1010 	281 NEbRASkA REPORTS

in his suspension. R.V., one of the alleged victims and 12 years
old at the time, testified regarding Christopher’s actions within
the home. When R.V. stated that he was afraid to testify in
front of Christopher and apparently changed his testimony on
the stand, the State called bartling to impeach R.V.’s testimony.
bartling had interviewed R.V. as part of an investigation into
the sexual assault charges against Christopher.
Christopher did not offer any evidence, and at the close
of the case, the State dismissed the § 43-247(1) law viola-
tions. The juvenile court then adjudicated Christopher under
§ 43-247(3)(b) and (c) and placed Christopher in the care,
custody, and control of the Nebraska Department of health and
human Services.
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Christopher assigns, consolidated and restated, that the juve-
nile court erred (1) in adjudicating under § 43-247(3)(c) using
the clear and convincing standard of evidence to find that
Christopher was a mentally ill and dangerous person; (2) in
finding that the State had adduced sufficient evidence to adju-
dicate Christopher under either § 43-247(3)(b) or (c); (3) in
overruling the objection to the testimony of Smith on Daubert/
Schafersman grounds; and (4) in relying on the testimony of
Smith, because Smith did not testify as to a reasonable degree
of medical or psychological certainty.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] Juvenile cases are reviewed de novo on the record, and
an appellate court is required to reach a conclusion indepen-
dent of the juvenile court’s findings.2
[2] In the absence of anything indicating to the contrary,
statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary mean-
ing; when the words of a statute are plain, direct, and unam-
biguous, no interpretation is necessary or will be indulged to
ascertain their meaning.3
2 In re Interest of Kevin K., 274 Neb. 678, 742 N.W.2d 767 (2007).
3 In re Interest of Jeffrey R., 251 Neb. 250, 557 N.W.2d 220 (1996).
IN RE INTEREST OF ChRISTOPhER T. 	1011
Cite as 281 Neb. 1008

V. ANALYSIS
The primary issue in this case is the relationship between
§ 43-247(3)(c) and the Nebraska Mental health Commitment
Act (MhCA), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-901 et seq. (Reissue 2009).
Section 43-247(3)(c) provides that the juvenile court shall have
jurisdiction over any juvenile “who is mentally ill and danger-
ous as defined in section 71-908.” Section 71-908 is part of
the MhCA and defines a mentally ill and dangerous person as
someone who presents:
(1) A substantial risk of serious harm to another person
or persons within the near future as manifested by evi-
dence of recent violent acts or threats of violence or by
placing others in reasonable fear of such harm; or
(2) A substantial risk of serious harm to himself or
herself within the near future as manifested by evidence
of recent attempts at, or threats of, suicide or serious
bodily harm or evidence of inability to provide for his or
her basic human needs, including food, clothing, shelter,
essential medical care, or personal safety.
Under § 71-925, the State must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the subject of the petition before a mental health
board is mentally ill and dangerous. With those statutes in
mind, we turn to Christopher’s first assignment of error.
1. stAndArd of proof
Christopher first argues that because there is no explicit stan-
dard of proof in § 43-247(3)(c), the State should be required to
prove that Christopher is mentally ill and dangerous beyond a
reasonable doubt, rather than by clear and convincing evidence.
The juvenile court noted that § 43-247(3)(c) does not explicitly
give a standard of proof, but the court determined to apply a
clear and convincing evidence standard.
Christopher asserts that the lack of a standard of proof under
§ 43-247(3)(c) means that the standard would “default” to the
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard,4 but he offers no sup-
port for that assertion. Commitments under the MhCA and the
Sex Offender Commitment Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-1201 et
4 brief for appellant at 13.
1012 	281 NEbRASkA REPORTS

seq. (Reissue 2009), are made under the clear and convincing
evidence standard.5 We have previously found that a mental
health commitment act was not unconstitutional for failing
to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.6 And, in fact, the
U.S. Supreme Court has found that the clear and convincing
evidence standard may be used as the burden of proof in a civil
commitment, noting that a lesser burden would deny the men-
tally ill person due process of law.7
[3] Although Christopher does not challenge the constitu-
tionality of § 43-247(3)(c), we find the reasoning utilized by
the U.S. Supreme Court to be persuasive with respect to our
ultimate conclusion that “clear and convincing evidence” is the
appropriate standard:
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is
embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of
factfinding, is to “instruct the factfinder concerning the
degree of confidence our society thinks he [or she] should
have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a par-
ticular type of adjudication.”8
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that different standards
of proof are necessary in civil commitment proceedings as
opposed to criminal prosecutions, because civil commitment
is not punitive. Furthermore, the central issue in a criminal
proceeding is very different from that of a mental health
commitment.
Whether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to
either himself or others and is in need of confined therapy
turns on the meaning of the facts which must be inter-
preted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists. Given
the lack of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric
5 In re Interest of J.R., 277 Neb. 362, 762 N.W.2d 305 (2009); In re Interest
of Blythman, 208 Neb. 51, 302 N.W.2d 666 (1981).
6 Kraemer v. Mental Health Board of the State of Nebraska, 199 Neb. 784,
261 N.W.2d 626 (1978).
7 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323
(1979).
8 Id., 441 U.S. at 423, citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25
L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970).
IN RE INTEREST OF ChRISTOPhER T. 	1013
Cite as 281 Neb. 1008

diagnosis, there is a serious question as to whether a state
could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an indi-
vidual is both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous.9
Using a clear and convincing evidence standard appropriately
balances the liberty interests of the subject of a commitment
order with the safety of both the community and the subject.
In the present case, although the Legislature did not specify
a standard of proof under § 43-247(3)(c), the statute does refer-
ence the MhCA. Mental health commitments have been made
under a clear and convincing evidence standard in Nebraska for
approximately the last 30 years, and we find no reason to apply
a different standard of proof in a juvenile case. Christopher’s
first assignment of error is without merit.
2. stAte produCed suffiCient evidenCe
to A dJudiCAte C hristopher
We next address whether the State presented sufficient evi-
dence to adjudicate Christopher under § 43-247(3)(b) and (c).
(a) § 43-247(3)(c)
having established the appropriate standard of proof to be
by clear and convincing evidence, and keeping in mind our
de novo review obligation, we first examine whether the State
met its burden to prove that Christopher was mentally ill and
dangerous under §§ 43-247(3)(c) and 71-908. Section 71-908
defines a mentally ill and dangerous person as someone who
presents a “substantial risk of serious harm to another person
or persons within the near future as manifested by evidence of
recent violent acts or threats of violence or by placing others
in reasonable fear of such harm” or, in the alternative, presents
a substantial risk to himself or herself. Although the juve-
nile court did not explicitly specify whether Christopher was
adjudged mentally ill and dangerous under § 71-908(1) or (2),
given the evidence presented, we assume that Christopher was
judged to be a danger to others.
The evidence presented at the adjudication hearing con-
sisted of testimony from Smith, the psychologist who evaluated
9 Id., 441 U.S. at 429.
1014 	281 NEbRASkA REPORTS

Christopher, as well as testimony from Christopher’s step-
brother and school counselor. Smith is a licensed psychologist
with specialties in physical aggression and violence, as well as
in sexual misbehaviors and sexual assaults. Smith testified that
85 percent of his practice focuses on those types of issues and
that he has experience in assessing sex offenders.
Smith administered to Christopher a psychosexual evalua-
tion and stated that he had followed Christopher’s progress
while 	Christopher 	was 	in 	detention. 	Smith 	also 	adminis-
tered the “Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory for
Adolescents[,] Millon Inventory for Adolescents[,] Wechsler
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence[,] . . . Abel Assessment for
Sexual Interest, . . . Trauma Symptom Checklist, Juvenile Sex
Offender Assessment Protocol[,] and the Estimate of Risk of
Adolescent Sexual Offense Recidivism.”
Smith’s evaluation also included the report from Christopher’s
younger sibling that Christopher had been sexually inappropri-
ate and had touched him in a sexual manner. As part of his
evaluation, Smith also interviewed staff at the Scottsbluff youth
shelter and the county juvenile detention center. Staff at the
shelter reported that Christopher was “‘scary’” because he
was “verbally aggressive, foul mouthed, and believe[d] that
rules [did] not apply to him.” Staff reported that Christopher
alternated between being quiet and polite and being aggressive,
defiant, and sexually inappropriate. Detention center staff also
informed Smith that Christopher was generally quiet, compli-
ant, and polite with staff, but bullied younger children.
Smith diagnosed Christopher with disruptive behavior dis-
order; peer, parent, and sibling relational problems; sexual
abuse of a child, perpetrator; and sexual abuse of a child,
victim. Smith testified that Christopher was at a moderate
to high risk to reoffend sexually. In his report, Smith stated
that when Christopher’s test scores were considered in light
of Christopher’s personality and recent actions, his risk of
reoffending was very high. Smith stated that even though
Christopher knew his behavior was inappropriate, had been
confronted about his behavior, and had been placed in the
detention center, Christopher refused to cease acting out and
refused to take responsibility for his actions.
IN RE INTEREST OF ChRISTOPhER T. 	1015
Cite as 281 Neb. 1008

We agree that Smith’s expert testimony, coupled with the
testimony of factual witnesses, discussed below, was sufficient
to show by clear and convincing evidence that Christopher was
a mentally ill and dangerous juvenile.
(b) § 43-247(3)(b)
Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-279 (Reissue 2008), the State is
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Christopher
is a juvenile as described by § 43-247(3)(b), in that he deports
himself so as to injure or endanger seriously the morals or
health of himself or others.
The evidence presented at the adjudication hearing included
testimony from R.V., one of Christopher’s stepbrothers. R.V.
stated that he was afraid to testify in front of Christopher
and was afraid that Christopher would be mad if R.V. talked
about what had happened. R.V. did not respond when the State
asked whether R.V. was being honest about what had hap-
pened when Christopher lived at home. The State then asked
whether R.V. had ever witnessed Christopher “do anything to
animals in the house.” R.V. stated that on one occasion, he
had watched as Christopher anally penetrated the family’s bird
with a stick.
After R.V. testified, the State called bartling to impeach
R.V.’s testimony by demonstrating that R.V. had changed his
testimony while on the stand. As noted above, bartling is a
lieutenant with the Nebraska State Patrol and has special-
ized training in interviewing victims of child sexual assaults.
During the course of her job, bartling interviewed R.V. regard-
ing allegations that Christopher had sexual contact with R.V.
and 	another 	sibling. 	bartling 	testified 	that 	R.V. 	reported
that Christopher had slapped R.V.’s buttocks and fondled
his genitals.
Christopher’s 	school 	counselor 	stated 	that 	Christopher
had been suspended on a number of occasions. Christopher
continued to engage in inappropriate behaviors even though
Christopher admitted that he was acting inappropriately. On
one occasion, Christopher shoved another student into a locker
and punched him in the head. And at an earlier detention hear-
ing held on June 29, 2010, Christopher’s caseworker testified
1016 	281 NEbRASkA REPORTS

that Christopher’s parents did not feel that their other children
would be safe if Christopher was in the home.
We find that such is sufficient to show that Christopher
deports himself so as to injure or endanger seriously the mor-
als or health of himself or others. As such, we agree with the
juvenile court that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that Christopher is a juvenile described by § 43-247(3)(b).
Christopher’s second assignment of error is without merit.
3. triAl C ourt did not err in overruling motion
for D aubert/S chaferSman heAring
We next address Christopher’s argument that the juvenile
court erred by overruling his motion for a Daubert/Schafersman
hearing. Christopher filed a written objection to Smith’s testi-
mony and asked for a Daubert/Schafersman hearing, anticipat-
ing that Smith would be relying on actuarial tables and other
“‘scientific theories’ of unknown origin or validity.”10 The dis-
trict court overruled Christopher’s motion and allowed Smith
to testify only as to the § 43-247(3)(c) allegations, implicitly
determining that no Daubert/Schafersman hearing was neces-
sary to allow a psychologist to testify as to his diagnosis of
Christopher as well as the diagnostic tools used.
[4,5] As 	a 	preliminary 	matter, 	we 	note 	that 	Daubert/
Schafersman requires the trial court to act as a gatekeeper to
ensure that expert testimony is scientifically valid and can be
properly applied to the facts in issue, and therefore helpful to
the trier of fact.11 We also recognize that in a bench trial, there
is a presumption that the finder of fact disregards inadmis-
sible evidence.12
Christopher was given the opportunity to cross-examine
Smith as to the psychological measures Smith used in diag-
nosing Christopher, thus giving the juvenile court an opportu-
nity to review Christopher’s claims that the tests were invalid
or unreliable. Therefore, we presume that the juvenile court
10 brief for appellant at 18.
11 See, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra note 1;
Schafersman v. Agland Coop, supra note 1.
12 See State v. Lara, 258 Neb. 996, 607 N.W.2d 487 (2000).
IN RE INTEREST OF ChRISTOPhER T. 	1017
Cite as 281 Neb. 1008

disregarded any evidence that was inadmissible and that it
made a determination as to the validity and relevance of
Smith’s evaluation and diagnosis of Christopher.
Although we have not previously addressed the requirement
of a Daubert/Schafersman hearing in the context of an adjudi-
cation under § 43-247(3)(c), we did recently address what is
required in order to request a Daubert/Schafersman hearing. In
State v. Casillas,13 the defendant objected to the introduction
of testimony regarding the horizontal gaze nystagmus (hGN)
test. The defendant claimed that the hGN test constituted sci-
entific evidence and should have been subjected to a Daubert/
Schafersman hearing. We held that all specialized knowledge
generally falls under the rules of Daubert/Schafersman and
that hGN involves scientific knowledge. Thus, we found the
trial court erred insofar as it indicated that hGN fell outside of
Daubert/Schafersman. but we noted that even as to specialized
evidence, what specific duties Daubert/Schafersman imposed
depended upon the circumstances. A pretrial hearing under
Daubert/Schafersman is not always mandated. Moreover, we
concluded that the extensiveness of any such hearing is left to
the discretion of the trial court.14
[6,7] We then found that to sufficiently call specialized
knowledge into question under Daubert/Schafersman is to
object with enough specificity so that the court understands
what is being challenged and can accordingly determine the
necessity and extent of any pretrial proceeding.15 Assuming
that the opponent has been given timely notice of the proposed
testimony, the opponent’s challenge to the admissibility of
evidence under Daubert/Schafersman should take the form of
a concise pretrial motion. It should identify, in terms of the
Daubert/Schafersman factors, what is believed to be lacking
with respect to the validity and reliability of the evidence and
any challenge to the relevance of the evidence to the issues of
the case. In order to preserve judicial economy and resources,
13 State v. Casillas, 279 Neb. 820, 782 N.W.2d 882 (2010).
14 Id.
15 Id.
1018 	281 NEbRASkA REPORTS

the motion should include or incorporate all other bases for
challenging the admissibility, including any challenge to the
qualifications of the expert.16
Christopher’s motion did not meet these requirements. his
written objection did not state any bases for challenging the
admissibility of the evidence. Christopher merely stated that
he “object[ed] to the expert testimony of Dr. Alan Smith at
trial without a Daubert Shatesman’s [sic] hearing.” In addition,
during one of the hearings prior to adjudication, Christopher’s
attorney objected to the testimony of Smith, saying, “Which, I
think the State would be incumbent, if they want him—typi-
cally, I’d expect him to testify as to actuarial risk factors and
things like that.”
Christopher had the opportunity to cross-examine Smith
about the accuracy and reliability of the psychological meas-
ures and did not object with any kind of specificity to Smith’s
testimony. As such, we conclude that Christopher did not
sufficiently preserve any claim under Daubert/Schafersman.
Christopher’s third assignment of error is without merit.
4. smith testified to reAsonAble degree of
mediCAl or psyChologiCAl C ertAinty
Finally, Christopher argues that Smith did not testify to
a reasonable degree of medical or psychological certainty.
Apparently, Christopher’s argument is based on the fact that
Smith failed to use the words “to a reasonable degree of
medical or psychological certainty” to confirm his diagnosis
of Christopher.
[8] As an initial matter, this court has never required
those words in order to consider an expert’s testimony to
be sufficiently accurate. We addressed the sufficiency of an
expert’s testimony to establish dangerousness in In re Interest
of G.H.17:
G.h. also argues that [the expert’s] opinion of danger-
ousness, expressed entirely in terms of risk, is insufficient
16 Id.
17 In re Interest of G.H., 279 Neb. 708, 717-18, 781 N.W.2d 438, 444-45
(2010).
IN RE INTEREST OF ChRISTOPhER T. 	1019
Cite as 281 Neb. 1008

to support a finding that G.h. is a dangerous sex offender.
G.h. contends that [the expert’s] opinions establish noth-
ing more than an increased risk or possibility that he
will reoffend without treatment. According to G.h., this
is insufficient under cases holding that in order to sup-
port civil commitment in civil mental health proceed-
ings, a medical expert must establish that the subject
poses a danger to others to a reasonable degree of medi-
cal certainty.
This is the same standard that we require for expert
medical opinion to establish causation under tort law. In
that context, we have held that although expert medical
testimony need not be couched in the magic words “rea-
sonable medical certainty” or “reasonable probability,” it
must be sufficient as examined in its entirety to establish
the crucial causal link between the plaintiff’s injuries
and the defendant’s negligence. Medical expert testimony
regarding causation based upon possibility or speculation
is insufficient; it must be stated as being at least “prob-
able,” in other words, more likely than not.
[9] We also stated that “the nonexistence of an instrument
which will perfectly predict future conduct does not preclude
the use of rationally based instruments developed and validated
by mental health professionals.”18 As in In re Interest of G.H.,
the testifying psychologist—in this case, Smith—used various
peer-reviewed risk assessments in conjunction with information
from other parties and clinical interviews.19 Smith testified that
Christopher’s risk of reoffending was moderate to high, and that
Christopher had about an 80-percent chance of repeating sexual
behaviors. Smith’s testimony established that it is more likely
than not that Christopher will repeat his behaviors. Viewed in
its entirety, Smith’s testimony established that Christopher is
significantly likely to reoffend. Christopher’s final assignment
of error is without merit.
18 Id. at 717, 781 N.W.2d at 444.
19 See In re Interest of G.H., supra note 17.
1020 	281 NEbRASkA REPORTS

VI. CONCLUSION
We find that the State is required to show by clear and con-
vincing evidence, rather than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” that
a juvenile is mentally ill and dangerous under § 43-247(3)(c).
The State presented sufficient evidence to adjudicate Christopher
under both § 43-247(3)(b) and (c). The juvenile court did not
err in admitting psychological testimony without a Daubert/
Schafersman hearing. And finally, the expert psychological
testimony given in this case satisfied the “reasonable degree
of medical certainty” standard even though that specific phrase
was not used by the testifying expert.
A ffirmed.
IN RE INTEREST OF ChRISTOPhER T. 	1021
Cite as 281 Neb. 1008