In re Interest of Erick M.

340 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
I n re I nterest of erIck M., a chIld
under 18 years of age.
state of nebraska, appellee, v.
erIck M., appellant.
820 N.W.2d 639
Filed September 14, 2012. 	No. S-11-919.
1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question
of law, which an appellate court reviews independently of the lower court’s
determination.
2. ____: ____. Absent a statutory indication to the contrary, an appellate court gives
words in a statute their ordinary meaning.
3. Statutes: Legislature: Intent: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not
look beyond a statute to determine the legislative intent when the words are plain,
direct, or unambiguous.
4. ____: ____: ____: ____. An appellate court can examine an act’s legislative his-
tory when a statute is ambiguous.
5. Statutes. A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible of more than one reasonable
interpretation.
6. Juvenile Courts: Judgments: Abandonment: Proof. For obtaining special
immigrant juvenile status under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (Supp. IV 2010), a
petitioner can show an absent parent’s abandonment by proof that the juvenile
has never known that parent or has received only sporadic contact and support
from that parent for a significant period.
7. Juvenile Courts: Judgments: Child Custody: Proof. If a juvenile lives with
only one parent when a juvenile court enters a guardianship or dependency order,
the reunification component under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (Supp. IV 2010) is
not satisfied if a petitioner fails to show that it is not feasible to return the juve-
nile to the parent who had custody.
8. Juvenile Courts: Judgments: Evidence. If a juvenile alien’s absent parent
has abused, neglected, or abandoned the juvenile, a petitioner seeking special
immigrant juvenile status for the juvenile should offer evidence on this issue.
Thus, when ruling on a petitioner’s motion for an eligibility order under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(27)(J) (Supp. IV 2010), a court should generally consider whether
reunification with either parent is feasible.
Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Lancaster
County: lInda s. porter, Judge. Affirmed.
Kevin Ruser, of University of Nebraska Civil Clinical Law
Program, and Amanda M. Civic, Senior Certified Law Student,
for appellant.
John 	C. 	McQuinn, 	Chief 	Lincoln 	City 	Prosecutor, 	for
appellee.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:41 AM CST

IN RE INTEREST OF ERICK M. 	341
Cite as 284 Neb. 340
heavIcan, c.J., WrIght, connolly, stephan, MccorMack,
and MIller-lerMan, JJ.
connolly, J.
SUMMARY
Erick M., a juvenile, requested that the juvenile court issue
an order finding that under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (Supp.
IV 2010), he was eligible for “special immigrant juvenile”
(SIJ) status. SIJ status allows a juvenile immigrant to remain
in the United States and seek lawful permanent resident status
if federal authorities conclude that the statutory conditions are
met.1 Under § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i), the conditions include a state
court order determining that the juvenile’s reunification with
“1 or both” parents is not feasible because of abuse, neglect,
or abandonment.2 The juvenile court found that Erick did not
satisfy that statutory requirement. Erick appeals.
The crux of this appeal is the meaning of the phrase “1
or both” parents under § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i). We conclude that
Congress wanted to give state courts and federal authorities
flexibility to consider a juvenile’s family circumstances in
determining whether reunification with the juvenile’s parent or
parents is feasible. Erick lived with only his mother when the
juvenile court adjudicated him as a dependent. So the juvenile
court did not err in finding that because reunification with
Erick’s mother was feasible, he was not eligible for SIJ status.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
sIJ status
Under § 1101(a)(27)(J), a juvenile’s petition for SIJ status
must include a juvenile court order showing that the juvenile
satisfies the statutory criteria.3 The court’s findings in an “eli-
gibility order” are a prerequisite to SIJ status, but they are not
1 See, Zheng v. Pogash, 416 F. Supp. 2d 550 (S.D. Tex. 2006); F.L. v.
Thompson, 293 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.D.C. 2003); Yu v. Brown, 36 F. Supp. 2d
922 (D.N.M. 1999). See, also, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h) (Supp. IV 2010).
2 See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(d) (2012).
3 See id.

342 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
binding on federal authorities’ discretion whether to grant a
petition for SIJ status.4
There are two eligibility provisions under § 1101(a)(27)(J),
which we will refer to as “the reunification and best interest
components.” Subparagraph (i) is the reunification component
and has two requirements: (1) The juvenile must be one whom
a state juvenile court has determined to be a dependent, or has
committed to or placed under the custody of a state agency or
department, or has committed to or placed with an individual
or entity appointed by the state or court; and (2) “reunification
with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents [must not be] viable
due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found
under State law.”5
Subparagraph (ii) is the best interest component. It requires
a judicial or administrative finding that “it would not be in
the alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or par-
ent’s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual
residence.”6 If a state court finds that both of the eligibility
components are satisfied, then federal authorities may grant a
petition for SIJ status.7
the facts of erIck’s case
Here, the juvenile court adjudicated Erick and commit-
ted him to the care and custody of a state agency. The court
committed him to the Office of Juvenile Services (OJS) in
December 2010 because of two charges of being a minor
in possession of alcohol. The court initially placed him in a
residential treatment center. In July 2011, the juvenile court
heard OJS’ motion to transfer Erick to the Youth Rehabilitation
and Treatment Center in Kearney, Nebraska. While in the
residential treatment center, Erick had continually disappeared
from the residential center, used alcohol and drugs, committed
4 See § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii).
5 § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i) (emphasis supplied).
6 See § 1101(a)(27)(J)(ii).
7 See § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii).

IN RE INTEREST OF ERICK M. 	343
Cite as 284 Neb. 340
law violations, and threatened staff. Erick did not resist the
motion for more restrictive custody, but his attorney stated that
Erick’s goal was to “get back home” and work on a rehabilita-
tion program from there. The court sustained the motion for
the transfer.
In September 2011, the court heard Erick’s motion for an
eligibility order for SIJ status. Erick’s family permanency
specialist testified that she had no contact information for
Erick’s father. In fact, she did not know whether paternity had
ever been established. She said Erick was unsure whether his
father was in Mexico or New York. She anticipated that she
would continue to work with Erick’s mother after OJS released
Erick from the Youth Rehabilitation and Treatment Center in
Kearney. She did not know of any reports or investigations of
abuse or neglect by Erick’s mother.
Erick’s mother testified that she did not know where Erick’s
father was and had not spoken to him in many years. She had
never been accused of abusing or neglecting Erick.
The court overruled Erick’s motion for an eligibility order.
It found that the first requirement was met because Erick was
committed to a state agency or department. But the court found
that the facts failed to show that reunification with Erick’s
mother was not viable because of abuse, neglect, or abandon-
ment. The court found that (1) it had removed Erick from his
home because of his alcohol abuse and he had never been
removed from his mother’s home because of abuse, neglect, or
abandonment; (2) Erick’s mother had been present at almost
every hearing; (3) Erick had lived with her before the court
committed him to OJS; and (4) no evidence showed that he
would not be returned to his mother when he was paroled or
discharged from the Youth Rehabilitation and Treatment Center
in Kearney.
The court concluded that there was no evidence that Erick’s
father had ever abused or neglected Erick. It made no find-
ings whether he had abandoned Erick. Because the reunifi-
cation component was not met, the court did not consider
whether return to Erick’s country of origin would be in his
best interest.

344 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Erick argues that the court erred in denying his motion for
an eligibility order for SIJ status.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which
we review independently of the lower court’s determination.8
ANALYSIS
As stated, this case hinges on the meaning of the federal
statute’s requirement that a juvenile court determine that reuni-
fication with “1 or both of the immigrant’s parents” is not
feasible because of abuse, neglect, or abandonment.9 Both par-
ties argue that the plain language of the statute supports their
interpretation.
Erick argues that § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i) requires that he show
only that reunification with one parent is not feasible because
of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. He contends that by using
the word “or” in the phrase “1 or both,” Congress intended
the statute to be disjunctive. And he argues that the evidence
shows his father abandoned him.
The State counters that if Congress had intended that a juve-
nile could satisfy the statute by showing only that reunifica-
tion with one parent was not feasible, then it would not have
included the words “or both.” It contends that Erick’s interpre-
tation renders this language superfluous and that Congress did
not intend courts to ignore the presence of a parent with whom
reunification is feasible. It argues that under Erick’s interpreta-
tion, a juvenile court would be required to find that the reunifi-
cation component was satisfied every time the State could not
identify or find a juvenile’s parent, even when reunification
with the other parent was appropriate. In addition, the State
argues that the evidence fails to show that Erick’s father ever
established paternity or abandoned him.
[2-5] Interpreting this statute to reach a legal conclusion
presents a challenge. To construe it as something other than
8 See State v. Jimenez, 283 Neb. 95, 808 N.W.2d 352 (2012).
9 See § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i).

IN RE INTEREST OF ERICK M. 	345
Cite as 284 Neb. 340
an indigestible lump, we turn to familiar statutory canons.
Absent a statutory indication to the contrary, we give words
in a statute their ordinary meaning.10 We will not look beyond
the statute to determine the legislative intent when the words
are plain, direct, or unambiguous.11 But we can examine an
act’s legislative history when a statute is ambiguous.12 A statute
is ambiguous if it is susceptible of more than one reasonable
interpretation.13
Although Erick’s argument is reasonable, Congress’ use of
the word “or” does not necessarily decide the issue in his favor.
Because “or” describes what a juvenile court must determine
in the alternative, we could also reasonably interpret the phrase
“1 or both” parents to mean that a juvenile court must find,
depending on the circumstances, that either reunification with
one parent is not feasible or reunification with both parents is
not feasible. Unfortunately, there are no related provisions in
the act from which we can discern Congress’ intent.14
It is true that courts will sometimes look to an agency’s
interpretation of a governing, ambiguous statute for guid-
ance.15 But here, the proposed regulations for the 2008 amend-
ment to § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i), which is the source of the confu-
sion, have not yet been adopted.16 And as proposed, they fail
10 See J.M. v. Hobbs, 281 Neb. 539, 797 N.W.2d 227 (2011).
11 See, Butler Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Freeholder Petitioners, 283 Neb. 903, 814
N.W.2d 724 (2012); State ex rel. Parks v. Council of City of Omaha, 277
Neb. 919, 766 N.W.2d 134 (2009).
12 See State v. Halverstadt, 282 Neb. 736, 809 N.W.2d 480 (2011).
13 See id. Accord, e.g., Consolidated Irr. Dist. v. Superior Court, 205 Cal.
App. 4th 697, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 622 (2012); SOCC, P.L. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 5D11-783, 2012 WL 2864384 (Fla. App. July
13, 2012); County of Du Page v. Illinois Labor Rel., 231 Ill. 2d 593, 900
N.E.2d 1095, 326 Ill. Dec. 848 (2008).
14 See Project Extra Mile v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm., 283 Neb. 379,
810 N.W.2d 149 (2012).
15 See, Chase Bank USA, N. A. v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 195, 131 S. Ct. 871, 178
L. Ed. 2d 716 (2011); Project Extra Mile, supra note 14, quoting Ameritas
Life Ins. v. Balka, 257 Neb. 878, 601 N.W.2d 508 (1999).
16 See Special Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,978 (proposed
Sept. 6, 2011).

346 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
to clarify the issue that we must decide.17 Absent any statutory
or regulatory guidance, we conclude that the statute is ambig-
uous because the parties have both presented reasonable, but
conflicting, interpretations of its language. And if an ambig-
uous statute is to make sense, we must read it in the light of
some assumed purpose. So we consider the statute’s legisla-
tive history.
In 2008, Congress amended the eligibility requirements for
SIJ status under § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i).18 Before 2008, subpara-
graph (i) defined a special immigrant juvenile as one whom a
state juvenile court had (1) determined to be a dependent under
its jurisdiction, (2) placed in the custody of a state agency or
department, and (3) deemed eligible for long-term foster care
due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment.19
Under the 2008 amendment, the eligibility requirements
under subparagraph (i) hinge primarily on a reunification
determination. The amendment expanded eligibility to include
juvenile immigrants whom a court has committed to or placed
in the custody of an individual or a state-appointed entity—not
just those whom a court has committed to or placed with a
state agency or department. In addition, Congress removed
the requirement that the juvenile be under the court’s juris-
diction because of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. Finally,
Congress removed the requirement that a state juvenile court
find that a juvenile is eligible for long-term foster care because
of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. Instead, a court must find
that reunification is not possible because of abuse, neglect, or
abandonment.
So under the amended subparagraph (i), a juvenile court no
longer needs to find that the juvenile is in the juvenile system
because of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. It is sufficient that
the court has placed the juvenile with a court-approved indi-
vidual or entity and that reunification with “1 or both” parents
is not feasible because of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. For
17 Id.
18 See, Pub. L. No. 110-457 § 235(d)(1), 122 Stat. 5044, 5074 (2008); 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i) (Supp. II 2008).
19 See § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i) (2006).

IN RE INTEREST OF ERICK M. 	347
Cite as 284 Neb. 340
example, a juvenile alien could be eligible for SIJ status if a
juvenile court has appointed a guardian for the juvenile for
any reason and reunification is not feasible because of parental
abuse, neglect, or abandonment.20
These 2008 changes expanded the pool of juvenile aliens
who could apply for SIJ status. But an earlier 1997 amendment
to the statute shows that despite this expansion, these juve-
niles must still be seeking relief from parental abuse, neglect,
or abandonment.
We start with the original language. Congress enacted the
SIJ statute as part of the Immigration Act of 1990.21 The origi-
nal eligibility requirements were a judicial or administrative
order determining only that the juvenile alien was dependent
on a juvenile court and that it would not be in the juve-
nile’s best interest to be returned to the juvenile’s or parent’s
home country.
In 1997, however, Congress amended § 1101(a)(27)(J) to
require that a court, in its order, determine that the juvenile (1)
is eligible for long-term foster care “‘due to abuse, neglect,
or abandonment’” and (2) has been declared a dependent of
a juvenile court or committed or placed with a state agency.22
“Congress intended that the amendment would prevent youths
from using this remedy for the purpose of obtaining legal per-
manent resident status, rather than for the purpose of obtaining
relief from abuse or neglect.”23
Even before the 1997 amendment, immigration authorities
interpreted the “eligible for long-term foster care” requirement
to mean that “a determination has been made by the juvenile
court that family reunification is no longer a viable option.”24
20 See, e.g., In re [Male Juvenile From Honduras], 2011 WL 7790475 (U.S.
Dept. of Just., Imm. & Nat. Serv., Admin. App. Ofc., Mar. 28, 2011); In
re [Male Juvenile From Mexico], 2011 WL 7790423 (U.S. Dept. of Just.,
Imm. & Nat. Serv., Admin. App. Ofc., Mar. 15, 2011).
21 See Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 153, 104 Stat. 4978, 5005 (1990).
22 Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat. 2440, 2460 (1997).
23 See 3 Charles Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure § 35.09[1] at
35-36 (rev. ed. 2011), citing H.R. Rep. No. 105-405 (1997) (Conf. Rep.).
24 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a) (1996).

348 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
Since 1997, however, that determination must be specifically
tied to parental abuse, neglect, or abandonment. And guid-
ance memorandums from the operational directors of the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to field direc-
tors show that protecting the juvenile from parental abuse,
neglect, or abandonment must be the petitioner’s primary pur-
pose. USCIS will not consent to a petition for SIJ status if it
was “‘sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining the status
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, rather
than for the purpose of obtaining relief from abuse or neglect
or abandonment.’”25
Moreover, administrative appeal decisions from the denial
of petitions for SIJ status illustrate how USCIS applies the
requirement that a juvenile court find that reunification with
“1 or both” parents is not feasible. We recognize that only
designated decisions rendered in administrative appeals are
published and considered binding precedent on immigration
officials.26 	But 	USCIS’ unpublished 	decisions 	nonetheless
enlighten and confirm our analysis.27
A petition for SIJ status is typically filed for two general
categories of juveniles: (1) for juvenile aliens who came to
the United States without their parents or who began living
with someone else soon after coming with their parents28; and
25 See Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir., Dom. Ops.,
and Pearl Chang, Acting Chief, Ofc. of Policy & Strategy, U.S. Dept. of
Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship & Imm. Servs., to Field Leadership, No.
HQOPS 70/8.5 (Mar. 24, 2009), reprinted in 14 Bender’s Immigration
Bulletin, No. 10 appx. D at 616 (May 15, 2009). Accord Memorandum
from William Yates, Assoc. Dir., Dom. Ops., U.S. Dept. of Homeland
Sec., U.S. Citizenship & Imm. Servs., No. HQADN 70/23 (May 27, 2004),
reprinted in 9 Bender’s Immigration Bulletin, No. 13 appx. A (July 1,
2004).
26 See 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) (2012).
27 Because USCIS redacts identifying information from its case names, we
have substituted descriptive case names for citing them.
28 See, e.g., In re Alamgir A., 81 A.D.3d 937, 917 N.Y.S.2d 309 (2011); In re
[Male Juvenile From Mexico], supra note 20; In re [Male Juvenile From
El Salvador], 2010 WL 4687105 (U.S. Dept. of Just., Imm. & Nat. Serv.,
Admin. App. Ofc., Mar. 30, 2010).

IN RE INTEREST OF ERICK M. 	349
Cite as 284 Neb. 340
(2) for juveniles who came to the United States with one or
both parents but later became a juvenile court dependent.29 In
either circumstance, if the petitioner shows that the juvenile
never knew a parent or that a parent has failed to provide care
and support for the juvenile for a significant period, USCIS
and courts have agreed that reunification with the absent par-
ent or parents is not feasible because of abandonment.30
But even when reunification with an absent parent is not
feasible because the juvenile has never known the parent or
the parent has abandoned the child, USCIS and juvenile courts
generally still consider whether reunification with the known
parent is an option.31 Thus, if the juvenile lives in the United
States with only one parent and never knew the other parent,
the reunification component is satisfied if reunification with
the known parent is not feasible.32
We believe that this result shows that the “1 or both” parents
rule is consistent with Congress’ intent to expand the pool of
potential applicants. That is, under the “1 or both” parents rule,
a juvenile is not disqualified from SIJ status solely because
one parent is unknown or cannot be found and, thus, cannot be
excluded from the possibility of reunification.33
[6] So we reject the State’s argument that Erick was
required to show that his father had established paternity
before Erick could prove abandonment. Because Erick has
lived with only his mother, his family circumstances appear
29 See In re [Female Juvenile From Jamaica], 2010 WL 3426795 (U.S. Dept.
of Just., Imm. & Nat. Serv., Admin. App. Ofc., Feb. 26, 2010).
30 See, In re Alamgir A., supra note 28; In re [Male Juvenile From Mexico],
supra note 20; In re [Female Juvenile From Mexico], 2009 WL 6520647
(U.S. Dept. of Just., Imm. & Nat. Serv., Admin. App. Ofc., Oct. 13, 2009).
31 See, Trudy-Ann W. v. Joan W., 73 A.D.3d 793, 901 N.Y.S.2d 296 (2010);
In re [Male Juvenile From Mexico], supra note 20; In re O.Y., slip op.,
No. 52669(U), 2009 WL 5196007 (N.Y. Fam. Sept. 22, 2009) (unpublished
disposition listed in table of “Decisions Without Published Opinions” at 26
Misc. 3d 1205(A), 906 N.Y.S.2d 781 (2009)).
32 See In re [Female Juvenile From Jamaica], supra note 29.
33 See Jacqueline Bhabha and Susan Schmidt, From Kafka to Wilberforce:
Is the U.S. Government’s Approach to Child Migrants Improving?,
Immigration Briefings (West Feb. 2011).

350 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
to fall within Congress’ intent that a juvenile court may some-
times focus primarily on whether reunification with only one
parent (the custodial parent) is feasible. In accordance with
USCIS cases, we hold that for obtaining SIJ status under
§ 1101(a)(27)(J), a petitioner can show an absent parent’s
abandonment by proof that the juvenile has never known that
parent or has received only sporadic contact and support from
that parent for a significant period.34 Whether an absent par-
ent’s parental rights should be terminated is not a factor for
obtaining SIJ status.
These cases also illustrate, however, that USCIS does not
consider proof of one absent parent to be the end of its inquiry
under the reunification component. A petitioner must nor-
mally show that reunification with the other parent is also
not feasible.35
[7] But if a juvenile lives with only one parent when a
juvenile court enters a guardianship or dependency order, the
reunification component under § 1101(a)(27)(J) is not satisfied
if a petitioner fails to show that it is not feasible to return the
juvenile to the parent who had custody. This is true without any
consideration of whether reunification with the absent parent is
feasible36 because the juvenile has a safe parent to whose cus-
tody a court can return the juvenile.
In contrast, if the juvenile was living with both parents
before a guardianship or dependency order was issued, reuni-
fication with both parents is usually at issue.37 These varied
results are all consistent with Congress’ intent that SIJ status
be available to only those juveniles who are seeking relief from
parental abuse, neglect, or abandonment.
34 See cases cited supra note 30.
35 See cases cited supra note 31.
36 See In re [Female Juvenile From Albania], 2009 WL 6521113 (U.S. Dept.
of Just., Imm. & Nat. Serv., Admin. App. Ofc., Oct. 30, 2009). Compare
Tung W.C. v. Sau Y.C., 34 Misc. 3d 869, 940 N.Y.S.2d 791 (2011).
37 See, e.g., In re Alamgir A., supra note 28; Jisun L. v. Young Sun P., 75
A.D.3d 510, 905 N.Y.S.2d 633 (2010); In re [Male Juvenile From Haiti],
2009 WL 6607581 (U.S. Dept. of Just., Imm. & Nat. Serv., Admin. App.
Ofc., Nov. 30, 2009).

IN RE INTEREST OF ERICK M. 	351
Cite as 284 Neb. 340
Erick relies on In re E.G.,38 an unpublished New York deci-
sion. We find it unpersuasive. In that case, a 13-year-old boy
left his mother and siblings in Guatemala and made his way
to the United States, where his biological father lived. The
father squandered his wages on alcohol and eventually left
the child alone. Social services removed the child from his
father’s custody when he was almost age 16; an attorney for
the child sought an eligibility order for SIJ status. The mother
filed an affidavit stating that she wanted her son to stay in
the United States because he would have better education
and employment opportunities. She also stated that because
gang members in Guatemala had threatened him, she feared
for his safety if he returned. The family court determined that
under the “1 or both” parents language, the child could peti-
tion for SIJ status even if he had a fit parent abroad “so long
as the minor has been abused, neglected or abandoned by
one parent.”39
In re E.G. is distinguishable because the only parent with
whom the juvenile was living when the dependency order was
issued was the parent who had neglected and abandoned him.
Also, the court’s order does not show whether his mother
had attempted to support or contact him. She did not attempt
to intervene in the neglect proceedings. So her absence may
have been the equivalent of abandonment. Most important,
we disagree with the court’s reasoning. Although many par-
ents in other countries might be willing to relinquish custody
of their child so the child could remain in the United States,
the question for SIJ status is parental abuse, neglect, or
abandonment.40
So we disagree that when a court determines that a juvenile
should not be reunited with the parent with whom he or she
has been living, it can disregard whether reunification with
an absent parent is not feasible because of abuse, neglect, or
38 In re E.G., slip op., No. 51797(U), 2009 WL 253556 (N.Y. Fam. Aug.
14, 2009) (unpublished disposition listed in table of “Decisions Without
Published Opinions” at 24 Misc. 3d 1238(A), 899 N.Y.S.2d 59 (2009)).
39 Id. at *3.
40 See Yeboah v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 345 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2003).

352 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
abandonment. Although a literal reading of the statute would
seem to permit a state court to ignore whether reunifica-
tion with an absent parent is feasible, in practice, courts and
USCIS officials normally consider whether the petitioner has
shown that an absent parent abused, neglected, or abandoned
the juvenile.
[8] We believe that this is the better rule. If a juvenile alien’s
absent parent has abused, neglected, or abandoned the juvenile,
a petitioner seeking SIJ status for the juvenile should offer evi-
dence on this issue. Thus, when ruling on a petitioner’s motion
for an eligibility order under § 1101(a)(27)(J), a court should
generally consider whether reunification with either parent
is feasible.41
But this case presents the exception. Because Erick was
living with only his mother when the juvenile court adjudi-
cated him, he could not satisfy the reunification component
without showing that reunification with his mother was not
feasible. Because he failed to satisfy this requirement, the
court had no need to consider whether reunification with
Erick’s father was feasible. We conclude that the juvenile
court did not err in concluding that Erick did not satisfy the
reunification component. Erick was not seeking SIJ status to
escape from parental abuse, neglect, or abandonment. There
is no claim that reunification with his mother is not feasible
for those reasons.
affIrMed.
41 See In re Interest of Luis G., 17 Neb. App. 377, 764 N.W.2d 648 (2009).