In re Interest of Ashley W.

424 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
suitable employment. We conclude that the compensation court
did not err in finding Becerra was entitled to a vocational reha-
bilitation plan consisting of formal training.
CONCLUSION
Because Becerra was a part-time hourly employee who suf-
fered a permanent impairment, the compensation court properly
calculated his average weekly wage for vocational rehabilita-
tion purposes under § 48-121(4). We agree with the compensa-
tion court that seeking to place Becerra in employment where
he would earn wages similar to those based upon the calcula-
tion used for permanent disability purposes would best achieve
the goal of restoring him to suitable employment. Accordingly,
we affirm the court’s award of vocational rehabilitation con-
sisting of formal training.
A ffirmed.
in re interest of A shley W., A child
under 18 yeArs of Age.
stAte of nebrAskA, Appellee, v.
A shley W., AppellAnt.
821 N.W.2d 706
Filed October 5, 2012. 	No. S-11-535.
1. Motions to Suppress: Investigative Stops: Warrantless Searches: Probable
Cause: Appeal and Error. A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress based
on the Fourth Amendment, apart from determinations of reasonable suspicion to
conduct investigatory stops and probable cause to perform warrantless searches,
is to be upheld on appeal unless its findings of fact are clearly erroneous.
2. Trial: Investigative Stops: Warrantless Searches: Appeal and Error. The
ultimate determinations of reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop
and probable cause to perform a warrantless search are reviewed de novo, and
findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, giving due weight to the inferences
drawn from those facts by the trial judge.
3. Constitutional Law: Evidence: Appeal and Error. When the State seeks to
submit evidence as sufficiently attenuated from a previous Fourth Amendment
violation, an appellate court reviews the trial court’s findings of historical facts
for clear error but reviews de novo the court’s ultimate attenuation determination
based on those facts.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:41 AM CST

IN RE INTEREST OF ASHLEY W. 	425
Cite as 284 Neb. 424
4. Juvenile Courts: Rules of Evidence. The Nebraska Evidence Rules control
adduction of evidence at an adjudication hearing under the Nebraska Juvenile
Code.
5. Trial: Evidence: Motions to Suppress: Waiver: Appeal and Error. The failure
to object to evidence at trial, even though the evidence was the subject of a pre-
vious motion to suppress, waives the objection, and a party will not be heard to
complain of the alleged error on appeal.
6. Trial: Rules of Evidence: Appeal and Error. Under Neb. Evid. R. 103, Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 27-103 (Reissue 2008), an error may not be predicated upon a rul-
ing which admits evidence unless a timely objection or motion to strike appears
of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if a specific ground was not
apparent from the context.
7. Trial: Evidence. An objection to the admission of evidence is generally not
timely unless it is made at the earliest opportunity after the ground for the objec-
tion becomes apparent.
8. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Motor Vehicles. Even though the
purpose of a stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief, stopping a
vehicle and detaining its occupants constitute a seizure within the meaning of the
4th and 14th Amendments.
9. ____: ____: ____. An occupant of a vehicle ordinarily has a legitimate expecta-
tion to be free of unreasonable governmental intrusion so as to give the occupant
standing to challenge a stop as violative of his or her Fourth Amendment rights.
10. Constitutional Law: Criminal Law: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Investigative
Stops. Pursuant to the 4th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and
article I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution, a law enforcement officer may legally
conduct an investigatory stop of a person suspected of criminal activity only
when the officer has a reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts that the
person has been, is, or is about to be involved in criminal activity.
11. 	Criminal Law: Investigative Stops. Generalized suspicions or unparticularized
hunches that a person has been or is engaged in criminal activity do not suffice
to justify a detention.
12. Police Officers and Sheriffs: Probable Cause. Reasonable suspicion depends
upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of
reliability.
13. Investigative Stops. Finding the necessary quantum of individualized suspicion
only after a stop occurs cannot justify the stop.
14. Search and Seizure: Evidence: Trial. Evidence obtained as the direct or indirect
“fruit” of an illegal search or seizure, “the poisonous tree,” is inadmissible in a
state prosecution and must be excluded.
15. Constitutional Law: Evidence: Appeal and Error. In addressing whether the
connection between a prior illegality and challenged evidence has become so
attenuated as to dissipate the taint, courts must take into account considerations
relating to the exclusionary rule and the constitutional principles which it is
designed to protect.
16. Evidence. The relevant factors for attenuation will depend upon the facts of a
particular case but include (1) the proximity between the actual illegality and the

426 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
evidence sought to be suppressed, (2) the presence of intervening factors, and (3)
the flagrancy of the governmental misconduct involved in the case.
17. Search and Seizure: Police Officers and Sheriffs. Consent to search given in
very close temporal proximity to the official illegality is often a mere submission
or resignation to police authority.
18. Evidence: Words and Phrases. Intervening circumstances are intervening events
of significance that render inapplicable the deterrence and judicial integrity pur-
poses which justify excluding tainted evidence.
19. Search and Seizure: Evidence: Confessions: Appeal and Error. Where a con-
fession follows confrontation of the defendant with illegally seized evidence, the
Nebraska Supreme Court has repeatedly said there has been an exploitation of
that illegality.
Petition for further review from the Court of Appeals,
inbody, Chief Judge, and cAssel and pirtle, Judges, on appeal
thereto from the Separate Juvenile Court of Douglas County,
elizAbeth crnkovich, Judge. Judgment of Court of Appeals
reversed, and cause remanded with directions.
Thomas C. Riley, Douglas County Public Defender, and
Melinda S. Currans for appellant.
Donald W. Kleine, Douglas County Attorney, and Cortney
Wiresinger for appellee.
heAvicAn, c.J., Wright, connolly, stephAn, mccormAck,
and miller-lermAn, JJ.
mccormAck, J.
I. NATURE OF CASE
The juvenile court adjudicated Ashley W. as a child within
the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(1) (Reissue 2008) for
possession of marijuana. Ashley appealed, and the Nebraska
Court of Appeals affirmed in a memorandum opinion filed on
December 15, 2011. The Court of Appeals declined to address
issues previously raised by Ashley in a motion to suppress,
concluding that she had failed to preserve the alleged errors.
We granted further review.
II. BACKGROUND
In June 2010, police officers Dan Wootton and Josiah Warren
investigated a fireworks complaint in Omaha, Nebraska. In the
process of their investigation, they issued Ashley, a minor

IN RE INTEREST OF ASHLEY W. 	427
Cite as 284 Neb. 424
child, a citation for possession of less than 1 ounce of mari-
juana. The county attorney filed a petition to have Ashley adju-
dicated as a child as defined by § 43-247(1). Ashley’s attorney
made a motion to suppress the evidence relating to the citation.
The juvenile court scheduled the hearing on Ashley’s motion to
suppress on the same day as the adjudication hearing.
1. Wootton And WArren testimony
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, held January 26,
2011, the State offered the testimony of Wootton and Warren.
No other testimony or evidence was presented.
Wootton and Warren testified that about 5 minutes after
receiving the call relating to the fireworks complaint, they were
“[w]ithin 50 feet” of the area where the complaint came from.
There, the officers noticed a vehicle parked on the street with
its headlights on and two occupants inside. Many other unoc-
cupied cars were similarly parked along the street. The officers
did not observe anyone else in the area. The officers did not
see any fireworks or fireworks debris in the area.
As the officers drove by, the individuals in the vehicle
reportedly “looked” at the officers. After the cruiser passed, the
vehicle’s driver pulled away from the curb and started to drive
down the street.
The officers turned around, engaged their cruiser’s flashing
lights, and pulled the vehicle over. Wootton explained that the
vehicle aroused suspicion because, “[w]ell, the lights on, sit-
ting in the area.”
The officers told the individuals in the vehicle that they were
investigating a fireworks complaint and asked for identifica-
tion. During this initial contact, Warren stood by the driver’s
side, where he conversed with the driver. Wootton stood by the
passenger side of the vehicle, where the window was rolled up.
Ashley was the passenger. Ashley and the driver denied any
involvement with or knowledge of the fireworks.
Warren testified that he had smelled marijuana upon their
initial approach to the vehicle after it was stopped. The officers
returned to their cruiser to process identification and discussed
searching the vehicle. It took 10 to 15 minutes to process the
driver’s and Ashley’s identifications.

428 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
Wootton then asked the driver whether they could search the
vehicle. Wootton did not tell the driver that he had a right to
refuse, and the driver gave his permission.
The officers removed the driver and Ashley from the vehicle
to conduct the search. Warren conducted a pat-down of the
driver for weapons and escorted him to the front of the cruiser.
Ashley was also directed to stand in front of the cruiser.
Wootton searched the area inside the vehicle, while Warren
stood watch over Ashley and the driver. Wootton testified that
Ashley was not free to go while the search was conducted.
Wootton testified that he found a baggie of marijuana on the
passenger side of the vehicle. He approached the driver and
Ashley, held up the baggie, and asked, “Who does this belong
to?” Wootton testified that Ashley “said it was mine.” After
issuing a citation to Ashley, the officers drove her home. The
officers estimated that approximately 25 minutes passed from
the time they initiated the stop to the time they issued the cita-
tion. The officers did not give Miranda warnings.
The officers had been employed by the Omaha Police
Department approximately 2 years. Both had received field
training and classes involving narcotics. The officers did not,
however, elaborate on such training or how it related to their
ability to identify the substance seized as marijuana. Nor did
the officers provide a detailed explanation as to how or why
they concluded that the substance they found in the vehicle
was marijuana.
2. A dJudicAtion postponed
After hearing testimony from the two officers, the juvenile
court denied Ashley’s motion to suppress. Following confirma-
tion that both parties were ready to proceed to trial, the follow-
ing dialog occurred between the juvenile court, the State, and
Ashley’s counsel:
THE COURT: All right. Let me ask this of you. Will
the evidence presented by the State be any different than
the evidence that was just heard?
[State]: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Would you have any other witnesses?
[State]: No, Your Honor.

IN RE INTEREST OF ASHLEY W. 	429
Cite as 284 Neb. 424
THE COURT: Would there be any agreement to stipu-
lating that that would be the State’s case in chief rather
than sit for 30 minutes and hear the precise same evi-
dence, given the fact that we just heard the evidence and
you did have an opportunity to cross-examine. Do you
want to ask your client whether that would be all right?
. . . .
[Ashley’s counsel]: Judge, I do not have an objec-
tion to the Court taking judicial notice of the testimony
as long — I would like to renew my objections to the
evidence of the statements that I put forth in the motion
to suppress.
THE COURT: Okay. You would have done that at trial,
so you — and so I will note that. And then I will — as I
would have at trial, will further indicate that that has been
ruled on.
[Ashley’s counsel]: (Nods head.)
THE COURT: All right. So does the State rest then?
[State]: Well, Your Honor, I would briefly call Officer
Wootton to the stand.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, now we’re going — now
we’re in a different place, because here’s what I asked
the State. Would your evidence be any different? You said
no. Do you have any other witnesses? You said no. So I
was trying to address the interest of time and [Ashley’s]
right and insistence on maintaining that right. We’ll have
to continue it to a later date. We will set this for trial at
a later date.
(Wherein, the bailiff was called.)
THE COURT: May I have a trial date, please? Half an
hour. Soon.
[State]: Your Honor, we would only need 15 minutes.
THE COURT: No, madam, because I gave you an
opportunity, respectfully. I was respecting the State. But
we can’t do it both ways. And that’s fine. That’s fine. But
we will adjudicate it. You will recall your witnesses and
present the same testimony.
[To Ashley] And who will you be calling as a witness?
[Ashley’s counsel]: Ashley.

430 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
THE COURT: Unless you wish to accept the previous
deal and just have Ashley come to the stand?
[State]: I didn’t know she was going to call her, so —
THE COURT: Well, we would — all right . . . . I
would have — I’m going to suggest that that might have
occurred to you given what has transpired in the last ten
minutes and/or with a question to counsel.
We’re adjourned. Date and time will be provided at a
later date.
3. A dJudicAtion heAring
The adjudication hearing was held on March 25, 2011.
The hearing began with Ashley’s attorney’s request “as a pre-
liminary matter, in reading over the transcript and the order,
I believe we are requesting the Court make specific findings
of facts and conclusions of law as to the motion to suppress
before we proceed to trial.” The court stated, “Okay. We are
going to proceed to trial today.” The dialog continued:
[Ashley’s counsel]: Okay.
THE COURT: Go ahead. I am not continuing the trial.
[Ashley’s counsel]: I’m not asking that. I’m just asking
for specific findings of facts and conclusions of law.
THE COURT: Okay. I can do that in the order that I
issue today.
[Ashley’s counsel]: As to the motion to suppress?
THE COURT: Yes.
[Ashley’s counsel]: Okay. All right.
[State]: At this time, Your Honor, the State would offer
what has been marked as Exhibit No. 2. It is a certified
copy of a certificate of live birth for Ashley . . . , and her
date of birth is March . . . 1994; Exhibit No. 3, which is
a transcript of the motion to suppress hearing that was
set and heard before this Court on January 26, 2011. The
transcript was typed by . . . the court reporter.
THE COURT: Okay. Any objection?
[Ashley’s counsel]: No objections.
THE COURT: All right. They will be received.
. . . .
THE COURT: Any other evidence?

IN RE INTEREST OF ASHLEY W. 	431
Cite as 284 Neb. 424
[State]: No other evidence at this time, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Counsel, are you presenting
evidence?
[Ashley’s counsel]: Yes, Judge. But I would like to
make a preliminary motion. I would move to dismiss the
case, being that the State has failed to prove their prima
facie case; specifically due to the inconsistencies in the
officers’ statements and also due to the fact that there was
no evidence establishing that what was found was actu-
ally marijuana.
THE COURT: Overruled.
[Ashley’s counsel]: Okay. And can I ask for a reason-
ing on that, Judge?
THE COURT: Because the Court finds that the State
presented a prima facie case and your motion to dismiss
for failure to state a prima facie case is overruled.
[Ashley’s counsel]: Specifically, Judge, I am object-
ing — I’m sorry — to the State — the testimony of the
State’s witnesses subject to my motion to suppress.
THE COURT: Now, just a moment.
[Ashley’s counsel]: Yes.
THE COURT: You just —
[Ashley’s counsel]: I know.
THE COURT: — said no objection. That has been
ruled on. You may not go back, Counsel.
[Ashley’s counsel]: Okay.
THE COURT: You have passed the moment when that
would have been an appropriate motion. You raised no
objection. The evidence is presented. The State has rested.
You — you appropriately made a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a prima facie case. I have overruled it. The
next step is, do you have evidence to present?
[Ashley’s counsel]: I do.
THE COURT: You may proceed then.
Ashley presented her defense, which consisted of her testi-
mony. Ashley denied that the marijuana was hers or that she
had ever said it was hers. According to Ashley, she had said,
“It’s not mine.” Ashley also testified that she had no knowl-
edge there was marijuana in the vehicle until they were pulled

432 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
over and the driver told her. She said that she had only been in
the car less than 2 minutes. She explained that the driver had
pulled to the curb a couple of houses down from her house
in order to pick up a compact disc and look for change to
buy food.
On May 26, 2011, the court issued a written order adjudi-
cating Ashley as a child under § 43-247(1). The court also set
forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law “regarding the
Motion to Suppress held on January 26, 2011.” The findings
reiterated the undisputed portions of the officers’ testimony,
and the court found that Ashley had admitted to the officers
that the baggie of marijuana was hers. The court concluded that
(1) the initial stop was based on a reasonable and articulable
suspicion of criminal activity, (2) there was probable cause for
the stop, (3) a rights advisory was not required as the child
in interest was not in a custodial situation or under arrest, (4)
the officers were conducting a voluntary search of the vehicle,
and (5) the statements were spontaneous and were freely and
voluntarily given.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in a memorandum opinion.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that Ashley’s trial counsel did
not object at trial to the evidence that was the subject of her
motion to suppress and thus failed to preserve the issue for
appellate review. The Court of Appeals also concluded that
the circumstantial evidence was sufficient for the trier of fact
to conclude the substance seized was marijuana. We granted
Ashley’s petition for further review.
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Ashley asserted in her appellate brief that the juvenile
court erred in denying her motion to suppress, because she
was illegally seized without reasonable, articulable suspicion
and the statements and evidence obtained were fruit of the
poisonous tree. Ashley further asserted that the court erred in
failing to suppress her statements to the officers, because she
was in custody and was not advised of her Miranda rights.
Finally, she asserted that the juvenile court erred in conclud-
ing there was sufficient evidence that the substance in question
was marijuana.

IN RE INTEREST OF ASHLEY W. 	433
Cite as 284 Neb. 424
Ashley asserts in her petition for further review that the
Court of Appeals erred in (1) concluding that she failed to
object at trial and thus preserve for appellate review the evi-
dence that was the subject of the motion to suppress and (2)
finding that the evidence in the record was sufficient to estab-
lish beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance in question
was marijuana.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress based on
the Fourth Amendment, apart from determinations of reason-
able suspicion to conduct investigatory stops and probable
cause to perform warrantless searches, is to be upheld on
appeal unless its findings of fact are clearly erroneous.1
[2] The ultimate determinations of reasonable suspicion to
conduct an investigatory stop and probable cause to perform a
warrantless search are reviewed de novo, and findings of fact
are reviewed for clear error, giving due weight to the infer-
ences drawn from those facts by the trial judge.2
[3] When the State seeks to submit evidence as sufficiently
attenuated from a previous Fourth Amendment violation, we
review the trial court’s findings of historical facts for clear
error but review de novo the court’s ultimate attenuation deter-
mination based on those facts.3
V. ANALYSIS
1. the obJection
The Court of Appeals determined that Ashley failed to
timely object to the introduction of evidence at trial which
was the subject of her previous motion to suppress. Therefore,
Ashley had not preserved the issue for appellate review and
the court did not address the underlying merits. We agree with
Ashley that this was error. The record shows that Ashley made
the necessary objection.
1 See State v. Royer, 276 Neb. 173, 753 N.W.2d 333 (2008).
2 See State v. Lee, 265 Neb. 663, 658 N.W.2d 669 (2003).
3 State v. Gorup, 279 Neb. 841, 782 N.W.2d 16 (2010).

434 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
[4-6] 	The 	Nebraska 	Evidence 	Rules 	control 	adduction
of evidence at an adjudication hearing under the Nebraska
Juvenile Code.4 We have said that the failure to object to
evidence at trial, even though the evidence was the subject
of a previous motion to suppress, waives the objection, and
a party will not be heard to complain of the alleged error on
appeal.5 Neb. Evid. R. 103, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-103 (Reissue
2008), provides that an error may not be predicated upon a
ruling which admits evidence unless “a timely objection or
motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground
of objection, if a specific ground was not apparent from the
context.” Thus, an untimely renewal of an objection, even
though the subject of a previous motion to suppress, will
waive the objection.
[7] An objection to the admission of evidence is generally
not timely unless it is made at the earliest opportunity after the
ground for the objection becomes apparent.6 Thus, an objection
to testimony is not usually considered timely when the testi-
mony has already been adduced without objection and where
the grounds for the motion should have been apparent at the
time of the testimony.7 And, in State v. Rodgers,8 and State v.
DiBaise,9 we said that an objection made at trial after the close
of the State’s case in chief fails to preserve the question of the
admissibility of exhibits which were the subjects of previous
motions to suppress. In both Rodgers and DiBaise, defense
counsel stated during the State’s case in chief that there was
no objection to the introduction of the exhibits, but then tried
to renew the motion to suppress those same exhibits after the
close of the State’s case.
However, we have excused an attorney’s failure to object
in circumstances where the need to object was not reasonably
4 In re Interest of J.L.M. et al., 234 Neb. 381, 451 N.W.2d 377 (1990).
5 State v. Trotter, 262 Neb. 443, 632 N.W.2d 325 (2001).
6 State v. Rodgers, 237 Neb. 506, 446 N.W.2d 537 (1991).
7 See State v. Giessinger, 235 Neb. 140, 454 N.W.2d 289 (1990).
8 State v. Rodgers, supra note 6.
9 State v. DiBaise, 232 Neb. 217, 440 N.W.2d 223 (1989).

IN RE INTEREST OF ASHLEY W. 	435
Cite as 284 Neb. 424
apparent. In State v. Giessinger,10 we determined that because
of the confusing nature of the proceedings, we would address
the defendant’s alleged error despite counsel’s failure to object
at trial. Prior to the suppression hearing in Giessinger, the
judge had told defense counsel it was the judge’s usual practice
to handle the motion to suppress and the trial “‘collectively,
at the same time.’”11 This was incorrect insofar as the motion
to suppress must be ruled on and finally determined before
trial.12 Counsel had made an objection to the disputed evidence
during that portion of the proceedings relating to the motion
to suppress. We concluded counsel may have failed to renew
that objection “because of the confusion introduced into the
proceedings by the county court judge’s suggestion that the
suppression hearing and the trial be combined.”13
Because of the unique nature of the proceedings, the grounds
for Ashley’s objection were not apparent before the State con-
cluded its case in chief. Cases such as Rodgers and DiBaise,
which are relied upon by the State, are not dispositive.
First, Ashley’s counsel was asked whether she had any
objection to exhibit 3, the transcript of the hearing on the
motion to suppress, almost immediately after Ashley’s counsel
concluded a discussion with the juvenile court regarding her
request for specific findings on her motion to suppress. The
admission of exhibit 3 was arguably necessary in order for the
court to comply with Ashley’s request for specific findings
on her motion to suppress. Furthermore, we can find no case
where we have deemed an objection waived when the objec-
tion was being discussed almost at the same moment as the
alleged waiver of the objection.
Second, the January 26, 2011, adjudication hearing was
postponed only because the State changed its mind and wanted
to call witnesses. Given this history, it is unclear whether,
at the March 25 continuation of the adjudication hearing,
10 State v. Giessinger, supra note 7.
11 See id. at 143, 454 N.W.2d at 292.
12 See State v. Harms, 233 Neb. 882, 449 N.W.2d 1 (1989).
13 See State v. Giessinger, supra note 7, 235 Neb. at 144, 454 N.W.2d at 292.

436 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
Ashley’s counsel could have expected that the entirety of the
State’s evidence would be a birth certificate and the transcript
of the suppression hearing. Ashley’s counsel was arguably
taken by surprise that the State’s case in chief began and ended
almost instantaneously.
This is distinguishable from circumstances where defense
counsel sits idly by while the State presents a more lengthy
presentation of its case. We have never found an objection to
an exhibit untimely when made within seconds of its being
offered and received. Likewise, we have not found an objec-
tion to come too late because it was made after the State’s case
in chief, when the State’s entire case in chief lasted a matter
of seconds. Especially in a bench trial, the rules of evidence
should not devolve into a game of “gotcha.”
Lastly, the need to object to the transcript of the suppression
hearing would not be apparent, because Ashley’s objection to
the officers’ testimony is embedded within it. The evidence
offered and received in other waiver cases was not the entire
transcript of the suppression hearing.14
Not only is exhibit 3 a “transcript of the motion to sup-
press hearing,” but that transcript contains counsel’s express
renewal of Ashley’s objection to the officers’ testimony. At
the beginning of the adjudication hearing on March 25, 2011,
when Ashley’s counsel believed the parties were proceeding to
a stipulated trial on the suppression hearing record, Ashley’s
counsel diligently renewed her objection to the evidence. If
an exhibit implicitly and explicitly containing an objection is
entered into evidence, then the objection itself has arguably
been reasserted with the admission of the exhibit.
It was an abuse of discretion for the juvenile court to con-
sider Ashley’s objection untimely. Ashley moved to suppress
the evidence, discussed her previous motion to suppress, and
then stated she did not object to a transcript of the hearing
on that motion. All parties and the juvenile court understood
that Ashley objected to the disputed evidence contained within
that objection. As soon as Ashley’s counsel realized what had
14 State v. Rodgers, supra note 6; State v. DiBaise, supra note 9. See, also,
e.g., State v. Timmens, 263 Neb. 622, 641 N.W.2d 383 (2002).

IN RE INTEREST OF ASHLEY W. 	437
Cite as 284 Neb. 424
occurred, she renewed her motion to suppress. This was almost
immediately after the admission of exhibit 3.
At the very least, the stop-start nature of these proceed-
ings and the presentation of the exhibit as a “transcript of the
motion to suppress hearing” rendered the need for an objection
unapparent. Ashley’s counsel objected to the officers’ testi-
mony at the earliest opportunity after the ground for the objec-
tion became apparent. The Court of Appeals erred in holding
otherwise. We therefore address the merits of Ashley’s motion
to suppress.
2. the stop
Ashley asserts that the stop of the vehicle was unconsti-
tutional because the officers lacked a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that the occupants were engaged in criminal activity.
She asserts that Warren’s subsequent observation of a suspi-
cious odor, the driver’s acquiescence to Wootton’s request
to search the vehicle, the marijuana found as a result of the
search, and Ashley’s statements when confronted with the
marijuana were all obtained through exploitation of the illegal
stop. We agree that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion
for the stop and that the State has failed to prove the evidence
obtained during the stop was sufficiently attenuated from the
primary illegality to be “purged” of its unconstitutional “taint.”
Accordingly, the juvenile court erred in denying Ashley’s
motion to suppress.
(a) Reasonable Suspicion
[8-10] Even though the purpose of a stop is limited and
the resulting detention quite brief, stopping a vehicle and
detaining its occupants constitute a seizure within the mean-
ing of the 4th and 14th Amendments.15 An occupant of a
vehicle ordinarily has a legitimate expectation to be free of
unreasonable governmental intrusion so as to give the occu-
pant standing to challenge the stop as violative of his or her
Fourth Amendment rights.16 Pursuant to the 4th and 14th
15 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660
(1979).
16 State v. Giessinger, supra note 7.

438 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 7, of the
Nebraska Constitution, a law enforcement officer may legally
conduct such an investigatory stop only when the officer
has a reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts that
the person has been, is, or is about to be involved in crimi-
nal activity.17
[11,12] The police officer must be able to point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational infer-
ences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.18
Generalized suspicions or unparticularized hunches that a per-
son has been or is engaged in criminal activity do not suffice
to justify a detention.19 Reasonable suspicion therefore depends
upon both the content of information possessed by police and
its degree of reliability.20
Geographical proximity of a suspect to a recently perpe-
trated offense21 and the number of people in that area22 can be
factors supporting reasonable suspicion. However, time of day
and reports of crime in the area will not, in and of themselves,
justify a Terry stop.23 The U.S. Supreme Court has said that
“presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing
alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized
suspicion that the person is committing a crime.”24
17 See In re Interest of Jabreco G., 12 Neb. App. 667, 683 N.W.2d 386
(2004). See, also, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d
889 (1968).
18 Terry v. Ohio, supra note 17.
19 See id.
20 See State v. Ortiz, 257 Neb. 784, 600 N.W.2d 805 (1999).
21 See, e.g., U.S. v. Goodrich, 450 F.3d 552 (3d Cir. 2006); U.S. v. Wimbush,
337 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2003); U.S. v. Brown, 334 F.3d 1161 (D.C. Cir.
2003); U.S. v. Brown, 159 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1998); U.S. v. Raino, 980 F.2d
1148 (8th Cir. 1992).
22 See, U.S. v. Goodrich, supra note 21; U.S. v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105 (4th
Cir. 1987).
23 State v. Maybin, 27 Kan. App. 2d 189, 2 P.3d 179 (2000). See, also, State
v. Lee, supra note 2.
24 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S. Ct. 673, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570
(2000). See, also, e.g., State v. Eric K., 148 N.M. 469, 237 P.3d 771 (N.M.
App. 2010).

IN RE INTEREST OF ASHLEY W. 	439
Cite as 284 Neb. 424
Thus, in M.M. v. State,25 the court found insufficient evi-
dence to justify a stop after a caller reported a fight between
a group of juveniles and the officers encountered four dishev-
eled juveniles in the area of the report. Similarly, in U.S. v.
Massenburg,26 the court concluded that the officers lacked
reasonable suspicion when the stop was based on a report of
possible gunshots fired in a high-crime area and the officers’
observation of a group of four men alone four blocks from
the reported shots. The court noted that the report provided no
physical description of the perpetrators and that the only link
between the report and the group of men was their general
proximity to the alleged gunshots.
The court in Massenburg reasoned that a lone group of indi-
viduals present in a high-crime area and in the general vicinity
of reported gunshots was a state of affairs simply “‘too generic
and susceptible to innocent explanation to satisfy the reason-
able suspicion inquiry.’”27 The court expressed concern about
“‘the way in which the Government attempts to spin . . . mun-
dane acts into a web of deception.’”28
At the time of the stop at issue in this case, the officers
were apparently aware only that someone in the area had heard
fireworks. There is no evidence that the caller provided any
description of the alleged perpetrators. There is no evidence
that the caller knew where these fireworks were being set off.
In other words, there is no evidence the caller indicated with
any specificity from what direction the caller heard the noise of
the fireworks or how loud it was. The officers did not indicate
that they knew, in their experience, what the potential radius
might be from the location of a caller hearing fireworks noise
to the site where the fireworks are being set off.
Close to the house of the caller who reported hearing fire-
works, the officers saw a vehicle legally parked alongside the
25 M.M. v. State, 72 So. 3d 328 (Fla. App. 2011).
26 U.S. v. Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480 (4th Cir. 2011).
27 Id. at 488, quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, supra note 24 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and in part dissenting; Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
join)).
28 Id. at 489, quoting U.S. v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2011).

440 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
curb. Other vehicles were similarly parked. It was night, and
the vehicle had its lights on. Unlike other vehicles along the
street, the vehicle was occupied. But there was no evidence
that the officers knew how long the occupants had been in
the vehicle.
The officers observed no particular suspicious behavior from
the occupants of the vehicle. There was no evidence that the
officers had seen fireworks residue in or around the vehicle—
or even in that general area. When the officers passed the
vehicle, the occupants “looked” at them. The occupants then
pulled onto the street and proceeded in a normal fashion.
Wootton explained they suspected the occupants of the
vehicle because, “[w]ell, the lights on, sitting in the area.” That
is not enough. Intentionally or not, the State is doing nothing
more than “‘spin[ning] . . . mundane acts.’”29 The demand
for specificity in the information upon which police action is
predicated is the central teaching of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.30 At the time of the stop,
Wootton and Warren lacked even a minimal quantum of spe-
cific information that the occupants of the vehicle had been,
were, or were about to be involved in criminal activity.
[13] While the State points to the fact that Warren thought he
smelled marijuana, this was only after the vehicle was stopped.
Finding the necessary quantum of individualized suspicion
only after a stop occurs cannot justify the stop.31 Because
Wootton and Warren lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the
vehicle, the stop was illegal, in violation of Ashley’s Fourth
Amendment rights.
(b) “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree”
[14] Evidence obtained as the direct or indirect “fruit” of an
illegal search or seizure, “the poisonous tree,” is inadmissible
in a state prosecution and must be excluded.32 To determine
29 Id.
30 Terry v. Ohio, supra note 17.
31 See U.S. v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2002).
32 See, e.g., State v. Kelley, 265 Neb. 563, 658 N.W.2d 279 (2003); State v.
Fitch, 255 Neb. 108, 582 N.W.2d 342 (1998).

IN RE INTEREST OF ASHLEY W. 	441
Cite as 284 Neb. 424
whether the evidence is a “fruit” of the illegal search or sei-
zure, the question is not as simple as whether the evidence
would have come to light but for the warrantless apprehen-
sion.33 The question is whether the evidence has been come
at by exploitation of the primary illegality or whether it has
instead been come at by means sufficiently distinguishable to
be purged of the primary taint.34
The juvenile court concluded that any taint of an illegal
stop was purged by the driver’s voluntary consent to search
and the voluntary nature of Ashley’s statement to the officers
when confronted with the fruits of that search. When a con-
sensual search is preceded by a Fourth Amendment violation,
the prosecution must prove two things in order to avoid the
exclusionary rule: (1) that the consent was voluntary and (2)
that there was sufficient attenuation, or a break in the causal
connection, between the illegal conduct and the consent to
search.35 The same two-part analysis is conducted for alleg-
edly voluntary and spontaneous statements following a Fourth
Amendment violation.36
When the State seeks to submit evidence as sufficiently
attenuated from a previous Fourth Amendment violation, we
review the trial court’s findings of historical facts for clear
error but review de novo the court’s ultimate attenuation
determination based on those facts.37 We find, in our de novo
review, that the driver’s consent to search and Ashley’s state-
ment were not sufficiently attenuated from the primary viola-
tion so as to purge its taint.
[15,16] 	In 	addressing 	whether 	the 	connection 	between
a prior illegality and challenged evidence has become so
33 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975).
34 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d
441 (1963).
35 See State v. Gorup, supra note 3.
36 See, Brown v. Illinois, supra note 33; Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 123 S.
Ct. 1843, 155 L. Ed. 2d 814 (2003); U.S. v. Yousif, supra note 31; People
v. Lewis, 975 P.2d 160 (Colo. 1999); State v. Towai, 234 Or. App. 292, 228
P.3d 601 (2010); U.S. v. Khamsouk, 57 M.J. 282 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
37 See State v. Gorup, supra note 3.

442 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
attenuated as to dissipate the taint, courts must take into
account considerations relating to the exclusionary rule and
the constitutional principles which it is designed to protect.38
The relevant factors for attenuation will depend upon the facts
of a particular case39 but include (1) the proximity between the
actual illegality and the evidence sought to be suppressed, (2)
the presence of intervening factors, and (3) the flagrancy of
the governmental misconduct involved in the case.40
[17] Consent to search given in very close temporal prox-
imity to the official illegality is often a mere submission or
resignation to police authority.41 If only a short period of time
has passed, a court is more likely to consider the consent or
statement as a “poisonous fruit” of the illegal act.42 The offi-
cers testified that they asked to search the vehicle as soon as
they were done running the occupants’ identification, which
took 10 to 15 minutes. In total, the stop lasted approximately
25 minutes. The factor of temporal proximity weighs against
attenuation and in favor of suppression of the evidence in
this case.
[18] Intervening circumstances are intervening events of
significance that render inapplicable the deterrence and judicial
integrity purposes which justify excluding tainted evidence.43
These can include representation of counsel, termination of
illegal custody, and intervening lawful arrest.44 In the case
of allegedly voluntary statements, whether Miranda warnings
were given is also a factor that may be considered with other
evidence indicating that the defendant has acted independently
38 See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 98 S. Ct. 1054, 55 L. Ed. 2d
268 (1978).
39 See State v. Gorup, 275 Neb. 280, 745 N.W.2d 912 (2008).
40 See Brown v. Illinois, supra note 33.
41 See State v. Gorup, supra note 3.
42 See id.
43 See U.S. v. Washington, 387 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2004).
44 See 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, a Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment § 11.4(b) (4th ed. 2004).

IN RE INTEREST OF ASHLEY W. 	443
Cite as 284 Neb. 424
of the unlawful inducement.45 Similarly, advisements of the
right to refuse a request to search may be a relevant factor—
although one of limited significance.46 Miranda warnings and
right-to-refuse advisements are not a cure-all and will not, by
themselves, purge the taint.47
[19] In this case, there were no advisements which the State
could argue made these acts independent of the initial illegal-
ity. Indeed, the State points to no intervening circumstances at
all. Where a confession follows confrontation of the defendant
with illegally seized evidence, we have repeatedly said there
has been an “‘“exploitation of that illegality.”’”48 “‘This is
because “the realization that the ‘cat is out of the bag’ plays a
significant role in encouraging the suspect to speak.”’”49 There
are no intervening circumstances attenuating the consent to
search from the illegality of the stop in this case, and Ashley’s
statement when confronted with the marijuana was certainly
not independent of the officers’ finding it.
The third factor, purposeful and flagrant conduct, includes
instances when the officer knew the conduct was likely uncon-
stitutional or should have known the conduct was an obvious
violation of the Fourth Amendment, but engaged in it none-
theless.50 It also includes “‘fishing expeditions’” conducted
in the hope that “‘“something might turn up.”’”51 Given the
obvious dearth of particularized information pointing toward
the occupants of the vehicle, this factor also weighs in favor
of exclusion.
45 See, U.S. v. Paradis, 351 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2003); U.S. v. Patzer, 277
F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2002). See, also, State v. Abdouch, 230 Neb. 929, 434
N.W.2d 317 (1989).
46 See, e.g., U.S. v. Perry, 437 F.3d 782 (8th Cir. 2006). See, also, State v.
Gorup, supra note 3.
47 See State v. Abdouch, supra note 45.
48 See id. at 945, 434 N.W.2d at 327, quoting 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search
and Seizure, a Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 11.4(c) (2d ed. 1987).
49 Id.
50 See State v. Gorup, supra note 3.
51 See id. at 863, 782 N.W.2d at 33.

444 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
Even assuming that the consent to search and Ashley’s
statements met the constitutional standards for voluntariness
under the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment standard
that this evidence be purged of the taint of the illegality of the
original stop has not been met. All the evidence derived from
the officers’ testimony was obtained through exploitation of
the illegality of the stop made without reasonable, articulable
suspicion. Therefore, the juvenile court erred in overruling
Ashley’s motion to suppress.
In a bench trial of a law action, including a criminal case
tried without a jury, erroneous admission of evidence is not
reversible error if other relevant evidence, admitted without
objection or properly admitted over objection, sustains the trial
court’s factual findings necessary for the judgment or deci-
sion reviewed.52 But in this case, the only evidence presented
against Ashley was the evidence we now deem inadmissible.
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision affirm-
ing the adjudication and we remand the matter to that court
with directions to remand the cause to the juvenile court with
directions to vacate and dismiss.
VI. CONCLUSION
The juvenile court erred in denying Ashley’s motion to sup-
press and in finding that she had waived her objection to the
evidence at the adjudication hearing. The Court of Appeals
erred in finding Ashley’s objection was waived and in affirm-
ing the order of adjudication.
reversed And remAnded With directions.
cAssel, J., not participating.
52 State v. Lujano, 251 Neb. 256, 557 N.W.2d 217 (1996).