Zawaideh v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs.

48 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
we do not reach the issue regarding the application of the
Nebraska Trust Deeds Act.
We 	vacate 	the 	judgments 	against 	the 	defendants 	and
remand the causes for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
Judgments vacated, and causes remanded
for further proceedings.
cassel, J., not participating.
Z iad l. Z awaideh, m.d., appellant, v. nebraska
department of health and human services
regulation and licensure and state
of nebraska ex rel. Jon bruning,
attorney general, appellees.
825 N.W.2d 204
Filed January 18, 2013. 	No. S-12-069.
1. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will affirm a lower
court’s grant of summary judgment if the pleadings and admissible evidence
offered at the hearing show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts
or the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. ____: ____. In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was
granted, and gives that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible
from the evidence.
3. ____: ____. The grant of a motion for summary judgment may be affirmed on
any ground available to the trial court, even if it is not the same reasoning the
trial court relied upon.
4. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing questions of law, an appellate
court resolves the questions independently of the lower court’s conclusions.
5. Courts: Jurisdiction: Immunity. It is well-settled law in Nebraska that sover-
eign immunity deprives a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.
6. Constitutional Law: Legislature: Immunity: Waiver. Neb. Const. art. V, § 22,
permits the State to lay its sovereignty aside and consent to be sued on such terms
and conditions as the Legislature may prescribe.
7. ____: ____: ____: ____. Neb. Const. art. V, § 22, is not self-executing, but
instead requires legislative action for waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:40 AM CST

ZAWAIDEH v. NEBRASKA DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 	49
Cite as 285 Neb. 48
8. Statutes: Immunity: Waiver. Statutes that purport to waive the protection of
sovereign immunity of the State or its subdivisions are strictly construed in favor
of the sovereign and against the waiver.
9. Immunity: Waiver. A waiver of sovereign immunity is found only where stated
by the most express language of a statute or by such overwhelming implication
from the text as will allow no other reasonable construction.
10. Actions: Immunity. A suit against a state agency is a suit against the State and
is subject to sovereign immunity.
11. 	Actions: States: Statutes: Contracts. The State Contract Claims Act autho-
rizes suits for contract claims against the State, in derogation of the State’s
sovereignty.
12. Actions: Statutes: Contracts. The State Contract Claims Act is the exclusive
remedy for resolving contract claims against the State.
13. Fraud: Pleadings. To state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, a plaintiff
must allege (1) that a representation was made; (2) that the representation was
false; (3) that when made, the representation was known to be false or made
recklessly without knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; (4) that the
representation was made with the intention that the plaintiff should rely on it; (5)
that the plaintiff did so rely on it; and (6) that the plaintiff suffered damage as
a result.
14. Negligence: Fraud. Negligent misrepresentation has essentially the same ele-
ments as fraudulent misrepresentation with the exception of the defendant’s
mental state.
15. Contracts: Fraud. Fraud and deceit provide a ground for recovery that is inde-
pendent of contract.
16. Actions: Statutes: Contracts: Fraud. A misrepresentation cause of action is not
a “contract claim” under the State Contract Claims Act.
17. Declaratory Judgments: Immunity: Waiver. Nebraska’s Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act does not waive the State’s sovereign immunity, and a plaintiff
who seeks declaratory relief against the State must find authorization for such
remedy outside the confines of the act.
Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: John
a. colborn, Judge. Affirmed.
William 	M. 	Lamson, 	Jr., 	and 	Denise 	M. 	Destache, 	of
Lamson, Dugan & Murray, L.L.P., for appellant.
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and Michael J. Rumbaugh
for appellees.
heavican, 	c.J., 	wright, 	stephan, 	mccormack, 	miller-
lerman, and cassel, JJ.

50 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
mccormack, J.
NATURE OF CASE
After our decision in Zawaideh v. Nebraska Dept. of Health
& Human Servs. (Zawaideh I),1 Ziad L. Zawaideh, M.D.,
filed an amended complaint against the Nebraska Department
of Health and Human Services Regulation and Licensure
(Department) and the Attorney General. The amended com-
plaint alleged that the Attorney General fraudulently and neg-
ligently misrepresented the adverse effects of the assurance
of compliance entered into by Zawaideh with the Attorney
General. The district court granted the Department and the
Attorney General’s motion for summary judgment, finding
the misrepresentation claims to be contract claims subject
to, and barred by, the State Contract Claims Act.2 Zawaideh
appeals.
BACKGROUND
This is the second appeal in this case. In Zawaideh I,
the following facts were established from the allegations in
Zawaideh’s complaint. These facts are not contested by either
party in its respective briefs.
Zawaideh is a physician, licensed by and practicing in
the State of Nebraska. In 2006, the Department began an
investigation into a case involving obstetrical care Zawaideh
provided to a patient in 2001. Terri Nutzman, an assistant
attorney general, sent Zawaideh a proposed petition for dis-
ciplinary action and offered the option of an agreed settle-
ment that would have constituted a disciplinary action against
Zawaideh’s license.
Zawaideh initially refused to enter into any agreement and
denied any unprofessional conduct. After another proposed dis-
ciplinary settlement was refused, Nutzman offered Zawaideh
an assurance of compliance. Nutzman emphasized that the
assurance of compliance was not a disciplinary procedure.3 In
1 Zawaideh v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 280 Neb. 997,
792 N.W.2d 484 (2011).
2 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-8,302 et seq. (Reissue 2008).
3 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 38-1,107 (Reissue 2008).

ZAWAIDEH v. NEBRASKA DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 	51
Cite as 285 Neb. 48
the assurance of compliance, Zawaideh would promise to no
longer provide obstetrical care. Zawaideh had already given up
obstetrical care, so he agreed.
As provided by the Uniform Credentialing Act,4 Zawaideh’s
assurance of compliance was made part of his public record.
He alleges that it is referenced on the Department’s Web site
and is available to the general public upon request.
Zawaideh is also licensed to practice medicine in the
State of Washington. Zawaideh alleges that the Washington
Department of Health learned “via public record” of the
assurance of compliance and initiated a disciplinary action
based solely on the assurance of compliance. Washington
entered a disciplinary order that was reported to the National
Practitioner Data Bank. Zawaideh alleges that the assurance
of compliance has led to the termination of his professional
board certification and board eligibility which, in turn, has
“created difficulties” for him in recredentialing with hospitals
and insurance plans.
Zawaideh alleges that he would not have entered into the
assurance of compliance had he known about the potential
consequences, which he alleges were issues known to Nutzman
at the time she assured Zawaideh that the assurance of compli-
ance was not disciplinary. According to Zawaideh, the incident
that formed the basis of the investigation into his conduct is
no longer subject to discipline under Nebraska law, and termi-
nating the assurance of compliance would allow him to have
the Washington disciplinary order removed and restore his
board eligibility with the American Board of Family Medicine.
Therefore, Zawaideh asked the Department and the Attorney
General to rescind the assurance of compliance and expunge
the public record. Each declined.
our decision in Z awaideh i
In Zawaideh I, Zawaideh appealed from the district court’s
decision to grant a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim, pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1112(b)(6).
In his original complaint, Zawaideh argued that the execution
4 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 38-101 et seq. (Reissue 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2012).

52 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
of the assurance of compliance, and the Attorney General’s
refusal to vacate it, deprived Zawaideh of due process of law.
His original complaint asserted four causes of action:
(1) The [Uniform Credentialing Act] is facially uncon-
stitutional because it permits discipline to be carried out
without due process of law, as assurances of compliance
are not appealable.
(2) The [Uniform Credentialing Act] is unconstitu-
tional as applied in this case because Zawaideh no longer
practices obstetrics, of his own accord, and the underly-
ing occurrence is no longer subject to discipline under
Nebraska law.
(3) The Attorney General carried out his statutory
authority in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
(4) The Attorney General committed fraudulent misrep-
resentation by concealing the material fact that the assur-
ances of compliance were having the effect of a discipli-
nary order on other physicians.5
We 	affirmed 	the 	district 	court’s 	order 	with 	respect 	to
Zawaideh’s first, second, and third due process claims for
relief. However, we reversed the district court’s order with
respect to the fraudulent concealment claim and remanded the
cause for further proceedings on that claim. In the Zawaideh I
opinion, we noted that “[o]ther issues, such as whether the fact
was within Zawaideh’s reasonably diligent attention or whether
Zawaideh reasonably relied on Nutzman’s statement, or any
potential affirmative defenses, are not before us in this pro-
ceeding, and we make no comment on them.”6
procedural history
since Z awaideh i
After 	remand, 	Zawaideh 	filed 	an 	amended 	complaint
asserting 	fraudulent 	and 	negligent 	misrepresentation. 	The
suit requested the district court to “1) declare the Assurance
of Compliance void or rescinded; 2) direct the [Department
and the Attorney General] to expunge any references to the
5 Zawaideh I, supra note 1, 280 Neb. at 1003, 792 N.W.2d at 491.
6 Id. at 1013, 792 N.W.2d at 498.

ZAWAIDEH v. NEBRASKA DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 	53
Cite as 285 Neb. 48
Assurance of Compliance from [Zawaideh’s] public records;
3) award [Zawaideh] costs and attorney fees; and 4) grant such
other relief as the Court deems just and proper.” Shortly there-
after, the Department and the Attorney General filed a motion
for summary judgment alleging that sovereign immunity barred
Zawaideh’s claims.
The district court granted the motion for summary judg-
ment and found that the assurance of compliance was a con-
tract subject to the State Contract Claims Act.7 The district
court noted that Zawaideh’s claims were barred because
he failed to procedurally comply with the State Contract
Claims Act.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Zawaideh has assigned as error the district court’s finding
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Further, he assigns
that the district court erred in finding his misrepresentation
causes of action were contract claims subject to and barred by
the State Contract Claims Act.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1-3] An appellate court will affirm a lower court’s grant of
summary judgment if the pleadings and admissible evidence
offered at the hearing show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material facts or the ultimate inferences that may be
drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.8 In reviewing a summary judg-
ment, an appellate court views the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party against whom the judgment was granted,
and gives that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences
deducible from the evidence.9 The grant of a motion for sum-
mary judgment may be affirmed on any ground available to the
trial court, even if it is not the same reasoning the trial court
relied upon.10
7 See § 81-8,302 et seq.
8 Olson v. Wrenshall, 284 Neb. 445, 822 N.W.2d 336 (2012).
9 Id.
10 Id.

54 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
[4] When reviewing questions of law, an appellate court
resolves the questions independently of the lower court’s
conclusions.11
ANALYSIS
Zawaideh’s arguent is complex and at times counterintuitive.
He has conceded that application of either the State Contract
Claims Act or the State Tort Claims Act12 would deprive the
district court of subject matter jurisdiction over his claims.
Therefore, he first argues that Zawaideh I precludes this court
from dismissing his case for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. His second and third arguments are that neither the State
Contract Claims Act nor the State Tort Claims Act apply to,
and thus do not bar, his claims. For his fourth and final argu-
ment, he argues that the modified “affirmative action” test in
Doe v. Board of Regents13 provides the district court with sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over his claims. We will address each of
these arguments in order.
[5-7] To begin, it is well-settled law in Nebraska that sov-
ereign immunity deprives a trial court of subject matter juris-
diction.14 Neb. Const. art. V, § 22, provides that “[t]he state
may sue and be sued, and the Legislature shall provide by law
in what manner and in what courts suits shall be brought.”
This provision permits the State to lay its sovereignty aside
and consent to be sued on such terms and conditions as the
Legislature may prescribe.15 It is not self-executing, but instead
requires legislative action for waiver of the State’s sovereign
immunity.16
[8,9] Statutes that purport to waive the protection of sov-
ereign immunity of the State or its subdivisions are strictly
11 Buckeye State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Humlicek, 284 Neb. 463, 822 N.W.2d 351
(2012).
12 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-8,209 et seq. (Reissue 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2012).
13 Doe v. Board of Regents, 280 Neb. 492, 788 N.W.2d 264 (2010).
14 See McKenna v. Julian, 277 Neb. 522, 763 N.W.2d 384 (2009).
15 Livengood v. Nebraska State Patrol Ret. Sys., 273 Neb. 247, 729 N.W.2d
55 (2007).
16 Engler v. State, 283 Neb. 985, 814 N.W.2d 387 (2012).

ZAWAIDEH v. NEBRASKA DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 	55
Cite as 285 Neb. 48
construed in favor of the sovereign and against the waiver.17 A
waiver of sovereign immunity is found only where stated by
the most express language of a statute or by such overwhelm-
ing implication from the text as will allow no other reason-
able construction.18
[10] Here, Zawaideh has brought suit against the Department
and the Attorney General. We have held that a suit against a
state agency is a suit against the State and is subject to sover-
eign immunity.19 Therefore, the burden rests with Zawaideh to
demonstrate how the State has waived sovereign immunity for
his misrepresentation claims.
With that in mind, Zawaideh’s first argument is that our
failure to dismiss for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in
Zawaideh I somehow precludes us from dismissing his case
on that ground now. We disagree. In Martin v. Nebraska Dept.
of Corr. Servs.,20 we held that an appellate court is required
to answer all jurisdictional questions presented by a case.
However, simply put, we were not presented in Zawaideh I
with the issue of subject matter jurisdiction on these misrep-
resentation claims.21 In fact, in the opinion, we stated that
“[o]ther issues, such as . . . any potential affirmative defenses,
are not before us in this proceeding, and we make no comment
on them. Rather, those matters are left to further proceedings
in the district court following remand.”22 Therefore, we are not
precluded from now reviewing the affirmative defense of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.
For his second argument, Zawaideh asserts that the dis-
trict court erred in finding that his misrepresentation claims
were subject to the State Contract Claims Act. Zawaideh
argues that his misrepresentation claims are tort actions and
17 Britton v. City of Crawford, 282 Neb. 374, 803 N.W.2d 508 (2011).
18 Id.
19 See Doe v. Board of Regents, supra note 13.
20 Martin v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 267 Neb. 33, 671 N.W.2d 613
(2003).
21 Zawaideh I, supra note 1.
22 Id. at 1013, 792 N.W.2d at 498.

56 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
not contract claims under the State Contract Claims Act.
We agree.
[11,12] The State Contract Claims Act authorizes suits for
contract claims against the State, in derogation of the State’s
sovereignty.23 The State Contract Claims Act is the exclusive
remedy for resolving contract claims.24 Under § 81-8,303(1), a
“[c]ontract claim shall mean a claim against the state involving
a dispute regarding a contract between the State of Nebraska or
a state agency and the claimant . . . .”
[13,14] It is well established that both fraudulent misrep-
resentation and negligent misrepresentation are tort causes of
action adopted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 525
and 552.25 To state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation,
a plaintiff must allege (1) that a representation was made; (2)
that the representation was false; (3) that when made, the rep-
resentation was known to be false or made recklessly without
knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; (4) that the
representation was made with the intention that the plaintiff
should rely on it; (5) that the plaintiff did so rely on it; and (6)
that the plaintiff suffered damage as a result.26 Negligent mis-
representation has essentially the same elements as fraudulent
misrepresentation with the exception of the defendant’s mental
state.27 The important thing to note is that none of the elements
require an underlying contract.
[15] Although contracts are often the end result of the plain-
tiff’s reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentation, the true
legal dispute for a misrepresentation cause of action is the
tortious actions of the defendant.28 We have stated that where a
23 See Baldwin Carpet v. Builders, Inc., 3 Neb. App. 40, 523 N.W.2d 33
(1994).
24 § 81-8,306.
25 Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 525 and 552 (1977). See, e.g., Lucky 7
v. THT Realty, 278 Neb. 997, 775 N.W.2d 671 (2009); Tolliver v. Visiting
Nurse Assn., 278 Neb. 532, 771 N.W.2d 908 (2009).
26 Knights of Columbus Council 3152 v. KFS BD, Inc., 280 Neb. 904, 791
N.W.2d 317 (2010).
27 Lucky 7 v. THT Realty, supra note 25.
28 See L. J. Vontz Constr. Co. v. State, 230 Neb. 377, 432 N.W.2d 7 (1988).

ZAWAIDEH v. NEBRASKA DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 	57
Cite as 285 Neb. 48
contractual relationship exists between persons and at the same
time a duty is imposed by or arises out of the circumstances
surrounding or attending the transaction, the breach of the duty
is a tort.29 In such case, the tortious act, and not a breach of
the contract, is the gravamen of the action; the contract is the
mere inducement creating the state of things which furnishes
the occasion for the tort.30 Thus, we have held that fraud
and deceit provide a ground for recovery that is independent
of contract.31
[16] Therefore, we hold that a misrepresentation cause of
action is not a “[c]ontract claim” under the State Contract
Claims Act. Our precedent requires us to strictly construe all
statutes that purport to waive sovereign immunity in favor
of the sovereign and against the waiver.32 Using that as our
guide, we find that a cause of action for misrepresentation
is not a “dispute regarding a contract,” because the grava-
men of the case is in tort, independent from any underlying
contract. In other words, the dispute is the tortious conduct
of the defendant, not the contract itself. By excluding misrep-
resentation claims from the definition of contract claims, we
properly narrow the applicability of the State Contract Claims
Act’s sovereign immunity waiver in favor of the sovereign.33
Our interpretation is also consistent with the intent of the
Nebraska Legislature, which has indicated that misrepresenta-
tion and deceit claims are torts under the State Tort Claims
Act.34 Therefore, we hold that the State Contract Claims
Act does not apply to Zawaideh’s misrepresentation causes
of action.
For his third argument, Zawaideh argues that although his
misrepresentation claims are torts, they are not subject to the
29 Driekosen v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, 158 Neb. 531, 64 N.W.2d 88 (1954).
30 Id.
31 See Streeks v. Diamond Hill Farms, 258 Neb. 581, 605 N.W.2d 110
(2000), overruled in part on other grounds, Knights of Columbus Council
3152 v. KFS BD, Inc., supra note 26.
32 Britton v. City of Crawford, supra note 17.
33 See id.
34 See § 81-8,219(4).

58 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
State Tort Claims Act. We again agree with Zawaideh. Section
81-8,210(4) of the State Tort Claims Act defines a “[t]ort
claim” as “any claim against the State of Nebraska for money
only.” In Czarnick v. Loup River P. P. Dist.,35 we interpreted this
definition to exclude nonmonetary claims, such as actions for
injunctive relief. Here, Zawaideh’s amended complaint prayed
for the contract to be voided or rescinded and expunged from
the record and did not request monetary damages. Therefore,
we find that Zawaideh’s claim is not “for money only” and,
thus, is not subject to the State Tort Claims Act.
[17] Finally, Zawaideh’s fourth argument is that his misrep-
resentation claims brought pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act36 are not barred by sovereign immunity under our
decision in Doe.37 We disagree. The problem for Zawaideh is
that the State’s sovereign immunity is unaffected by the declar-
atory judgment statutes.38 Nebraska’s Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act does not waive the State’s sovereign immunity,
and a plaintiff who seeks declaratory relief against the State
must find authorization for such remedy outside the con-
fines of the act.39 Such authorization is typically found in the
State Contract Claims Act, the State Tort Claims Act, and the
Administrative Procedure Act.40 Zawaideh concedes that none
of these acts are applicable in this instance.
Therefore, Zawaideh argues that sovereign immunity does
not apply in the first instance under the modified “affirmative
action” test we set out in Doe.41 In Doe, we stated, in dicta,
that actions to compel an officer to perform an act the officer is
legally required to do are not barred by state sovereign immu-
nity unless the affirmative act would require the state official
35 Czarnick v. Loup River P. P. Dist., 190 Neb. 521, 209 N.W.2d 595 (1973).
36 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,149 et seq. (Reissue 2008).
37 See Doe v. Board of Regents, supra note 13.
38 Logan v. Department of Corr. Servs., 254 Neb. 646, 578 N.W.2d 44
(1998).
39 Id.
40 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 84-901 et seq. (Reissue 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2012).
41 See Doe v. Board of Regents, supra note 13.

ZAWAIDEH v. NEBRASKA DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 	59
Cite as 285 Neb. 48
to expend public funds.42 Without addressing the other ele-
ments of the modified “affirmative action” test, we will address
whether the Department and the Attorney General are legally
required to rescind the assurance of compliance.
Two cases cited by this court in Doe in support of the
modified “affirmative action” test help define what it means
to be “legally required” to act. In State ex rel. Steinke v.
Lautenbaugh,43 we did not apply sovereign immunity to an
action to compel a county election commissioner to reverse
the district changes he had made. We held that the commis-
sioner had gone beyond his statutory authority in redistrict-
ing and, therefore, was legally required to restore the original
districts.44 In comparison, in County of Lancaster v. State,45 we
held that sovereign immunity applied to a lawsuit which sought
to require the Department of Public Institutions to accept
committed mental health patients. Our citation to County of
Lancaster in the Doe opinion retrospectively suggests that
despite the defendant’s being legally required to act under the
Nebraska Mental Health Commitment Act,46 the lawsuit was
barred because, unlike State ex rel. Steinke, the legally required
action would require expenditure of public funds.47 Therefore,
to satisfy the “legally required” element, Zawaideh must prove
either that state law requires the Attorney General to rescind
the assurance of compliance or that the assistant attorney gen-
eral went beyond her statutory authority by entering into the
assurance of compliance.
Here, we find that the Attorney General is not legally
required to rescind the assurance of compliance under either
theory. First, Zawaideh does not argue that a Nebraska stat-
ute, rule, regulation, or mandate requires rescission of the
42 Id.
43 State ex rel. Steinke v. Lautenbaugh, 263 Neb. 652, 642 N.W.2d 132
(2002).
44 Id.
45 County of Lancaster v. State, 247 Neb. 723, 529 N.W.2d 791 (1995).
46 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-901 et seq. (Reissue 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2012).
47 County of Lancaster v. State, supra note 45.

60 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
assurance of compliance. The assurance of compliance was a
voluntary agreement, which was negotiated and entered into by
Zawaideh and the assistant attorney general.48 Thus, we find
that the rescission of this agreement of compliance is at the
discretion of the parties and not compelled by law. And second,
the record establishes that the assistant attorney general did not
go beyond her authority in entering into the assurance of com-
pliance. Under the Uniform Credentialing Act, the Attorney
General’s office has the authority to enter into an assurance
of compliance with a medical professional.49 Thus, we hold
that the Attorney General is not legally required to rescind
the contract.
Therefore, the district court did not err in determining that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction, because sovereign immunity
bars Zawaideh’s misrepresentation claims.
CONCLUSION
We hold that the district court erred in finding that Zawaideh’s
fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation claims were subject
to, and barred by, the State Contract Claims Act. However, we
find that, albeit for different reasons, the district court did not
err in granting summary judgment on the issue of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction.
affirmed.
connolly, J., not participating.
48 Zawaideh I, supra note 1.
49 § 38-1,108.
keri clark, appellant, v. alegent
health nebraska, appellee.
825 N.W.2d 195
Filed January 18, 2013. 	No. S-12-271.
1. Workers’ Compensation. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-120(2)(a) (Reissue
2010), an employee has the right to select a physician who has maintained the