State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Crawford

STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CRAWFORD 	321
Cite as 285 Neb. 321
sentence. Therefore, his trial and appellate counsel were not
ineffective.
Pittman has failed to establish that trial and appellate coun-
sel were ineffective in failing to raise at sentencing or on
direct appeal that Pittman should have been sentenced for
attempted kidnapping as a Class III felony. The court properly
denied Pittman’s postconviction claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision, which reversed
the sentence and remanded the cause to the trial court for
resentencing, and remand the cause to the Court of Appeals
with directions to affirm the postconviction court’s decision
denying Pittman’s claims for relief.
R eveRsed and Remanded with diRections.
milleR-leRman and cassel, JJ., not participating.
state of nebRaska ex Rel. counsel foR discipline
of the nebRaska supReme couRt, RelatoR, v.
teRRi l. cRawfoRd, Respondent.
827 N.W.2d 214
Filed March 1, 2013. 	No. S-11-626.
1. Disciplinary Proceedings: Appeal and Error. A proceeding to discipline an
attorney is a trial de novo on the record, in which the Nebraska Supreme Court
reaches a conclusion independent of the findings of the referee; provided, how-
ever, that where the evidence is in conflict on a material issue of fact, the court
considers and may give weight to the fact that the referee heard and observed the
witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than another.
2. Disciplinary Proceedings: Attorneys at Law. A license to practice law confers
no vested right, but is a conditional privilege, revocable for cause.
3. ____: ____. The license to practice law is granted on the implied understanding
that the attorney’s conduct will be proper and that the attorney will abstain from
practices that discredit the attorney, the profession, and the courts.
4. ____: ____. Violation of any of the ethical standards relating to the practice of
law or any conduct of an attorney in his or her professional capacity which tends
to bring reproach on the courts or the legal profession constitutes grounds for
suspension or disbarment.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:39 AM CST

322 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
5. ____: ____. When a complainant has made allegations of attorney misconduct,
the Counsel for Discipline is required to make an initial determination of whether
the allegations warrant formal investigation.
6. Rules of the Supreme Court: Disciplinary Proceedings: Notice. The discipli-
nary rules do not contemplate that an attorney must be notified of every allega-
tion of misconduct which the Counsel for Discipline ultimately determines to be
without potential merit.
7. Rules of the Supreme Court: Disciplinary Proceedings. The disciplinary rules
do not require a formal grievance as a threshold requirement for the power to
investigate allegations of misconduct or to audit attorney trust accounts.
8. ____: ____. The disciplinary rules do not limit the Counsel for Discipline’s pow-
ers of investigation to the allegations stated in a grievance.
9. Disciplinary Proceedings. It is the formal charges, not the grievance, that limit
the scope of misconduct which an attorney may properly be disciplined for.
10. Disciplinary Proceedings: Due Process: Notice. Due process in attorney disci-
plinary proceedings requires that the attorney be given notice of the proceeding
and an opportunity to defend at a hearing, and that the proceeding be essen-
tially fair.
11. 	Constitutional Law: Disciplinary Proceedings: Discrimination: Proof. The
general rule is that unless there is proof that a particular disciplinary prosecution
was motivated by an unjustifiable standard based, for example, on race or reli-
gion, the use of such discretion does not violate constitutional protections.
12. ____: ____: ____: ____. In order to support a defense of selective or discrimina-
tory prosecution, the attorney must show not only that others similarly situated
have not been prosecuted, but that the selection of the defendant for prosecution
has been invidious or in bad faith, based upon considerations such as race, reli-
gion, or the desire to prevent the exercise of his or her constitutional rights.
13. Disciplinary Proceedings: Attorneys at Law. Whatever attorneys believe is
motivating opposing counsel, a judge, or the Counsel for Discipline, attorneys
are nevertheless expected to maintain the level of decorum which the profession
demands and to act in accordance with their duties.
14. Disciplinary Proceedings. An attorney’s failure to respond to inquiries and
request for information from the office of the Counsel for Discipline is con-
sidered to be a grave matter and a threat to the credibility of attorney discipli-
nary proceedings.
15. ____. The disciplinary process as a whole must function effectively in order for
the public to have confidence in the integrity of the profession and to be protected
from unscrupulous acts.
16. ____. Responding to disciplinary complaints in an untimely manner and repeat-
edly ignoring requests for information from the Counsel for Discipline indicate
disrespect for the Nebraska Supreme Court’s disciplinary jurisdiction and a lack
of concern for the protection of the public, the profession, and the administration
of justice.
17. ____. The Counsel for Discipline should not be forced to threaten an attorney
with the suspension of his or her license in order to get the attorney to respond to
requests for information.

STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CRAWFORD 	323
Cite as 285 Neb. 321
18. ____. A failure to make timely responses to inquiries of the Counsel for
Discipline violates ethical canons and disciplinary rules which prohibit conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice.
19. Disciplinary Proceedings: Words and Phrases. In the context of attorney
discipline proceedings, misappropriation is any unauthorized use of client funds
entrusted to an attorney, including not only stealing, but also unauthorized tempo-
rary use for the attorney’s own purpose, whether or not the attorney derives any
personal gain or benefit therefrom.
20. Attorney Fees: Words and Phrases. Advance fees are payments made by a cli-
ent for the performance of legal services and belong to the client until earned by
the attorney.
21. Attorneys at Law. The license to practice law in this state is a continuing procla-
mation by the Nebraska Supreme Court that the holder is fit to be entrusted with
professional and judicial matters and to aid in the administration of justice as an
attorney and as an officer of the court.
22. ____. It is the duty of every recipient of the conditional privilege to practice
law to conduct himself or herself at all times, both professionally and person-
ally, in conformity with the standards imposed upon members as conditions for
that privilege.
23. Disciplinary Proceedings. Misappropriation of client funds is one of the most
serious violations of duty an attorney owes to clients, the public, and the courts.
24. ____. Misappropriation by an attorney violates basic notions of honesty and
endangers public confidence in the legal profession.
25. ____. Misappropriation as the result of a serious, inexcusable violation of a duty
to oversee entrusted funds is deemed willful, even in the absence of improper
intent or deliberate wrongdoing.
26. ____. A lawyer’s poor accounting procedures and sloppy office management are
not excuses or mitigating circumstances in reference to commingled funds.
27. ____. The fact that the client did not suffer any financial loss does not excuse
an attorney’s misappropriation of client funds and does not provide a reason for
imposing a less severe sanction.
28. ____. Absent mitigating circumstances, disbarment is the appropriate discipline
in cases of misappropriation or commingling of client funds.
Original action. Judgment of disbarment.
Kent L. Frobish, Assistant Counsel for Discipline, for relator.
Christopher M. Ferdico, of Baylor, Evnen, Curtiss, Grimit &
Witt, L.L.P., and Sheri Long Cotton, of Law Offices of Sheri
Long Cotton, P.C., L.L.O., for respondent.
heavican, c.J., wRight, connolly, stephan, mccoRmack,
milleR-leRman, and cassel, JJ.

324 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
peR cuRiam.
I. NATURE OF CASE
The respondent appeals from the report and recommenda-
tion of the referee in an attorney disciplinary action. The ref-
eree recommended disbarment for violations of Neb. Ct. R. of
Prof. Cond. §§ 3-501.5(f) (failure to provide detailed account-
ing for fees when requested), 3-501.15(a) and (c) (failure to
deposit unearned fees into trust account and withdraw only as
earned), and 3-508.4(c) and (d) (dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation and conduct prejudicial to administration of
justice), and for violating the respondent’s oath of office. The
facts were strongly contested, and the respondent argues there
was not clear and convincing evidence of the misconduct.
The respondent also asserts that her due process rights were
violated throughout the disciplinary proceedings and that such
violations warrant a new hearing.
II. BACKGROUND
The respondent, Terri L. Crawford, was admitted to the
practice of law in the State of Nebraska on April 23, 2001.
Before going to law school, Crawford worked as a paralegal.
She became a sole practitioner shortly after passing the bar.
She predominantly practices in the areas of juvenile law and
criminal defense.
Crawford maintained one trust account at Bank of the West.
She maintained a personal savings account at Centris Federal
Credit Union (Centris).
In September 2009, Crawford entered into an agreement
to represent Nathan Cheatams. Cheatams was arrested in
September 2009 in relation to a shooting that prior July. He was
charged with nine felonies. A public defender was appointed
for Cheatams, but Cheatams decided to hire Crawford as pri-
vate counsel. On September 26, Cheatams signed a fee agree-
ment with Crawford.
The September 26, 2009, agreement stated that Crawford
would charge $150 per hour and that Cheatams would pay a
$2,500 retainer. The agreement stated that “[d]uring the pro-
gression of legal services your account will be monitored and
additional retainers and / or monthly installment payments may

STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CRAWFORD 	325
Cite as 285 Neb. 321
be required in the event the initial retainer is exhausted or if
the nature of your case changes.” A trial retainer would be
required if it appeared the case would be proceeding to trial.
The agreement provided that after the initial retainer has been
exhausted, “any monthly installment due will commence on
the first of the month.” The agreement further stated, “You will
receive detailed monthly statements which will reflect all work
performed on your case.”
Cheatams’ mother, Seleka Nolan, paid the retainer of $2,500
on September 24, 2009, and paid an additional $6,500 on
January 5, 2010. Sometime around July 2010, still before
Cheatams’ trial, a dispute arose between Cheatams, Nolan, and
Crawford regarding fees. Crawford withdrew as counsel when
Nolan refused to pay her any further. Thereafter, Cheatams was
represented by a public defender. Crawford refused to give
the public defender the entirety of Cheatams’ file, claiming
confidentiality of her work product. Cheatams and the public
defender now agree that this failure to forward Cheatams’ file
did not ultimately prejudice Cheatams’ case.
1. gRievance
Nolan and Cheatams complained to Counsel for Discipline.
Prior to the filing of a grievance against Crawford, written cor-
respondence and telephone conversations between Cheatams,
Nolan, and Counsel for Discipline took place. Those communi-
cations are the source of some dispute and will be set forth in
more detail in our analysis below.
The grievance, signed by both Nolan and Cheatams, gener-
ally alleged that Crawford was neglectful in her representation
of Cheatams, that she refused to provide an accounting of
her time as requested, and that she had demanded payments
beyond the agreed-upon amount. Counsel for Discipline sent
the grievance to Crawford and proceeded with a formal inves-
tigation. The details of that investigation will be set forth in
our analysis.
2. foRmal chaRges
Counsel 	for 	Discipline’s 	investigation 	led 	to 	an 	audit
of Crawford’s trust account. As a result of the audit and

326 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
Crawford’s responses during the course of the investigation,
Counsel for Discipline determined that Crawford had mis-
appropriated $3,500 of client funds. Counsel for Discipline
also determined that Crawford had failed to cooperate with
the investigation.
After the matter was reviewed by the Committee on Inquiry,
Counsel for Discipline filed formal charges against Crawford.
In count I, Counsel for Discipline charged that Crawford vio-
lated § 3-501.15(a) and (c) when she failed to deposit into
her client trust account an unearned $3,500 from the $6,500
advance fee payment by Nolan. Counsel for Discipline also
charged that Crawford violated § 3-501.5(f) by failing to
provide an accounting of her services in sufficient detail to
apprise the client of the nature of the work performed. Counsel
for Discipline charged that Crawford violated § 3-508.4(c) by
engaging in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation
in her communications with Counsel for Discipline during the
investigation. Counsel for Discipline charged that Crawford
violated § 3-508.4(d) by failing to timely respond to inquiries
from Counsel for Discipline. Finally, Counsel for Discipline
charged that Crawford violated Neb. Ct. R. of Prof. Cond.
§ 3-501.16(d) when she failed to surrender all papers and
property to which Cheatams was entitled to Cheatams’ sub-
sequent counsel after her withdrawal. Counsel for Discipline
charged that Crawford violated her oath of office through these
same acts.
In count II, Counsel for Discipline charged that Crawford
violated § 3-501.15 by routinely depositing her personal funds
into her client trust account and withdrawing said funds as her
personal and business needs required. Counsel for Discipline
also charged that Crawford violated § 3-508.4 by refusing
to provide Counsel for Discipline with the requested cop-
ies of all trust account checks issued during the time period
specified and for refusing to identify the payee of each trust
account check.
3. R epoRt and R ecommendation
The referee found by clear and convincing evidence that
Crawford (1) failed to provide Nolan or Cheatams detailed

STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CRAWFORD 	327
Cite as 285 Neb. 321
monthly statements reflecting work performed by Crawford
on behalf of Cheatams, (2) failed to provide Cheatams’ public
defender with all of the contents of Cheatams’ file upon exit-
ing representation, (3) failed to cooperate with Counsel for
Discipline’s office in regard to the investigation of her repre-
sentation of Cheatams and her handling of trust account funds
in regard to Cheatams, and (4) failed to deposit in her trust
account the $3,500 advance fee payment given to her by Nolan
as part of a $6,500 cashier’s check.
The referee concluded that through these acts, Crawford
violated §§ 3-501.5(f), 3-501.15(a) and (c), and 3-508.4(c)
and (d). The referee also found that Crawford violated her
oath of office. The referee did not find that Crawford violated
§ 3-501.16(d), as alleged in the charges, because the referee
considered Crawford’s failure to turn over all materials in
Cheatams’ file to the public defender to be the result of an hon-
est misunderstanding of her ethical obligations.
The referee recommended that Crawford be disbarred, not-
ing that our court has been severe in regard to discipline when
it comes to misappropriation of client funds. Furthermore,
Crawford’s untruthfulness “weigh[ed] heavily against her.”
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Crawford assigns that the referee erred in (1) finding that
Counsel for Discipline has met his burden of proof by clear
and convincing evidence; (2) overruling Crawford’s motion for
mistrial when Counsel for Discipline withheld material allega-
tions and evidence that significantly prejudiced her defense; (3)
overruling Crawford’s motion to recuse Counsel for Discipline
based upon the fact that he knew or should have known from
the inception of this matter that he was a necessary wit-
ness in the case; (4) finding that Crawford failed to provide
an adequate explanation for her conduct, thus impermissibly
shifting the burden of proof to Crawford in violation of court
rules; (5) failing to find that Counsel for Discipline’s failure to
provide the relevant grievances until the time of trial violated
Crawford’s rights of due process; (6) finding that Crawford
failed to cooperate with Counsel for Discipline; (7) finding
that there was clear and convincing evidence that Crawford

328 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
was not truthful; and (8) finding that the conduct of Crawford
rises to the level of disbarment.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] A proceeding to discipline an attorney is a trial de
novo on the record, in which the Nebraska Supreme Court
reaches a conclusion independent of the findings of the ref-
eree; provided, however, that where the evidence is in con-
flict on a material issue of fact, the court considers and may
give weight to the fact that the referee heard and observed
the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather
than another.1
V. ANALYSIS
[2-4] A license to practice law confers no vested right, but
is a conditional privilege, revocable for cause.2 The license to
practice law is granted on the implied understanding that the
attorney’s conduct will be proper and that the attorney will
abstain from practices that discredit the attorney, the profes-
sion, and the courts.3 Violation of any of the ethical standards
relating to the practice of law or any conduct of an attorney in
his or her professional capacity which tends to bring reproach
on the courts or the legal profession constitutes grounds
for suspension or disbarment.4 Violation of those standards,
which are set forth in the disciplinary rules, must be estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence.5 Since Counsel for
Discipline does not take exception with the referee’s findings,
we will examine only those violations ultimately found by
the referee.
1 State ex rel. Special Counsel for Dis. v. Fellman, 267 Neb. 838, 678
N.W.2d 491 (2004).
2 Neb. Ct. R., ch. 3, art. 3, Preface.
3 See, e.g., State ex rel. NSBA v. Thor, 237 Neb. 734, 467 N.W.2d 666
(1991); State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Association v. Walsh, 206 Neb.
737, 294 N.W.2d 873 (1980).
4 Id.
5 State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Lopez Wilson, 283 Neb. 616, 811 N.W.2d
673 (2012).

STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CRAWFORD 	329
Cite as 285 Neb. 321
1. failuRe to coopeRate
The evidence relating to the charges of failing to cooper-
ate is central to all of the issues presented in this appeal.
Therefore, we will address the evidence pertaining to that
charge first. Upon our de novo review, we find that Crawford
was antagonistic, evasive, and untruthful throughout the inves-
tigation and the disciplinary hearing. While Crawford’s failure
to cooperate and dishonesty will be apparent in our examina-
tion of the evidence relating to all the charges of misconduct,
we find sufficient for now an examination of the investi-
gatory correspondence between Counsel for Discipline and
Crawford. Based on this evidence, we agree with the referee
that Crawford showed “not only a reluctance to cooperate, but
belligerence and a pattern of stalling.”
Crawford’s first written response to the grievance was appro-
priate, albeit incomplete. Crawford explained that the retainer
was never intended to cover the entire case and that she never
negotiated a flat fee. Apparently referring to the hearing where
Crawford withdrew as counsel, Crawford stated she provided
Cheatams with “a detailed itemization and accounting, which
we discussed.” Cheatams was purportedly unable to keep the
papers, however, “because he was detained and cuffed at the
hearing and not allowed to take additional documentation from
his attorney.” Crawford attached an aggregate billing statement
reflecting $11,250 in fees and a sum of $9,000 in fees paid.
Crawford itemized that the $9,000 was paid in one installment
of $2,500 and another of $6,500.
On October 20, 2010, Counsel for Discipline requested an
explanation regarding the billing fractions shown in Crawford’s
aggregate 	billing, 	photocopies 	of 	the 	monthly 	statements
Crawford provided to Cheatams, an exact date for each entry
of the aggregate billing statement (if not shown in the monthly
statements), and a complete copy of Crawford’s office file
regarding her representation of Cheatams.
Counsel for Discipline also requested evidence that Crawford
deposited the $2,500 money order and the $6,500 cashier’s
check from Nolan into her client trust account. Counsel for
Discipline asked for evidence of all subsequent withdrawals
made by Crawford of those funds from her trust account. If

330 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
Crawford did not deposit any of those funds in a trust account,
Counsel for Discipline requested an explanation as to why not.
Counsel for Discipline requested that Crawford provide all this
information by November 1, 2010.
Crawford 	continuously 	evaded 	Counsel 	for 	Discipline’s
request for evidence that the advance fee payments by Nolan
were properly deposited into her trust account and withdrawn
only as earned. On November 1, 2010, Crawford sent Counsel
for Discipline a fax requesting additional time “to receive
information from my financial institution.”
She did not provide those bank statements until December
1, 2010. At the disciplinary hearing, Crawford explained that
she could simply walk into a bank branch and ask for the
documentation Counsel for Discipline had requested. The
bank, depending on how busy the employees were, could
process her request immediately while she waited or the bank
could process it later and have her pick it up. Crawford’s
testimony is unclear as to which of these two things occurred
with respect to the bank statements. Her testimony is likewise
unclear as to when she requested financial information from
her bank.
On November 2, 2010, Counsel for Discipline expressed
to Crawford that he was “concerned that you were not able
to respond to my specific questions within 10 days as I
requested.” Counsel for Discipline explained that copies of
monthly bank statements, with the requested transactions cir-
cled by Crawford, would be sufficient to satisfy his request.
Counsel for Discipline obviously believed that Crawford would
have these statements easily accessible pursuant to her duty
under § 3-501.15(a) to preserve “[c]omplete records” of trust
account funds for “5 years after termination of the representa-
tion.” The comment to that rule specifies that a “lawyer should
maintain on a current basis books and records in accordance
with generally accepted accounting practice.” Nevertheless,
Counsel for Discipline directed that if Crawford was waiting
for bank records for whatever reason, she should answer all
other questions, identify exactly which questions she could
not answer without bank records, and identify what bank
records she would need to answer the questions. Counsel for

STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CRAWFORD 	331
Cite as 285 Neb. 321
Discipline asked that Crawford provide the requested informa-
tion by November 8.
On November 8, 2010, Counsel for Discipline received a
letter from Crawford. Crawford did not provide the requested
bank records or other documentation regarding Nolan’s advance
fee payments. Neither did Crawford identify what bank records
were needed in order to provide the requested documentation.
Crawford instead wrote, “[A]ll funds collected from a cli-
ent or on his/her behalf are always deposited into my client
trust account.”
In the November 8, 2010, letter, Crawford did explain
the billing fractions listed in her aggregate billing. Crawford
admitted that she had not provided copies of monthly billing
statements to Cheatams. She explained that this was “[d]ue to
the fact that . . . Cheatams[’] circumstances surrounding his
case were unique, in that he remained incarcerated, and the
confidential nature of the billing statements, his billing would
not have been mailed to Douglas County Corrections.” She
stated that per their agreement, Crawford instead had “face-
to-face discussions, at least monthly, regarding all work per-
formed on his behalf and he was given a detailed explanation
of the work, accordingly.” Crawford wrote that Cheatams’ file
was still being copied.
On November 9, 2010, Counsel for Discipline wrote to
Crawford and reiterated his concern that Crawford was unable
to promptly supply the requested information. Counsel for
Discipline stated he was “surprised” that Crawford did not
have her trust account records “readily available.” Counsel
for Discipline stated that Crawford “should be able to imme-
diately 	provide 	all 	requested 	information 	regarding 	[her]
trust account.”
Counsel for Discipline wrote that regardless of whether
the monthly itemized statements were given to Cheatams,
he wished to see copies of the statements Crawford had dis-
cussed with Cheatams during their alleged monthly visits. If
such statements did not exist, Counsel for Discipline asked
that Crawford provide more detail in the aggregate statement
provided to him. Specifically, Counsel for Discipline requested
exact dates, a more detailed statement of the content of the

332 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
telephone call or other activity listed, telephone records show-
ing each call, and the name of the telephone service provider
and account number.
Counsel 	for 	Discipline 	also 	reiterated 	his 	concern 	that
Crawford was unable to timely provide a copy of Cheatams’
file. Counsel for Discipline stated that “[a]ny further delay in
providing a copy of the file will be considered as a failure to
cooperate with this investigation.”
Crawford responded on November 11, 2010: “When I stated
that I did not have financial records readily available, that only
meant that such records from over a year ago are in storage
and not in my office.” Crawford explained that she thought
it would be “more expeditious to make the request of my
financial institution rather than waste precious time digging
in boxes.”
Later, in her deposition and at the disciplinary hearing,
Crawford clarified that “in storage . . . not in [her] office”
meant that the boxes were in one of the other rooms of her
office suite and not in her personal office. But Crawford
thought it would have been more time consuming to go
through the boxes, because they contained 8 years of bank
statements from approximately five bank accounts. Since
Crawford 	had 	only 	one 	trust 	account, 	we 	surmise 	that
Crawford filed not only her trust account statements in those
boxes, but also the bank statements from other personal and
business accounts.
Time was passing despite Crawford’s apparent belief that
obtaining the records from her bank was more expeditious.
As of November 11, 2010, Crawford still had not provided
the requested documentation regarding Nolan’s advance fee
payments.
Crawford stated that she was in the process of requesting
telephone records. But she reiterated that she would never
be able to provide the more detailed billing statement as
requested by Counsel for Discipline. She said it was not her
practice to provide more detail at the time billing is created
and had no way to recreate such a billing statement without
speculation. Crawford added: “I do not believe (or at least
I have not been informed), that . . . Cheatams is disputing

STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CRAWFORD 	333
Cite as 285 Neb. 321
that I have performed the legal services for which he has
been billed.”
Crawford explained that, as a sole practitioner, she had
still not been able to copy Cheatams’ “large file.” Crawford
explained that her office copier could not accommodate the
volume and that she had taken the file to a copy service cen-
ter to copy it and that it “will arrive under separate cover.”
Crawford asserted that “this should not be construed as any
failure on my part to cooperate with this investigation.” The
record shows that Crawford’s file on Cheatams consisted of
164 pages and was less than 1 inch thick.
By November 29, 2010, Counsel for Discipline had received
Cheatams’ file, but had still not received the documentation
regarding the proper handling of Nolan’s advance fee pay-
ments. In a letter to Crawford, Counsel for Discipline pointed
out several items in the aggregate billing statement that did not
appear to correspond to anything provided in the file. Counsel
for Discipline reiterated that Crawford was required to provide
an itemized billing statement which identified the date for each
entry made. Counsel for Discipline pointed out that Crawford’s
fee agreement stated that she was working hourly and that she
would provide detailed monthly statements reflecting all work
performed on the case.
Counsel for Discipline made it clear that he was becom-
ing suspect of Crawford’s continued inability to provide the
requested trust account information. Despite this suspicion,
Counsel for Discipline was still not fully auditing Crawford’s
trust account. Counsel for Discipline was requesting only
trust account statements and records indicating that the two
advance fee payments by Nolan had been properly deposited
into Crawford’s trust account and properly withdrawn only as
earned. In his November 29, 2010, letter, Counsel for Discipline
requested, for the fourth time, this documentation.
Since Crawford had written that the original trust account
statements were “in storage,” Counsel for Discipline suggested
that Crawford obtain an immediate printout or get the infor-
mation from Crawford’s bank online. Counsel for Discipline
requested, in boldface type, that Crawford provide this docu-
mentation “immediately.” Crawford later explained that she

334 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
did not try to get the requested information online, as had been
suggested in Counsel for Discipline’s letter, because she did
not “trust [the bank’s] process.”
Crawford responded on December 1, 2010, finally providing
some incomplete documentation of the advance fee deposits.
Crawford provided bank statements for September 2009 and
February 2010. But she did not provide a trust account state-
ment for January 2010, the month Nolan gave Crawford the
cashier’s check for $6,500.
The September 2009 statement reflected a deposit of $2,500
on September 28 into Crawford’s trust account at Bank of the
West. The February 2010 trust account statement, however,
did not show a deposit directly corresponding to the $6,500
advance fee payment. It instead reflected a single deposit
of $13,121 and four checks written on the account total-
ing $10,600.
Crawford did not circle and identify the transactions as
requested by Counsel for Discipline or otherwise provide the
information requested concerning withdrawals on those funds
only as earned. Because no other monthly bank records were
provided, Counsel for Discipline still had no way of knowing
when or if those funds were withdrawn.
Crawford attached a copy of the deposited $2,500 money
order from Nolan. Crawford also attached the deposit slip for
the $2,500 money order into her trust account.
But the $6,500 cashier’s check was different. Crawford
stated that the $6,500 payment had “required additional
research, which is why there was a delay in responding to
your request on this matter.” Crawford explained that the
$6,500 was part of the $13,121 deposit in February 2010
which was reflected in the February bank statement. Crawford
explained that because a portion of the $6,500 had already
been earned by the time she received the cashier’s check
from Nolan, she negotiated the cashier’s check at Centris,
where she kept her personal savings account. Crawford said
she deposited the $3,000 earned amount of the advance fee
payment into her savings account. Crawford took the remain-
ing unearned $3,500 in cash with the intention of depositing
it into her trust account. Apparently, Crawford had never

STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CRAWFORD 	335
Cite as 285 Neb. 321
withdrawn any earned amounts from the $2,500 advance
fee payment.
Crawford explained that 5 weeks after negotiating the $6,500
cashier’s check at Centris, she took the $3,500 cash to Bank
of the West and deposited it with other funds into her trust
account as part of the $13,121 total deposit. Crawford did not
explain why there was a 5-week delay in depositing the $3,500
into her trust account.
As with the $2,500 money order, Crawford provided a copy
of the negotiated $6,500 cashier’s check showing a bank stamp
at the time of the deposit. But Crawford did not provide a
deposit slip for the $13,121 deposit. Such deposit slip would
have demonstrated that the $3,500 was indeed part of that
$13,121 deposit.
Crawford provided a statement from her savings account
at Centris showing a balance of 8 cents at the beginning of
January 2010, a $3,000 deposit on January 8, and an end-
ing balance on January 31 of $3,000.08—apparently to dem-
onstrate that she did not deposit the entirety of the $6,500
cashier’s check into her checking account.
Crawford wrote to Counsel for Discipline that she looked
forward to prompt resolution of the investigation. Based on the
fact that her aggregate billing showed a total fee of $11,250,
Crawford also wrote that she looked forward to the final pay-
ment of the fees owed to her.
Far from resolving the investigation, it was after Crawford’s
December 1, 2010, letter that Counsel for Discipline expanded
his investigation. On December 14, Counsel for Discipline
wrote: “You have not responded to all the requests made
in my letters of October 20, November 2, November 9,
and November 29. Please do so immediately.” Counsel for
Discipline then explained that he was auditing Crawford’s
trust account with respect to the advance fee payments made
by Nolan.
Pursuant to the audit, Counsel for Discipline requested each
monthly trust account statement from September 1, 2009, to
the present. Counsel for Discipline reiterated that Crawford
needed to identify when any trust fund payments were with-
drawn. Counsel for Discipline asked Crawford where the

336 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
$3,500 was from January 8 to February 11, 2010. And Counsel
for Discipline asked that Crawford provide evidence that the
$3,500 cash was part of the $13,121 deposit into the trust
account on February 11. Counsel for Discipline observed that
Crawford had provided no deposit slip for the $13,121 deposit,
whereas she had provided a deposit slip for the $2,500 deposit.
Counsel for Discipline requested that Crawford provide a
deposit slip for the $13,121 deposit. In addition, Counsel for
Discipline asked that Crawford identify the owners of the other
$9,621 and their respective amounts.
Counsel for Discipline received a response from Crawford
on December 29, 2010. Crawford wrote a list of her withdraw-
als from the retainer payments as: $3,000 in January 2010
and $1,000 each in March, in May, on June 3, and on June
10. The monthly trust fund statements were enclosed. As for
the 5-week delay in depositing the cash, Crawford stated that
any “[f]unds not immediately deposited were in safekeeping
in my office safe, separate and apart from my own property
or any other client’s property.” Crawford further explained
that “[u]nfortunately, many evenings I do not leave my office
until well after the bank lobby closes and I do not use the
drive-through to make such deposits. As stated the funds were
properly safeguarded, kept separate as required, and depos-
ited accordingly.”
Crawford attempted to respond to various questions about
her billing in Cheatams’ case, attaching additional notes found
in a computer file. However, she again stated that she could
not produce a daily itemization as Counsel for Discipline had
requested. Crawford opined that such billing was not required
by the Nebraska Rules of Professional Conduct. Crawford
further commented that her clients had always considered the
detail of her billing acceptable.
Crawford closed her letter by questioning the scope of
Counsel for Discipline’s investigation. She observed that “[i]n
the past when a client has filed a ‘grievance’ I have not been
questioned on how much time it takes me to accomplish
a particular task.” Crawford stated that the original com-
plaint focused on an allegation of neglect and “[c]learly there
has been no neglect of [Cheatams’] case.” Crawford wrote,

STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CRAWFORD 	337
Cite as 285 Neb. 321
“Somehow this inquiry has taken a turn in another direction,
which is of concern.”
Crawford once again failed to provide the deposit slip or any
other evidence that the $13,121 deposit actually included the
unearned $3,500 of Nolan’s advance fee payment. Crawford
did not address the reason for this failure.
On January 18, 2011, Counsel for Discipline explained that
under Neb. Ct. R. § 3-906, he had the power to audit trust
accounts at any time, and that he was doing so as part of his
investigation of the grievance filed by Nolan and Cheatams.
Counsel for Discipline opined that “[o]n any given day, a law-
yer should be able to account for all funds held in trust for each
client,” and that “[m]ost attorneys maintain a trust account log
or record for each client for whom funds are deposited into the
trust account.”
Counsel for Discipline asked whether Crawford maintained
such a log, and if so, he asked that she provide a copy. In
order to make it easier for Crawford, Counsel for Discipline
provided a list of deposits and withdrawals evidenced from
the audit being conducted and asked that Crawford fill in
client/payee information for those transactions. Counsel for
Discipline asked that this information be provided by February
2, 2011.
Instead of providing the requested information, on January
31, 2011, Crawford sent Counsel for Discipline what could
be described as a letter of protest. Crawford outlined all the
documentation and information she had previously provided
and stated that in her opinion, much of that information had
“no bearing on the grievance.” Crawford stated that she found
Counsel for Discipline’s reference in his letter to “[m]ost
attorneys” maintaining a trust account log was “at best . . .
condescending.” Crawford believed that she had provided
information “in excess of what is necessary to make a find-
ing that there is no merit to the grievance” and that the new
request for all trust account information “disturbs me on
many levels.”
Crawford further wrote that Counsel for Discipline’s request
for client/payee information relating to her trust account was
“offensive, immaterial, unreasonable[,] unduly cumbersome,

338 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
and has no bearing on the grievance filed by . . . Cheatams and
. . . Nolan.” Finally, Crawford commented: “It certainly makes
one wonder if there is other motivation for such a request
under such circumstances. My question would be why is this
information being requested? Is this an inquiry regarding a dis-
gruntled client or has it turned into something else?” Crawford
concluded, “I have fully cooperated in this inquiry and pro-
vided all the necessary information that relates directly to . . .
Cheatams and my representation on his case. If anything else
is required please let me know, so that this matter can come to
a conclusion.”
Thus, Crawford still did not provide the requested deposit
slip or any other evidence that the $3,500 cash representing
Nolan’s unearned advance payment was part of the February
deposit of $13,121 into her trust account.
On February 4, 2011, Counsel for Discipline wrote to
Crawford and attempted to clarify that he did not intend to be
condescending and that Crawford was not being “picked on.”
But Counsel for Discipline repeated his previous requests for
documentation. Counsel for Discipline specifically repeated his
request for evidence that the $3,500 of unearned funds was part
of the $13,121 deposit, as Crawford claimed.
Crawford did not respond until February 16, 2011. She
telephoned Counsel for Discipline asking for additional time
to produce the requested information. According to Counsel
for Discipline, Crawford did not provide the requested infor-
mation by the agreed-upon extended deadline. Crawford dis-
putes that a certain date was discussed for the extension of
the deadline.
In any event, having heard no further from Crawford, on
March 15, 2011, Counsel for Discipline sent Crawford another
letter. Counsel for Discipline gave Crawford 7 days to produce
documentation proving that the $3,500 in cash was deposited
into her trust account on February 11, 2010, as part of the total
deposit of $13,121. Counsel for Discipline stated that if such
specific information was not received by that deadline, Counsel
for Discipline would seek temporary suspension of Crawford’s
license to practice law.

STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CRAWFORD 	339
Cite as 285 Neb. 321
After the March 15, 2011, letter in which Counsel for
Discipline threatened Crawford with imminent temporary sus-
pension, Crawford’s story about what happened to the $3,500
changed. On March 24, Counsel for Discipline received a letter
from Crawford explaining that she had just discovered she had
been wrong about the $3,500 being part of the February 11,
2010, deposit of $13,121.
Crawford explained that after her telephone request for addi-
tional time, she discovered the $3,500 retainer still in her office
safe. According to Crawford, it had been there all along. It had
been over 1 year since the $6,500 cashier’s check was cashed.
Crawford wrote:
As I originally stated to you in a previous correspond-
ence there were several deposits combined as one for
the February, 2010 deposit. As it has been my practice
in the past, (though no longer) these deposits were safely
kept in my office safe until I could make such deposit.
It appears, that only the checks were deposited and not
the cash, I must have gotten distracted and grabbed only
one of the envelopes instead of both. After this discovery,
my recollection was that I completed the deposit slips
separately for checks and cash and placed them in sepa-
rate envelopes( in order to keep separate client separate).
Recently, I removed all contents from my safe includ-
ing important legal papers, copies of executed Will, and
title documents, final arrangement documents and busi-
ness documents. Underneath several manila envelopes,
I located the cash, still in the envelope with the deposit
slip, having never been deposited. You can imagine my
shock and dismay (and I must say embarrassment) when
I made this discovery. I must have only deposited the
“check” envelope and not the “cash” envelope when I
made the deposit.
Crawford believed “the major issue which caused this prob-
lem for me is the lack of guidance and guidelines on maintain-
ing an attorney trust account.” Crawford claimed that she had
never noticed any “discrepancies” in her trust account balance
because she had been depositing her earned court appointment
fees into her trust account. For that same reason, Crawford

340 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
asserted that no “client funds” were affected by this error of
unknowingly keeping the $3,500 unearned advance fee in
her safe.
Crawford explained that “until recently,” she had no reason
to go back and check that the $3,500 was indeed deposited into
the trust account.
Crawford attached some of the client/payee information
which Counsel for Discipline had requested. To explain the
delay in providing that information, Crawford said that the
requested trust fund information was normally kept in each
client’s file. Thus, Crawford had to go through each one
of her files to gather the information, which she explained
was a “daunting task.” Crawford sent separate lists of trust
account deposits and withdrawals from September 1, 2009, to
November 30, 2010, for five different clients and for numerous
Douglas County appointments. She also sent copies of various
checks and deposit slips.
A contemporaneously produced deposit slip reflected that
$3,500 cash was deposited into Crawford’s trust account on
February 25, 2011. Crawford did not use the original deposit
slip which she had said she had prepared when she placed the
cash in a manila envelope a year before.
Crawford did not at first explain why she had not imme-
diately reported the discovery of the $3,500 to Counsel for
Discipline and had waited instead to inform Counsel for
Discipline a month later in the letter received on March 24,
2011. In her deposition, Crawford said that the delay in inform-
ing Counsel for Discipline was because “we did not have
that type of a relationship where I could pick up the phone
and explain to you over the phone exactly what happened. I
thought it would be best for me to make sure that I documented
each of those steps in a letter.”
On March 28, 2011, Counsel for Discipline responded that
he still needed the payee information for each check written
on Crawford’s trust account from September 1, 2009, through
November 30, 2010. Counsel for Discipline provided a form
for Crawford to fill in the payee information for various trans-
actions. Counsel for Discipline also asked for more detail

STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CRAWFORD 	341
Cite as 285 Neb. 321
about certain cash withdrawals reflected in Crawford’s trust
account records.
In light of the new information contained in Crawford’s
recent letter, Counsel for Discipline wrote Crawford that he was
extending the audit of Crawford’s trust account to December
2010 through March 2011. Counsel for Discipline asked for the
requested information by April 4, 2011.
Crawford failed to supply all the requested audit informa-
tion. Instead, on April 7, 2011, Counsel for Discipline received
another 	protest 	letter. 	Crawford 	objected 	to 	Counsel 	for
Discipline’s new requests as being overly intrusive. Crawford
stated that any withdrawals were her own funds and were
mostly in cash. She stated that she could not and would not
account for how they were spent. Crawford noted that “laws
of discrimination and civil liberties” would not allow such an
inquiry by an employer. Crawford also opined that although
this may not have been the most “prudent” approach, there was
nothing in the disciplinary rules prohibiting her from deposit-
ing earned funds into her trust account.
Crawford commented that Counsel for Discipline, “hav-
ing been fully appraised [sic] of the circumstances on the
Cheatams[’] grievance, ha[d] chosen to parlay the Cheatams
resolved facts into some other unsolicited, unwarranted and
unnecessary inquiry into other unrelated matters.” Crawford
again wrote that Counsel for Discipline’s request “deeply dis-
turbs me on many levels.” She considered the request a ran-
dom and arbitrary audit which, “[o]n its face, . . . gives the
appearance that Counsel for Discipline, after being provided
with documentation to address the initial grievance, is now
on a ‘fishing’ expedition to see if there can be a ‘discovery’
of other matters that were not of concern to this or any cli-
ent.” Crawford “respectfully decline[d]” to provide Counsel
for Discipline with the information, stating that “in addition to
being irrelevant to the inquiry, [it] is privileged and constitu-
tionally protected.”
Attached to this letter, Crawford provided Counsel for
Discipline with the monthly trust fund statements for December
2010 and January and February 2011. But she did not fill in

342 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
the form provided by Counsel for Discipline for the payee
information, nor did she otherwise provide such information.
That was the end of Crawford’s written correspondence with
Counsel for Discipline.
The record speaks for itself. Crawford continuously failed
to respond to Counsel for Discipline’s clear requests for docu-
mentation, and she failed to provide clear answers to Counsel
for Discipline’s questions during the investigation. Notably,
Counsel for Discipline did not receive the requested docu-
mentation regarding deposit of the $3,500 until he threat-
ened Crawford with imminent suspension. Crawford’s corre-
spondence evidences that she alternately evaded Counsel for
Discipline’s inquiries and attacked Counsel for Discipline for
pursuing the investigation at all. Crawford failed to cooperate
with the investigation.
Crawford argues, however, that the charges of failure to coop-
erate are punishment for “having the audacity to ask questions
and inquire as to the relevance of [Counsel for Discipline’s]
investigation.”6 She argues that the root of her confusion and
questioning attitude was Counsel for Discipline’s failure to dis-
close other “grievances” from Nolan and Cheatams, consisting
of the communications between the office of the Counsel for
Discipline, Nolan, and Cheatams that led up to the grievance
letter sent to Crawford. Notably, these “grievances” raised an
“accounting issue,”7 while the grievance letter she received
did not. Crawford claims these undisclosed “grievances” were
the true basis of the investigation and charges against her.
In addition, Crawford asserts that the investigation and pros-
ecution were permeated with racial bias, “although perhaps
subconscious.”8 She raises these arguments to conclude both
that her level of cooperation was reasonable under the cir-
cumstances and that due process demands a new disciplinary
hearing. For the foregoing reasons, we find these arguments
lack merit.
6 Brief for respondent at 12.
7 Id. at 22.
8 Id. at 24.

STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CRAWFORD 	343
Cite as 285 Neb. 321
Crawford’s undisclosed “grievances” arguments stem from
a series of communications between Counsel for Discipline,
Nolan, and Cheatams leading up to the formal grievance letter
sent to Crawford. Counsel for Discipline first received a tele-
phone call from Nolan on July 16, 2010, stating that Crawford
was refusing to continue to represent Cheatams unless she
paid 	additional 	funds. 	Nolan 	apparently 	told 	Counsel 	for
Discipline at this time that she had paid Crawford $9,000,
but that Crawford was acknowledging receipt of only $5,000.
According to Counsel for Discipline, he called Crawford to
discuss that and other allegations. And, according to Counsel
for Discipline, Crawford told Counsel for Discipline over
the telephone that she had received only $5,000 from Nolan.
Crawford denies this conversation took place.
Counsel for Discipline then wrote to Nolan explaining that
if she would like to file a grievance, she would need to write
a letter detailing the allegations and providing any documen-
tation she might have. Counsel for Discipline noted in this
letter that he had spoken to Crawford about Nolan’s concerns
and that Crawford had told Counsel for Discipline that Nolan
had paid her only $5,000. According to Nolan’s testimony at
the disciplinary hearing—the source of Crawford’s belated
discovery of the alleged undisclosed “grievances”—Counsel
for Discipline told Nolan that if Nolan could provide docu-
mentation of the $9,000 payment, then, based on the fact that
Crawford said she had received only $5,000, “‘I would really
have to investigate, because that would mean I caught her in
an out lie, and we don’t like that.’” Crawford emphasizes this
statement as evidence of Counsel for Discipline’s undisclosed
bias against her.
Nolan accordingly faxed a handwritten letter to Counsel for
Discipline outlining her allegations of misconduct. Nolan was
recovering from a stroke, and the letter was difficult to read.
The letter alleged that Crawford had agreed her representation
would cost no more than $10,000 total and that Crawford had
demanded money in excess of that amount in order to con-
tinue her representation of Cheatams. Nolan also alleged that
Crawford had failed to provide billing statements as requested,
that she had forgotten a court date, and that she visited

344 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
Cheatams only once during the course of a year. Nolan sent
Counsel for Discipline copies of a money order in the amount
of $2,500, dated September 24, 2009, negotiated at Bank of
the West, and a cashier’s check in the amount of $6,500, dated
January 5, 2010, negotiated at Centris.
After receipt of the handwritten letter, Counsel for Discipline
spoke with Nolan on the telephone in more detail about her
allegations. They agreed that Counsel for Discipline would
type a letter on Nolan’s behalf and that he would send it to her
for review and approval. Counsel for Discipline has explained
that it is the practice of the office of the Counsel for Discipline
to assist complainants with any difficulties they may have writ-
ing a grievance letter. Counsel for Discipline did so, typing up
the allegations of Nolan’s handwritten letter.
The first typed version of the allegations added Nolan’s
complaint that after paying the $2,500, she had negotiated a
final payment of $6,500 which Crawford had agreed would get
them through trial, and that Crawford subsequently demanded
money in excess of this agreed-upon fee. In other words,
Nolan was alleging that they had renegotiated the total cost for
Crawford’s representation through the end of trial at $9,000
and that Crawford, after receiving this amount, demanded
more money in order to continue representation. That typed
version did not contain the allegation that Crawford failed to
acknowledge receipt of the total $9,000 in payments already
made by Nolan.
Counsel for Discipline sent the typed letter to Nolan. Nolan
returned it to Counsel for Discipline with the handwritten addi-
tion that Crawford had allegedly told Counsel for Discipline
in a telephone conversation that she had received only $5,000
in payments.
However, Counsel for Discipline sent the original typed
letter, without Nolan’s handwritten additions, back to Nolan,
explaining that Cheatams, as the client, should also review the
letter and sign it. Cheatams did so, and this time, Cheatams,
not Nolan, made handwritten additions to the letter. Cheatams
did not make any significant changes. Most notably, Cheatams
did not add the allegation concerning Crawford’s failure to
acknowledge receipt of the entire $9,000. This typed letter with

STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CRAWFORD 	345
Cite as 285 Neb. 321
Cheatams’ handwritten additions was the only grievance sent
to Crawford.
Crawford 	first 	argues 	that 	the 	written 	communications
represent “grievances,” as defined by the disciplinary rules.
Therefore, under those rules, Crawford claims she had a right
to be notified of them. Neb. Ct. R. § 3-308(B) states, “The
Counsel for Discipline shall . . . (2) Notify a member in writ-
ing that he or she is the subject of a Grievance and furnish the
member a copy [of the grievance] within fifteen days of receipt
of the Grievance.”
A grievance is defined as follows:
Any written statement made by any person alleging
conduct on the part of a member which appears, in the
judgment of the Counsel for Discipline, to have merit,
and, if true, would constitute a violation of the member’s
oath, the Nebraska Rules of Professional Conduct, or
these rules; allegations of misconduct not appearing in the
judgment of the Counsel for Discipline to have merit are
not deemed a Grievance under these rules.9
Crawford focuses on the “[a]ny written statement” portion of
this definition.
Crawford ignores that part of the definition which qualifies
a grievance as only that written statement which appears, “in
the judgment of the Counsel for Discipline, to have merit.” In
other words, the “Grievance” referred to in § 3-308(B) is only
that draft which the office of the Counsel for Discipline deter-
mines meritorious and which it directs its employees to pursue.
Communications preliminary to that determination are simply
“allegations of misconduct.”10
[5] Thus, § 3-309(D) further states:
If it appears to the Counsel for Discipline that allegations
of misconduct may have merit and, if true, would con-
stitute grounds for discipline, he or she shall notify the
member against whom the allegations are directed that the
member is the subject of a Grievance, and within fifteen
days of its receipt furnish the member a copy thereof by
9 Neb. Ct. R., ch. 3, art. 3, Definitions.
10 See Neb. Ct. R. § 3-309(C) (rev. 2011).

346 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
certified mail, return receipt requested, at the member’s
last known address.
(Emphasis supplied.) When a complainant has made allega-
tions of attorney misconduct, Counsel for Discipline is required
to make an initial determination of whether the allegations
warrant formal investigation.11 In making this determination,
Counsel for Discipline may make such preliminary inquiry
regarding the underlying facts as deemed appropriate.12
[6] The disciplinary rules do not contemplate multiple
“grievances” stemming from the same complainant as to the
same representation of the same client. Nor do the rules con-
template that an attorney must be notified of every allegation
of misconduct that Counsel for Discipline ultimately deter-
mines to be without potential merit. Counsel for Discipline
approved only one written statement containing allegations of
misconduct. That was the only grievance against Crawford. We
are not persuaded by Crawford’s assertion that there were sev-
eral “grievances” in this case which the office of the Counsel
for Discipline failed to supply to her.
Next, Crawford asserts that the scope of the investigation
and the disciplinary charges against her must be limited to
the scope of the grievance letter she received. In particular,
Crawford asserts that the audit of her trust account was some-
how improper because it had nothing to do with the charges
made in the grievance, which were neglect and breach of the
fee agreement.
Crawford cites to no law that would specifically support this
contention. She instead relies on vague notions of due process
and asserts that “[t]he rules establish that the basis for the
investigation is the delivered grievance.”13
But § 3-308(B) states, “The Counsel for Discipline shall . . .
(1) Review, investigate, or refer for investigation all matters of
alleged misconduct called to his or her attention by Grievance
or otherwise.” (Emphasis supplied.) Furthermore, § 3-906 of
the disciplinary rules specifically gives Counsel for Discipline
11 Cotton v. Steele, 255 Neb. 892, 587 N.W.2d 693 (1999).
12 Id.
13 Brief for respondent at 22.

STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CRAWFORD 	347
Cite as 285 Neb. 321
the broad power “to audit at any time any trust account
required by [the court] rules.” (Emphasis supplied.)
[7] Attorneys licensed to practice law in the State of
Nebraska agree to operate under the supervision of the office
of the Counsel for Discipline. Trust accounts, in particular, are
always open to review. The disciplinary rules do not require
a formal grievance as a threshold requirement for this power
to investigate allegations of misconduct or to audit attorney
trust accounts.
[8,9] The rules certainly do not limit Counsel for Discipline’s
powers of investigation to the allegations stated in a griev-
ance. In State ex rel. Special Counsel for Dis. v. Fellman,14
for instance, we explicitly noted that the violation which we
found—mishandling a retainer—was not the basis for the cli-
ent’s complaint and was only discovered during Counsel for
Discipline’s own investigation of the matter. Nevertheless,
that allegation was subsequently made part of the formal
charges.15 It is the formal charges, not the grievance, that
limit the scope of misconduct an attorney may properly be
disciplined for.
The disciplinary rules provide that if, upon conclusion of
any investigation, Counsel for Discipline determines there are
reasonable grounds for discipline, he or she shall reduce the
grievance to a complaint specifying with particularity the facts
which constitute the basis thereof and the grounds for disci-
pline which appear to have been violated.16 That complaint is
to be forwarded to the attorney against whom it is made and
to the Committee on Inquiry to determine whether there are
reasonable grounds for discipline and whether a public interest
would be served by filing a formal charge.17
We have described a hearing before the Committee on
Inquiry as the equivalent of a probable cause hearing.18 That
was done in this case, and the Committee on Inquiry found
14 State ex rel. Special Counsel for Dis. v. Fellman, supra note 1.
15 Id.
16 § 3-309(G).
17 § 3-309(H).
18 See State ex rel. NSBA v. Kirshen, 232 Neb. 445, 441 N.W.2d 161 (1989).

348 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
reasonable 	grounds 	for 	discipline. 	The 	complaint 	against
Crawford alleged that she misappropriated funds based on facts
which have nothing to do with the allegation that Crawford
failed to acknowledge receipt of the total $9,000 in payments
made by Nolan.
Counsel for Discipline then filed the formal charges against
Crawford and served those charges on her in advance of the
disciplinary hearing. The formal charges alleged the facts
showing misappropriation based upon the disappearance of
the $3,500. Suffice it to say that those facts did not involve
the allegation that Crawford failed to acknowledge receipt
of $9,000 in payments. The referee ultimately determined
Crawford misappropriated funds based on the facts alleged
in the formal charges. There was no finding of miscon-
duct based on the failure to acknowledge full receipt of
Nolan’s payments.
[10] 	Due 	process 	in 	attorney 	disciplinary 	proceedings
requires that the attorney be given notice of the proceeding and
an opportunity to defend at a hearing, and that the proceeding
be essentially fair.19 The “adjudication” must be preceded by
notice and an opportunity to be heard which is fair in view
of the circumstances and conditions existent at the time.20
Because neither the formal charges nor the findings of the
referee were based on the long-since discarded allegation that
Crawford failed to acknowledge the entirety of Nolan’s pay-
ments, Crawford’s due process rights were not violated by the
failure to disclose that allegation.
Crawford argues that, at the very least, the “concealment”
of the correspondence preliminary to the grievance gave rise
to “legitimate confusion” on Crawford’s part during the course
19 See, e.g., In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S. Ct. 1222, 20 L. Ed. 2d 117
(1968); State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Haave, 290 P.3d 747 (Okla.
2012); Flamenco v. Independent Refuse Service, 130 Conn. App. 280, 22
A.3d 671 (2011); Attorney Grievance v. Coppola, 419 Md. 370, 19 A.3d
431 (2011); In re Discipline of Russell, 797 N.W.2d 77 (S.D. 2011). See,
also, Annot., 86 A.L.R.4th 1071 (1991); 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law
§ 105 (2007).
20 State ex rel. NSBA v. Dineen, 235 Neb. 363, 365, 455 N.W.2d 178, 180
(1990).

STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CRAWFORD 	349
Cite as 285 Neb. 321
of the investigation.21 This confusion, Crawford asserts, was
“exploited”22 into additional charges of “non-cooperation.”23
Crawford further points out that but for the concealment of the
pregrievance correspondence, there never would have been an
audit of her trust account.
We fail to see the legal significance of any “but for” argu-
ments. Undisclosed allegations motivating an inquiry do not
somehow void the investigation and consequent evidence that
lead to a formal complaint and charges.
And we find no merit to Crawford’s argument that she
was justifiably confused and that there was consequently an
unfair impression that she was being uncooperative. Crawford
insists that the entirety of the investigation and her attitude
during that investigation were tainted by the nondisclosure
of this “accounting issue.”24 As concerns any “accounting
issue,” Counsel for Discipline’s initial requests were quite
limited. Counsel for Discipline requested proof that the $9,000
in advance fees was properly deposited in a trust account
and properly withdrawn when earned. This was a routine
request and, as already discussed, was within the proper scope
of Counsel for Discipline’s authority. Whatever her confu-
sion, Crawford was unjustified in believing that she did not
have to promptly provide this information upon Counsel for
Discipline’s clear request.
The record reflects that it was not until months of delay and
Crawford’s apparent inability to produce simple documenta-
tion showing the proper handling of Nolan’s two advance
payments that Counsel for Discipline decided to more fully
audit Crawford’s trust account. Whatever “accounting issue”
was the subject of the initial allegations of misconduct,
Crawford’s failure to provide routine trust fund documenta-
tion during the course of the investigation raised entirely
different accounting issues. And Counsel for Discipline was
candid throughout the investigation as to his concerns and
21 Brief for respondent at 22.
22 Id. at 23.
23 Id. at 22.
24 Id.

350 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
how those concerns had been raised. Crawford’s evasion and
attitude throughout the investigation were not justified by
any confusion.
Crawford next asserts that her recalcitrant communications
with Counsel for Discipline reflected a reasonable belief that
the investigation was the result of racial or other impermis-
sible bias against her. Crawford relatedly argues that the entire
investigatory and disciplinary process was contaminated with
racial bias. Crawford asserts that due process demands a new
disciplinary hearing with a special prosecutor to substitute for
the Counsel for Discipline who prosecuted this case. Because
we find no evidence of impermissible bias, we find no merit to
these arguments.
The discretion of the office of the Counsel for Discipline
and of the Committee on Inquiry is informed by considerations
in the disciplinary rules, the rules of professional conduct,
relevant case law, and other practical factors peculiar to each
case.25 We have said that these factors and guidelines afford
sufficient legal guidance to obviate the danger of arbitrary or
discriminatory enforcement.26
[11,12] The general rule is that unless there is proof that a
particular disciplinary prosecution was motivated by an unjus-
tifiable standard based, for example, on race or religion, the
use of such discretion does not violate constitutional protec-
tions.27 In order to support a defense of selective or discrimina-
tory prosecution, the attorney must show not only that others
similarly situated have not been prosecuted, but that the selec-
tion of the defendant for prosecution has been invidious or in
bad faith, based upon considerations such as race, religion,
or the desire to prevent the exercise of his or her constitu-
tional rights.28
As proof of bad faith prosecution here, Crawford first points
to the failure to disclose the correspondence preliminary to
25 See State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. James, 267 Neb. 186, 673 N.W.2d 214
(2004).
26 Id.
27 See id.
28 See id.

STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CRAWFORD 	351
Cite as 285 Neb. 321
the grievance. For the reasons already discussed, the undis-
closed allegation that Crawford failed to acknowledge receipt
of the full $9,000 in client funds was never deemed by the
office of the Counsel for Discipline to have likely merit.
Regardless, there was no obligation to disclose the allegation.
Therefore, such nondisclosure does not indicate impermissible
bias against Crawford.
Crawford next argues that the record reflects a “deeply held
level of distrust”29 by Counsel for Discipline throughout the
process. She concludes that such distrust is contrary to the
objectivity that due process demands. While we agree that
the record reflects some distrust, we disagree that it raises the
specter of impermissible bias. Due process does not demand
that Counsel for Discipline “trust” the attorneys under investi-
gation. If prosecutors’ distrust of the persons being prosecuted
were contrary to due process, then we cannot imagine how the
adversary system would function.
Crawford presents the affidavit of Dr. Omowale Akintunde
to prove this distrust stemmed from impermissible racial
animus. Akintunde is a tenured associate professor of Black
studies at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. Akintunde
averred that he had examined the exchanges between Counsel
for Discipline and Crawford and that he had also exam-
ined 	other 	disciplinary 	cases 	occurring 	around 	the 	same
time as the investigation of Crawford. Akintunde concluded
that the disciplinary process pertaining to Crawford “was
entrenched 	with 	unrecognized 	and 	unacknowledged 	racial
bias.” Akintunde explained that Counsel for Discipline had
demonstrated “improper motive” and “microagression,” which
Akintunde defined as the “subtle, stunning, often automatic
verbal (and non-verbal) exchanges which are ‘put downs’ of
blacks by offenders.” To illustrate his conclusions, Akintunde
points to Counsel for Discipline’s “aggressive, threatening and
intended intimidation in statements and comments throughout
his correspondence with [Crawford] and exchange during the
deposition i.e. threats of ‘suspension’ and the ‘most attor-
neys’ language.”
29 Brief for respondent at 24.

352 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
In our de novo review of the record, we find that the state-
ments made by Counsel for Discipline fail to reveal any racial
bias. Counsel for Discipline is charged with the task of super-
vising attorneys, compelling information from them during an
investigation, and pursuing formal charges where appropriate.
Many of the targeted attorneys perceive this as aggressive and
otherwise threatening. The more uncooperative the attorney
under investigation, the more Counsel for Discipline may be
forced to “threaten” that attorney to get the necessary informa-
tion. Counsel for Discipline’s threat of suspension was a cred-
ible and reasonable threat given Crawford’s failure to respond
to clear requests which, as a licensed attorney, she was obli-
gated to comply with.
We also fail to see how Counsel for Discipline’s comment
referring to “[m]ost attorneys” indicates racial animus. It is our
belief and hope that most attorneys indeed handle their trust
accounts with the care that Counsel for Discipline expected
of Crawford. We expect, and the office of the Counsel for
Discipline ought to also expect, that all licensed attorneys
live up to the same standards set forth by our rules of profes-
sional conduct.
In her brief, Crawford further points to an exchange during
her deposition as “evidence of the subconscious perceptions
outlined by . . . Akintunde.”30 Toward the end of the deposi-
tion, when Counsel for Discipline attempted to explain his
investigation of Crawford as a normal part of the responsibility
of his office to maintain the sanctity of attorney trust accounts,
Crawford said, “What I don’t understand is why it appears
to be very aggressive when it comes to black attorneys in
Nebraska.” Counsel for Discipline responded:
Q. Prior to today, . . . had you [Crawford] and I
ever met?
A. I have never met you.
Q. How did I know that you were African-American or
black, or however you want to identify yourself?
A. How did you know that?
Q. How do you know I knew that?
30 Id. at 29.

STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CRAWFORD 	353
Cite as 285 Neb. 321
[Counsel 	for 	Crawford]: 	Objection, 	argumentative,
form and foundation. If you would like to ask her a rel-
evant question, I have no objection to that, but you’re
asking — you’re testifying here now.
[Counsel for Discipline]: I am asking her why she’s
calling me a racist.
According to Crawford, “[f]or [Counsel for Discipline] to
internalize that comment [by Crawford discussing her ‘hon-
estly held perception that black attorneys are treated differently
in Nebraska’] and act so harshly to it as a specific affront on
him, is evidence of the subconscious perceptions outlined by
. . . Akintunde.”31
In our view of the record, Crawford asked Counsel for
Discipline why the office of the Counsel for Discipline was
so aggressive against “black” attorneys. This was, in essence,
a charge of racism. Counsel for Discipline responded to this
charge. We observe from the record that Counsel for Discipline
was at that moment already palpably frustrated with Crawford’s
continuous refusal to clearly answer Counsel for Discipline’s
questions. Long discourses took place over topics such as the
wording of the fee agreement or the size of manila envelopes.
Rarely would Crawford simply affirm or deny an allega-
tion or answer a question with a “yes” or “no.” Counsel for
Discipline could have kept his emotions more in check, but
we do not see subconscious “internaliz[ation]” demonstrating
Counsel for Discipline was racially biased. In any event, such
psychological inferences would not satisfy Crawford’s burden
of proof. Crawford has failed to demonstrate that Counsel for
Discipline’s pursuit of the disciplinary investigation or his
conduct during the investigation was racially motivated or the
product of any other impermissible bias.
[13] Crawford may have genuinely felt Counsel for Discipline
was motivated by racial animus or some other personal ven-
detta against her. Crawford presented evidence of a previous
grievance and how she felt that Counsel for Discipline was
out to “‘get [her].’” Crawford also testified that “we, those
who look like me, don’t feel like disciplinary counsel is our
31 Id.

354 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
friend, and more of a foe.” But Crawford’s perceptions do not
justify her failure to cooperate in this case. Attorneys licensed
to practice law in this state ought to be deferential to the office
of the Counsel for Discipline in its essential role of monitoring
the integrity of the profession. Furthermore, whatever attorneys
believe is motivating opposing counsel, a judge, or Counsel
for Discipline, attorneys are expected to maintain the level of
decorum that the profession demands and to act in accordance
with their duties.
[14,15] We have repeatedly emphasized how important it
is for an attorney to respond to inquiries and requests for
information from Counsel for Discipline.32 We have held that
an attorney’s failure to respond to inquiries and request for
information from the office of the Counsel for Discipline is
considered to be a grave matter and a threat to the credibility
of attorney disciplinary proceedings.33 The disciplinary process
as a whole must function effectively in order for the public to
have confidence in the integrity of the profession and to be
protected from unscrupulous acts.34
[16-18] Responding to disciplinary complaints in an untimely
manner and repeatedly ignoring requests for information from
Counsel for Discipline indicate disrespect for this court’s dis-
ciplinary jurisdiction and a lack of concern for the protection
of the public, the profession, and the administration of jus-
tice.35 Counsel for Discipline should not be forced to threaten
an attorney with the suspension of his or her license in order
to get the attorney to respond to requests for information.36 A
32 See, e.g., State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Smith, 278 Neb. 899, 775
N.W.2d 192 (2009); State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Carbullido, 278 Neb.
721, 773 N.W.2d 141 (2009); State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Wickenkamp,
277 Neb. 16, 759 N.W.2d 492 (2009).
33 See, e.g., State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Hutchinson, 280 Neb. 158, 784
N.W.2d 893 (2010); State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Switzer, 275 Neb.
881, 750 N.W.2d 681 (2008).
34 State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. James, supra note 25.
35 State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Smith, 275 Neb. 230, 745 N.W.2d 891
(2008).
36 State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. James, supra note 25.

STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CRAWFORD 	355
Cite as 285 Neb. 321
failure to make timely responses to inquiries of Counsel for
Discipline violates ethical canons and disciplinary rules which
prohibit conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.37
We find that Crawford violated § 3-508.4(c) and (d) (dishon-
esty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and conduct prejudicial
to administration of justice) and violated her oath of office
throughout the course of the investigation.
But before moving on to address the other findings of
misconduct, we address some remaining procedural objec-
tions. These objections also stem from the undisclosed alle-
gation that Crawford failed to acknowledge payment of the
full $9,000 in payments from Nolan. Crawford asserts that
she was prejudiced by Counsel for Discipline’s failure to
appoint special counsel and to inform her of the previously
discussed 	$9,000/$5,000 	allegation, 	because 	Counsel 	for
Discipline should have been a witness at the disciplinary hear-
ing. According to Crawford, Counsel for Discipline knew or
should have known that “as the only person with first-hand
knowledge of this alleged conversation [about the failure to
acknowledge full receipt of Nolan’s payments], he would be
subject to being called as a witness, being confronted and
being cross-examined.”38 Crawford also asserts that the failure
to disclose the correspondence preliminary to the grievance
was a discovery violation.
As a quasi-judicial proceeding, attorney disciplinary pro-
ceedings do not entitle their participants to pretrial discovery
as a constitutional right—although refusal to grant a discovery
request may, in certain circumstances, so prejudice the party as
to amount to a denial of due process.39 Parties derive rights to
discovery from statutes or court rules.40 Crawford did not sub-
mit any discovery requests to Counsel for Discipline. Crawford
37 Id.
38 Brief for respondent at 21-22.
39 See, In the Matter of Tobin, 417 Mass. 81, 628 N.E.2d 1268 (1994); In re
Herndon, 596 A.2d 592 (D.C. 1991); In re Wireman, 270 Ind. 344, 367
N.E.2d 1368 (1977).
40 See In the Matter of Tobin, supra note 39.

356 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
does not point out what statute or rules were allegedly violated
in this case, other than the “grievances” argument we have
already discussed. Preliminary correspondence is the unavoid-
able consequence of the fact that Counsel for Discipline is
required to both investigate and prosecute attorney misconduct.
And technicalities cannot be invoked to defeat charges where
there is evidence showing that the conduct alleged against
the attorney is ethically wrong.41 The referee denied a motion
for continuance and for mistrial. But the referee did grant
Crawford’s request that the record remain open for 14 days
while Crawford reviewed the entire investigatory file which
Counsel for Discipline provided to her. Because of the negli-
gible evidentiary value of the undisclosed documents and of
any examination of Counsel for Discipline as a witness to the
discarded $9,000/$5,000 allegation, we find no merit to these
procedural objections.
2. undeRlying chaRges
Finally, we turn to the remaining charges of misconduct. We
find clear and convincing evidence of Crawford’s failure to
provide a monthly accounting as agreed to, of misappropriating
client funds, and of lying in order to cover up the misconduct.
As Crawford points out, the evidence is largely circumstantial,
disputed, and complicated. We find the evidence nonetheless
clear and convincing.
(a) Billing Cheatams
We begin with the relatively simple matter of the billing. We
find by clear and convincing evidence that Crawford failed to
provide Nolan or Cheatams with detailed monthly statements
reflecting work performed, contrary to her agreement and their
repeated demands.
Crawford testified that the fee agreement providing for
the detailed monthly statements was just a standard form she
used. It was part of the alleged verbal agreement to never
leave any documents at Douglas County Correctional Center.
Crawford explained that sometimes jailers raid the jail cell
41 State ex rel. NSBA v. Rhodes, 234 Neb. 799, 453 N.W.2d 73 (1990).

STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CRAWFORD 	357
Cite as 285 Neb. 321
of the inmates and that inmates can then forcibly take papers
from other inmates. Crawford testified in her deposition and
at trial that she met with Cheatams at least monthly at the jail
and showed him a handwritten billing, which she discussed
with him and which showed the work done and how much
of the retainer had been spent. She explained that she did not
send a copy of the billing to Nolan because Nolan was not
her client.
Nolan, however, testified that Crawford had agreed to send
Nolan detailed monthly billing statements, with Cheatams’
permission, which he gave. Nolan testified that she repeatedly
left messages asking Crawford to send billing statements that
would show what they owed. Nolan testified that she directed
Cheatams to also ask Crawford about the billing statements
whenever he saw Crawford. When Nolan was able to speak to
Crawford on the telephone and ask for the billing statements,
Crawford would tell her, “‘Oh, that’s no problem. That’s the
least of our worries. We got a real thing that we’re trying to get
done. But you’ll get that.’”
Cheatams similarly testified that he asked for billing state-
ments but that Crawford did not provide him or Nolan with
such statements. Cheatams explained:
She told me that she couldn’t give it to my mom [Nolan]
because [she] wasn’t her client, so I would have to need it
or want it, so — and that’s — But she said that she didn’t
want to give it to me because she didn’t know about, like,
I guess, inmates stealing, you know, other — stealing
paperwork or however. But I had paperwork there, so,
you know, I figured that wasn’t the reason. I just figured
that she was just lack of time or she just, you know, just
was doing it on her own.
Cheatams testified that the first time Crawford went over
any billing statement or discussed money with him at all was
when Crawford told him the $2,500 “was down” and that they
“needed to come up with some more money” because they
were going to trial. The only other time he saw a billing state-
ment was at the withdrawal hearing.
Cheatams’ visitation history from September 24, 2009, to
January 27, 2011, showed only three visits from Crawford on

358 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
February 17, March 15, and June 28, 2010. In addition, there
were court hearings on October 21 and November 30, 2009, in
which Crawford was present.
Section 3-501.5(f) (fees) states:
Upon reasonable and timely request by the client, a lawyer
shall provide, without charge, an accounting for fees and
costs claimed or previously collected. Such an accounting
shall include at least the following information:
(1) Itemization of all hourly charges, costs, interest
assessments, and past due balances.
(2) For hourly rate charges, a description of the serv-
ices performed and a notation of the person who per-
formed those services. The description shall be of suffi-
cient detail to generally apprise the client of the nature of
the work performed.
While certainly there were irreconcilable versions of the
facts, in disciplinary proceedings, findings made by the referee
are given special consideration on matters that are in irrecon-
cilable conflict.42 We consider and may give weight to the fact
that the referee heard and observed the witnesses and accepted
one version of the facts rather than another.43 We find clear and
convincing evidence that Crawford violated § 3-501.5.
(b) Misappropriation and Lying
We also find clear and convincing evidence that Crawford
misappropriated $3,500 in client funds. Indisputably, Crawford
took $3,500 in unearned client funds in cash into her posses-
sion. Indisputably, that cash was not deposited into the trust
account, and Crawford knew or should have known it was not
properly deposited for at least 5 weeks. Then, according to
Crawford, through further negligence, she thought the cash had
already been deposited and left the money in her safe undis-
covered for a year. She looked in her safe for the cash only
after repeated requests by Counsel for Discipline for proof of
the deposit and a threat of temporary suspension prompted fur-
ther investigation.
42 State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Association v. Walsh, supra note 3.
43 State ex rel. Special Counsel for Dis. v. Fellman, supra note 1.

STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CRAWFORD 	359
Cite as 285 Neb. 321
Even accepting Crawford’s version of events, this is a seri-
ous violation of § 3-501.15, which mandates that client funds
“shall be kept in a separate account” and that a “lawyer shall
deposit into a client trust account legal fees and expenses that
have been paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only
as fees are earned or expenses incurred.”44 Under the discipli-
nary rules, keeping unearned fees in an office safe is not safe-
keeping of client funds. Crawford admits to this “mishandling”
of client funds, but not “misappropriation.”
[19,20] In the context of attorney discipline proceedings,
misappropriation 	is 	any 	unauthorized 	use 	of 	client 	funds
entrusted to an attorney, including not only stealing, but also
unauthorized temporary use for the attorney’s own purpose,
whether or not the attorney derives any personal gain or benefit
therefrom.45 Advance fees are payments made by a client for
the performance of legal services and belong to the client until
earned by the attorney.46
Crawford argues that under the standard of clear and con-
vincing proof to which we hold disciplinary violations, we
cannot disbelieve her testimony that the $3,500 cash was sit-
ting unused in a client safe for more than a year. She points
out that there was no affirmative evidence to the contrary.
According to Crawford, there is no “objective evidence” or
“inferences strong enough” for Counsel for Discipline to
sustain his burden of proof that she lied.47 By demanding
that she prove her explanation was credible, Crawford claims
Counsel for Discipline impermissibly shifted to her the burden
of proof.
We conclude that once it was established that the unearned
funds were cashed out and not deposited in a trust account as
the rules require, the burden properly shifted to Crawford to
explain where those funds were. And we agree with the referee
that Crawford’s explanation was unsatisfactory.
44 § 3-501.15(a) and (c).
45 State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Beltzer, 284 Neb. 28, 815 N.W.2d 862
(2012).
46 State ex rel. Special Counsel for Dis. v. Fellman, supra note 1.
47 Brief for respondent at 18.

360 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
Crawford could not explain why she negotiated the $6,500
cashier’s check in her personal savings account at Centris and
withdrew the $3,500 unearned client funds in cash to deposit
in the trust account later. Counsel for Discipline pointed out
that Crawford could have negotiated the check at Bank of the
West, depositing the advance fee cashier’s check directly into
her trust account, and could have then withdrawn the $3,000
earned amount as cash or through writing a check from her
trust account. Crawford testified at the disciplinary hearing, “I
think I could have done either. . . . And I don’t think it mat-
tered which I did. . . . I didn’t have any particular reason for
choosing one over the other.”
Crawford likewise could give no particular reason why she
took the unearned $3,500 out in cash rather than asking for
a cashier’s check or other more traceable and secure form.
According to Crawford, she took the $3,500 cash back to her
office that same day. According to Crawford, it was her inten-
tion to get to the bank and deposit the cash in her trust account
“as soon as it was practical for me to do so.”
A branch office of Bank of the West was located approxi-
mately 11⁄2 blocks from Crawford’s law office in downtown
Omaha. Crawford gave no explanation as to why she did not
immediately pass by the Bank of the West on her way to her
office. She testified that she went back to her office the same
day she negotiated the $6,500 cashier’s check.
Crawford testified at her deposition that when she arrived
at her office from the bank, she placed the envelope of $3,500
cash inside a larger manila envelope with a trust account
deposit slip that she had prepared from her book of deposit
slips. Crawford testified in her deposition that she had a book
of trust account checks, four to a page, with stubs, in her desk
drawer. When asked whether there was anything else in the
manila envelope with the cash, Crawford replied that, no, she
“wouldn’t have put anything else in that manila envelope with
that cash.”
Crawford testified that she placed the manila envelope in
a safe located under her desk. The safe was not very large.
Crawford explained that the height of the safe was such that
the 2-inch deposition transcript would not have fit inside. The

STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CRAWFORD 	361
Cite as 285 Neb. 321
width was such that a letter-sized envelope could fit in the safe.
Crawford described that the safe opened up from the front.
There was no shelf inside the safe or any other type of divider.
Crawford stated that when she put the manila envelope con-
taining the $3,500 into the safe, there were other items already
in the safe. Crawford testified that she laid the envelope on top
of those items.
Crawford could not say when she might have opened the
safe between January 8 and February 10, 2010, or if she did at
all, but she admitted that whenever she next opened the safe,
the manila envelope containing the $3,500 would have been
the first thing visible on the pile. Whenever that occurred,
Crawford claims she did not notice it.
Crawford claims that, for a while, she simply forgot about
the $3,500 cash. When asked how that could have occurred,
Crawford explained:
I can tell you in retrospect. After I put it inside of [the]
safe I made a mental note to myself that this task had
been accomplished, so there was really nothing that was
drawing my attention to it, although I knew I had done
that. There was nothing that was drawing my attention
to it.
Sometime after February 10, 2010, Crawford put another
manila envelope into the safe. That envelope contained two
checks to be deposited into her trust account. One check
was a $9,000 bond refund check that a client had assigned to
Crawford, dated February 10, 2010. The other check was a
$4,121 personal injury settlement, dated February 5, 2010. The
February 5 check was made out to both Crawford and the cli-
ent, so her client had to endorse it before it could be deposited
in the trust account.
Crawford explained that she placed the two checks together
into the manila envelope whenever she had them both in her
possession. The fact that the other check was dated February
10, 2010, would indicate it would not have been before
that date.
The next day, on February 11, 2010, when Crawford reached
into her safe again to remove that second manila envelope and
deposit those checks, she purportedly became cognizant of the

362 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
$3,500 of unearned funds cashed from Nolan’s cashier’s check.
And, having forgotten about the carefully prepared separate
envelope, Crawford thought the $3,500 cash was inside the
envelope with the two checks. We note that this explanation is
not entirely consistent with a previous explanation in her letter
received on March 24, 2011, that she “must have” just grabbed
one of the envelopes instead of both.
On February 11, 2010, at 6:17 p.m., Crawford took the
manila envelope with the two checks to a grocery store
branch of Bank of the West on West Fort Street. Crawford
testified that at Bank of the West, she handed the teller the
manila envelope and directed the teller to deposit the contents.
She claims she never discovered during this transaction that
she was wrong in her purported belief that the $3,500 was
inside that envelope with the two checks. Crawford explained,
“Because of my relationship with the bank, I could on occa-
sion, and sometimes many occasions, go in and hand them
either cash, checks, envelope, whatever the case may be,
and indicate to them which account I needed it to go into.”
Crawford explained that when she handed the teller the enve-
lope, “in my mind,” the envelope contained one check and the
$3,500 cash.
When 	Counsel 	for 	Discipline 	asked 	whether 	Crawford
checked the February 11, 2010, deposit slip at the time of the
deposit, to make sure it accurately reflected the total amount
she had intended to deposit that day, she indicated that she only
checked to confirm a total deposit amount of $13,121. When
asked why she would have thought that the $3,500 was in that
manila envelope and part of the February 11 deposit, Crawford
said, “Because I knew there were two deposits in there, and in
my mind the two deposits meant checks and cash.”
Because Crawford was already sure “in [her] mind” that the
$13,121 included the $3,500, she only requested verification
that a $13,121 deposit had been made—despite Counsel for
Discipline’s repeated requests for an itemized deposit slip. Only
after the March 15, 2011, letter from Counsel for Discipline,
threatening Crawford with temporary suspension of her license
to practice law, did Crawford go to her bank to ask them “to

STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CRAWFORD 	363
Cite as 285 Neb. 321
check before and after to look for exactly what happened with
this deposit.”
Crawford testified that after discovering that the $3,500 was
not part of that $13,121 deposit, she decided to look in her
safe. According to Crawford, she found the cash just as she
had left it—in the manila envelope with the original trust fund
deposit slip she had filled out on January 8, 2010.
Crawford testified in her deposition that she took the $3,500
cash to Bank of the West within a day or two of discovering it
in her safe. She deposited it into her trust account, even though
it would have been earned funds by that time. She thought it
“prudent” to do so, “since there was an inquiry.” But Crawford
did not use the old deposit slip she had originally dated and
placed in the manila envelope with the cash, and she did not
keep track of where that old deposit slip went after the discov-
ery of the envelope in her safe. Crawford explained why Bank
of the West would not have accepted the original deposit slip.
But Crawford was unclear as to whether she had asked the
bank to utilize the old deposit slip—and the bank refused to
do so—or whether she had determined that she could not use it
and never tried to.
By the time Counsel for Discipline learned of these alleged
events and asked to see the safe, a month had passed and the
safe was gone. Crawford explained that she had given her safe
away, because she “didn’t want this type of incident to occur
in my office again.”
Crawford originally told Counsel for Discipline that the safe
was “in Minnesota.” After Counsel for Discipline subpoenaed
more specific information, Crawford’s brother came forward
with an affidavit in which he averred that Crawford had given
him the safe in late February 2011, while he was visiting
Omaha from his home in Minnesota. He averred that the last
time he saw the safe was sometime in March 2011. He stated
that the safe “was left in my unlocked vehicle and my guess is
it was stolen.”
At the disciplinary hearing, Crawford testified that although
she could not locate the original deposit slip, she had recently
found its carbon. The carbon was hidden behind her desk

364 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
drawer. Crawford explained that rather than tearing out only
the original deposit slip and leaving the carbon copy in the
deposit slip book, she “must have” torn both the original and
the carbon out when she wrote the deposit slip. Then she must
have put both the deposit-slip book and the loose carbon back
in her desk drawer. She stated that the carbon must have subse-
quently fallen behind her desk drawer.
Crawford offered into evidence a carbon copy of a deposit
slip for $3,500 cash dated January 8, 2010. The referee
found that the carbon is “nearly pristine, showing no sign of
being bent, folded, or marred in any fashion.” We agree with
that assessment.
Counsel for Discipline presented evidence that the same day
Crawford deposited the $3,500 into her trust account, Crawford
had negotiated an $8,380.20 check through her personal sav-
ings account. She had deposited only $2,380.20 and had taken
the remainder in cash. At the disciplinary hearing, Crawford
provided documentation that $1,500 of that $6,000 in cash was
deposited into another checking account. She then testified as
to where the remaining cash had been spent. Crawford testified
that it was not unusual for her to transact most of her business
in cash.
We agree with the referee that this is a convoluted story.
We observe that the story has morphed throughout the course
of Counsel for Discipline’s investigation to meet the questions
being raised. There being no credible explanation as to what
happened to the $3,500 in client funds, we conclude that it was
misappropriated. Crawford violated § 3-501.15(a) and (c) (fail-
ure to deposit unearned fees into trust account and withdraw
only as earned), and her oath of office. In addition, the evi-
dence is clear and convincing that Crawford has lied through-
out the investigation, before the referee, and to this court,
about the whereabouts of the $3,500. Because she intentionally
evaded inquiry and lied about it, she violated § 3-508.4(c) and
(d), and her oath of office.
3. disbaRment and pRopoRtionality
[21,22] We conclude that disbarment is the proper discipline
for Crawford’s cumulative acts of misconduct. The license to

STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CRAWFORD 	365
Cite as 285 Neb. 321
practice law in this state is a continuing proclamation by this
court that the holder is fit to be entrusted with professional and
judicial matters and to aid in the administration of justice as an
attorney and as an officer of the court. It is the duty of every
recipient of the conditional privilege to practice law to conduct
himself or herself at all times, both professionally and person-
ally, in conformity with the standards imposed upon members
as conditions for that privilege.48
[23-25] Misappropriation of client funds is one of the most
serious violations of duty an attorney owes to clients, the pub-
lic, and the courts.49 Misappropriation by an attorney violates
basic notions of honesty and endangers public confidence in
the legal profession.50 Misappropriation, as the result of a seri-
ous, inexcusable violation of a duty to oversee entrusted funds,
is deemed willful, even in the absence of improper intent or
deliberate wrongdoing.51
[26,27] Thus, misappropriation of client funds, including
paying oneself a retainer before earning it, typically results
in disbarment.52 And a lawyer’s poor accounting procedures
and sloppy office management are not excuses or mitigat-
ing circumstances in reference to commingled funds.53 The
fact that the client did not suffer any financial loss also
does not excuse an attorney’s misappropriation of client
funds and does not provide a reason for imposing a less
severe sanction.54
[28] Absent mitigating circumstances, disbarment is the
appropriate 	discipline 	in 	cases 	of 	misappropriation 	or
48 Neb. Ct. R. § 3-303(A).
49 See State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Jones, 270 Neb. 471, 704 N.W.2d 216
(2005).
50 See State ex rel. NSBA v. Veith, 238 Neb. 239, 470 N.W.2d 549 (1991).
51 State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Wintroub, 267 Neb. 872, 678 N.W.2d 103
(2004); State ex rel. NSBA v. Veith, supra note 50.
52 See State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Jones, supra note 49.
53 State ex rel. NSBA v. Malcom, 252 Neb. 263, 561 N.W.2d 237 (1997).
54 State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Beltzer, supra note 45. See, also, State ex
rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Carter, 282 Neb. 596, 808 N.W.2d 342 (2011).

366 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
commingling of client funds.55 In fact, we have observed that,
generally, an attorney who has misappropriated client funds
will be disbarred absent “extraordinary” mitigating factors.56
Examples of extraordinary mitigating factors include State
ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Davis.57 In Davis, we suspended,
but did not disbar, an attorney who had used her attorney
trust account as both a business account and a personal check-
ing account and had failed to promptly deliver trust account
funds to a client’s health care provider.58 As mitigating factors,
she had cooperated with Counsel for Discipline; was seeking
treatment for depression, anxiety, and alcoholism; and had
entered into a monitoring contract with the Nebraska Lawyers
Assistance Program. She had no aggravating factors.
In State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Beltzer,59 we likewise
only suspended the attorney for misappropriation, noting the
attorney’s “extremely cooperative dealings with the Counsel
for Discipline,” the staggering number of letters submitted in
the attorney’s support, and the fact that the attorney had “made
no attempt to conceal what had occurred from the Counsel for
Discipline during its investigation and that he accepted full
responsibility for his egregious error in judgment.”
Crawford submitted several letters in support of her quali-
fications as a lawyer and her good character. A juvenile court
55 See State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Beltzer, supra note 45. See, also, State
ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Carter, supra note 54; State ex rel. Counsel for
Dis. v. Samuelson, 280 Neb. 125, 783 N.W.2d 779 (2010).
56 State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Carter, supra note 54, 282 Neb. at 607,
808 N.W.2d at 351.
57 State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Davis, 276 Neb. 158, 760 N.W.2d 928
(2008).
58 Id.
59 State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Beltzer, supra note 45, 284 Neb. at 32-33,
815 N.W.2d at 867. See, also, e.g., State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Gase,
283 Neb. 479, 811 N.W.2d 169 (2012); State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v.
Lindmeier, 280 Neb. 620, 788 N.W.2d 555 (2010); State ex rel. Counsel
for Dis. v. Riskowski, 272 Neb. 781, 724 N.W.2d 813 (2006); State ex rel.
Counsel for Dis. v. Monjarez, 267 Neb. 980, 679 N.W.2d 226 (2004); State
ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Wintroub, supra note 51; State ex rel. Special
Counsel for Dis. v. Fellman, supra note 1.

STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CRAWFORD 	367
Cite as 285 Neb. 321
judge was very complimentary of Crawford’s zealous represen-
tation of her clients and commitment to her community. The
director of transportation for the Omaha Public Schools wrote
about Crawford as an advocate and community leader who,
among other things, often spoke to high school students about
their legal rights, the importance of planning for their futures,
and their career aspirations. Akintunde wrote of Crawford’s
service to the community and her qualifications as legal coun-
sel, as a professor in the Department of Black Studies at the
University of Nebraska at Omaha, and as a personal friend
whose friendship has “meant as much to me as any human
bond I have ever formed.”
But, in and of themselves, this handful of letters of support
are not extraordinary mitigating factors. And, unfortunately,
we are presented with several aggravating factors in this case.
Crawford has not taken full responsibility for her actions.
She has not cooperated with Counsel for Discipline. She
has made repeated attempts, through dishonesty, to conceal
her misconduct.
This court does not look kindly upon acts which call into
question an attorney’s honesty and trustworthiness. The essen-
tial eligibility requirements for admission to the practice of
law in Nebraska include “[t]he ability to conduct oneself
with a high degree of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness
in all professional relationships and with respect to all legal
obligations.”60 With or without misappropriation, acts of dis-
honesty can result in disbarment.61
The propriety of a sanction must be considered with ref-
erence to the sanctions imposed in prior similar cases.62 In
State ex rel. NSBA v. Howze,63 we disbarred an attorney who
similarly misappropriated client funds and failed to cooper-
ate with Counsel for Discipline. The attorney had retained
60 § 3-103(A).
61 See, e.g., State ex. rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Beach, 272 Neb. 337, 722
N.W.2d 30 (2006); State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Swanson, 267 Neb.
540, 675 N.W.2d 674 (2004).
62 Id.
63 State ex rel. NSBA v. Howze, 260 Neb. 547, 618 N.W.2d 663 (2000).

368 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
approximately $300 of settlement funds to pay a medical
bill and did not pay the bill until a complaint was filed with
Counsel for Discipline. At that time, he paid the bill with a
cashier’s check instead of a trust account check. For another
client, that attorney had delayed paying approximately $2,000
in medical bills out of client funds retained for the pur-
pose, until a complaint was filed. During the investigation,
despite Counsel for Discipline’s repeated requests, the attorney
failed to provide an explanation regarding that client’s funds
or any trust account records. The mitigating factors were
not significant.64
In State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Rasmussen,65 we dis-
barred an attorney who waited several months to return the
$300 unearned portion of a retainer to one client and paid him-
self another client’s retainer of $3,000 before he had earned it.
The attorney also, like Crawford, failed to provide those clients
with monthly itemized statements as the written fee agree-
ments provided for, eventually providing only a cumulative
statement. The attorney gave delayed and incomplete responses
to Counsel for Discipline’s requests for information during the
course of investigation. The attorney originally testified at the
disciplinary hearing that the $3,000 was for fees he had earned
working for another client. But when he was confronted with
evidence that those other fees had already been withdrawn in
a separate transaction, the attorney claimed he simply did not
remember why he had withdrawn the $3,000. We observed
that the confusion over the $3,000 was compounded by the
attorney’s mismanagement of his trust account. But that was
no excuse. The attorney also was neglectful in his handling
of two clients. In disbarring the attorney, we noted that the
attorney had “failed to demonstrate any sincere regret for
his behavior.”66
Despite such cases, Crawford suggests that disbarment in
this case would be indicative of racial bias by this court.
64 See id.
65 State ex. rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Rasmussen, 266 Neb. 100, 662 N.W.2d
556 (2003).
66 Id. at 113, 662 N.W.2d at 566.

STATE v . EAGLE BULL 	369
Cite as 285 Neb. 369
She argues that some similar cases involving nonminorities
resulted in more lenient sanctions. We do not note in our dis-
ciplinary opinions the race of the attorney under discipline,
because that is not relevant. As discussed above, disbarment
is frequently the sanction in any case involving misappro-
priation of client funds, failure to cooperate with Counsel for
Discipline, and lying during a disciplinary investigation. This
is true regardless of an attorney’s gender, race, ethnicity, or
religion. Comparing Crawford’s conduct to other attorneys
disciplined by this court, we conclude that disbarment is the
appropriate sanction.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is the judgment of this court that Crawford should be
and hereby is disbarred from the practice of law in the State
of Nebraska, effective immediately. Crawford is directed to
comply with Neb. Ct. R. § 3-316, and upon failure to do so,
she shall be subject to punishment for contempt of this court.
Crawford is directed to pay costs and expenses in accordance
with Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 7-114 and 7-115 (Reissue 2012) and
Neb. Ct. R. § 3-323(B). We overrule the miscellaneous motions
made by Crawford’s attorney at oral arguments.
Judgment of disbaRment.
state of nebRaska, appellee, v.
autumn eagle bull, appellant.
827 N.W.2d 466
Filed March 1, 2013. 	No. S-11-1072.
1. Criminal Law: Convictions: Evidence: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a suf-
ficiency of the evidence claim, whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial,
or a combination thereof, the standard is the same: An appellate court does not
resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh
the evidence; such matters are for the finder of fact. The relevant question for an
appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential ele-
ments of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Criminal Law: Directed Verdict. In a criminal case, a court can direct a ver-
dict only when there is a complete failure of evidence to establish an essential