In re Interest of Shaquille H.

512 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
I n re I nterest of shaquIlle h., a chIld
under 18 years of age.
state of nebraska, appellee, v. shaquIlle h., appellant.
827 N.W.2d 501
Filed March 15, 2013. 	No. S-11-953.
1. Juvenile Courts: Child Custody: Time. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-271(1)(b) (Reissue
2008) provides that the hearing as to a juvenile in custody of the probation
officer or the court shall be held as soon as possible but, in all cases, within a
6-month period after the petition is filed, and as to a juvenile not in such custody
as soon as practicable but, in all cases, within a 6-month period after the petition
is filed.
2. Speedy Trial: Minors. The computation of the 6-month period provided for in
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-271(1)(b) (Reissue 2008) shall be made as provided in Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (Cum. Supp. 2012), as applicable.
3. ____: ____. A juvenile is entitled to a speedy adjudication, i.e., one within 6
months of the filing of a petition; but that right is subject to the calculations used
when determining a criminal defendant’s speedy trial rights.
4. Juvenile Courts: Words and Phrases. The “shall” from Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 43-271 (Reissue 2008) is directory, rather than mandatory, and discharge is
not required if it can be shown that it remains in the juvenile’s best interests to
deny discharge.
5. Speedy Trial: Proof. Evidence of a crowded docket alone is insufficient to sup-
port a finding of good cause for exclusion of time periods under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 29-1207 (Cum. Supp. 2012).
6. ____: ____. When ruling on a motion for absolute discharge, specific findings
of all excludable periods of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(a) to (f) (Cum. Supp.
2012) are required.
7. Juvenile Courts: Speedy Trial. A juvenile court judge must make specific find-
ings on the record regarding any excludable time periods as defined in Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 29-1207 (Cum. Supp. 2012) before making the ultimate determination as
to whether discharge would be in the best interests of a child.
Petition for further review from the Court of Appeals,
I nbody, Chief Judge, and I rwIn and sIevers, Judges, on appeal
thereto from the Separate Juvenile Court of Douglas County,
douglas f. Johnson, Judge. Judgment of Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Thomas C. Riley, Douglas County Public Defender, Christine
D. Kellogg, and Christine Mori for appellant.
Donald W. Kleine, Douglas County Attorney, Malina Dobson,
Debra Tighe-Dolan, and Tony Hernandez, Senior Certified Law
Student, for appellee.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:39 AM CST

IN RE INTEREST OF SHAQUILLE H. 	513
Cite as 285 Neb. 512
heavIcan, c.J., wrIght, connolly, stephan, MccorMack,
and cassel, JJ.
heavIcan, c.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shaquille H. appealed from an order of the separate juvenile
court of Douglas County, Nebraska, which denied his motion
to discharge. The Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed. We
granted Shaquille’s petition for further review.
II. BACKGROUND
1. factual background
On September 14, 2010, the State of Nebraska filed a
complaint in the county court for Douglas County alleging
that Shaquille, born in May 1994, had violated Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 28-1202 (Cum. Supp. 2012) and Omaha Mun. Code,
ch. 20, art. VII, § 20-204 (1993). On October 13, Shaquille
filed a motion to transfer to juvenile court. That motion was
initially denied following a hearing on November 4. On
November 9, however, the motion was granted upon a motion
to reconsider.
An amended petition was filed in the Douglas County
Juvenile Court on November 10, 2010, alleging violations of
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(1) (Reissue 2008). Specifically, the
amended petition alleges that Shaquille carried a concealed
weapon on his person in violation of § 28-1202(1) and pos-
sessed a “pistol, revolver or other form of short-barreled
hand firearm” in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1204(1)
(Cum. Supp. 2012). At a detention hearing held on November
10, Shaquille was ordered to be detained at the Douglas
County Youth Center or post bond. Shaquille was arraigned
on December 8, a written denial was entered on his behalf,
and the record indicates that a request to “exonerate” the
bond was filed. Though unclear, it appears from the record
that Shaquille was released from custody sometime between
November 10 and December 8 and has not been in custody
since that time.
A pretrial conference was held on January 6, 2011, and the
matter was set for adjudication on February 11. Due to the

514 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
funeral of an attorney who had practiced before the juvenile
court, the court, on its own motion, rescheduled the adjudica-
tion for April 13. Shaquille’s counsel indicated that Shaquille
was unable to attend the hearing on April 13 because he did
not have transportation. A continuance was requested, and the
matter was rescheduled for July 1 in anticipation of a plea.
Shaquille failed to appear at the July 1 hearing. The State
requested a capias be issued, and Shaquille’s counsel requested
a continuance. Both motions were denied. The court then gave
Shaquille until July 5 to appear.
The record shows that Shaquille eventually appeared on July
1, 2011, following the conclusion of the original hearing. At
that time, it was determined that Shaquille no longer wished to
enter a plea. The record provides that “by agreement of coun-
sel,” the adjudication was reset for October 14.
On October 12, 2011, Shaquille filed a motion to discharge
for failure to adjudicate within the time required by Nebraska
statute. The next day, the court called counsel into the court-
room to discuss a continuance so that the juvenile court judge
could attend his aunt’s funeral on October 14. During the
October 13 hearing, the motion to discharge was discussed
but not decided. The adjudication remained scheduled for the
next day.
At the adjudication hearing on October 14, 2011, the par-
ties first addressed the pending motion to discharge. The
State called the juvenile court’s bailiff, who testified that she
did not specifically recall rescheduling Shaquille’s case, but
that she would have rescheduled it to the next available date
that “worked around counsel’s conflicts and the [c]ourt’s cal-
endar.” Following the bailiff’s testimony, the juvenile court
judge denied the motion to discharge, stating on the record
that because the purpose of the juvenile court is rehabilitative
and the nature of the charges was quite serious, it was not in
Shaquille’s best interests to grant the motion. The judge made
no specific findings with respect to Shaquille’s statutory right
to speedy adjudication or calculation of any possible exclud-
able time periods.
The State then called its first adjudication witness. Shortly
thereafter, 	the 	hearing 	was 	again 	continued, 	this 	time 	to

IN RE INTEREST OF SHAQUILLE H. 	515
Cite as 285 Neb. 512
December 22, 2011. On November 8, Shaquille appealed the
denial of his motion to discharge.
2. court of appeals’ opInIon
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the juvenile
court.1 In its opinion, the Court of Appeals performed the cal-
culations related to the speedy adjudication claim that were not
prepared by the juvenile court. The Court of Appeals separated
the delay into four time periods: February 12 to April 13, 2011;
April 14 to July 1; July 2 to October 14; and October 15 to
November 8.
(a) February 12 to April 13
The Court of Appeals concluded that this period of 61 days
was excludable from Shaquille’s speedy adjudication calcula-
tion for good cause. Specifically, Shaquille’s case was contin-
ued in this instance on the motion of the juvenile court judge
so that he could attend the funeral of an attorney who had
practiced before the juvenile court. The Court of Appeals, rely-
ing in part on this court’s decision in In re Interest of Brandy
M. et al.,2 concluded that the record supported this finding
and affirmatively showed the bailiff would have rescheduled
Shaquille’s case on the next available date.
(b) April 14 to July 1
The Court of Appeals concluded that this period of 79 days
was a delay attributable to Shaquille. Because Shaquille did not
appear at the April 13, 2011, hearing due to lack of transporta-
tion, the continuance was chargeable to him.
(c) July 2 to October 14
The Court of Appeals concluded this period of 105 days was
also a delay attributable to Shaquille, because the record shows
that the continuance was “‘by agreement of counsel.’”3
1 In re Interest of Shaquille H., 20 Neb. App. 141, 819 N.W.2d 741 (2012).
2 In re Interest of Brandy M. et al., 250 Neb. 510, 550 N.W.2d 17 (1996).
3 In re Interest of Shaquille H., supra note 1, 20 Neb. App. at 147, 819
N.W.2d at 746.

516 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
(d) October 15 to November 8
The Court of Appeals concluded this period—between the
continuance granted, following the beginning of the adjudica-
tion hearing on October 14, 2011, until the filing of Shaquille’s
appeal—was excludable for good cause due to the bailiff’s tes-
timony regarding how matters are rescheduled and the judge’s
explanation about his aunt’s funeral.
We granted Shaquille’s petition for further review.
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
In his petition for further review, Shaquille assigns, restated
and consolidated, that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the juvenile court’s denial of his motion to discharge.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appellate court’s review of a juvenile court’s determina-
tion of whether a juvenile has been denied his or her statutory
right to a prompt adjudication is made de novo on the record
to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion by
the juvenile court.4 Prompt adjudication determinations are ini-
tially entrusted to the discretion of the juvenile court and will
be upheld unless they constitute an abuse of discretion.5
V. ANALYSIS
1. statutory speedy adJudIcatIon
At issue in this petition for further review is whether the
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the denial of Shaquille’s
motion to discharge.
[1,2] Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-271(1)(b) (Reissue 2008) provides:
The hearing as to a juvenile in custody of the probation
officer or the court shall be held as soon as possible but,
in all cases, within a six-month period after the petition
is filed, and as to a juvenile not in such custody as soon
as practicable but, in all cases, within a six-month period
after the petition is filed. The computation of the six-
month period provided for in this section shall be made as
provided in section 29-1207, as applicable.
4 In re Interest of Brandy M. et al., supra note 2.
5 Id.

IN RE INTEREST OF SHAQUILLE H. 	517
Cite as 285 Neb. 512
[3-5] Thus, generally speaking, a juvenile is entitled to a
speedy adjudication, i.e., one within 6 months of the filing
of a petition; but that right is subject to the calculations used
when determining a criminal defendant’s speedy trial rights.
As the Court of Appeals noted in its opinion, in this case,
the speedy adjudication clock began running on November
11, 2010, or the day after the petition was filed in juvenile
court, so the last day upon which the court could schedule
the adjudication would have been May 10, 2011.6 But this
court has held that (1) the “shall” from § 43-271 is directory,
rather than mandatory, and discharge is not required if it can
be shown that it remains in the juvenile’s best interests to
deny discharge, and (2) evidence of a crowded docket alone
is insufficient to support a finding of good cause for exclu-
sion of time periods under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (Cum.
Supp. 2012).7
Shaquille does not take issue with the exclusion of the
79-day period between April 14 and July 1, 2011; nor does
he take issue with the exclusion of the 25 days subsequent to
the commencement of his adjudication until his appeal was
filed. He does take issue, however, with the exclusion of the
period between February 12 and April 13, and the exclusion
of the period between July 2 and October 14. In particular,
Shaquille argues that it is the State’s burden to show those
time periods are excludable8 and that the State failed to meet
that burden.
With respect to the first period, Shaquille acknowledges
that the bailiff’s testimony was presented, but argues that
under In re Interest of Brandy M. et al., a crowded court
docket is insufficient to support a showing of good cause.
With respect to the latter period, Shaquille essentially argues
that the record does not support the conclusion made by
the Court of Appeals that the delay until October 14, 2011,
was done with Shaquille’s consent. We address the latter
period first.
6 See State v. Baker, 264 Neb. 867, 652 N.W.2d 612 (2002).
7 See In re Interest of Brandy M. et al., supra note 2.
8 See State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133, 761 N.W.2d 514 (2009).

518 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
(a) July 2 to October 14
With respect to this time period, the record includes an order
of the juvenile court filed July 6, 2011, memorializing the July
1 hearing, providing that “by agreement of counsel this matter
shall be reset for an adjudication hearing for an hour and a
half on October 14, 2011 at 10:30 a.m. (Counsel shall notify
client of scheduled hearing date and time).”
Shaquille argues that the notation in the record cannot mean
that he or his counsel agreed to the October 14, 2011, adjudi-
cation hearing, because the record as a whole is clear that due
to the court’s crowded docket, “counsel are not in a position
to pick and choose court dates.”9 As such, “by agreement of
counsel” means that counsel agreed only to the length of time
(11⁄2 hours) of the hearing.
Upon reviewing Shaquille’s argument, we find that the
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion, nor did the Court
of Appeals abuse its discretion, in concluding that the State
met its burden to exclude this time period from Shaquille’s
speedy 	adjudication 	calculation. 	The 	juvenile 	court 	order
clearly provides that counsel for Shaquille agreed to the delay
in adjudication. Thus, we shall exclude this time period from
Shaquille’s calculation.
(b) February 12 to April 13
Shaquille argues this period is not attributable to good cause
because this court has concluded that a crowded docket is not
sufficient to show good cause, and the State did not otherwise
meet its burden to show good cause. The Court of Appeals
explicitly concluded that this 61-day period was excluded for
good cause because the juvenile court judge continued the
adjudication so that he could attend the funeral of an attorney
who practiced before the juvenile court and that the attend-
ant delay for the crowded court docket was also excludable
because the bailiff testified that she rescheduled the adjudica-
tion on the next available date.
9 Memorandum brief for appellant in support of petition for further review
at 6.

IN RE INTEREST OF SHAQUILLE H. 	519
Cite as 285 Neb. 512
It is unnecessary for this court to analyze whether this time
period is excludable in order to find that Shaquille’s motion
to discharge should be dismissed; thus, we decline to do so.
The Court of Appeals concluded that when excluding all of the
four periods of time, the State had 270 days, or until February
4, 2012, to schedule Shaquille’s adjudication. If we do not
exclude this 61-day period, the State would have had 209
days, or until December 5, 2011, to schedule the adjudication.
Shaquille filed his motion to discharge on October 12, 2011,
and, as such, it was premature. Shaquille’s adjudication com-
menced on October 14, though it did not finish, and Shaquille
does not contend that this was insufficient to comply with his
speedy adjudication right. Thus, we find the Court of Appeals
did not abuse its discretion in affirming the decision of the
juvenile court.
2. constItutIonal speedy
trIal adJudIcatIon
Shaquille also assigns that the Court of Appeals erred in
not addressing his constitutional speedy adjudication rights.
Because we find that Shaquille’s motion to discharge was
premature and that there has been no violation of Shaquille’s
statutory speedy adjudication right in this case, we decline to
address this assignment of error. We agree with the Court of
Appeals that even if such constitutional right exists, which we
do not decide here, no constitutional rights have been impli-
cated in this case because Shaquille has time remaining on the
statutory speedy trial adjudication clock.10
3. lack of specIfIc fIndIngs
[6,7] Finally, we address Shaquille’s concern that the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the juvenile court, even
though the juvenile court judge failed to make any specific
findings regarding the excludable time periods as defined in
§ 29-1207. This court held in State v. Williams11 that specific
findings of all excludable periods of § 29-1207(4)(a) to (f) are
10 See In re Interest of Brandy M. et al., supra note 2.
11 State v. Williams, supra note 8.

520 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
required. In this case, the juvenile court did not make such
specific findings; the Court of Appeals did those calculations
for the juvenile court. The holding in Williams may have
escaped the notice of a juvenile court judge because Williams
is an adult criminal case. Thus, here, we explicitly extend this
requirement to the juvenile court. A juvenile court judge must
make specific findings on the record regarding any exclud-
able time periods as defined in § 29-1207 before making the
ultimate determination as to whether discharge would be in the
best interests of a child.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
affIrMed.
MIller-lerMan, J., participating on briefs.
state of nebraska, appellee, v.
rebecca M. bree, appellant.
827 N.W.2d 497
Filed March 15, 2013. 	Nos. S-12-684 through S-12-686.
1. Sentences: Appeal and Error. Whether a defendant is entitled to credit for time
served is a question of law. An appellate court reviews questions of law indepen-
dently of the lower court.
Appeals from the District Court for Platte County, robert
r. steInke, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court for
Platte County, frank J. skorupa, Judge. Sentences vacated, and
causes remanded for resentencing.
Nathan J. Sohriakoff, Deputy Platte County Public Defender,
for appellant.
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, George R. Love, and Siobhan
E. Duffy, Senior Certified Law Student, for appellee.
heavIcan, c.J., wrIght, connolly, stephan, MccorMack,
and cassel, JJ.