A & P II v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal.

- 216 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
A & P II v. LANCASTER CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
Cite as 316 Neb. 216
A & P II, LLC, et al., appellants, v. Lancaster
County Board of Equalization, appellee.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed March 15, 2024. 	No. S-23-296.
1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question that does not
involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a mat-
ter of law.
2. ____: ____. It is the power and duty of an appellate court to determine
whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it, irrespective of
whether the issue is raised by the parties.
3. Statutes: Appeal and Error. The right of appeal in this state is clearly
statutory, and unless the statute provides for an appeal from the decision
of a quasi-judicial tribunal, such right does not exist.
4. Actions: Final Orders. Quasi-judicial actions that are interlocutory,
incomplete, provisional, or not yet effective are not final.
5. Judgments: Words and Phrases. Every direction of a court or judge,
made or entered in writing and not included in a judgment, is an order.
6. Actions: Words and Phrases. An action is any proceeding in a court by
which a party prosecutes another for enforcement, protection, or deter-
mination of a right or the redress or prevention of a wrong involving and
requiring the pleadings, process, and procedure provided by statute and
ending in a judgment.
7. ____: ____. Every other legal proceeding other than an action, by
which a remedy is sought by original application to a court, is a special
proceeding.
8. Taxation: Final Orders. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 77-5018 and 77-5019
(Reissue 2018) incorporate the definition of “final order” set forth in
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Cum. Supp. 2022).
9. Statutes. Statutes relating to the same subject, although enacted at dif-
ferent times, are in pari materia and should be construed together.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:39 AM CDT

- 217 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
A & P II v. LANCASTER CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
Cite as 316 Neb. 216
10. Statutes: Legislature: Presumptions. The Legislature must be pre-
sumed to have had in mind all previous legislation upon the subject, so
that in the construction of a statute, courts must consider the preexisting
law and any other acts relating to the same subject.
11. ____: ____: ____. Where words in a statute have received a settled
construction, the Legislature, in using the same words in a subsequent
statute on the same subject matter, must be presumed to have intended
to employ them in the same sense.
12. Statutes: Words and Phrases. A statutory definition of a term found in
one statute may be considered when interpreting that same term as used
in a different statute.
13. Final Orders: Words and Phrases. A substantial right is an essential
legal right, not a mere technical right.
14. Final Orders. It is not enough that the right itself be substantial; the
effect of the order on that right must also be substantial.
15. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Whether the effect of an order is
substantial depends on whether it affects with finality the rights of the
parties in the subject matter.
16. Moot Question: Final Orders. A relevant consideration in determining
if an order is immediately appealable as a final order is whether it may
be mooted by subsequent developments in the litigation.
17. Moot Question. Mootness refers to events occurring after the filing
of a suit which eradicate the requisite personal interest in the dispute’s
resolution that existed at the beginning of the litigation.
18. Actions: Moot Question. An action becomes moot when the issues
initially presented in the proceedings no longer exist or the parties lack
a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the action.
Appeal from the Tax Equalization and Review Commission.
Appeal dismissed.
Nathan D. Clark, Andrew R. Willis, and Kimberly A.
Duggan, of Cline, Williams, Wright, Johnson & Oldfather,
L.L.P., for appellants.
Patrick F. Condon, Lancaster County Attorney, Daniel J.
Zieg, and Delaney A. Baumgartner, Senior Certified Law
Student, for appellee.
Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, Eric J. Hamilton, and
Zachary B. Pohlman for State of Nebraska.

- 218 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
A & P II v. LANCASTER CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
Cite as 316 Neb. 216
Kari 	A.F. 	Scheer, 	Audrey 	R. 	Svane, 	and 	Michael 	D.
Matejka, of Woods Aitken, L.L.P., for amici curiae Community
Development Resources et al.
Cathy S. Trent-Vilim, of Lamson, Dugan & Murray, L.L.P.,
for amicus curiae Nebraska Investment Finance Authority.
Sydney L. Hayes and Daniel J. Gutman, of Law Office of
Daniel Gutman, L.L.C., for amicus curiae Midwest Housing
Equity Group.
Scott Mertz, Jennifer Gaughan, and Mark T. Bestul for
amicus curiae Legal Aid of Nebraska.
Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
and Freudenberg, JJ.
Freudenberg, J.
INTRODUCTION
The developers of rent-restricted housing projects appeal
a decision of the Tax Equalization and Review Commission
(Commission) granting 21 petitions by the Lancaster County
Board of Equalization (Board) to determine the assessed val-
ues of rent-restricted housing projects named in the petitions
by using a professionally accepted mass appraisal method
that is different from the income approach mandated by Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 77-1333 (Reissue 2018). The Board had not yet
fully developed the professionally accepted mass appraisal
method it sought permission to use and did not present final
valuations of the subject properties. The Commission found
that pursuant to the exception set forth in § 77-1333(10),
the Board had proved that failing to determine that a differ-
ent methodology should be used would result in a value that
is not equitable and in accordance with the law. However,
the Commission stated its decision was not “an approval of
the final valuation methodology utilized by the Lancaster
County Assessor’s office when determining assessed values

- 219 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
A & P II v. LANCASTER CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
Cite as 316 Neb. 216
for low-income properties for tax year 2023.” We dismiss the
appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
Petitions
In January 2023, the Board filed 21 petitions with the
Commission “pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. §77-1333(10),” asking
the Commission “to consider the Lancaster County Assessor’s
alternate methodology of rent restricted housing.”
Section 77-1333 governs taxation of rent-restricted hous-
ing projects and is intended to “further the provision of safe,
decent, and affordable housing to all residents of Nebraska.”
Section 77-1333(3) states in part, “Except as otherwise pro-
vided in this section, the county assessor shall utilize an
income-approach calculation to determine the actual value of a
rent-restricted housing project when determining the assessed
valuation to place on the property for each assessment year.”
Section 77-1333(8) elaborates that, with certain exceptions,
each county assessor, in the county assessor’s income-approach
calculation, shall use the capitalization rate or rates provided
annually by the Rent-Restricted Housing Projects Valuation
Committee to the Property Tax Administrator to each county
assessor and the “actual income and actual expense data
filed by owners of rent-restricted housing projects.” However,
§ 77-1333(10) sets forth an exception to the mandate of using
the statutory income approach where the county assessor
believes the “income-approach calculation does not result in a
valuation of a rent-restricted housing project at actual value”;
the Board petitions the Commission “to consider the county
assessor’s utilization of another professionally accepted mass
appraisal technique that, based on the facts and circumstances
presented by a county board of equalization, would result in
a substantially different determination of actual value of the
rent-restricted housing project”; and the Board proves that
“failure to make a determination that a different methodology

- 220 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
A & P II v. LANCASTER CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
Cite as 316 Neb. 216
should be used would result in a value that is not equitable and
in accordance with the law.”
The respondents are owners of rent-restricted housing proj-
ects in Lincoln, Lancaster County, Nebraska. Petitions were
brought against the following: (1) A & P II, LLC; (2) Affordable
Housing West, L.P.; (3) Pedcor Investments-2010-CXXVI, L.P.;
(4) Pedcor Investments-2011-CXXXVII, L.P.; (5) Centennial &
O, LLC; (6) City Impact Homes, LLC; (7) Creekside Village,
Ltd.; (8) Cyrilla Crown, LLC; (9) Glenbrook Townhouses
Associates LP; (10) Liberty Estates, LLC; (11) Lincoln Action
Program Housing Development Corporation; (12) The Lincoln
ALF, Ltd.; (13) The Lodge Apartments Holdings, LLC; (14)
New Heights Community Development Corporation; (15) Old
Mill Crown, Ltd.; (16) The People’s City Mission Home; (17)
Prairie Crossing Limited Partnership; (18) Progress for People
II, L.L.C.; (19) Reese Estates, L.P.; (20) Scotts Creek Crown,
LLC; and (21) Victory Park, LLC (collectively Respondents).
All 21 properties had timely provided annual statements detail-
ing their actual income and actual expense data for the prior
year and a description of their land-use restrictions as required
by § 77-1333(5).
The petitions alleged that “[u]sing professionally accepted
mass 	appraisal 	methods, 	the 	Lancaster 	County 	Assessor
has determined that the actual value is substantially dif-
ferent 	than 	value 	derived 	under 	the 	unique 	method 	cre-
ated by §77-1333(8).” The petitions generally set forth that
using actual income and actual expenses, as required under
§ 77-1333(8), results in land values significantly less than
using “professionally accepted mass appraisal methods.” The
petitions did not specify the nature of the professionally
accepted mass appraisal method utilized to reach these con-
clusions. The Board asked the Commission to “determine the
actual value of the subject parcels, and other such relief as
deemed necessary.”

- 221 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
A & P II v. LANCASTER CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
Cite as 316 Neb. 216
Evidence Before Commission
An 	informal 	evidentiary 	hearing 	was 	held 	before 	the
Commission.
Respondents’ witnesses testified that to qualify for low-
income housing tax credits under the Internal Revenue Code, 1
each rent-controlled property is bound by a land use restric-
tion agreement (LURA). 2 A LURA restricts the amount of rent
that an owner can charge the tenants of a certain percentage
of units. A LURA also describes the targeted population for
those units, such as elderly, special needs, or family. Finally,
a LURA sets forth amenities and supportive services to be
provided by an owner to the tenants, such as transportation
or medical visits. The income generated by a low-income
housing project can vary depending on its targeted popula-
tion and the supportive services and amenities agreed upon in
the LURA.
The duration of a LURA is usually 45 years but can range
from 30 to 45 years. A LURA runs with the land, encumbering
the housing for the life of the agreement even if it is sold to
another party. 3 The tax credits generally are taken in the first
10 years, considered the “credit period.” 4 The first 15 years of
a LURA is considered the “compliance period,” because, dur-
ing that time, any noncompliance is reported to the Internal
Revenue Service. 5 The remaining period of the LURA is the
“extended use period.” 6 Once the LURA is no longer in place,
there is a 3-year “decontrol period” to allow rent-controlled
tenants to transition to other housing. 7
1 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2018).
2 See 26 U.S.C. § 42(g) and (h).
3 See 26 U.S.C. § 42(h)(6)(B)(v).
4 See 26 U.S.C. § 42(f).
5 See 26 U.S.C. § 42(i)(1).
6 See 26 U.S.C. § 42(h)(6)(D).
7 See 26 U.S.C. § 42(h)(6)(E)(ii).

- 222 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
A & P II v. LANCASTER CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
Cite as 316 Neb. 216
Up to 75 percent of the funds to build a new low-income
housing project comes from selling the tax credits to syndication
investors. The tax credits are based on the total eligible costs to
build the low-income housing project, minus any market-rate
units, and the credit for said total eligible costs is spread over
10 years. Syndication investors pay a discounted, present value
price for the future 10 years of payments. Syndication inves-
tors usually own 99.99 percent of the project during the first 15
years of the compliance period and then exit and hand it over
to a nonprofit organization. Developers have an approximate
.0049 percent ownership in the project.
Per the standard agreement, the onus of meeting all require-
ments of the LURA is on the developer. The remaining funds
for the projects come from state and federal funding agen-
cies that impose additional restrictions on the properties. The
developer must adopt the most restrictive limitations of all the
funding sources.
Respondents’ witnesses testified that property taxes are one
of the highest annual expenses for a rent-controlled hous-
ing project, and the ability to raise rents to make up for an
increased tax burden is “virtually nil.” Low-income housing
projects operate on very thin margins such that it is not uncom-
mon to have a negative cashflow. Respondents’ witnesses
testified that it is not feasible for developers to provide rent-
controlled housing if the housing is taxed at a market rate.
Even a normalized methodology utilizing average restrictions
and incomes for rent-controlled housing would both “halt
future projects in Lancaster County” and “seriously jeopardize
the existing ones out there.”
The Board presented the testimony of two employees of
the Lancaster County assessor’s office (Assessor’s Office),
who explained that they use the filings by rent-controlled
housing project owners to determine actual income and actual
expenses on an annual basis. Secondarily, however, they pro-
duce an estimate of what they consider “actual value.” The

- 223 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
A & P II v. LANCASTER CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
Cite as 316 Neb. 216
Assessor’s Office only uses the income approach described in
§ 77-1333(3) and (8) when the two analyses lead to the same
value. Otherwise, they petition under § 77-1333(10) to use an
alternate methodology. According to the Assessor’s Office,
the income approach specified in § 77-1333(3) and (8) rarely
or never results in values that correspond to the Assessor’s
Office’s calculation of actual value.
The Board presented evidence of six rent-restricted housing
properties that had sold for “higher than the current assessed
value,” as a way of illustrating that the statutory income
approach did not result in actual value. These were not the
properties listed in the petitions, and none of the properties
were sold within the first 15-year control period. One of the
six properties was in a decontrol period at the time of sale,
which allowed more rentals to market-based tenants. Another
was sold to a tenant and thus was sold free of any LURA or
a transition period. The remaining four of the six sales were
outside of Lancaster County.
More specific to Respondents’ properties, the Assessor’s
Office found that use of the income approach described in
§ 77-1333(3) and (8) resulted in “one group of property being
valued in total at zero, and the other group of properties being
valued with a negative building value such that the land was
no longer valued as though vacant and developable to its high-
est and best use.” In other words, the assessed value of each
property as calculated under § 77-1333(3) and (8) is less than
the market value of the land if vacant and undeveloped (and
not subject to a LURA).
Exhibits entered into evidence at the hearing, which exhib-
its had also been presented to the Board when seeking per-
mission to file petitions with the Commission, demonstrated
that 	out 	of 	26 	low-income 	housing 	projects 	considered,
the Assessor’s Office had found under the methodology of
§ 77-1333(3) and (8) that seven projects had a value of zero,
excluding, as required by § 77-1333(3) and (8), the value of
the land. These were Reese Estates, New Heights Community

- 224 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
A & P II v. LANCASTER CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
Cite as 316 Neb. 216
Development 	Corporation, 	Liberty 	Estates, 	Scotts 	Creek
Crown, Old Mill Crown, Progress for People II, and Curtis
Center Housing, L.P. Additionally, two parcels of the City
Impact Homes project showed a value of zero.
Because of concerns that the statutory income approach
was not rendering actual values for Respondents’ properties,
the Assessor’s Office began to work on a different methodol-
ogy to value all rent-controlled housing projects in Lancaster
County. The Assessor’s Office began developing an “income
approach using the filings for similarly-situated parcels” rather
than owners’ actual costs and actual expenses as mandated by
the income method described in § 77-1333(3) and (8). This
methodology sought to achieve “assessments that are uniform
across the class of restricted properties” by utilizing “an equal-
ized typical income and expense level.”
The Assessor’s Office had not yet settled on the normalized
ratios, however. When presenting to the Board, the Assessor’s
Office had compiled a list of estimated market values for
Respondents’ properties based on their nonstatutory income
approach that used a 45 percent normalized expense ratio, the
actual income data, and the capitalization rate established by
the valuation committee. By the time of the hearing before
the Commission, the Assessor’s Office conceded the estimated
market values of this document were no longer accurate.
The Assessor’s Office was still using actual income in
their nonstatutory income approach when it presented to the
Board but had decided to also normalize the income by the
time of the hearing before the Commission. The normalized
income was based on the reporting of the other rent-controlled
properties since 2018 and their typical gross income. The
Assessor’s Office had, in essence, created a “Section 42 sub-
market” that represents what is typical for such properties.
The change to “imputed income” was because it “is more
typical with mass appraisal.” Furthermore, charitable orga-
nizations, such as Progress for People II and Curtis Center
Housing, made using reported actual income “problematic.”

- 225 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
A & P II v. LANCASTER CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
Cite as 316 Neb. 216
Other than recognizing the projects were generally subject to
restrictions under the “Section 42 program,” the Assessor’s
Office did not compare the restrictions of the properties
used to develop the normalized ratios to the restrictions on
Respondents’ properties at issue at the hearing. The Board
was not aware of the Assessor’s Office’s change from actual
income to imputed income.
The Board did not ask the Commission to approve a spe-
cific alternate methodology, but, rather, to “allow us to vary
from the formula valuation put forward in that statute and to
use a method that gets us closer to actual value.” Likewise,
the Board was not asking the Commission for a “specific set
of numbers at this point.” That would “be later down the road
when the county sets a value for each of these parcels.” While,
at the time of the hearing, the Assessor’s Office was using an
“expense ratio” of 52 percent, the normalized percentage, it
explained that may end up being different. The Board was ask-
ing simply for general “permission to deviate from the actual
income and expenses” as specified under the income method
under § 77-1333.
The Assessor’s Office was unaware of whether a similar nor-
malized methodology had been applied to rent-restricted hous-
ing in other counties or elsewhere in the country. Nevertheless,
it presented the opinion that its normalized income approach,
still under development, complied with professionally accepted
mass 	appraisal 	standards 	and 	the 	Uniform 	Standards 	of
Professional Appraisal Practice.
The Assessor’s Office explained that using a normalized
expense ratio of 52 percent, only eight properties had an
“actual value” that was substantially different than the value
under the income method specified in § 77-1333. Those
eight properties were New Heights Community Development
Corporation, Progress for People II, Curtis Center Housing,
Reese Estates, Liberty Estates, Scotts Creek Crown, City
Impact Homes, and Old Mill Crown. They were the same
properties that data presented to the Board had shown as

- 226 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
A & P II v. LANCASTER CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
Cite as 316 Neb. 216
having a zero value. The Board did not submit updated values
to the Commission for the remaining 13 properties subject to
the petitions, because, for all but 8 properties, “the [statutory
income approach] gets you to actual value.” Accordingly, the
Board’s witnesses told the Commission that the Board was
requesting permission to use a different methodology for only
these eight projects, and only for the current year.
Commission’s Decision
In its decision, the Commission described that the Board
had filed 21 petitions with the Commission “pursuant to
. . . § 77-1333(10), seeking permission to use a profession-
ally accepted mass appraisal method, other than the method
set forth in § 77-1333, to determine the assessed values of
Rent-Restricted Housing Projects.” The Commission granted
the petitions, holding that for the tax year 2023, the Board had
proved that failing to determine that a different methodology
should be used would result in a value that is not equitable and
in accordance with the law.
The Commission did not state what that different methodol-
ogy was; nor did it determine the valuation of the properties.
The Commission concluded that § 77-1333 did not require
the Board to present a specific alternative methodology, but
only required the Board to prove that a failure to determine a
different methodology should be used would result in a value
that is not equitable and in accordance with the law. In grant-
ing permission to use a professionally accepted mass appraisal
method, the Commission reasoned that the “vast differential
between the individualized valuations calculated using the sec-
tion 77-1333 methodology and the alternative uniform mass
appraisal methodology demonstrates that the failure to make
a determination that a different methodology should be used
would result in a value that is not equitable and in accordance
with the law.”
The Commission concluded that the grant of the petitions
would not prevent the owners from protesting the valuations

- 227 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
A & P II v. LANCASTER CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
Cite as 316 Neb. 216
that would later be assigned by the Lancaster County assessor
(County Assessor). Its decision was expressly not “an approval
of the final valuation methodology utilized by the [Assessor’s
Office] when determining assessed values for low-income
properties for tax year 2023.”
Petition for Review
Fifteen 	of 	the 	Respondents 	jointly 	filed 	a 	petition 	for
review in accordance with Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-5019 (Reissue
2018). They are A & P II, Affordable Housing West, City
Impact Homes, Creekside Village, Cyrilla Crown, Glenbrook
Townhouses Associates LP, Liberty Estates, The Lincoln ALF,
New Heights Community Development Corporation, Old Mill
Crown, Prairie Crossing Limited Partnership, Progress for
People II, Reese Estates, Scotts Creek Crown, and Victory Park
(hereinafter Developers).
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Developers assign that the Commission erred in granting
the Board’s petitions, because it (1) failed to individually
consider each property and the petitions due to the Board’s
failure to individually consider each property, (2) incorrectly
determined that the assessed values of the properties under
the actual income and expenses methodology set forth by
§ 77-1333(8) are inequitable and not in accordance with the
law, (3) incorrectly determined that the Board was not required
to present an alternative valuation methodology, (4) granted
petitions on projects other than the eight properties identi-
fied in the Board’s evidence and advanced at the hearing, and
(5) wrongly permitted the Board to use an income approach
modified from that set forth in § 77-1333(8). Developers also
assign that the Commission erred in granting relief that was
different from what was sought in the petitions and from what
was authorized under § 77-1333(10) and (14).
The Board did not cross-appeal.

- 228 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
A & P II v. LANCASTER CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
Cite as 316 Neb. 216
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] A jurisdictional question that does not involve a factual
dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law. 8
ANALYSIS
[2,3] Developers make several arguments as to how the
Commission erred in granting permission for the tax year
2023 to use a professionally accepted mass appraisal method
other than the income approach set forth in § 77-1333. Before
addressing the legal issues presented for review, though, we
must ensure we have appellate jurisdiction. It is the power
and duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has
jurisdiction over the matter before it, irrespective of whether
the issue is raised by the parties. 9 The right of appeal in this
state is clearly statutory, and unless the statute provides for
an appeal from the decision of a quasi-judicial tribunal, such
right does not exist. 10 The Commission is a quasi-judicial
tribunal. 11
The question presented is whether the Commission’s order
was a “final decision” under the appeal provisions of Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 77-5018 (Reissue 2018) and § 77-5019. Section
77-5018(3) provides: “The Tax Commissioner or the Property
Tax Administrator shall have thirty days after a final deci-
sion of the commission to appeal the commission’s decision
pursuant to section 77-5019.” Section 77-5019(1), in turn,
describes the appeal to the Nebraska Court of Appeals of the
“final decision” of the commission on a petition, stating in
relevant part that “any party aggrieved by a final decision of
the commission on a petition, . . . shall be entitled to judicial
8 Schreiber Bros. Hog Co. v. Schreiber, 312 Neb. 707, 980 N.W.2d 890
(2022).
9 Smith v. Lincoln Meadows Homeowners Assn., 267 Neb. 849, 678 N.W.2d
726 (2004).
10 Lydick v. Johns, 185 Neb. 717, 178 N.W.2d 581 (1970).
11 See Gage Cty. Bd. v. Nebraska Tax Equal. & Rev. Comm., 260 Neb. 750,
619 N.W.2d 451 (2000).

- 229 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
A & P II v. LANCASTER CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
Cite as 316 Neb. 216
review in the Court of Appeals.” Under § 77-5019(2)(a)(i),
“Proceedings for review shall be instituted by filing a petition
and the appropriate docket fees in the Court of Appeals: (i)
Within thirty days after the date on which a final appealable
order is entered by the commission.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 77-5019(1) also provides for appeals from “a final
decision in a case appealed to the commission,” “an order of
the commission issued pursuant to section 77-5020 or sec-
tions 77-5023 to 77-5028,” and a “final decision of the com-
mission appealed by the Tax Commissioner or the Property
Tax 	Administrator 	pursuant 	to 	section 	77-701.” 	Section
77-5019(2)(a)(ii) provides “[f]or orders issued pursuant to
section 77-5028, within thirty days after May 15 or thirty days
after the date ordered pursuant to section 77-1514, whichever
is later.”
[4] We have not elaborated the meaning of “final deci-
sion” under the Tax Equalization and Review Commission
Act, and that term is not defined in that act. But under the
Administrative Procedure Act, which § 77-5019 was modeled
after, 12 we have held that to invoke judicial review, that deci-
sion must be “final.” 13 We have explained that quasi-judicial
actions that are interlocutory, incomplete, provisional, or not
yet effective are not final. 14
[5] We have recently read another administrative statute’s
description of the right to appeal a “final decision” as incor-
porating the rules of appealability in civil matters, includ-
ing Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Cum. Supp. 2022). 15 In civil
matters generally, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1911
12 See McLaughlin v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Equal., 5 Neb. App 781, 567
N.W.2d 794 (1997).
13 Purdie v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 292 Neb. 524, 872 N.W.2d 895
(2016).
14 See Van Fossen v. Board of Governors, 228 Neb. 579, 423 N.W.2d 458
(1988).
15 See, In re Interest of T.W., 314 Neb. 475, 991 N.W.2d 280 (2023); In re
Interest of K.C., 313 Neb. 385, 984 N.W.2d 277 (2023).

- 230 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
A & P II v. LANCASTER CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
Cite as 316 Neb. 216
(Reissue 2016), in order for an appellate court to acquire
jurisdiction of an appeal, there must be a final judgment or
a final order entered from the tribunal from which the appeal
is taken. Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1301 (Cum. Supp.
2022), a judgment is the final determination of the rights of
the parties in an action. Every direction of a court or judge,
made or entered in writing and not included in a judgment, is
an order. 16
[6,7] A “final order” is defined by § 25-1902 as (1) an
order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such
order in effect determines the action and prevents a judg-
ment; (2) an order affecting a substantial right made during a
special proceeding; (3) an order affecting a substantial right
made on summary application in an action after a judgment
is entered; and (4) an order denying a motion for summary
judgment when such motion is based on the assertion of sov-
ereign immunity or the immunity of a government official.
There is no “‘final order’” unless it is made in the context
of either an action or a special proceeding. 17 An action is any
proceeding in a court by which a party prosecutes another for
enforcement, protection, or determination of a right or the
redress or prevention of a wrong involving and requiring the
pleadings, process, and procedure provided by statute and end-
ing in a judgment. 18 Every other legal proceeding by which a
remedy is sought by original application to a court is a spe-
cial proceeding. 19 A special proceeding occurs where the law
confers a right and authorizes a special application to a court
to enforce it; it includes every special statutory remedy that is
not itself an action. 20
16 Paxton v. Paxton, 314 Neb. 197, 989 N.W.2d 420 (2023).
17 Champion v. Hall County, 309 Neb. 55, 76, 958 N.W.2d 396, 411 (2021).
18 Schreiber Bros. Hog Co. v. Schreiber, supra note 8.
19 Id.
20 See id.

- 231 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
A & P II v. LANCASTER CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
Cite as 316 Neb. 216
[8-12] We find that §§ 77-5018 and 77-5019 incorporate the
definition of “final order” set forth in § 25-1902. Statutes relat-
ing to the same subject, although enacted at different times,
are in pari materia and should be construed together. 21 The
Legislature must be presumed to have had in mind all previ-
ous legislation upon the subject, so that in the construction
of a statute, courts must consider the preexisting law and any
other acts relating to the same subject. 22 And where words in
a statute have received a settled construction, the Legislature,
in using the same words in a subsequent statute on the same
subject matter, must be presumed to have intended to employ
them in the same sense. 23 A statutory definition of a term found
in one statute may be considered when interpreting that same
term as used in a different statute. 24
We have repeatedly referred to § 25-1902 as defining what
is a “final appealable order,” 25 which is the same term used in
§ 77-5019(2)(a)(i). Although §§ 77-5018 and 77-5019 use the
term “final decision,” rather than “final order,” such “decision”
could not be considered a “judgment,” because it is made in
a quasi-judicial proceeding rather than through an action in a
court of law. The Commission’s decision is an “order” issued
in a special proceeding. Thus, “final decision” and “final
order” are interchangeable under these statutes.
[13-15] 	Whether 	the 	Commission’s 	decision 	was 	final
depends on whether it affected a substantial right, since the
21 See Lang v. Sanitary District, 160 Neb. 754, 71 N.W.2d 608 (1955).
22 Sun Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 169 Neb. 94, 98 N.W.2d 692 (1959). See,
also, Alisha C. v. Jeremy C., 283 Neb. 340, 808 N.W.2d 875 (2012); Evan
S. v. Laura H., 31 Neb. App. 750, 990 N.W.2d 27 (2023).
23 See Kendall v. Garneau, 55 Neb. 403, 75 N.W. 852 (1898).
24 Kozal v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm., 297 Neb. 938, 902 N.W.2d 147
(2017).
25 See, e.g., Tegra Corp. v. Boeshart, 311 Neb. 783, 976 N.W.2d 165 (2022);
In re Estate of Beltran, 310 Neb. 174, 964 N.W.2d 714 (2021); Big John’s
Billiards v. State, 283 Neb. 496, 811 N.W.2d 205 (2012).

- 232 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
A & P II v. LANCASTER CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
Cite as 316 Neb. 216
other three forms of final order as defined by § 25-1902
do not apply to these quasi-judicial proceedings. We have
explained that a substantial right is an essential legal right, not
a mere technical right. 26 Further, it is not enough that the right
itself be substantial; the effect of the order on that right must
also be substantial. 27 Whether the effect of an order is substan-
tial depends on whether it affects with finality the rights of the
parties in the subject matter. 28
An order affects a substantial right when the right would
be significantly undermined or irrevocably lost by postponing
appellate review. 29 If the right affected would not be signifi-
cantly undermined by delaying appellate review, then the order
falls under the general prohibition of immediate appeals from
interlocutory orders. 30 This general prohibition operates to
avoid piecemeal appeals arising out of the same set of opera-
tive facts, chaos in trial procedure, and a succession of appeals
in the same case to secure advisory opinions to govern further
actions of the trial court. 31
[16-18] Thus, a relevant consideration in determining if an
order is immediately appealable as a final order is whether it
may be mooted by subsequent developments in the litigation. 32
Mootness refers to events occurring after the filing of a suit
which eradicate the requisite personal interest in the dispute’s
resolution that existed at the beginning of the litigation. 33 An
action becomes moot when the issues initially presented in
26 Noland v. Yost, 315 Neb. 568, 998 N.W.2d 57 (2023).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 In re Interest of Kamille C. & Kamiya C., 302 Neb. 226, 922 N.W.2d 739
(2019).
31 Id.
32 Tegra Corp. v. Boeshart, supra note 25.
33 Dion v. City of Omaha, 311 Neb. 522, 973 N.W.2d 666 (2022).

- 233 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
A & P II v. LANCASTER CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
Cite as 316 Neb. 216
the proceedings no longer exist or the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome of the action. 34
The Commission noted that the grant of the petitions
would not prevent the owners from protesting the valua-
tions that would subsequently be assigned by the County
Assessor. Further, its decision expressly was not “an approval
of the final valuation methodology utilized by the [Assessor’s
Office] when determining assessed values for low-income
properties for tax year 2023.” We have exercised appellate
jurisdiction over appeals from the Commission’s decisions
respecting final valuations of property, 35 a property’s exempt
status, 36 and the raising or lowering of the valuation of a class
or subclass of real property to achieve equalization under
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 77-5023 (Cum. Supp. 2022) to 77-5028
(Reissue 2018). 37 But we have never addressed the merits of
an appeal from an order that merely grants permission to use
a method of valuation different from the statutory income
approach, without yet approving the specific different meth-
odology to be used or the valuations of the subject properties
under that methodology.
34 Chaney v. Evnen, 307 Neb. 512, 949 N.W.2d 761 (2020).
35 See, e.g., Lincoln Cty. Bd. of Equal. v. Western Tabor Ranch Apts., 314
Neb. 582, 991 N.W.2d 889 (2023); Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal. v. Moser,
312 Neb. 757, 980 N.W.2d 611 (2022); Wheatland Indus. v. Perkins Cty.
Bd. of Equal., 304 Neb. 638, 935 N.W.2d 764 (2019).
36 See, e.g., Upper Republican NRD v. Dundy Cty. Bd. of Equal., 300 Neb.
256, 912 N.W.2d 796 (2018); Harold Warp Pioneer Village Found. v.
Ewald, 287 Neb. 19, 844 N.W.2d 245 (2013); Fort Calhoun Bapt. Ch.
v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Eq., 277 Neb. 25, 759 N.W.2d 475 (2009); St.
Monica’s v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal., 275 Neb. 999, 751 N.W.2d 604
(2008).
37 See, e.g., County of Webster v. Nebraska Tax Equal. & Rev. Comm., 296
Neb. 751, 896 N.W.2d 887 (2017); County of Douglas v. Nebraska Tax
Equal. & Rev. Comm., 296 Neb. 501, 894 N.W.2d 308 (2017); County
of Franklin v. Tax Equal. & Rev. Comm., 296 Neb. 193, 892 N.W.2d 142
(2017); Dodge Cty. Bd. v. Nebraska Tax Equal. & Rev. Comm., 10 Neb.
App. 927, 639 N.W.2d 683 (2002).

- 234 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
A & P II v. LANCASTER CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
Cite as 316 Neb. 216
By expressly declining to approve a valuation methodology
or valuations, the Commission created the possibility that its
decision could be rendered moot. Under the Commission’s
order, the County Assessor could use any methodology; thus,
the County Assessor could have ultimately assessed some
or all of Developers’ rent-restricted properties at a value
equal to that calculated under the statutory income approach,
which would deprive Developers of a case or controversy.
Alternatively, the order presently before us would be rendered
moot if the County Assessor ultimately assessed some or all
of Developers’ properties at a value greater than that calcu-
lated under the statutory income approach, those values were
challenged by Developers, and the Board or the Commission
refused to approve them. Either situation would render a deci-
sion on the merits of this appeal advisory.
While Developers’ right to have their properties assessed
under the income approach as mandated by § 77-1333(3) may
be substantial, the effect of the present order on that right was
not. There is no irrevocable harm to Developers in permit-
ting the County Assessor to try out some unspecified different
methodology that the Commission has not yet approved and
can evaluate later. The Commission’s order was incomplete
and provisional. Developers’ asserted right to have their prop-
erties assessed under the statutory income approach can effec-
tively be vindicated through an appeal from the Commission’s
approval of final valuations—if it is given. We are not at this
time expressing an opinion on whether the Commission was
correct in concluding that the use of a different valuation
methodology was necessary pursuant to the exception set forth
in § 77-1333(10). Because Developers’ substantial rights have
not been affected by the order they have appealed, we lack
appellate jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Because we lack appellate jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
Papik, J., not participating.