State v. Castellaw

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
322 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. CASTELLAW
Cite as 322 Neb. 555
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
Devante Castellaw, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed October 9, 2026. 	No. S-25-830.
1. Right to Counsel: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews a trial
court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw as appointed counsel and appoint
substitute counsel for an abuse of discretion.
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When an appellate court reviews a trial
court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion, it is considering whether the
ruling exceeded the bounds of permissible choice, given the evidence
presented and the applicable law.
3. Pleas: Appeal and Error. A trial court is afforded discretion in deciding
whether to accept guilty pleas, and an appellate court will reverse the
trial court’s determination only in a case of an abuse of discretion.
4. Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. An appellate court
resolves claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal
only where the record is sufficient to conclusively determine whether
trial counsel did or did not provide effective assistance and whether the
defendant was or was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficient per-
formance as matters of law.
5. ____: ____. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim will not be
addressed on direct appeal if it requires an evidentiary hearing.
6. ____: ____. Whether a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be
determined on direct appeal is a question of law.
7. Right to Counsel. When a defendant becomes dissatisfied with court-
appointed counsel, unless he or she can show good cause to the court for
the removal of counsel, his or her only alternative is to proceed pro se if
he or she is competent to do so.
8. ____. An indigent defendant’s right to have counsel does not give the
defendant the right to choose his or her own counsel.
9. ____. Mere distrust of, or dissatisfaction with, appointed counsel is not
enough to secure the appointment of substitute counsel.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/18/2026 12:36 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
322 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. CASTELLAW
Cite as 322 Neb. 555
10. Conflict of Interest: Good Cause: Proof. Good cause can be shown
if the defendant shows that trial counsel has a conflict of interest that
renders counsel incompetent.
11. Conflict of Interest: Words and Phrases. A conflict of interest exists
when a defense attorney is placed in a situation inherently conducive to
divided loyalties.
12. Attorney and Client: Conflict of Interest: Words and Phrases. The
phrase “conflict of interest” denotes a situation in which regard for one
duty tends to lead to disregard of another, where a lawyer’s represen-
tation of one client is rendered less effective by reason of his or her
representation of another client, or where it becomes a lawyer’s duty
on behalf of one client to contend for that which the lawyer’s duty to
another client would require him or her to oppose.
13. Conflict of Interest. Whether a conflict of interest exists is a case-by-
case determination to be made on the facts of the particular case.
14. Pleas: Waiver. In order to support a finding that a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere has been entered freely, intelligently, voluntarily, and
understandingly, the court must (1) inform the defendant concerning (a)
the nature of the charge, (b) the right to assistance of counsel, (c) the
right to confront witnesses against the defendant, (d) the right to a jury
trial, and (e) the privilege against self-incrimination; and (2) examine
the defendant to determine that he or she understands the foregoing.
Additionally, the record must establish that (1) there is a factual basis
for the plea and (2) the defendant knew the range of penalties for the
crime with which he or she is charged. A voluntary and intelligent
waiver of the above rights must affirmatively appear from the face of
the record.
15. Pleas: Mental Competency. A defendant cannot voluntarily enter a plea
if the defendant is not competent.
16. Trial: Pleas: Mental Competency. A person is competent to plead or
stand trial if he or she has the capacity to understand the nature and
object of the proceedings against him or her, to comprehend his or her
own condition in reference to such proceedings, and to make a ratio-
nal defense.
17. Trial: Mental Competency. The competency standard includes both (1)
whether the defendant has a rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings against him or her and (2) whether the defendant has
sufficient present ability to consult with his or her lawyer with a reason-
able degree of rational understanding.
18. Mental Competency. There are no fixed or immutable signs of incom-
petence, and a defendant can meet the modest aim of legal competency,

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
322 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. CASTELLAW
Cite as 322 Neb. 555
despite paranoia, emotional disorders, unstable mental conditions, and
suicidal tendencies.
19. Pleas: Mental Competency. A court is not required to make a compe-
tency determination in every case in which a defendant seeks to plead
guilty. A specific competency inquiry and determination is necessary
only when a court has reason to doubt the defendant’s competence.
20. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof: Appeal and Error. When reviewing
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal, the ques-
tion is whether the record affirmatively shows that the defendant’s trial
counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance
actually prejudiced the defendant’s defense.
21. Effectiveness of Counsel: Records: Appeal and Error. On direct
appeal, an appellate court only addresses claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel that can be conclusively determined from the record.
22. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof. A court may examine performance
and prejudice in any order and need not examine both prongs if a
defendant fails to demonstrate either.
23. ____: ____. To show deficient performance, the defendant must show
that counsel’s performance did not equal that of a lawyer with ordinary
training and skill in criminal law.
24. ____: ____. To show prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate a rea-
sonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.
25. Words and Phrases. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.
26. Effectiveness of Counsel: Presumptions: Appeal and Error. There
is a strong presumption that counsel acted reasonably, and an appellate
court will not second-guess reasonable strategic decisions.
27. Effectiveness of Counsel: Records: Appeal and Error. The record on
appeal is sufficient if it establishes either that trial counsel’s perform-
ance was not deficient, that the appellant will not be able to establish
prejudice as a matter of law, or that trial counsel’s actions could not be
justified as a part of any plausible trial strategy.
28. ____: ____: ____. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim will not be
addressed on direct appeal if it requires examination of facts not con-
tained in the record.
29. Effectiveness of Counsel: Postconviction: Records: Appeal and
Error. When a defendant’s trial counsel is different from his or her
counsel on direct appeal, the defendant must raise on direct appeal any
issue of trial counsel’s ineffective performance which is known to the
defendant or is apparent from the record; otherwise, the issue will be
procedurally barred in a subsequent postconviction proceeding.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
322 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. CASTELLAW
Cite as 322 Neb. 555
30. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof: Appeal and Error. When a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel is raised in a direct appeal, the appel-
lant is not required to allege prejudice; however, an appellant must make
specific allegations of the conduct that he or she claims constitutes defi-
cient performance by trial counsel.
31. Courts: Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction. A motion to transfer a case
from the district court to juvenile court under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1816
(Cum. Supp. 2024) requires the district court to consider the criteria set
forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-276 (Cum. Supp. 2024).
32. Pleas: Proof. The right to withdraw a plea previously entered is not
absolute, and the defendant has the burden to show the grounds for
withdrawal by clear and convincing evidence.
33. Pleas. When a defendant moves to withdraw his or her plea before
sentencing, a court, in its discretion, may sustain the motion for any fair
and just reason, provided that such withdrawal would not substantially
prejudice the prosecution.
34. ____. A defendant’s change of mind alone is not a fair and just reason to
withdraw a guilty or no contest plea.
35. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof: Appeal and Error. General allega-
tions that trial counsel performed deficiently or that trial counsel was
ineffective are insufficient to preserve the issue for later review.
36. Effectiveness of Counsel: Pleas: Appeal and Error. A broad allegation
that trial counsel was deficient for failing to move to withdraw a plea,
without articulating the legal basis upon which such a motion should
have been based, is too general to preserve the issue.
37. Plea Bargains: Appeal and Error. A broad allegation that a defendant
was coerced or threatened into accepting a plea bargain is not sufficient
to preserve the issue.
38. Attorneys at Law: Effectiveness of Counsel. A defense attorney has a
duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision
that makes particular investigations unnecessary.
Appeal from the District Court for Scotts Bluff County:
Andrea D. Miller, Judge. Affirmed.
Kenneth Jacobs, of Hug and Jacobs, L.L.C., for appellant.
Michael 	T. 	Hilgers, 	Attorney 	General, 	and 	Jacob 	M.
Waggoner for appellee.
Funke, 	C.J., 	Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Papik, 	Freudenberg,
Bergevin, and Vaughn, JJ.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
322 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. CASTELLAW
Cite as 322 Neb. 555
Freudenberg, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
The defendant appeals his conviction for second degree
murder pursuant to a guilty plea. He argues that the district
court erred in overruling his court-appointed trial counsel’s
motion to withdraw after the appellant sent a complaint letter
to the Counsel for Discipline of the Nebraska Supreme Court.
He also argues the district court erred by accepting his guilty
plea despite it allegedly not being voluntary, knowing, or free
from force or coercion. Finally, the defendant asserts his trial
counsel was ineffective for allowing the defendant to enter a
plea while a neuropsychological evaluation was pending, fail-
ing to investigate witnesses and potential third-party perpetra-
tors, and failing to file motions to transfer his case to juvenile
court and withdraw his plea. We affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
Following a fatal stabbing, Devante Castellaw, who was
17 years old at all relevant times, was charged in adult court
with use of a deadly weapon, other than a firearm, to commit
a felony, a Class II felony, and second degree murder, a Class
IB felony. He was represented by court-appointed defense
counsel. After an initial plea of not guilty, Castellaw, pursuant
to a plea agreement, pled guilty to second degree murder, a
Class IB felony. 1
The charges against Castellaw stemmed from events on
January 20, 2025. According to the factual basis provided by
the State, three individuals fled from a stolen Mercury Mariner
after it struck a tree while evading law enforcement’s pursuit
of the vehicle. Wyatt Reeb, the victim of the stabbing, was
one of the three individuals. Castellaw was a passenger in
another vehicle, a red Mitsubishi, which had also been pursu-
ing the stolen Mariner. After the Mariner crashed, Castellaw
and two others from the Mitsubishi pursued Reeb on foot and
eventually caught up to him. Surveillance video showed an
1 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-105 (Cum. Supp. 2024) and 28-304 (Reissue 2016).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
322 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. CASTELLAW
Cite as 322 Neb. 555
individual identified as Castellaw strike Reeb three times in
the chest with what appeared to be a knife. After the attack,
Castellaw and the others from the Mitsubishi got back into
that vehicle and drove away.
1. Adolescent Brain Development Expert’s
Neuropsychological Evaluation of Castellaw
Before Castellaw changed his plea to guilty, the trial court
granted his trial counsel’s motion for court appointment of
Valerie Sims, Psy.D., an expert in “adolescent brain develop-
ment,” and authorized Sims to perform a neuropsychological
evaluation on Castellaw, which would include information
regarding Castellaw’s “cognitive and emotional development
and his present and future treatment needs.” Castellaw’s coun-
sel asserted that Sims’ testimony would be “relevant both
to [Castellaw’s] capacity to form intent and to mitigation.”
Castellaw’s trial counsel elaborated:
I am certain it would be helpful for this Court whether in
guilt or in sentencing to have more than just my comments
about such matters as adolescent brain development as to
the impact of good and bad influences in somebody’s life
when they are 17 years old and not in school and strug-
gling about the particular level of development that this
young man is at right now . . . .
Castellaw’s trial counsel acknowledged at the hearing that
Castellaw’s case would remain in “adult court,” implying she
would not pursue a motion to transfer Castellaw’s case to juve-
nile court.
Sims 	performed 	her 	neuropsychological 	evaluation 	of
Castellaw before Castellaw entered his guilty plea, but she
had not yet submitted her written report to the court. Sims
submitted the report of her findings in September 2025,
before Castellaw was sentenced, and it was made part of the
presentence investigation report.
Sims set forth in her neuropsychological evaluation report
that the purpose of her evaluation was “to provide insight into

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
322 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. CASTELLAW
Cite as 322 Neb. 555
[Castellaw’s] neuropsychological profile and provide recom-
mendations regarding the type of treatment to his attorney.”
Sims’ report generally described Castellaw as polite, coopera-
tive, and responsive during the evaluation. Sims indicated that
Castellaw understood the gravity of the charges against him
and was remorseful for his role in the situation.
Sims detailed Castellaw’s academic struggles, including
learning disorders in math, reading, and reading comprehen-
sion, related in part to his absenteeism. Sims also detailed
Castellaw’s difficult upbringing, which included exposure to
trauma, violence, drugs, and alcohol. Sims explained that
these factors culminated in severe psychological distress man-
ifesting as post-traumatic stress disorder, alcohol use disorder,
and multiple suicide attempts. Sims opined that Castellaw’s
specific neurodevelopmental disorders, combined with his
young age, made him particularly vulnerable to peer influ-
ence. Sims noted that, despite these issues, Castellaw had
made promising progress in the time he was incarcerated,
which was 6 months at the time of her evaluation.
2. Plea Agreement
Under the terms of the plea agreement, in exchange for
Castellaw’s guilty or no contest plea to second degree murder,
the State agreed to drop the use of a deadly weapon to com-
mit a felony charge, as well as a separate case pending against
Castellaw for third degree assault. At the plea hearing, the dis-
trict court conducted a plea colloquy with Castellaw in which
the court confirmed Castellaw had discussed the plea agree-
ment with his trial counsel, Castellaw understood the terms of
the plea agreement, and that no one had made any “promises,
threats, [or] inducements” to get Castellaw to change his plea.
Castellaw stated he had chosen to enter a plea of either guilty
or no contest of his own free will.
The district court also ensured that Castellaw understood
the potential penalties he would face for pleading guilty or
no contest to the second degree murder charge, as well as the

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
322 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. CASTELLAW
Cite as 322 Neb. 555
rights he would be waiving. Castellaw affirmed that he had
enough time to think about his change of plea, discuss the
decision with his family, and discuss with counsel the facts of
the case and the decision to enter a change of plea.
The 	district 	court 	found 	beyond 	a 	reasonable 	doubt
that a factual basis existed for Castellaw’s guilty plea and
that Castellaw understood the nature of the allegations and pos-
sible penalties associated therewith. The court also expressly
found beyond a reasonable doubt that Castellaw “knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily entered a plea of guilty to the
charge.” Accordingly, the court accepted Castellaw’s plea and
found him guilty of murder in the second degree.
3. Trial Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw
After Castellaw entered his guilty plea but before the sen-
tencing hearing, Castellaw’s trial counsel moved to withdraw
at Castellaw’s request. In conjunction with the motion to with-
draw, Castellaw had apparently filed a complaint letter with
the Counsel for Discipline regarding trial counsel’s representa-
tion. The complaint letter was never offered below and is not
part of the record on appeal.
Trial counsel indicated in the motion to withdraw that
Castellaw and his family were dissatisfied with her work,
though she did not know exactly why. Castellaw’s trial counsel
had initially been hired with a $10,000 retainer by Castellaw’s
father, and the court approved Castellaw’s application for her
appointment after the retainer was exhausted and the family
could not continue to pay.
In 	an 	affidavit 	supporting 	the 	motion 	to 	withdraw,
Castellaw’s trial counsel responded to complaints made by
Castellaw and his family. Trial counsel explained in her affida-
vit that the decision not to file a motion to transfer Castellaw’s
case to juvenile court was informed by her prior experience
as defense attorney in State v. Leroux, 2 a case she described
2 State v. Leroux, 26 Neb. App. 76, 916 N.W.2d 903 (2018).

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STATE v. CASTELLAW
Cite as 322 Neb. 555
as having several factual similarities to Castellaw’s case.
Trial counsel explained that, based on Leroux and subsequent
Nebraska case law, she decided not to file a motion to transfer
Castellaw’s case.
Trial counsel acknowledged in her affidavit that she had
received a copy of the complaint letter, which was sent by
Castellaw to both the Counsel for Discipline and the district
court. According to trial counsel’s affidavit, the complaint
letter alleged that trial counsel and her paralegal “‘laughed
at’” Castellaw, told Castellaw a jury would not believe him,
coerced him into entering a guilty plea, and asked him to
lie to the court reporter. Castellaw’s trial counsel denied the
accusations.
Castellaw spoke at the hearing on the motion to withdraw.
He claimed that his trial counsel had done unprofessional
“things” but did not explain further.
The court denied the motion to withdraw. The court found
that Castellaw’s comments showed mere distrust or dissatisfac-
tion with appointed counsel, which was not enough to secure
appointment of substitute counsel without a showing of good
cause. The court ordered that trial counsel stay on the case
unless Castellaw chose to retain private counsel.
Trial counsel stayed on the case until after sentencing and
filing the notice of appeal, when she was allowed to withdraw
and be replaced.
4. Sentencing
At the sentencing hearing, the court considered arguments
from both the State and Castellaw’s trial counsel, along with
the presentence investigation report, including Sims’ report,
and victim impact statements from the victim’s family. The
court found as mitigating factors that Castellaw had a trau-
matic childhood, was surrounded by violent people and vio-
lent events, and was negatively impacted by his peers, leading
him to experience mental health issues. Nevertheless, the
district court sentenced Castellaw to a term of imprisonment

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STATE v. CASTELLAW
Cite as 322 Neb. 555
of 55 years to life. The court explained as significant factors
in its sentencing decision the level of violence involved in
the crime and Castellaw’s minimizing his responsibility for
the victim’s death.
Castellaw appeals.
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
With new counsel on appeal, Castellaw assigns, restated,
that the district court erred in (1) overruling trial counsel’s
motion to withdraw, knowing that he sent a complaint letter to
the Counsel for Discipline, and (2) accepting his plea despite
it not being voluntary, knowing, or free from force or coer-
cion. Castellaw also assigns that trial counsel was ineffective
by (3) failing to file a motion to transfer his case to juvenile
court, (4) failing to file a motion to withdraw his plea after he
indicated he was forced and coerced into entering the plea, (5)
failing to investigate witnesses and other potential third-party
perpetrators provided by Castellaw and his family, and (6)
allowing Castellaw to enter a plea while a neuropsychological
evaluation was pending.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] An appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a
motion to withdraw as appointed counsel and appoint substi-
tute counsel for an abuse of discretion. 3 When an appellate
court reviews a trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion,
it is considering whether the ruling exceeded the bounds of
permissible choice, given the evidence presented and the appli-
cable law. 4
[3] A trial court is afforded discretion in deciding whether to
accept guilty pleas, and an appellate court will reverse the trial
court’s determination only in a case of an abuse of discretion. 5
3 See State v. Figures, 308 Neb. 801, 957 N.W.2d 161 (2021).
4 State v. Damore, 320 Neb. 914, 31 N.W.3d 604 (2026).
5 State v. Mead, 313 Neb. 892, 987 N.W.2d 271 (2023).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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STATE v. CASTELLAW
Cite as 322 Neb. 555
[4] An appellate court resolves claims of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel on direct appeal only where the record is suf-
ficient to conclusively determine whether trial counsel did or
did not provide effective assistance and whether the defendant
was or was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficient per-
formance as matters of law. 6
[5] An ineffective assistance of counsel claim will not be
addressed on direct appeal if it requires an evidentiary hearing. 7
[6] Whether a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may
be determined on direct appeal is a question of law. 8
V. ANALYSIS
1. District Court’s Denial of Trial Counsel’s
Motion to Withdraw
Castellaw first asserts that the district court abused its dis-
cretion in denying his court-appointed trial counsel’s motion
to withdraw after Castellaw sent a complaint letter to the
Counsel for Discipline concerning his trial counsel’s represen-
tation. We find that the district court acted within its discretion
in denying Castellaw’s court-appointed trial counsel’s motion
to withdraw.
[7-9] When a defendant becomes dissatisfied with court-
appointed counsel, unless he or she can show good cause to
the court for the removal of counsel, his or her only alternative
is to proceed pro se if he or she is competent to do so. 9 An
indigent defendant’s right to have counsel does not give the
defendant the right to choose his or her own counsel. 10 Mere
distrust of, or dissatisfaction with, appointed counsel is not
enough to secure the appointment of substitute counsel. 11
6 State v. Kruger, 320 Neb. 361, 27 N.W.3d 398 (2025).
7 Id.
8 State v. Lopez, 321 Neb. 118, 32 N.W.3d 868 (2026).
9 State v. Figures, supra note 3.
10 Id.
11 Id.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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STATE v. CASTELLAW
Cite as 322 Neb. 555
[10-12] Castellaw argues that his complaint letter to the
Counsel for Discipline regarding his court-appointed trial
counsel created a “potential” conflict of interest that “could”
render trial counsel incompetent and require termination of
representation. 12 Good cause can be shown if the defendant
shows that trial counsel has a conflict of interest that renders
counsel incompetent. 13 A conflict of interest exists when a
defense attorney is placed in a situation inherently condu-
cive to divided loyalties. 14 The phrase “conflict of interest”
denotes a situation in which regard for one duty tends to lead
to disregard of another, where a lawyer’s representation of
one client is rendered less effective by reason of his or her
representation of another client, or where it becomes a law-
yer’s duty on behalf of one client to contend for that which
the lawyer’s duty to another client would require him or her
to oppose. 15
Castellaw does not assert how the complaint letter created
an actual conflict of interest or impacted his trial counsel’s
performance. Nor does he explain how his trial counsel was
incompetent in any other way. In sum, he appears to suggest
that any complaint letter to the Counsel for Discipline creates
a per se conflict that renders counsel incompetent. We disagree
with this argument.
[13] Castellaw relies on State v. Weathers 16 and State v.
McGuire 17 to support his contention that a complaint letter to
the Counsel for Discipline created a potential conflict of inter-
est that was disqualifying. These cases both involve conflicts
of interest, but not the kind of conflict of interest alleged
12 Brief for appellant at 21.
13 State v. Weathers, 304 Neb. 402, 935 N.W.2d 185 (2019).
14 State v. Mata, 321 Neb. 566, 36 N.W.3d 432 (2026).
15 Id.
16 State v. Weathers, supra note 13.
17 State v. McGuire, 286 Neb. 494, 837 N.W.2d 767 (2013).

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STATE v. CASTELLAW
Cite as 322 Neb. 555
here. As we have recognized in another context, whether a
conflict of interest exists is a case-by-case determination to
be made on the facts of the particular case. 18
In McGuire, an indigent defendant’s counsel moved to
withdraw from representation because he had been hired by
the office prosecuting the indigent defendant. After the dis-
trict court allowed counsel to withdraw, the indigent defend-
ant challenged that decision on appeal. On appeal, the State
argued that counsel became incompetent to represent the
defendant because of his new employment with the prosecu-
tor’s office. We agreed and held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in allowing trial counsel to withdraw
because trial counsel had a conflict of interest that rendered
him incompetent because of his new employment with the
prosecutor’s office. 19
In Weathers, we held that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion by denying an indigent defendant’s motion to dismiss
his trial counsel, who worked for the public defender’s office.
The defendant alleged there was a conflict of interest because
the defendant had raised an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim against another attorney in the same public defender’s
office in a separate case. 20 We found that the separate ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim against the other attorney was
not imputed to the defendant’s current trial counsel. There was
thus no conflict of interest rendering counsel incompetent and
thereby requiring removal. 21
Neither of these cases suggests that filing a complaint let-
ter to the Counsel for Discipline against one’s own counsel,
without more, creates a disqualifying conflict of interest.
18 State ex rel. Condon v. Braaten, 320 Neb. 214, 26 N.W.3d 532 (2025).
19 State v. McGuire, supra note 17.
20 State v. Weathers, supra note 13.
21 Id.

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STATE v. CASTELLAW
Cite as 322 Neb. 555
We agree with other jurisdictions that hold it does not. 22 In
Hutchinson v. State, 23 for example, the Florida Supreme Court
held that a bar complaint against appointed defense coun-
sel does not per se constitute a conflict of interest. Rather,
the defendant must demonstrate how the alleged conflict
based on the bar complaint impacted counsel’s performance.
Likewise, in P.M. v. State, Dept. of Hlth. & Soc. Servs., 24 the
Alaska Supreme Court explained in a footnote that “[f]iling
a bar grievance against an attorney does not by itself destroy
the attorney-client relationship or require the attorney to with-
draw from representation.” 25
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by denying Castellaw’s court-appointed
trial counsel’s motion to withdraw. Castellaw’s filing of a
complaint letter to the Counsel for Discipline and express-
ing unhappiness with trial counsel showed mere distrust or
dissatisfaction with her representation, not a disqualifying
conflict of interest. Castellaw did not show that the complaint
letter resulted in trial counsel’s disregarding her duty to rep-
resent Castellaw. Castellaw did not show that his filing of the
complaint letter impacted counsel’s performance as to render
her incompetent. Under these facts, the district court acted
within its discretion in denying Castellaw’s court-appointed
trial counsel’s motion to withdraw.
22 See, Hutchinson v. State, 17 So. 3d 696 (Fla. 2009); P.M. v. State, Dept.
of Hlth. & Soc. Servs., 42 P.3d 1127 (Alaska 2002); Jefferson v. State, 133
Nev. 874, 410 P.3d 1000 (Nev. App. 2017); Holsey v. State, 291 Ga. App.
216, 661 S.E.2d 621 (2008); State v. Michael, 161 Ariz. 382, 778 P.2d
1278 (Ariz. App. 1989).
23 Hutchinson v. State, supra note 22.
24 P.M. v. State, Dept. of Hlth. & Soc. Servs., supra note 22.
25 Id. at n.19 (citing Michigan Comm. on Prof. & Judicial Ethics, Informal
Op. 84 (1991) and ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof. Responsibility, Formal
Op. 384 (1994)).

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STATE v. CASTELLAW
Cite as 322 Neb. 555
2. District Court’s Acceptance of
Castellaw’s Guilty Plea
Castellaw 	next 	asserts 	that 	the 	district 	court 	erred 	by
accepting his guilty plea before Sims’ report from her neuro-
psychological evaluation of Castellaw was complete. We dis-
agree and find the district court acted within its discretion to
accept Castellaw’s guilty plea as freely, intelligently, volun-
tarily, and understandingly made.
[14] In order to support a finding that a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere has been entered freely, intelligently, vol-
untarily, and understandingly, the court must (1) inform the
defendant concerning (a) the nature of the charge, (b) the right
to assistance of counsel, (c) the right to confront witnesses
against the defendant, (d) the right to a jury trial, and (e)
the privilege against self-incrimination; and (2) examine the
defendant to determine that he or she understands the forego-
ing. 26 Additionally, the record must establish that (1) there is a
factual basis for the plea and (2) the defendant knew the range
of penalties for the crime with which he or she is charged. 27
A voluntary and intelligent waiver of the above rights must
affirmatively appear from the face of the record. 28
[15-18] A defendant cannot voluntarily enter a plea if the
defendant is not competent. 29 We have held that a person is
competent to plead or stand trial if he or she has the capac-
ity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings
against him or her, to comprehend his or her own condition
in reference to such proceedings, and to make a rational
defense. 30 The competency standard includes both (1) whether
the defendant has a rational as well as factual understanding of
26 State v. Mead, supra note 5.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 See Oyague v. Artuz, 393 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2004).
30 State v. Kellogg, 321 Neb. 502, 35 N.W.3d 442 (2026).

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the proceedings against him or her and (2) whether the defend-
ant has sufficient present ability to consult with his or her
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. 31
There are no fixed or immutable signs of incompetence, and
a defendant can meet the modest aim of legal competency,
despite paranoia, emotional disorders, unstable mental condi-
tions, and suicidal tendencies. 32
[19] A court is not required to make a competency deter-
mination in every case in which a defendant seeks to plead
guilty. 33 A specific competency inquiry and determination is
necessary only when a court has reason to doubt the defend-
ant’s competence. 34
Castellaw does not challenge that the district court engaged
in the required plea colloquy; instead, Castellaw argues the
district court, sua sponte, should have inquired further into his
competency before accepting his plea, because the results of
Sims’ neuropsychological evaluation were still pending when
his guilty plea was entered. Reading his argument generously,
Castellaw suggests that the pending neuropsychological evalu-
ation gave the court reason to doubt his competence.
But there was no showing that Sims’ evaluation of Castellaw
was intended to inquire into his competency to plead or stand
trial. Instead, the record shows that Sims’ evaluation was
done for the purpose of understanding adolescent cognitive
development, as applied to Castellaw, in determining “guilt
or in sentencing.” Sims’ report ultimately detailed Castellaw’s
traumatic upbringing, detailed how that upbringing affected
him cognitively and developmentally, and recommended treat-
ment options moving forward. In no part of Sims’ evaluation
did she ultimately make any conclusions or findings related
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 State v. Haas, 317 Neb. 919, 12 N.W.3d 787 (2024).
34 See id.

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to Castellaw’s ability to understand the legal proceedings, to
enter a plea, or to stand trial.
We disagree with Castellaw’s argument that because the neu-
ropsychological evaluation report was still pending, the district
court abused its discretion in finding, without further inquiry
into his competency, that Castellaw knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily entered a guilty plea. The district court, after
having the opportunity to observe and question Castellaw,
was satisfied that he was competent to plead and accepted his
guilty plea. 35 The pending results of Sims’ neuropsychological
evaluation, which was not related to Castellaw’s competency to
plead or stand trial, were immaterial.
3. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
Represented by new counsel on direct appeal, Castellaw
asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for four reasons:
(1) failing to file a motion to transfer his case to juvenile
court, (2) failing to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
(3) failing to investigate witnesses and other potential sus-
pects, and (4) allowing him to enter a guilty plea while a
neuropsychological evaluation was pending. We first discuss
the general legal principles of ineffective assistance of counsel
before addressing each claim in turn.
[20-22] When reviewing an ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claim on direct appeal, the question is whether the record
affirmatively shows that the defendant’s trial counsel’s per-
formance was deficient and that the deficient performance
actually 	prejudiced 	the 	defendant’s 	defense. 36 	On 	direct
appeal, an appellate court only addresses claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel that can be conclusively determined
from the record. 37 A court may examine performance and
35 See id. (noting that district court had benefit of observing accused during
plea hearing).
36 State v. Kruger, supra note 6.
37 Id.

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prejudice in any order and need not examine both prongs if a
defendant fails to demonstrate either. 38
[23-26] To show deficient performance, the defendant must
show that counsel’s performance did not equal that of a law-
yer with ordinary training and skill in criminal law. 39 To show
prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable prob-
ability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. 40 A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome. 41 There is a strong presumption that counsel
acted reasonably, and an appellate court will not second-guess
reasonable strategic decisions. 42
[27,28] The record on appeal is sufficient if it establishes
either that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient, that
the appellant will not be able to establish prejudice as a mat-
ter of law, or that trial counsel’s actions could not be justified
as a part of any plausible trial strategy. 43 Conversely, an inef-
fective assistance of counsel claim will not be addressed on
direct appeal if it requires examination of facts not contained
in the record. 44
[29,30] When a defendant’s trial counsel is different from
his or her counsel on direct appeal, the defendant must raise
on direct appeal any issue of trial counsel’s ineffective per-
formance which is known to the defendant or is apparent
from the record; otherwise, the issue will be procedurally
barred in a subsequent postconviction proceeding. 45 When a
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.

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claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised in a direct
appeal, the appellant is not required to allege prejudice; how-
ever, an appellant must make specific allegations of the con-
duct that he or she claims constitutes deficient performance
by trial counsel. 46
(a) Failing to File Motion to
Transfer to Juvenile Court
Castellaw first argues that his trial counsel was ineffec-
tive for failing to file a motion to transfer his case to juvenile
court. We find that the trial record is sufficient to conclude that
trial counsel’s decision not to file a motion to transfer was not
unreasonable and, therefore, trial counsel was not deficient for
failing to file a motion to transfer.
[31] A motion to transfer a case from the district court to
juvenile court under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1816 (Cum. Supp.
2024) requires the district court to consider the criteria set
forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-276 (Cum. Supp. 2024). “After
considering all the evidence and reasons presented by both
parties, the case shall be transferred to juvenile court unless
a sound basis exists for retaining the case in county court or
district court.” 47
While trial counsel’s strategic decisionmaking is not usu-
ally in the trial record, in this case, trial counsel explained
on the record that her decision not to file a motion to transfer
Castellaw’s case to juvenile court was based on her experience
as counsel in Leroux 48 and her “inability to find any post-
Leroux Nebraska cases in which a juvenile charged with mur-
der [had their case] transferred to juvenile court.” In Leroux,
the Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s
decision to not transfer a 15-year-old defendant’s case to
46 State v. Miller, 315 Neb. 951, 2 N.W.3d 345 (2024).
47 § 29-1816(3)(a). See State v. Jeremiah T., 319 Neb. 133, 21 N.W.3d 313
(2025).
48 State v. Leroux, supra note 2.

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juvenile court. The juvenile defendant in Leroux was charged
with murder in the second degree and use of a deadly weapon
to commit a felony after he stabbed the victim several times in
the chest during an argument, ultimately resulting in the vic-
tim’s death. The juvenile defendant in that case did not have
a history of being a violent and aggressive offender, had only
one misdemeanor in his criminal history, and was responsive
to services made available to him during the pendency of his
case. 49 Nonetheless, the district court found, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed, that the juvenile defendant’s case should be
retained in the district court. 50 The district court and Court of
Appeals were most concerned with the severity of the offense
charged, the perceived threat to public safety, and the concern
that rehabilitation could not be completed before the juvenile
defendant reached the age of majority. 51
Here, trial counsel was not deficient by failing to file
a motion to transfer. She made this decision based on her
experience and research of relevant Nebraska law. It cannot
be said on this record that trial counsel’s performance did
not equal that of a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in
criminal law when she made the informed decision not to file
a motion to transfer Castellaw’s second degree murder case to
juvenile court.
(b) Failing to File Motion to
Withdraw Guilty Plea
[32-34] Castellaw next argues that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. The right to withdraw a plea previously entered is
not absolute, and the defendant has the burden to show the
grounds for withdrawal by clear and convincing evidence. 52
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 See State v. Miller, supra note 46.

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When a defendant moves to withdraw his or her plea before
sentencing, a court, in its discretion, may sustain the motion
for any fair and just reason, provided that such withdrawal
would not substantially prejudice the prosecution. 53 A defend-
ant’s change of mind alone is not a fair and just reason to
withdraw a guilty or no contest plea. 54
Castellaw concedes that he did not ask trial counsel to with-
draw his plea. Still, he claims his desire to do so was “clear,”
“even if he did not state it in those exact terms.” 55 This clear
desire to withdraw his plea allegedly comes from his letter to
the Counsel for Discipline, in which he allegedly complained
that trial counsel “coerced” him into accepting the State’s
plea agreement. Castellaw complains that, rather than move
to withdraw as counsel, trial counsel should have moved to
withdraw his plea. Castellaw does not specifically assert on
appeal that his trial counsel in fact coerced him into entering
a plea, and he gives no explanation as to how she might have
coerced him into the plea agreement. He does not argue any
other basis for a motion to withdraw his plea.
[35-37] General allegations that trial counsel performed
deficiently or that trial counsel was ineffective are insuffi-
cient to preserve the issue for later review. 56 As explained in
State v. Liner, 57 a broad allegation that trial counsel was defi-
cient for failing to move to withdraw a plea, without articu-
lating the legal basis upon which such a motion should have
been based, is too general to preserve the issue. Similarly, a
broad allegation that a defendant was coerced or threatened
into accepting a plea bargain is not sufficient to preserve the
issue. 58 The record affirmatively shows that trial counsel’s
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Brief for appellant at 32.
56 See State v. Filholm, 287 Neb. 763, 848 N.W.2d 571 (2014).
57 See State v. Liner, 24 Neb. App. 311, 886 N.W.2d 311 (2016).
58 See id.

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performance was not deficient by failing to move to withdraw
Castellaw’s plea.
(c) Failing to Investigate Witnesses and
Potential Third-Party Perpetrators
Castellaw also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to investigate witnesses and potential third-party
perpetrators identified by Castellaw’s family. Specifically,
Castellaw points to one individual, identified by name, who
was allegedly in the same vehicle as Castellaw during the
pursuit of the stolen vehicle but was apparently not arrested
or charged. Castellaw’s argument on appeal does not seem to
be that the uncharged individual was the one who committed
the murder of the victim but that he was involved and should
have been investigated by Castellaw’s trial counsel. We find
that the trial record is insufficient to resolve this claim on
direct appeal.
[38] A defense attorney has a duty to make reasonable inves-
tigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary. 59 We have insufficient informa-
tion in the trial record concerning whether or to what extent
Castellaw’s trial counsel investigated the uncharged individual
identified in Castellaw’s brief or what strategic decisionmaking
was involved in counsel’s level of investigation. The uncharged
individual’s name appears several times throughout the pre-
sentence investigation report, including in Castellaw’s trial
counsel’s sentencing memorandum, but it is unclear why the
uncharged individual was not charged and if Castellaw’s case
would have been different had trial counsel investigated the
uncharged individual.
Accordingly, we conclude that this allegation of deficient
performance was alleged with sufficient particularity, but the
record on direct appeal is insufficient to resolve it.
59 State v. Stricklin, 300 Neb. 794, 916 N.W.2d 413 (2018).

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(d) Allowing Castellaw to Enter Plea While
Neuropsychological Evaluation Was Pending
Finally, Castellaw argues that his trial counsel was ineffec-
tive for permitting him to enter a guilty plea while the results
of his neuropsychological evaluation were pending. We find no
merit to this allegation based on the trial record, because, as a
matter of law, Castellaw cannot show that he was prejudiced.
Had Castellaw’s counsel waited until after the results of the
neuropsychological evaluation were complete before “permit-
ting” him to enter a guilty plea, the results would have been
the same, if not worse. As discussed above, the reasons for
the requested neuropsychological evaluation were not related
to competency. And the results from the neuropsychological
evaluation demonstrated that Castellaw’s competency to plead
or stand trial was not at issue. Castellaw cannot show that had
his trial counsel waited to proceed with the guilty plea until
after the results of the evaluation were complete, there was a
reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would
have been different.
It is also worth noting that, prior to the plea agreement,
Castellaw faced charges for use of a deadly weapon to commit
a felony, a Class II felony, and for third degree assault, a Class
I misdemeanor. By accepting the plea agreement, Castellaw
avoided facing these charges in addition to the second degree
murder charge.
Because Castellaw cannot show prejudice from trial coun-
sel’s decision to permit him to enter a guilty plea while a
neuropsychological evaluation was pending, this assignment of
error fails.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err in
denying Castellaw’s trial counsel’s motion to withdraw or in
accepting Castellaw’s guilty plea as knowing and voluntary.
We affirm.
Affirmed.