P.V., on behalf of minor child, T.S. v. Board of Education of the Township of Verona, Essex County, 3/7/2020, (#61-23)

61-23
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
P.V. , on behalf of minor child, T.S.,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Township of Verona,
Essex County,
Respondent.
Synopsis
Petitioner filed the within appeal on June 6, 2022, challenging the discipline imposed by the respondent
Board upon her minor son, T.S., for making an inappropriate remark in class on February 19, 2020, during
his freshman year at Verona High School. T.S. received a one-day in-school suspension, a one-day
Saturday suspension, and the loss of cell phone privileges for multiple days following the incident. The
petitioner maintains that the discipline imposed upon T.S. by the Board was based on an incorrect
infraction level as detailed in the school’s Student Guidebook, and that this discipline later impacted his
ability to join the National Honor Society. The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which was converted to a
motion for summary decision.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: there is no issue of material fact in this case, and the matter is ripe for
summary decision; pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i), petitioners must file a petition no later than the 90 th
day from the date of receipt of the notice of a final order, ruling or other action by the district board of
education, individual party, or agency, which is the subject of the requested contested case hearing;
here, the petitioner was aware of the discipline imposed and voiced her disagreement with the
infraction level and penalty assessed when it occurred, yet the instant petition was not filed until more
than two years later; petitioner does not present exceptional circumstances or a compelling reason to
warrant relaxation of the ninety-day rule; and her petition was filed well beyond the required time
frame. The ALJ concluded that the appeal was clearly filed out of time. Accordingly, the ALJ granted
summary decision to the Board and dismissed the petition.
Upon a comprehensive review, the Commissioner concurred with the ALJ that this matter is time-barred
by the 90-day limitations period set forth in N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(a). Accordingly, the Initial Decision of the
OAL was adopted as the final decision in this matter and the petition was dismissed as untimely.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader.
It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.

OAL Dkt. No. EDU 05685-22
Agency Dkt. No. 141-6/22
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
P.V., on behalf of minor child, T.S.,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Township of Verona,
Essex County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law
(OAL) have been reviewed. The parties did not file exceptions.
Petitioner filed the instant petition on June 6, 2022 challenging the discipline imposed
on her son by the Board for making an inappropriate remark in class on February 19, 2020. The
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the petition should be dismissed as it was filed
outside the 90-day limitation period set forth in N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i). The ALJ also found that the
circumstances do not warrant relaxation of the filing timeframe.1
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that this matter was filed more
than two years after the discipline was imposed and is therefore barred by the 90-day statute
of limitations set forth in N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i). The Commissioner further agrees that relaxation
of the limitations period is not warranted.
1 Petitioner filed a prior emergent matter to compel her son’s admission to the National Honor Society as he was
precluded from joining based on his disciplinary infraction; the emergent matter was dismissed. The ALJ found
that this matter was not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because an analysis on the limitations period
was not conducted.
61-23

2
Accordingly, the Initial Decision of the OAL is adopted as the final decision in this matter
for the reasons stated therein, and the petition of appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 2
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision:
Date of Mailing:
2 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.1.
Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days from the date
of mailing of this decision.
March 7, 2023
March 9, 2023

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05685-22
AGENCY DKT. NO. 141-6/22
P.V. ON BEHALF OF T.S.,
Petitioners,
v.
TOWNSHIP OF VERONA, BOARD OF
EDUCATION,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
P.V. on behalf of T.S., appearing pro se
Gabrielle Pettineo, Esq., for respondent (Kenney, Gross, Kovats & Parton,
attorneys)
Record Closed: January 26, 2023 	Decided: January 31, 2023
BEFORE NANCI G. STOKES, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 6, 2022, petitioner challenged respondent’s discipline imposed on her
minor child, T.S., on February 19, 2020, for an incident in school. 	Is the claim time-

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05685-22
2
barred? 	Yes. 	Under 	N.J.A.C. 	6A:3-1.3(d), 	absent 	exceptional 	circumstances, 	a
petitioner must file an appeal "no later than the 90th day from the date of receipt of the
notice of a final order, ruling, or other action by the district board of education, individual
party, or agency, that is the subject of the [case].” Ibid.; N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.1.6
.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 6, 2022, petitioner filed a Petition with the Commissioner of the
Department of Education (Commissioner) contesting discipline entered by respondent
against her minor son while a freshman at Verona High School (Verona). 	Petitioner
maintains that Verona imposed discipline against T.S. for the incorrect infraction level
under the high school’s Student Guidebook, and this discipline later impacted his ability
to join the National Honor Society.
In response to the petition, Verona filed a Motion to Dismiss in place of an
Answer on July 6, 2022, asserting that P.V. had another pending case challenging
T.S.’s denial of entry into the National Honor Society, resolved by an Order on
Emergent relief dated May 23, 2022, denying petitioner’s request. Respondent’s motion
maintained that transfer to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) was unnecessary
because the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied as the proceeding explored the same
discipline in the earlier case under OAL DKT. NO. EDU 03920-22. 	Respondent also
asserted that the case is duplicative and precluded by N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.4(c), requiring
petitioner to certify there are no pending related matters.
Still, the Commissioner declined to address respondent’s motion to dismiss and
transmitted this case to the OAL. 	On July 11, 2022, the OAL filed the contested case
under 	the 	Administrative 	Procedure 	Act, 	N.J.S.A. 	52:14B-1 	to 	-15, 	and 	the 	act
establishing the OAL, N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -13, for a hearing under the Uniform
Administrative Procedure Rules, N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.1 to -21.6.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05685-22
3
On September 23, 2022, respondent filed a motion to dismiss that I converted to
a motion for summary decision to consider facts and evidence outside of the pleadings.
Significantly, Verona’s motion included a certification with exhibits. 	I requested a copy
of the transcript of the argument on the emergent application under OAL DKT. NO. EDU
03920-22 before the Hon. Julio Morejon, A.L.J., given his discussion of the disputed
suspension in his Order. See N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.6(p). 	On September 24, 2022, petitioner
filed her opposition to the motion. 	On October 24, 2022, respondent objected to
converting the motion to a motion for summary decision.
On December 7, 2022, the OAL received the transcript, and I permitted petitioner
additional time to respond. However, petitioner resubmitted her same opposition. 	On
December 19, 2022, respondent replied to petitioner’s opposition. On January 3, 2023,
I requested additional information from Verona, which I received on January 26, 2023,
and closed the record.1
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based on the documents submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion
for summary decision, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
I FIND the following as FACT for purposes of this motion only:
T.S. was a ninth-grade student in attendance at Verona during the 2019-20
school year.
On February 19, 2020, T.S. received a one-day in-school suspension, a one-day
Saturday suspension, and the loss of cell phone privileges for multiple days due to his
role in an incident in his Spanish class. 	Before class, T.S.’s Spanish teacher was
collecting student cell phones, as was her procedure at the time. 	T.S. jokingly told his
classmates that they should “all say the teacher touched us” so they would not need to
1 Both parties noted the Student Guidebook in their motion papers, but none provided a certified copy
from the 2019-2020 school year. Thus, I requested a certified copy.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05685-22
4
turn in their phones. 	See Transcript, p. 12, 6-8. 	The teacher heard what T.S. said and
sent T.S. to the assistant principal’s office.
The 	assistant 	principal 	spoke 	with 	T.S. 	and 	P.V. 	on 	February 	19, 	2020,
discussing the incident and the discipline imposed. 	That same day, the assistant
principal also talked to the Spanish teacher. 	P.V. voiced her disagreement with the
suspension imposed, believing the penalty was excessive under Verona’s Student
Guidebook. 	More pointedly, P.V. asserted that the Student Guidebook supported a
level 	two 	infraction 	rather 	than 	a 	level 	three 	infraction, 	which 	warranted 	lesser
consequences. See Transcript, p. 14, 6-10. That same day, the assistant principal sent
a letter documenting the conference and explaining the discipline. 	The letter also
advises the parent to contact the guidance counselor or the assistant principal with any
questions, concerns, or beliefs about a discrepancy.
The Board of Education policies are readily available on the District’s website.
Notably, Verona’s principal forwards an electronic email to all parents at the start of
each school year, including 2019-20, containing links to the Verona Student Handbook
(Guidebook), which includes the Student Code of Conduct. 	The Code of Conduct
states that a student or parent has the right to a hearing and can appeal discipline
decisions under the Code of Conduct.
T.S. served his suspensions without incident.
On April 22, 2022, P.V. filed a Petition of Appeal with the Commissioner because
Verona failed to admit her minor son, T.S., into the National Honor Society (NHS) due to
his suspension in February 2020. 	On April 29, 2022, Verona formally denied T.S.’s
NHS admission, noting that T.S.’s “student conduct record is inconsistent with the
character requirements of the NHS.” 	The denial instructed T.S. to reapply next year
and recommended that he use the time between now and then to amplify his candidacy.
Further, the letter advised T.S. that he could request a meeting for clarification of the

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05685-22
5
denial and advocate for himself. 	Neither P.V. nor T.S. requested a meeting with NHS’s
faculty council.
On May 16, 2022, petitioner converted her petition under OAL DKT. NO. EDU
03920-22 to an application for emergent relief under N.J.A.C. 6A-31.6. On May 23,
2022, following oral argument and submissions from both parties, the Hon. Julio
Morejon, A.L.J., denied the emergent relief because the proofs failed to establish the
necessary elements to grant emergency relief under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b), and Crowe v.
DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982).
Judge Morejon also stated that “the issue of suspension of the student is moot as
petitioner admits that she did not file a timely appeal with the Department of Education
under 	N.J.A.C. 	6a:3-1.3(i).” See Exhibit 	C, 	p. 	7. 	On 	July 	8, 	2022, 	the 	Acting
Commissioner of Education upheld the denial of emergent relief and concluded no
underlying issues remained, thereby dismissing the case.
During the oral argument on May 20, 2022, before Judge Morejon, petitioner
confirmed that Verona informed her of the incident with her son and suspension when it
happened. See Transcript, p. 14, lines 2-10. 	Petitioner spoke with the assistant
principal “constantly” about the February 19, 2020, events and suspension, disputing
the infraction level and discipline. See Transcript, p. 14, lines 6-10,19 through p. 15, line
9. P.V. also “guessed” that she could have gone to the Board of Education about the
suspension. See Transcript, p. 15, lines 22-23 and p. 20, lines 17-23. Yet, P.V. took no
further action regarding the suspension until 2022, maintaining that no one told her she
could appeal the discipline. Instead, P.V. became aware of the discipline’s significance
once Verona denied T.S.’s admission to NHS.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05685-22
6
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Summary-Decision Standard
It is well settled that when facts beyond the initial pleadings are relied on in
determining the motion, the motion to dismiss is converted to a motion for summary
decision. Jersey City Educ. Ass'n v. City of Jersey City, 316 N.J. Super. 245, 253-54
(App. Div. 1998); see e.g. Price v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of Washington, EDU 6121-07,
Initial 	Decision, 	(December 	7, 	2007), adopted Comm'r 	(January 	24, 	2008)
http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/search.html (ALJ converted the motion to dismiss
to a motion for summary judgment); see also K.L. & K.L. o/b/o minor children C.L. &
M.L. v. Kinnelon Bd. of Educ., EDU 1191-08 and EDU 1192-08 (consolidated), Initial
Decision, 	(April 	24, 	2008),
http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/search.html., adopted Comm'r 	(July 	22, 	2008)
http://www.state.nj.us/education/legal/index.html 	(where 	judge, sua 	sponte, converted
the board's motion to dismiss to a motion for summary decision). Here, respondent
attached a certification and several exhibits with its motion papers. 	Respondent also
relies upon materials from the earlier case involving the parties. 	Thus, I CONCLUDE
respondent's motion is appropriately considered a motion for summary decision.
A party may move for summary decision upon all or any substantive issues in a
contested case. N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(a). A party must make the motion a party makes with
briefs, with or without affidavits. When the filed papers and discovery, together with any
affidavits, show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is
entitled to prevail as a matter of law, the judge may grant the motion. N.J.A.C. 1:1-
12.5(b). When a party makes such a motion providing that support, an adverse party, to
prevail, must submit an affidavit setting forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue
of material fact exists that can only be determined in an evidentiary proceeding. Ibid.
Even though a statute calls for a “hearing,” where a motion for summary decision
is made and supported by documentary evidence and where the objector submits no

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05685-22
7
evidence to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists, the motion
procedure constitutes the hearing, and no trial-type hearing is necessary. 	Contini v.
Newark Bd. of Educ., 286 N.J. Super. 106, 120–21 (App. Div. 1995), certif. denied, 145
N.J. 372 (1996).
To determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists that precludes
summary judgment, the motion judge must consider whether the competent evidential
materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
are sufficient to demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).
Moreover, even if the non-movant comes forward with some evidence, the court
must grant summary judgment if the evidence is “so one-sided that [the movant] must
prevail as a matter of law.” 	Ibid. at 536 (citation omitted). 	If the non-moving party’s
evidence is “merely colorable or is not significantly probative,” the judge should not deny
summary judgment. Bowles v. City of Camden, 993 F. Supp. 255, 261 (D.N.J. 1998).
In this case, no genuine issue exists as to the material facts. The only questions
are whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars petitioner’s claim or whether
petitioner timely filed her petition disputing T.S.’s discipline under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(d).
More pointedly, no genuine issue exists that petitioner filed a prior case involving the
same punishment, now dismissed, and that she did not file the current action within
ninety days of the discipline notification. 	Since these facts are clear and undisputed, I
CONCLUDE that this case is ripe for summary decision.
Collateral Estoppel
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or “issue preclusion," is an equitable principle
that arises when an issue of fact or law is fully litigated and determined by a final
judgement. 	The earlier determination can preclude future litigation when the party
asserting the bar shows that: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05685-22
8
decided 	in 	the 	prior 	proceeding; 	(2) 	the 	issue 	was 	actually 	litigated 	in 	the 	prior
proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits;
(4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party
against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the
earlier proceeding. 	Olivieri v. Y.M.F. Carpet, Inc., 186 N.J. 511, 521 (2006) (quoting In
re Estate of Dawson, 130 N.J. 1, 20-21 (1994) (quotation marks omitted).
Undeniably, Judge Morejon addressed the discipline issue between the parties,
took sworn statements about the events on February 19, 2020, and rendered a decision
upheld by the Acting Commissioner. 	However, exceptions to issue preclusion exist
warranting new determinations because of "differences in the quality or extensiveness
of the procedures followed in the two courts” or when “the issue is one of law and . . . an
intervening change in the applicable legal context or . . . inequitable administration of
the 	laws” 	requires 	consideration. 	Id. at 	25. 	(citing 	the 	Restatement 	(Second) 	of
Judgements § 28 (1982).
Petitioner, appearing pro se, filed the prior action to compel T.S.’s admission to
NHS, not to challenge Verona’s discipline. 	The preceding case ended when Judge
Morejon concluded that the petitioner did not satisfy emergent relief requirements, a
different standard. 	Further, Judge Morejon highlighted that NHS admission was not a
right and subject to review only upon a showing that a school district’s admission
decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. 	Still, his Order did not analyze
whether the circumstances warranted relaxation of the filing timeframe for a petition
disputing Verona’s discipline. 	In other words, my review of the record below does not
reveal that Judge Morejon fully addressed the timeliness of petitioner’s actions under
the law. 	Thus, I CONCLUDE that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not equitably
applied to bar this case.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05685-22
9
Timeliness
Under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(d), a party must file an appeal with the Commissioner of
Education “no later than the 90th day from the date of receipt of the notice of a final
order, ruling, or other action by the district board of education, individual party, or
agency, that is the subject of the requested contested case hearing.” This rule "provides
a measure of repose, an essential element in the proper and efficient administration of
the school laws," giving school districts the “security of knowing” that an aggrieved party
cannot challenge its actions after ninety days. Kaprow v. Board of Educ. of Berkeley
Twp., 131 N.J. 572, 582 (1993).
Courts 	strictly 	construe 	and 	consistently 	apply 	the 	ninety-day 	limitation
period. Kaprow, 131 N.J. at 588-89; Nissman v. Bd. of Educ., 272 N.J. Super 373, 380-
81, (App. Div. 1994); Riely v. Bd. of Educ., 173 N.J. Super. 109, 112-14, (App. Div.
1980). This period begins to run when the petitioner "learn[s] from the Local Board the
existence of that state of facts that would enable him to file a timely claim." Kaprow, 131
N.J. at 588-89. Indeed, the "notice of a final order, ruling or other action" is "sufficient to
inform an individual of some fact that he or she has a right to know and that the
communicating party has a duty to communicate." Id. at 587. Notably, a petitioner need
not receive official and formal notification that they may have a valid claim to begin the
ninety days. Id. at 588.
However, the Commissioner may exercise her authority under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-
1.1.6 to relax the application of the ninety-day rule "where strict adherence thereto may
be 	deemed 	inappropriate 	or 	unnecessary 	or 	may 	result 	in 	injustice." 	Ibid. 	Yet,
exceptions to the ninety-day rule are only appropriate where compelling circumstances
exist to justify the enlargement or relaxation of the time limit. See Kaprow, 131 N.J. at
590; DeMaio v. New Providence Bd. of Educ., 96 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 449, 453.
Indeed, 	this 	extraordinary 	relief 	is 	reserved 	for 	situations 	where 	the 	party
presents a substantial constitutional issue or a matter of significant public interest

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05685-22
10
beyond concern only to the parties. Portee v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 94 N.J.A.R.2d
(EDU) 381, 384; Wise v. Trenton Bd. of Educ., EDU 160-00, Initial Decision (July 25,
2000), adopted, Comm'r 	Decision 	(September 	11, 2000), aff'd, St. 	Bd. 	(January 	3,
2001), http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/.
Here, I found that petitioner was aware of the discipline imposed and voiced her
disagreement with the infraction level and penalty assessed when it occurred. The
ninety-day limitation flows from that notice, not when it became essential to petitioner to
challenge because that discipline later impacted T.S.’s NHS admission. 	Further,
petitioner does not dispute that her son made an inappropriate remark on February 19,
2020, or that Verona could discipline her son. 	Instead, she maintains that she did not
know she could appeal the disputed infraction level or discipline imposed. However, the
Student Code of Conduct in the Student Guidebook she discussed with the assistant
principal regarding the infraction level advises of an ability to appeal. 	Further, the
record discloses no Verona conduct that caused the petitioner to postpone filing her
claim for more than two years.
Notably, petitioner's claim has only personal significance, making relaxation of
the rule unwarranted. 	If the Commissioner relaxed the filing timeframe for every harsh
result, that action would nullify the rule's salutary public policy of encouraging prompt
resolution of disputes. 	Pacio v. Bd. of Educ. of Lakeland Reg. High Sch. Dist., 1989
S.L.D. 2060 (Comm'r July 29, 1989). Thus, I CONCLUDE that petitioner does not
present exceptional circumstances or a compelling reason which warrant relaxation of
the ninety-day rule and that she filed her petition well beyond the required time frame.
ORDER
Given my findings of fact and conclusions of law, I ORDER that the Verona
Township Board of Education be GRANTED summary decision. 	I further ORDER that
petitioner’s Petition of Appeal be DISMISSED.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05685-22
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I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and
unless such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become
a final decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: 	BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES
AND DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500, marked “Attention: Exceptions.” A copy of any exceptions must be sent to
the judge and to the other parties.
January 31, 2023
DATE 	NANCI G. STOKES, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: 	January 31, 2023
Date Mailed to Parties: 	January 31, 2023
ljb