Board of Education of the Township of Lakewood, Ocean County v. New Jersey Department of Education, 8/6/19, (#202-19)

202-19
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Board of Education of the Township of
Lakewood, Ocean County,
Petitioner,
v.
New Jersey Department of Education,
Respondent.
Synopsis
In June 2019, the Board of Education of the Township of Lakewood (Lakewood) filed an application for
emergent relief and a petition seeking, inter alia, state aid of approximately $30,000,000 to enable the
Lakewood school district to provide its students with a thorough and efficient education. Such funding had
been included in the Governor’s proposed budget for 2019-2020, but was eliminated from the final budget
as approved by the Legislature and signed by the Governor. Lakewood argued that the promised funding
was required to meet its anticipated shortfall for the 2019-2020 school year. 	The Department contended
that Lakewood’s petition was procedurally deficient and failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, thereby requiring dismissal of the petition. Following a June 26, 2019 hearing on the matter,
Lakewood announced it was shutting down the school district effective July 1, 2019, despite the fact that its
underlying petition indicated that the school district had sufficient funds to cover operations through
March 2020. The Department subsequently argued that the within matter is now moot, because on
July 1, 2019, the Commissioner certified to the State Treasurer that Lakewood required $36,033,862 to
enable it to meet its constitutional obligations, and the State Treasurer subsequently approved a loan in that
amount to the district.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: although Lakewood failed to file the required formal motion for emergent
relief, and instead combined a request for an emergent hearing with a petition seeking final relief, 	an
accommodation for the procedurally deficient filing was allowed because of the importance of the issue
herein; however, such accommodation must not be construed as precedent for accepting other procedurally
deficient filings; Lakewood has failed to demonstrate entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to Crowe v.
DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982), and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6; further, on July 1, 2019, the Commissioner
certified to the State Treasurer that Lakewood required $36,033,862 to enable it to meet its constitutional
obligations; and the State Treasurer subsequently approved a loan in that amount to the district, which has
rendered the matter moot. Accordingly, the ALJ granted the Department’s motion to dismiss the petition.
Upon a comprehensive review, the Commissioner concurred with the findings and conclusions of the ALJ,
and adopted the Initial Decision of the OAL as the final decision in this matter. 	The petition was
dismissed.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither
reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.
August 6, 2019

OAL Dkt. No. EDU 8386-19
Agency Dkt. No. 142-6/19
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Board of Education of the Township of
Lakewood, Ocean County,
Petitioner,
v.
New Jersey Department of Education,
Respondent.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the OAL have been reviewed,
as have the exceptions filed pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4 by the petitioner, the Lakewood
Township Board of Education (Lakewood), and the New Jersey Department of Education’s
(Department) reply thereto.1 In this matter, Lakewood filed a petition of appeal and a motion for
emergent relief 2 seeking the state aid (approximately $30,000,000) that was promised during
budget proceedings which will enable it to provide its students with a thorough and efficient
education.3
Following a hearing at the OAL on the emergent application, the ALJ found that
Lakewood failed to demonstrate entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to Crowe v. DeGioia, 90
1 Lakewood filed a sur-reply to the Department’s reply exceptions that was not considered because N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4
makes no provision for sur-replies to reply exceptions.
2 As noted in the Initial Decision, Lakewood did not file a formal motion for emergent relief, which is required;
however, given the importance of the issue, the ALJ treated the application as both a petition of appeal seeking final
relief and as a motion for emergent relief.
3 Lakewood sought additional relief connected to the budget, which is outlined in the Initial Decision.

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N.J. 126 (1982), and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6. 	The ALJ also found that the underlying
petition of appeal should be dismissed as moot because on July 1, 2019, the Commissioner
certified to the State Treasurer that Lakewood required $36,033,862 to enable it to meet its
constitutional obligations, and the State Treasurer subsequently approved a loan in that amount
to the district. 	Therefore, the ALJ granted the Department’s motion to dismiss the petition of
appeal as moot.
In its exceptions, 	Lakewood maintains that the Initial Decision should be
modified or rejected in a manner sufficient to rectify purported factual and legal deficiencies set
forth in the Initial Decision. 	Lakewood first contends that the ALJ mischaracterized the relief
sought, as the Initial Decision indicates that Lakewood sought $30,000,000 in advance aid, when
in fact Lakewood was seeking the $30,000,000 in direct State aid that was originally promised
by the Governor during the budget process.4
Lakewood also reiterated its arguments from the proceedings below, taking
exception to the ALJ’s analysis of the Crowe factors that must be established for emergent relief
to be granted. 	Lakewood emphasizes that its students will suffer irreparable harm without the
additional State aid promised in the Governor’s budget because Lakewood lacks the financial
resources to adopt a budget, as required by N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5(c)5, sufficient to provide a
thorough and efficient education for its students. Moreover, the failure to supply the monetary
relief that was sought actually resulted in a break in services to students – a judicially recognized
form of irreparable harm – when Lakewood ceased operations on July 1, 2019.
4 Direct aid and advance aid for school districts are discussed more fully by the ALJ on pages 3-4 of the Initial
Decision.
5 N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5(c), provides “[a]nnually, on or before March 4 … each district board of education shall adopt,
and submit to the Commissioner for approval, … a budget that provides for a thorough and efficient education.”

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Next, Lakewood contends that the ALJ erroneously concluded that Lakewood
failed to demonstrate a well-settled right to the relief sought. New Jersey’s Constitution and the
case law clearly provide that it is the duty of the Commissioner to ensure that every school
district 	provides 	a 	thorough 	and 	efficient 	school 	system. 	Lakewood 	argues 	that 	the
Commissioner conceded Lakewood’s well-settled right to the relief sought in his letter dated July
1, 2019. 	Likewise, with respect to a likelihood of success on the merits, based on the
concessions in the July 1, 2019 letter, Lakewood contends that there is no dispute that Lakewood
requires the funds at issue, and thus it has already prevailed on the merits.
Finally, Lakewood maintains that the children of Lakewood would suffer greater
harm if they are not able to attend school than any potential harm that could come to the
Department, including the potential chaos to the budget process that the ALJ wrongfully found in
the Initial Decision. For the foregoing reasons, the ALJ’s legal conclusions as to all four of the
Crowe factors should be rejected and replaced with conclusions in Lakewood’s favor considering
the Department’s written concessions and the ample legal support for Lakewood’s position.
In its exceptions, Lakewood also argues that the ALJ improperly determined that
the underlying claims are now moot. 	The removal of $30,000,000 in State aid from the
Governor’s budget has not been resolved, but rather the Department now attempts to paper over
the issue with a gargantuan loan. 	Since it is undisputed that Lakewood requires an additional
$36,000,000 in order to vindicate its students’ constitutional rights, these monies must be in the
form of direct State aid as originally proposed by the Governor, rather than a loan. 	Therefore,
the Initial Decision’s conclusion that this matter is moot should be rejected.6
6 All of the arguments advanced by Lakewood in its exceptions were fully considered by the Commissioner;
however, not every argument merited discussion herein.

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In reply, the Department asserts that the Initial Decision denying Lakewood’s
request for emergent relief and granting the Department’s motion to dismiss should be adopted
as the final decision in this matter. First, the Department contends that the ALJ properly found
that Lakewood failed to establish any of the Crowe factors required for entry of emergent relief.
Specifically, the Department stresses that Lakewood failed to timely approve its budget and
ceased operations, which was a self-created emergency that does not constitute irreparable harm,
particularly in light of Lakewood’s admission that it had funds available to meet its obligations
through March 2020. As the ALJ stated, “[t]he failure of the district to produce a budget by the
statutory date does not create an emergency warranting immediate relief when it represents that it
has funds to operate.” 	(Initial Decision at 8). 	Additionally, Lakewood cannot choose to cease
district operations over the State’s political budget process, and then claim that any hypothetical
harm to the students it serves is irreparable. 	The Department also addressed and replied to
Lakewood’s exceptions in connection with the remaining Crowe factors.
Regarding the viability of Lakewood’s underlying claim, the Department agrees
with the ALJ that, to the extent Lakewood is seeking consequential relief in the form of revenue
to cover any alleged shortfalls in its FY2020 operating budget, the matter is moot. 	Despite
Lakewood’s contention that the matter is not moot because the original issue presented [is] the
removal of $30,000,000 in State aid from the Governor’s budget, the ALJ correctly rejected
Lakewood’s efforts to have the OAL “interject itself into the political process of state budget
approval.” (Initial Decision at 11). The Department further argues that the Commissioner lacks
the authority to provide Lakewood with aid that the Legislature did not appropriate. Lakewood
has received aid in the amount that it requested in its petition, which are sufficient funds to
provide its students with a thorough and efficient education. 	Therefore, the Commissioner

5
should adopt the ALJ’s determination that Lakewood’s claims are now moot and adopt the Initial
Decision as the final decision in this matter.
Upon a comprehensive review of the record in this matter, the Commissioner
concurs with the ALJ – for the reasons thoroughly set forth in the Initial Decision – that
Lakewood has failed to demonstrate an entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to Crowe, supra.
Notably, the essence of Lakewood’s irreparable harm argument is that without the State aid
promised in the Governor’s budget, Lakewood was unable to comply with N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5(c)
as it lacked the financial resources to submit a budget sufficient to provide a thorough and
efficient education. Lakewood further alleges that its inability to comply with N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-
5(c), forced it to shut down services on July 1, 2019. Yet, Lakewood admittingly had the funds
necessary to meet its obligations to provide a thorough and efficient education through
March 2020, so clearly no financial shortfall was imminent. 	Moreover, on July 1, 2019, the
Commissioner, consistent with his practice of prior years, certified to the State Treasurer that
Lakewood required $36,033,862 to enable it to meet its constitutional obligations. 	The
Commissioner likewise agrees with the ALJ’s determination that Lakewood did not establish any
of the remaining Crowe factors.
The Commissioner is also in accord with the ALJ’s determination that the
underlying petition should be dismissed as moot. 	As discussed above, on July 1, 2019, the
Commissioner certified to the State Treasurer that Lakewood required $36,033,862 to meet its
constitutional obligations. 	As the ALJ succinctly stated, “[t]he Commissioner has acted within
the limits of his statutory authority to ensure that the district will have sufficient funding to
provide its students [with] a thorough and efficient education. The State Treasurer has complied
and has approved the loan to the district.” 	(Initial Decision at 11). 	Further, to the extent

6
Lakewood is seeking a political remedy – i.e. recourse for the disparity between the Governor’s
recommended budget and the budget passed by the Legislature – this forum does not have any
authority to rule on that request. Finally, the Commissioner is not persuaded that the exceptions
filed by Lakewood dictate a different result, because the objections outlined therein were
previously raised before the ALJ and were clearly taken into account by her in denying emergent
relief and determining that Lakewood’s underlying claim is now moot. Accordingly, the Initial
Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter and the petition of appeal is hereby
dismissed.7
IT IS SO ORDERED. 8
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	August 6, 2019
Date of Mailing: 	August 6, 2019
7 The Commissioner concurs with the ALJ’s determination that Lakewood’s request for records is too vague and that
the request for costs is not available in this forum.
8 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to P.L. 2008, c. 36.
(N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.1).

State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
(INCORPORATING 	MOTION
FOR EMERGENT RELIEF)
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08386-19
AGENCY DKT. NO. 142-6/19
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
LAKEWOOD TOWNSHIP,
(OCEAN COUNTY),
Petitioner,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION,
Respondent.
Michael I. Inzelbuch, Esq., appearing for petitioner
Lauren Jensen, Deputy Attorney General, appearing for respondent (Gurbir S.
Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney)
Record Closed: July 3, 2019 	Decided: July 3, 2019
BEFORE SUSAN M. SCAROLA, ALJ (Ret., on recall):

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, the Board of Education of Lakewood Township (Board or district), filed
this action against respondent, the New Jersey Department of Education (DOE), as an
emergent-relief request and petition, including a request that the petition also be
accepted as an application for emergent relief in lieu of a more formal petition.
Lakewood seeks that the DOE provide any and all requested records/documents
previously requested as to the [DOE] budget and the budget proceedings; that the DOE
take any and all steps to provide necessary and definitive and secure funding to the
Board; that the DOE take whatever action is required to allow the district to complete its
budget; that the DOE immediately advise the Board that public-school children will be
provided with a thorough and efficient education and the source of funding; that the
DOE forego collecting any and all previous loans/State-aid advances as it knew or
should have known that the monies were required to provide a thorough and efficient
education and were not able to be paid back; that the DOE reimburse the Board for any
and all costs and fees associated with the application; and any and all other relief
deemed appropriate and just.
The DOE contends that the petition is procedurally deficient and also fails to
state a claim on which relief can be granted, thereby requiring dismissal of the petition.
Further as of July 1, 2019, when the Commissioner provided the state aid advance
sought by the petitioner, the DOE contends the case is moot.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On or about June 19, 2019, the petitioner filed an “Emergent Relief Request and
Petition” with the DOE. 	The Commissioner of Education transmitted the matter as
“emergent” to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), where it was filed on June 20,
2019. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15; N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -13. The petitioner supplemented
its filing on June 26, 2019.

3
On June 26, 2019, the DOE filed a motion to dismiss. 	Oral argument was held
on June 26, 2019.9 	The respondent was given until July 1, 2019, to respond to the
petitioner’s supplemental exhibits, and the district was given until July 3, 2019, to
respond, if necessary. On July 1, 2019, before the DOE could respond, the district filed
two supplementary briefs and exhibits. 	The DOE was given additional time to respond
to these new filings, and replied on July 1 and 2, 2019. 	The district filed additional
supplementary letters and exhibits on July 1, 2, and 3, 2019.10 	The record closed on
July 3, 2019.11
FACTS
Lakewood is a unique school district within New Jersey: 	it is comprised of
approximately 6,000 enrolled public-school students, as well as approximately 31,000
non-public-school students. 	State aid to the district is based on the number of public-
school students. This calculation impacts the amount of funds that remain available for
the district to provide its enrolled students with a constitutionally-mandated thorough
and efficient education, because Lakewood also has a statutory mandate to pay for the
transportation and special-education costs for the non-public-school students.
Lakewood has been under the supervision of a State monitor since 2014. 	In
addition to School Funding Reform Act funding, the district has received nearly $47
million in advance State-aid payments since the 2015–2016 school year. 	Under the
School District Fiscal Accountability Act (SDFAA), N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-54 to -60, the
Commissioner of Education can recommend to the State Treasurer that an advance
State-aid payment should be made to a school district for which a State monitor has
been appointed. 	The Commissioner’s recommendation is based upon whether the
payment is necessary to ensure the provision of a thorough and efficient education.
N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-56(a).
9 The district bused approximately 100 students, including young special-education students, to
the hearing in Trenton. While hearings at the OAL are generally open to the public, and while
the interest of the children is understandable, the presence of children is not necessary to
impress upon this tribunal the seriousness of this matter.
10 These pleadings contained additional requests for relief not contained in the original application.
11 See list of exhibits.

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In 	2015–2016, 	the 	Commissioner 	recommended, 	and 	the 	district 	received,
$4,500,000; in 2016–2017, the Commissioner recommended, and the district received,
$5,640,183; and in 2017–2018, the Commissioner recommended, and the district
received, $8,522,678.12 	Most recently, the Commissioner recommended, and the
district received, approximately $28,000,000 in advance aid for the 2018–2019 school
year. 	Under the SDFAA, such aid is to be repaid by the school district through
automatic reductions in the State aid provided to the school district in subsequent years.
N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-56(b).
As the Governor prepared his proposed State budget for fiscal year 2019–2020,
an additional $30,000,000 (approximately) was earmarked for the district. 	However, by
June 20, 2019, the Legislature had approved and submitted a budget to the Governor
that eliminated this provision. 	Notwithstanding that these funds had already been
removed 	from 	the 	legislatively 	approved 	budget 	(appropriations 	act), 	the 	Board
approved its budget for 2019–2020 on June 24, 2019, but made it contingent upon the
receipt of the “promised” funds.
The Board states that it requires the $30,000,000 to meet its anticipated shortfall
for school year 2019–2020 to meet its constitutional obligations to the public-school
students to provide a thorough and efficient education, and to the non-public-school
students for whom it is statutorily mandated to provide services.13 	At oral argument,
Lakewood represented that the relief it was seeking was an order compelling the
Commissioner to write a letter to the State Treasurer to obtain the $30,000,000 in
advance aid the district claims is necessary to complete its budget for the upcoming
school year, and for that amount to be forthcoming from the State.14
12 For fiscal year ending June 30, 2018, the letter was not sent from the Commissioner to the Treasurer until
November 11, 2017.
13 The basis for the $30,000,000 in aid has not been disclosed as part of these proceedings other than that the state
fiscal monitors employed by the district have certified that this amount is necessary to provide Lakewood students a
thorough and efficient education.
14 Transcript at 67:
The Court: So what you’re saying is what you’re really looking for
is another letter, like the four previous letters that have been sent
from the Commissioner to the Treasurer saying “Lakewood needs
X dollars because it needs it to get a T&E”?

5
Following oral argument on June 26, 2019, the Board advised that because the
budget signed by the Governor on June 30, 2019, did not include the $30,000,000, the
budget the Board had approved earlier that week was null and void, the district had no
operating budget in place, and it was shutting down services effective July 1, 2019.15
On July 1, 2019, the Board shut down the school district.
On July 2, 2019, the DOE advised that on July 1, 2019, the Commissioner had
written a letter to the State Treasurer requesting that $36,033,862 be provided to the
district in the form of advance aid for school year 2019–2020, and that the State
Treasurer had approved the request. 	The DOE urges that this matter is now moot and
must be dismissed. The Board has not consented to the dismissal because the removal
of the funds from the governor’s budget was “political” and the loan of approximately
$36,000,000 recommended by the Commissioner and approved by the State Treasurer
is not the same as receiving $30,000,000 in direct aid.
As of July 3, 2019, the district represents that it is the only one in the state
without a certified budget and that it requires an additional $16.9 million in aid for the
coming school year.
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
I. 	Procedural Issues
The DOE has initially raised a procedural issue, namely, that the application that
was filed is not in conformity with N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(a), which provides:
Where the subject matter of the controversy is a particular
course of action by a district board of education or any other
party subject to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner, the
Mr. Inzelbuch: Exactly.
15 The underlying “petition” indicated that Lakewood had sufficient funds to cover the school district through March
2020.

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petitioner may include with the petition of appeal, a separate
motion for emergent relief or a stay of that action pending
the Commissioner’s final decision in the contested case.
Here, the petitioner filed an “Emergent Relief Request and Petition.” If this application is
considered as a “petition,” then no motion seeking emergent relief accompanied it. 	If
the application is considered as a “motion for emergent relief,” then no underlying
petition seeking final relief accompanied it.
The DOE is correct that procedurally the filing is deficient. 	However, given the
importance of the issue, the application will be treated as both a petition seeking final
relief and as a motion for emergent relief without the necessity of the petitioner filing a
formal motion for emergent relief, or filing supplemental pleadings.16
II. 	Emergent Issues
Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b), an application for emergent relief shall not be
granted unless it satisfies the following four standards:
1. 	The 	petitioner 	will 	suffer 	irreparable 	harm 	if 	the
requested relief is not granted;
2. 	The legal right underlying petitioner’s claim is settled;
3. 	The petitioner has a likelihood of prevailing on the
merits of the underlying claim; and
4. 	When the equities and interests of the parties are
balanced, the petitioner will suffer greater harm than the
respondent will suffer if the requested relief is not granted.
[See Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126, 132–34 (1982).]
The petitioner must meet all four criteria to prevail on its motion. 	See Crowe, 90 N.J.
126; DEC Electric, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of the S. Gloucester Cty. Reg’l High Sch. Dist. &
USA Elec. Contractors, Inc., 96 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 789, 790 (citing DEC Electric, Inc. v.
16 This accommodation, however, is not to be construed as precedent for accepting any other procedurally deficient
filings.

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S. Gloucester Cty. Reg’l High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. & USA Elec. Contractors, Inc.,
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 10833-95, Order Denying Emergent Relief (December 6, 1995),
adopted, Comm’r (December 26, 1995) (denied unsuccessful bidder’s request for
emergent relief because it was unable to establish that it would suffer immediate and
irreparable harm, although it was able to establish a reasonable likelihood of success on
the merits and that the parties opposing the motion would not suffer undue harm)).
The moving party has the burden to prove each of the Crowe factors by clear
and convincing evidence. 	Brown v. City of Paterson, 424 N.J. Super. 176, 183 (App.
Div. 2012); Waste Mgmt. of N.J. v. Union Cty. Utils. Auth., 399 N.J. Super. 508, 520
(App. Div. 2008).
Accordingly, each prong of the test must be analyzed:
1. 	Whether petitioner will suffer irreparable harm if the application is not
granted.
One of the principles for emergent relief is that relief should only be ordered to
prevent irreparable harm to the petitioner. 	Crowe, 90 N.J. at 132–33. 	Harm is
irreparable when it cannot be addressed with monetary damages. 	Ibid. 	This standard
contemplates that the harm also be both substantial and immediate. 	Subcarrier
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Day, 299 N.J. Super. 634, 638 (App. Div. 1997). 	“In certain
circumstances, 	severe 	personal 	inconvenience 	can 	constitute 	irreparable 	injury
justifying issuance of injunctive relief.” 	Crowe, 90 N.J. at 133. 	“Pecuniary damages
may be inadequate because of the nature of the injury or of the right affected.” Ibid.
The district alleges that its students will suffer irreparable harm if the relief sought
is not granted, namely that the Commissioner be compelled to certify to the State
Treasurer that it requires $30,000,000 to meet its funding obligations.
Under N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5(c), “[a]nnually, on or before March 4, or on or before
March 20 in the case of a school district with an annual school election in November,

8
each district board of education shall adopt, and submit to the commissioner for
approval, together with such supporting documentation as the commissioner may
prescribe, a budget that provides for a thorough and efficient education.”17 	Neither the
statutes 	nor 	the 	regulations 	governing 	school 	budgets 	specifically 	address 	the
consequences of a school district’s failure to adopt, or submit for approval, a budget
within the prescribed time limits. 	In particular, and important to this matter, there is an
absence of statutory or regulatory authority addressing whether a school district that
fails to adopt a budget for an upcoming school year may, or must, shut down and cease
all operations upon the start of the school year.
The Board did not approve its budget until the eleventh hour—and a contingent
budget at that. By not having a budget, the Board is asserting that irreparable harm will
occur because it cannot pay for services to its students. 	However, the petition alleged
that the district has funds available to meet its obligations through March 2020, so no
financial shortfall has yet occurred. While without a budget, the district may continue to
operate if it so chooses. The district is seeking a remedy that is in the form of monetary
relief. 	The failure of the district to produce a budget by the statutory date does not
create an emergency warranting immediate relief when it represents that it has funds to
operate.
2. 	Whether the legal right underlying petitioner’s claim is well settled.
The Board claims that the legal right underlying its claim is well settled, but it is
not. 	The school funding formula has been found to be constitutional.18 	The Board
contends that the district cannot spend money if it does not have an approved budget in
place for the 2019–2020 school year, but it has provided no law in support of that
position except to note that as State law requires the State to shut down non-essential
services if it does not have an approved budget, so must the district.
17 The date was adjusted by the Commissioner to March 12, 2019.
18 Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 199 N.J. 140 (2009). In a separate action pending in the OAL, other petitioners
allege that the school funding formula is unconstitutional as applied to Lakewood.

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The regulations concerning the budget process were designed to give districts
more than adequate time to arrange for budget review and approval with the DOE.
Were the district’s position correct, then districts acting with a monitor across the state
could decline to adopt budgets in accordance with the regulations and then claim an
emergency to compel the DOE to fund its services.
The district also claims that because the State monitors certified the amount
necessary for the district to provide a thorough and efficient education, that the
Commissioner should accept that amount without further review or analysis. 	But the
Commissioner can review any requests for additional aid to cover budget deficiencies in
order to determine whether a district is entitled to grants or loans. 	The Board has
certainly availed itself of this procedure in the years preceding this application. 	Indeed,
for fiscal year 2017-2018, the Board passed its budget but the requested letter from the
Commissioner was not issued until November 2017.
Accordingly, this prong of Crowe has not been met.
3. 	Whether petitioner is likely to be successful on the merits of its claim.
The Board did not demonstrate at the emergent hearing that it is likely to prevail
on the merits as the Commissioner had not yet determined whether to provide financial
assistance to the district for the 2019–2020 school year. The district has not shown that
relief is mandated in these circumstances. 	Moreover, no law or regulation requires the
Commissioner to be ordered to grant additional aid to the district, although as the record
closed, the DOE advised that the Commissioner did in fact send a letter to the State
Treasurer to request that the advance State aid be sent to the district in the amount of
$36,033,862, and further, that the treasurer has approved the request.

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4. 	Whether the petitioner will suffer greater harm than respondent if the
requested relief is not granted.
No doubt the issues raised by the district are substantial, but the harm is not
necessarily greater to the district than to the DOE. Indeed, if relief were granted here, it
could act as precedent for other monitored districts facing a budgetary shortfall to
withhold complying with the budget regulations and to file for orders to compel the
Commissioner to provide funds to them. Such a result could cause chaos in the school
funding and budget procedures. 	Moreover, the district has not demonstrated that it
would 	suffer 	greater 	harm 	if 	the 	relief 	requested 	were 	not 	granted, 	although
undoubtedly, children would suffer greater harm if they could not attend school.
Conclusion
After 	weighing 	the 	Crowe 	criteria, 	the 	district 	has 	not 	proven 	clearly 	and
convincingly that it has satisfied Crowe’s four prongs or that the district is entitled to
emergent relief. Accordingly, the request for emergent relief must be denied because it
is moot. The district received the relief it requested.
III. 	The Underlying “Petition”
The “petition” filed in this matter, while essentially seeking emergent relief, is also
being treated as an original petition. 	(See Section I.) 	Here, the district seeks the
following:
1. 	Compel the DOE to provide any and all requested records/documents
previously requested as to the budget and the budget proceedings;
2. 	that the DOE take any and all steps to provide necessary and definitive
and secure funding to the Board;

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3. 	that the DOE take whatever action is required to allow the district to
complete its budget;
4. 	that the DOE immediately advise the Board that public-school children will
be provided with a thorough and efficient education and the source of funding;
5. 	that 	the 	DOE 	forego 	collecting 	any 	and 	all 	previous 	loans/State-aid
advances as it knew or should have known that the monies were required to
provide a thorough and efficient education and were not able to be paid back;
and
6. 	that 	the 	DOE 	reimburse 	the 	Board 	for 	any 	and 	all 	costs 	and 	fees
associated with the application; and any and all other relief deemed appropriate
and just.
The DOE moves to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim on which relief
can be granted and, further, because the matter is moot. 	Indeed, this matter is now
moot. 	On July 1, 2019, the Commissioner, consistent with his practice of prior years,
certified to the State Treasurer that the Board required $36,033,862 to meet its
constitutional obligation. 	The Commissioner has acted within the limits of his statutory
authority to ensure that the district will have sufficient funding to provide its students a
thorough and efficient education. The State Treasurer has complied and has approved
the loan to the district.19
The request for records is too vague for relief to be granted. 	The request for
costs is not available in this forum. 	The remaining prayers for relief were resolved, as
counsel for the Board represented at the hearing that the letter from the Commissioner
that has now been provided would resolve this matter. The district would like this forum
to interject itself into the political process of state budget approval and the disparity
between the Governor’s recommended budget and that passed by the Legislature (but
later signed by the Governor). 	As the district seeks a political remedy, this forum is
19 The district argues that this advance should be an outright grant and not a loan.

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without authority to rule on those issues. 	Accordingly, the matter is now moot. 	“Courts
should not decide cases where judgment cannot grant relief,” or when the court’s
decision can have no practical effect on the existing controversy. 	Plainfield v. Dep’t of
Health & Senior Servs., 412 N.J. Super. 466, 483–84 (App. Div. 2010).
The petition shall be dismissed.
ORDER
The Board having failed to meet the four-pronged test of Crowe, the application
for emergent relief is DENIED.
As to any underlying claims not disposed of in the emergent application, they are
moot. 	Accordingly, 	the 	respondent’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	the 	petition 	is 	hereby
GRANTED. The petition is DISMISSED.
I hereby FILE this order on application for emergent relief and this initial decision
with the COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This order on application for emergency relief and this initial decision may be
adopted, modified or rejected by the COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, who by law is authorized to make a final decision in this matter. The final
decision shall be issued without undue delay, but no later than forty-five days following
the 	entry 	of 	this 	order. 	If 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE 	DEPARTMENT 	OF
EDUCATION does not adopt, modify or reject this order within forty-five days, this
recommended order shall become a final decision on the issue of emergent relief and a
final decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

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Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: 	BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES
AND DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500, marked “Attention: Exceptions.” A copy of any exceptions must be sent to
the judge and to the other parties.
July 3, 2019
DATE 	SUSAN M. SCAROLA, ALJ
(Ret., on recall)
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
SMS/cb

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APPENDIX
WITNESSES
For petitioner:
None
For respondent:
None
EXHIBITS
For petitioner:
June 20, 2019 	Petition with Exhibits A – E
June 25, 2019 	Supplemented Petition with Exhibits A – L
June 26, 2019 	Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
June 26, 2019 	Email with Exhibits
June 27, 2019 	Correspondence
June 27, 2019 	Correspondence with Exhibits A – D
June 27, 2019 	Correspondence with Flash Drive
June 28, 2019 	Correspondence with Exhibits A – E
July 1, 2019 	Correspondence with Exhibits
July 1, 2019 	Correspondence with Exhibits and Flash Drive
July 1, 2019 	Emails (3:28 p.m., 3:34 p.m. and 3:43 p.m.)
July 2, 2019 	Correspondence with Certifications
July 2, 2019 	Emails (1:24 p.m., 4:14 p.m. and 4:20 p.m.)
July 2, 2019 	Correspondence with Exhibits
July 3, 2019 	Correspondence with Exhibits A – I
For respondent:
June 25, 2019 	Motion to Dismiss – Brief and Certification
July 1, 2019 	Correspondence
July 2, 2019 	Emails (11:57 a.m. and 1:22 p.m.)