Luis A. Salcedo v. New Jersey Department of Education, Office of School Bus Safety, 3/30/26 (#115-26E)

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115-26E
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 02297-26
Agency Dkt. No. 038-02-26
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Order on Emergent Relief
Luis A. Salcedo,
Petitioner,
v.
New Jersey Department of Education, Office of
School Bus Safety,
Respondent.
The record of this emergent matter, the sound recording of the hearing held at the Office of
Administrative Law (OAL), and the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) have been
reviewed and considered.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that petitioner has failed to demonstrate
entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to the standards enunciated in Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126,
132-34 (1982), and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6.
Accordingly, the recommended Order denying petitioner’s application for emergent relief is
adopted. This matter shall continue at the OAL with such proceedings as the parties and the ALJ deem
necessary to bring it to closure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	March 30, 2026
Date of Mailing: 	March 30, 2026
New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ORDER DENYING
EMERGENT RELIEF
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02297-26
AGENCY DKT. NO. 038-02-26
LUIS A. SALCEDO,
Petitioner,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, OFFICE OF SCHOOL
BUS SAFETY,
Respondent.
______________________________
Luis A. Salcedo., petitioner, pro se
David L. Kalisky, Deputy Attorney General, (Jennifer Davenport, Acting Attorney
General of New Jersey, attorney) for respondent
BEFORE ERNEST M. BONGIOVANNI, ALJ
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The petitioner, Luis A. Salcedo (Salcedo/petitioner) challenges the Department of
Education, 	Office 	of 	School 	Bus 	Safety 	(DOE/respondent) 	determination 	that 	on
January 23, 2026, a child was left on the school bus to which he was assigned as bus
driver notwithstanding that N.J.S.A. 18A:39-28 et. Seq. which advised him as bus driver
to conduct a visual inspection at the end of his transportation toute to assure no pupil
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02297-26
2
has been left on his bus, and for which his school bus “S’ endorsement be suspended
for a period of six (6) months.
His appeal of this Action has suspended the imposition of this suspension until
his case is heard. 	However, petitioner asks, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6 et. seq., for
an order for emergent relief which would grant or order, among other things 1) “fully
vacate” the suspension of the S endorsement 2) that his three years of service with no
violations be considered 3) that a six month suspension would ‘result in loss of
employment and significant financial hardship” and 	4) that remedial measures such as
more training and monitoring be imposed instead of the suspension.
Here he seeks a stay from respondent’s action and claims his request for relief is
supported by the standards for emergent relief pursuant to Crowe v DeGioia, 90, N.J.
126 (1982) and N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6 	The underlying appeal was transmitted to the Office
of Administrative Law (OAL) on February 6, 2026 with instructions that the merits of the
appeal be addressed once the request for emergent relief has been decided. Briefs and
statements 	of 	uncontested 	facts 	were 	received, 	and 	I 	have 	determined 	there 	is
practically no dispute whatsoever regarding essential facts in this action for emergent
relief. 	Oral Argument was heard February 17, 2025, and the parties were given an
additional day to cite previously unsubmitted case and statutory law supporting their
arguments. 	Having received none, the record closed February 18, 2026. 	For the
reasons which follow, I now deny the request for emergent relief and determine that
case shall be set down for further hearings.
Petitioner argues he followed the correct procedure as a bus driver dropping off
children at school, at the stop that occurred at a school in Woodland Park, New Jersey
at approximately 8:10 a.m. on January 23, 2025, after he was done operating his bus on
Bus Route R127. Although petitioner said he followed the correct procedure, he did not
explain those procedures in his moving papers but did explain the procedures he
followed during oral argument on the motion. oral argument on his motion
He stated the school his aide who was with him the entire trip assisted by getting
off the bus at the school stop and staying behind the bus to keep children to watch them
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02297-26
3
depart and go to the school. Although there seemed to be no counting system in effect
the aide did not alert him to anything amiss. Nevertheless, when he proceeded back to
the bus parking lot at 8:40, and parked his bus, he activated the “child safety button,
which resulted in his realization that a pupil Amir Brown was still on the bus 	Petitioner
noted that the child was never left alone on the bus despite his not knowing the child
was there except when he parked the truck and transferred to another bus after
realizing that the pupil needed to be transferred back to the school by another bus
driver.
Petitioner states that the suspension of his school bus (S) endorsement will result
in a loss of employment and significant financial hardship, that he has driven a school
bus for three years without any other incident and that the respondent could provide
less onerous remedies like requiring additional training.
The respondent argues that notwithstanding Salcedo’s statutory obligation to
conduct a visual inspection at the end of his transportation route to assure that no pupils
remain on the bus, one child was left undiscovered and still on the bus. 	This statutory
obligation may indeed by be a strict liability statute although that was not specifically
pleaded by the respondent, perhaps as it has not had sufficient time to file their pleading
to the underlying petition. 	In any event the respondent points out that the 6 months
suspension of the license endorsement is mandatory, which would indicate the bus
driver is held to a strict liability standard in this regard. 	In any case, here Salcedo
admitted that he did not perform any final inspection of his bus on the last stop of his
transportation toute ending at the school on January 23, 2026. 	In his moving papers he
even admits had he done “an inspection of the bus prior to departing the school
premises would have further insured that no students remained on board.”
Motion for Emergent Relief
The moving party must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he is
entitled to emergent relief, the standards for granting such relief which are governed by
Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1990).
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02297-26
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The petitioner has the burden of establishing all of the above requirements in
order to warrant relief in their favor. 	D.I. and S.I. on behalf of T.I. v. Monroe Township
Board of Education, 2017 N.J. Agen LEXIS 814, 7 (OAL Docket No. EDS 10816-17,
October 25, 2017). 	The moving party bears the burden of proving each of the Crowe
elements “clearly and convincingly.” 	Waste Mgmt. of N.J. v. Union Cnty. Utils. Auth.,
399 N.J. Super. 508, 520 (App. Div. 2008).
1. Did petitioner demonstrate substantial immediate and irreparable harm?
First here the harm appears to be purely the loss of possible future income.
Purely economic loss, even six months possible loss of income is not generally
considered irreparable, and petitioner has not argued he couldn’t make up the loss by
some other way such as different employment. 	Under Crowe, 90 NJ at 132-133, harm
is generally considered irreparable if it cannot be adequately redressed by monetary
damages. 	In other words, it has been described as “substantial injury to a material
degree coupled with the inadequacy of money damages.” Judice’s Sunshine Pontiac v.
General Motors Corp., 418 F.Supp. 1212, 1218 (D.N.J. 1976) (citation omitted). 	In any
event we have no idea when the penalty will have any effect on petitioner because his
filing of this appeal has barred any action against his license until the entire matter is
concluded by the litigation process. Therefore, any loss if there is one is not “imminent”
with or without a stay. 	I find the entire issue of immediate and irreparable harm to be
mere speculation at this point.
2. Is Petitioner likely to prevail on the Merits of the Claim and 3, is there a
legal right underlying the petitioner’s claim well settled.
No. 	At this stage it appears Salcedo will have a difficult time meeting this
challenge. 	He has cited no supporting law, e.g. whether he should be held to a mere
“negligence standard.” 	Further Salcedo, in his motion admitted he failed to make what
appears to be his statutory obligation to personally make a visual inspection at his last
stop while dropping off the students and even admits if he had the pupil probably
wouldn’t have been left on the bus. 	See N.J.S.A 18A39-28 	Also, the statute provides
that “In the event that after notice and opportunity to be heard a school bus driver is
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02297-26
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found to have left a pupil on the school bus at the end of his route, his school bus
endorsement shall be a. suspended for six months for a first offense…” N.J.S.A.18A38-
29. 	Even if an appeal is taken from the imposition of the penalty the only issue on
appeal other than whether it was a first offense would be “did the driver leave a student
on the bus after finishing his route.”
For the same reasons, the legal right underlying petitioner’s claim while well
settled is settled on the side of respondent, and thus petitioner fails to establish three of
the four standards under Crowe.
As petitioner must meet all four standards under Crowe, and has failed the first
three as described, I refrain from determining whether the equities are balanced and if
so if petitioner suffers greater harm than respondent if the requested relief is not
granted.
ORDER DENYING EMERGENCY RELIEF
Under the circumstances, I CONCLUDE that the petitioner has not met the
burden of establishing a right to emergent relief as he failed to prevail on any of the four
“prongs” of Crowe where he is required to prevail on all of them to be entitled to relief.
Therefore, all emergent relief sought is DENIED.
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02297-26
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This Order on application for emergency relief may be adopted, modified or
rejected by the COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by
law is authorized to make a final decision in this matter. 	The final decision shall be
issued without undue delay but no later than forty-five days following the entry of this
order. 	If the COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION does not
adopt, modify or reject this order within forty-five days, this recommended order shall
become a final decision on the issue of emergent relief in accordance with N.J.S.A.
52:14B-10.
February 19, 2026
DATE 	ERNEST M. BONGIOVANNI, ALJ
Date Received at Agency 	2/19/26
Date Mailed to Parties: 	2/19/26
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