Borough of Highlands, Monmouth County and Jo-Anne Olszewski v. Board of Education of the Henry Hudson Regional School District, Monmouth County, 3/30/26 (#111-26)

111-26
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 10919-25
Agency Dkt. No. 117-4/25
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Borough of Highlands, Monmouth County and
Jo-Anne Olszewski,
Petitioners,
v.
Board 	of 	Education 	of 	the 	Henry 	Hudson
Regional School District, Monmouth County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL),
the exceptions filed by petitioners pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and the Henry Hudson Regional
Board of Education’s (Board) reply thereto, have been reviewed and considered.
Following passage of a referendum in September 2023, the Henry Hudson Regional School
District (District) was expanded from a limited purpose regional school district to an all-purpose
regional school district serving students in grades pre-kindergarten through twelve from the
Boroughs of Highlands and Atlantic Highlands. In January 2025, the District published an Annual
Comprehensive Financial Report for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 2024, which indicated that the
former Highlands Board of Education (BOE) contributed more net assets and total reserves to the
District than the former Atlantic Highlands BOE.

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Thereafter, in April 2025, petitioners, the Borough of Highlands and Jo-Anne Olszewski,
Council President, filed the instant petition and sought an order requiring “an accounting of the
moneys, and other assets” received by the District from the BOEs pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:13-50,
explaining how they were budgeted and used. In addition, they sought equitable relief pursuant
to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9 in the form of an order requiring the District to create a reserve fund to be
used for the benefit of students attending Highlands Elementary School and a tax credit which,
in tandem with the reserve fund, would equal the disproportionate assets and reserve funds
contributed by the former Highlands BOE to the District.
Respondent moved to dismiss the petition pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.5, claiming that the
matter was untimely filed and belonged in the Superior Court of New Jersey pursuant to N.J.S.A.
19:29-2, an election law statute, and that the remedies sought were unavailable to them. 	In
particular, respondent asserted that N.J.S.A. 18A:13-50 does not support petitioners’ claim for
an accounting to be ordered by the Commissioner, and that petitioners had no factual or legal
basis upon which to request that the Commissioner order the equitable relief sought.
Upon review, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted respondent’s motion to dismiss
the petition. The ALJ concluded that petitioners failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted regarding the accounting and held that N.J.S.A. 18A:13-50 imposes no continuing duty
to account for transferred assets. The ALJ reasoned that N.J.S.A. 18A:13-50 “describes how real
and personal property is transferred to, and vests in, a regional district” and “does not address
the timing or format of any asset inventory.” Initial Decision, at 6. The ALJ further explained that
the statute’s plain language “clearly indicates that this process occurs as part of the dissolution
of the local districts” and “serves an administrative purpose . . . rather than an informational

3
purpose, informing the public how the assets previously held by their local districts were or would
be used.” Ibid. 	Thus, the ALJ determined that “[a]ny assertion that Highlands’ taxpayers are
entitled to an inventory or report beyond what the statute contemplates is therefore legally
unsupported.” Ibid.
Additionally, the ALJ concluded that petitioners failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted regarding a reserve fund and tax credit because the relief sought exceeds the
Commissioner’s authority given the circumstances. 	While recognizing that the Commissioner
has, in limited instances, exercised equitable authority to allocate costs between constituent
districts to address constitutional concerns, the ALJ found as follows:
Even accepting all facts that petitioners allege, and drawing all
reasonable inferences in their favor, they have not alleged any facts
that would warrant the Commissioner granting the relief they seek.
Petitioners allege only that Highlands [BOE] contributed more
resources than Atlantic Highlands [BOE]. They do not allege that
Highlands’ students are not receiving a thorough and efficient
education, that constitutional issues are implicated, or that they
have taken any action at the local legislative level. 	Although
petitioners allege they unknowingly and unwittingly voted for
broader regionalization, that is not a valid basis to demand that the
Commissioner allocate resources for the sole benefit of one
constituent elementary school in a district charged with education
management at a regional level.
[Initial Decision, at 8.]
In their exceptions, petitioners argue that: 	(1) the ALJ misinterpreted the inventory
requirement set forth at N.J.S.A. 18A:13-50; and (2) the ALJ erred when concluding that the
Commissioner lacked authority to provide the relief sought, i.e., equitable allocation of assets to
rectify disproportionate contributions made to the District by the former Highlands and Atlantic
Highlands BOEs.

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In response, the Board reiterates its position that: (1) N.J.S.A. 18A:13-50 does not support
the relief requested by petitioners; (2) there is no reason for the Commissioner to exercise her
equitable authority at this juncture; and (3) this petition is really an untimely election law appeal
that belongs in the Superior Court of New Jersey and not before the Commissioner.
Upon review, the Commissioner adopts the Initial Decision as the final decision in this
matter. 	Petitions are subject to dismissal by the Commissioner “on the grounds that the
petitioner has advanced no cause of action even if the petitioner’s factual allegations are
accepted as true.” N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.10. This standard also appears in New Jersey Court Rule 4:6-
2(e), which permits a motion for judgment on the pleadings for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. See Jonathan Wadley v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., Office of Student Prot., OAL
Dkt. No. EDU 09223-22, Initial Decision at 4-5 (Mar. 10, 2023), adopted, Commissioner Decision
No. 110-23 (Apr. 11, 2023) (assessing motion to dismiss pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.10 under
standards used by courts when analyzing Rule 4:6-2 motions). Such motions “must be evaluated
in light of the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged.” Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100,
106 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Donato v. Moldow, 374 N.J. Super. 475, 482 (App. Div. 2005)).
Ultimately, a petition must be dismissed for failure to state a claim “if it has failed to articulate a
legal basis entitling [petitioners] to relief.” Ibid.
The Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that N.J.S.A. 18A:13-50 does not provide a legal
basis entitling petitioners to an accounting of moneys, assets, and reserves received by the
District from the BOEs, explaining how they were budgeted and used. “The Legislature’s intent
is the paramount goal when interpreting a statute and, generally, the best indicator of that intent
is the statutory language.” DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005). Words must be ascribed

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“their ordinary meaning and significance” and read “in context with related provisions so as to
give sense to the legislation as a whole.” Ibid.; N.J.S.A. 1:1-1.
“The Legislature has enacted a complex statutory scheme designed to promote the
regionalization of school districts.” 	In re Verified Petition for Proposed Creation of PK-12 All-
Purpose Reg’l Sch. Dist., 262 N.J. 318, 320 (2025) (citing N.J.S.A. 18A:13-1 to -81). As part of that
statutory scheme, N.J.S.A. 18A:13-50 governs the orderly transfer of assets from a dissolved
school district to a successor regional school district. The statute provides in relevant part: “All
personal property, books, papers, vouchers and other documents belonging to any district, being
dissolved, shall be transferred to the secretary of said regional district who shall cause a complete
inventory to be made on all assets, real and personal, received by the regional school district.”
While “inventory” is not statutorily defined, its plain language meaning is “an itemized list
of 	current 	assets.” 	Merriam-Webster 	Dictionary, 	https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/inventory (last visited March 9, 2026). 	An inventory differs from an
“accounting” requested by petitioners, which is “the system of recording and summarizing
business and financial transactions and analyzing, verifying, and reporting the results.” Merriam-
Webster 	Dictionary, 	https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/accounting 	(last 	visited
March 9, 2026). Based upon a reading of the statute’s plain language and Chapter 13 as a whole,
the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that N.J.S.A. 18A:13-50 does not require the District to
produce an accounting to petitioners of assets it received from the now dissolved districts.
Petitioners’ reliance on the educational advocacy inventories referenced in N.J.S.A.
18A:7G-4 and room inventories in N.J.A.C. 6A:26-3.2 and 3.3 pertaining to school facilities
projects to support its position that they are entitled to an accounting of assets is unavailing.

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They concede that the purpose of the inventory requirements in N.J.S.A. 18A:7G-4 and N.J.A.C.
6A:26-3.2 and 3.3 is to disclose information to the Commissioner, who is tasked with overseeing
certain school facilities projects pursuant to the Educational Facilities Construction and Financing
Act (EFCFA), N.J.S.A. 18A:7G-1 to -48. Neither N.J.S.A. 18A:7G-4 nor N.J.A.C. 6A:26-3.2 and 3.3
support petitioners’ contention that the inventory requirement in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-50 requires an
accounting to be produced and disclosed to taxpayers at large who are not required to oversee
the transition of assets from dissolved school districts to regional school districts.
In sum, Chapter 13 does not create a private right of action for taxpayers to compel
production of an accounting. The referendum process allowed taxpayers to be heard regarding
expansion of the regional school district. Nothing in the plain language of Chapter 13 suggests
that the Legislature intended to empower taxpayers to attack the referendum after its passage
by requiring regional school districts to produce an accounting for their benefit. 	Contrary to
petitioners’ assertion, interpreting the statutory scheme in such a manner would not be
consistent with the Legislature’s goal “to promote the regionalization of school districts, with
particular focus on creating all-purpose regional school districts to educate public school students
at all grade levels.” In re Verified Petition, 262 N.J. at 322. 	Instead, burdening regional school
districts with a requirement to produce an accounting to dissatisfied taxpayers after passage of
a referendum could achieve the opposite goal.
As for the equitable relief sought, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that neither
N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9 nor case law provide a legal basis entitling petitioners to a reserve fund and a tax
credit to offset disproportionate assets and funds contributed by the former Highlands BOE to
the District. While the Supreme Court ordered the Commissioner to develop an equitable cost

7
apportionment scheme for a regional school district in In the Matter of the Petition for
Authorization to Conduct a Referendum on the Withdrawal of North Haledon School District from
the Passaic County Manchester Regional High School District, 181 N.J. 161, 186 (2004), the
extraordinary circumstances at issue there are not present here.
In North Haledon, the Borough of North Haledon was not permitted to conduct a
referendum to withdraw from the Passaic County Manchester Regional High School District
because its withdrawal would negatively impact the racial composition of the regional school
district. 	The Court held that “the constitutional imperative to address racial segregation”
required North Haledon “to remain in the Regional District despite the tax burden on its citizens.”
Id. at 186. Furthermore, the Court held that “when a constituent municipality is compelled to
participate in a Regional District . . . the Commissioner may determine cost allocations among
and between” the constituent municipalities. Ibid.
In this case, the circumstances are very different. Highlands’ voters elected to expand the
District, which resulted in dissolution of Highlands BOE and the transfer of its assets to the District
pursuant to the statutory scheme discussed herein. Highlands was not compelled to remain in
the District to prevent racial segregation. As the ALJ correctly determined, petitioners do not
allege that students from Highlands are not receiving a thorough and efficient education in the
District, or that other constitutional issues are implicated. For these reasons, the Commissioner
declines to grant petitioners the extraordinary equitable remedy they seek.
Petitioners’ reliance upon Borough of Seaside Park v. Commissioner of Education, 432 N.J.
Super. 167 (App. Div. 2013), and In the Matter of the Distribution of Liquid Assets Upon Dissolution
of Union County Regional High School District No. 1, 168 N.J. 1 (2001), is misplaced. In Seaside

8
Park, the court recognized the Supreme Court’s directive to the Commissioner regarding
equitable cost apportionment under the extraordinary circumstances in North Haledon.
However, the court in Seaside Park did not order equitable relief there because the circumstances
differed from North Haledon. Instead, the court held that “because this case does not implicate
the impact of withdrawal or dissolution on racial diversity or issues of other constitutional
dimension after a successful referendum, we discern no basis to invoke the extraordinary remedy
of judicial intervention and mandate that the Commissioner implement an equitable cost
allocation.” Id. at 208. Decided before North Haledon, In the Matter of the Distribution of Liquid
Assets, 168 N.J. at 15, is distinguishable because it concerns whether deviation from N.J.S.A.
18A:8-24, which governs equitable distribution of liquid assets and liabilities among constituent
communities following dissolution of a regional school district, is permissible under the
applicable statutory framework. That statutory scheme is not implicated here.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter, and the
petition of appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.1
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	March 30, 2026
Date of Mailing: 	March 30, 2026
1 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
9.1. Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days
from the date of mailing of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
DISMISSAL
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10919-25
AGENCY DKT. NO. 117-4/25
BOROUGH OF HIGHLANDS, MONMOUTH
COUNTY AND JO-ANNE OLSZEWSKI,
Petitioners,
v.
HENRY HUDSON REGIONAL SCHOOL
DISTRIC BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Respondent.
Kerri A. Wright, Esq., for petitioners (Porzio, Bromberg & Newman, P.C.)
Rita F. Barone, Esq., for respondent (Flanagan, Barone & O’Brien, LLC, attorney)
Record Closed: December 4, 2025 Decided: December 31, 2025
BEFORE DEAN J. BUONO, A.L.J.:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioners, Borough of Highlands and Councilmember Jo-Anne Olszewski,
challenge what they view as an inequitable distribution of assets following the dissolution

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10919-25
2
of the Highlands and Atlantic Highlands Boards of Education and the reconfiguration of
the Henry Hudson Regional School District (the District).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL DISCUSSION
In 2020, the Boroughs of Highlands and Atlantic Highlands, then constituent
districts of the limited-purpose Henry Hudson Regional School District, began exploring
whether to reconfigure the District into an all-purpose regional district that could educate
all children in grades PK–12. Thereafter, feasibility studies were conducted in 2020 and
2021 to assess the financial, educational, and racial impact of the proposed
reconfiguration. A third feasibility study, conducted in 2023, supported a petition to the
Commissioner of Education to authorize a referendum on the District’s reconfiguration.
On July 21, 2023, the Commissioner authorized a referendum, which was held on
September 26, 2023. The public was afforded multiple opportunities to review and
discuss the reconfiguration proposal. There were two public sessions held in May 2022
and September 2023, as well as regular Board of Education meetings. Ultimately, the
referendum passed by majority vote.
On July 1, 2024, the District was reconfigured and expanded into an all-purpose
regional school district, serving the PK–12 students of Highlands and Atlantic Highlands.
On January 22, 2025, the District published the Annual Comprehensive Financial
Report for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2024, which contained financial figures related
to how assets from the dissolved boards had been managed.
On April 22, 2025, petitioners submitted a verified petition, making two allegations
against the District. (Petitioners’ Verified Petition against Respondent Henry Hudson
Regional School District Board of Education at 6–8.) First, petitioners allege that the
District violated N.J.S.A. 18A:13-50 by failing to inventory assets it received from the
dissolved boards of education. They claim this failure prevents Highlands’ taxpayers from
knowing how their community’s assets have been spent or whether it was primarily for
the benefit of Highlands’ students. Petitioners further claim that had Highlands’ voters

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10919-25
3
known the outcome of the eventual asset distribution, they would not have voted in favor
of the wider regionalization. They request that the Commissioner order the District to
provide an accounting of (1) assets received, (2) how the District budgeted and used
those assets, and (3) any credits or other equitable measures the District has undertaken
to account for the disparity in assets and reserves contributed.
Second, petitioners allege that by entering into the new regionalization plan,
Highlands’ taxpayers unknowingly and unfairly entered into an arrangement in which they
contributed significantly more resources to the new district than Atlantic Highlands
taxpayers. To rectify this, they ask that the Commissioner require creation of a reserve
fund for the sole benefit of Highlands Elementary School and issue a tax credit to the
Borough of Highlands to offset the alleged disparity.
On June 11, 2025, the District filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer, alleging
that petitioners failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (See Respondent’s
Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss in Lieu of an Answer), and the matter was
subsequently transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL).
ISSUE TO BE DECIDED
The question is whether petitioners have alleged sufficient facts to a claim for
relief, thereby precluding dismissal.
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. The standards for a motion to dismiss.
The rules of procedure governing petitions filed with the Commissioner permit a
respondent to submit a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer “on the grounds that the
petitioner has advanced no cause of action even if the petitioner's factual allegations are
accepted as true or for lack of jurisdiction, failure to prosecute, or other good reason.”
N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.10; N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.5(g). However, these education rules do not offer
any guidance on the standards by which such motions should be assessed.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10919-25
4
The Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules (UAPR), N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.1 to -21.6,
also do not include such standards but provide that, “[i]n the absence of a rule, a judge
may proceed in accordance with the New Jersey Court Rules, provided the rules are
compatible with” the UAPR, which are designed “to achieve just results, simplicity in
procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and
delay,” N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.3(a).
Here, the court rule that fills the void is R. 4:6-2 which, like N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.5(g)
and N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.10, allows for motions to dismiss. Since R. 4:6-2 serves the interests
of time and expense and may help achieve just results, it is compatible with the UAPR’s
purposes, and thus it is appropriate to assess respondent’s motion to dismiss in lieu of
an answer under the standards used by the courts in applying R. 4:6-2.
Under these standards, if the basis for a motion to dismiss is that the petition has
advanced no cause of action, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
“the test for determining the adequacy of [the] pleading [is] whether a cause of action is
‘suggested’ by the facts,” such that the “inquiry is limited to examining the legal sufficiency
of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint.” Printing-Mart Morristown v. Sharp Elecs.
Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) (citing R. 4:6-2(e); Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988); Rieder v. Dep’t of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552 (App. Div.
1987)).
Importantly, for purposes of the motion, it does not matter whether a petitioner can
ultimately “prove the allegation contained in the complaint” because “all facts alleged in
the complaint and the legitimate inferences drawn therefrom are deemed admitted.”
Printing-Mart Morristown, 116 N.J. at 746 (citing Somers Constr. Co. v. S. Gloucester
Cnty. Reg’l High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 198 F. Supp. 732, 734 (D.N.J. 1961)); Smith v.
City of Newark, 136 N.J. Super. 107, 112 (App. Div. 1975) (citing Heavner v. Uniroyal,
Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 133 (1973); J.H. Becker, Inc. v. Marlboro Twp., 82 N.J. Super. 519, 524
(App. Div. 1964)). While “[a] complaint should not be dismissed . . . where a cause of
action is suggested by the facts,” “a dismissal is mandated where the factual allegations

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10919-25
5
are palpably insufficient to support a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Rieder, 221
N.J. Super. at 552.
Also, if “matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the
court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided by R. 4:46, and all parties shall be given reasonable notice of the court’s
intention to treat the motion as one for summary judgment and a reasonable opportunity
to present all material pertinent to such a motion.” R. 4:6-2.
II. Petitioners have not stated a claim for an accounting.
Petitioners assert that the District violated N.J.S.A. 18A:13-50 when it allegedly
failed to inventory the assets it received from the now dissolved boards of education of
Highlands and Atlantic Highlands. This claim fails as a matter of law.
A. The statute imposes no continuing duty to account for transferred assets.
N.J.S.A. 18A:13-50 governs the transfer of funds and property upon the dissolution
of a local school district that elects to join a regional school district. It provides:
Upon the dissolution of any local district the officer having
custody of the funds of such district shall deliver all of the
funds of the dissolved district in his possession to the
secretary of the successor regional district who shall give his
receipt therefor and shall, in a district which has a treasurer of
school moneys, immediately turn the same over to the
treasurer of school moneys of the regional district.
All personal property, books, papers, vouchers and other
documents belonging to any district, being dissolved, shall be
transferred to the secretary of said regional district who shall
cause a complete inventory to be made on all assets, real and
personal, received by the regional school district. Upon and
after the date of dissolution of the district all proceeds of taxes
of any nature raised or to be levied for use or benefit of each
dissolving school district and rights and claims with respect
thereto, and all the property, funds, moneys and assets of
each dissolving district shall vest in the regional district and
the regional district shall be subject to all the contracts, debts

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10919-25
6
and other obligations of each dissolving district. Upon said
date all bonds and notes, of each dissolving district,
theretofore issued and outstanding and all bonds and notes
theretofore issued and outstanding of any municipality
constituting or comprised within any dissolving district which
were issued for the purpose of acquiring property which is
vesting on said date in the regional district shall be and shall
constitute obligations of and payable as to both principal and
interest by the regional district, and, unless otherwise required
or provided for by law, in the same manner and to the same
extent as if such bonds and notes had been issued by the
board of the regional district. The regional board shall cause
an audit and settlement of all accounts of officers of the former
district or districts to be made forthwith. The official bonds of
such officers shall be continued in full force and effect until the
completion of such audit and satisfactory financial settlement
of said accounts shall have been made.
[Ibid. (emphasis added).]
The statute describes how real and personal property is transferred to, and vests
in, a regional district. It does not address the timing or format of any asset inventory.
Instead, the language clearly indicates that this process occurs as part of the dissolution
of the local districts. It serves an administrative purpose, ensuring an orderly transfer of
financial responsibility to the newly formed district, rather than an informational purpose,
informing the public how the assets previously held by their local districts were or would
be used. Any assertion that Highlands’ taxpayers are entitled to an inventory or report
beyond what the statute contemplates is therefore legally unsupported.
B. Petitioners’ allegations are speculative and legally insufficient.
Petitioners’ allegation that Highlands’ taxpayers may not have voted in favor of
wider regionalization if they had known how the assets would be distributed is pure
conjecture and cannot form the basis of a claim.
Petitioners cite numerous financial figures they say were obtained from the Annual
Comprehensive Financial Report of the Henry Hudson Regional Board of Education for
the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2024. Their claim that no inventory of assets exists is
undermined by their own reliance on these figures, which could only have been derived

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10919-25
7
from an underlying asset inventory. Indeed, the figures were detailed enough for
petitioners themselves to identify and challenge the distribution of assets.
Since petitioners are not entitled to any specific form of accounting, they have not
advanced a cause of action warranting the accounting they seek.
III. The relief sought exceeds the Commissioner’s authority.
Petitioners argue that the Commissioner has general equitable powers over cost
allocation and related matters in school regionalization, such that the Commissioner could
order the requested accountings, reserve fund, and tax credit. However, such relief goes
beyond what the Commissioner is authorized to grant under the circumstances and would
circumvent the legislative processes for cost appropriations and budgetary controls.
The Commissioner’s authority is limited to that conferred by statute. While the
Commissioner may exercise equitable discretion in certain circumstances, its appropriate
exercise is highly fact sensitive. In Borough of Seaside Park v. Commissioner,
Department of Education, the Appellate Division acknowledged that the Commissioner
may have such authority when addressing constitutional concerns, like that of racial
segregation. See 432 N.J. Super. 167 (App. Div. 2013). The circumstances cited as an
example were that a constituent municipality had been prohibited from withdrawing from
a regional district because withdrawal would have created de facto segregation, and
“[w]hen a constituent municipality is compelled to participate in a Regional District. . . the
Commissioner may determine cost allocations among and between [constituent
districts].” Id. at 181 (citing In re Petition for Authorization to Conduct a Referendum on
Withdrawal of N. Haledon Sch. Dist. from the Passaic Cnty. Manchester Reg’l High Sch.
Dist., 181 N.J. 161, 184 (2004)).
There, the Appellate Division noted that “the voters [in Seaside Park] rejected the
referendum on dissolution. . . never voted on the issue of Seaside Park’s withdrawal. . .
and rejected a modification of the funding formula after the court’s February 2008
decision,” thus there was “no basis to invoke the extraordinary remedy of judicial

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10919-25
8
intervention and mandate that the Commissioner implement an equitable cost allocation.”
Seaside Park, 432 N.J. Super. 167 at 208. Further, the court stated:
Here, there is no allegation that the students. . . are not
receiving a thorough and efficient education, i.e., that there
are insufficient financial resources in the District to provide a
thorough education, or that financial resources are being
squandered at the expense of the children’s education.
Rather, plaintiffs attack the constitutionality of the equalized
valuation method for funding regional school districts because
it imposes a greater financial burden on municipalities such
as Seaside Park, which have high property values and few
students attending the school system. The distribution of
education costs among taxpayers is a policy decision to be
made by the Legislature. . . and plaintiffs’ arguments should
be directed to that body.
[Id. at 212.]
Even accepting all facts that petitioners allege, and drawing all reasonable
inferences in their favor, they have not alleged any facts that would warrant the
Commissioner granting the relief they seek. Petitioners allege only that Highlands
contributed more resources than Atlantic Highlands. They do not allege that Highlands’
students are not receiving a thorough and efficient education, that constitutional issues
are implicated, or that they have taken any action on the local legislative level. Although
petitioners allege they unknowingly and unwittingly voted for broader regionalization, that
is not a valid basis to demand that the Commissioner allocate resources for the sole
benefit of one constituent elementary school in a district charged with education
management at a regional level.
For the reasons stated, I CONCLUDE that petitioners have failed to advance a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
ORDER
It is therefore ORDERED that respondent’s motion to dismiss is hereby
GRANTED, and it is further ORDERED that petitioners’ petition is DISMISSED.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10919-25
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I hereby FILE my initial decision with the COMMISSIONER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. If the Commissioner of the Department of Education
does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless such time
limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final decision in
accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES AND
DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey 08625-
0500, marked “Attention: Exceptions.” A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the
Judge and to the other parties.
December 31, 2025
DATE DEAN J. BUONO, A.L.J.
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
DJB/ol/gd

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10919-25
10
APPENDIX
Exhibits
For respondent
R-1 Event Details for the Highlands Borough Website containing the Ballot
Proposal and Explanatory Statement for the September 26, 2023,
Regionalization Referendum
R-2 Henry Hudson Tri District LEAP Grant Feasibility Study Findings
Presentation from May 25, 2025
R-3 March 2023 Updated Financial Analysis, by Dr. Brian Falkowski
R-4 September 2023 Updated Financial Analysis, by Dr. Brian Falkowski