David Moy V. Board of Education of the Township of Maple Shade, Burlington County, 2/28/19, (#51-19)

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51-19
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
David Moy,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Township of
Maple Shade, Burlington County,
Respondent.
Synopsis
Pro se petitioner challenged the attendance and care of school property policies of the respondent
Maple Shade Board of Education (Board), and argued that the Superintendent of Schools violated District
policy regarding the duties of the superintendent. More specifically, petitioner contended, inter alia, that
these Board policies violated N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.6, and further claimed that the attendance policy
conflicted with other Board policies on: promotion and retention; reporting student progress; student
discipline and code of conduct; and high school graduation. The Board filed a motion for summary
decision.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: the petitioner challenged the District’s policies on attendance and care of
school 	property 	and 	alleged 	that 	the 	Superintendent 	violated 	District 	policy 	regarding 	the
Superintendent’s duties, but failed to dispute the veracity of the facts as set forth by the Board; nor did
petitioner set forth any specific evidence to show that there are material facts in dispute; additionally,
aside from invoking various Board policies, the petitioner has set forth no facts explaining the alleged
conflicts or showing that any genuine issue of material fact exists; even if petitioner were to set forth
evidence supporting a policy, statutory, or regulatory violation by the Superintendent, he would not be
entitled to any relief, as evaluation of the superintendent’s performance and any action resulting
therefrom is governed by contract and statute; accordingly, as there are no real issues of material fact
herein, the matter is ripe for summary decision; 	petitioner’s claims regarding the District’s attendance
policy are moot because, inter alia, the implementing regulation of the attendance policy has been revised
to modify or eliminate the challenged provisions; regarding the care of school policy, petitioner has
produced no evidence to show that the District has withheld report cards from students with outstanding
fines for damage to school property; and it is well settled that decisions of local boards of education are
entitled to a presumption of correctness; petitioner has not met his burden to prove that the District’s
attendance and care of school property policies are arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Accordingly,
the ALJ granted summary decision to the Board.
Upon comprehensive review of the record, and for the reasons expressed by the ALJ, the Commissioner
adopted the Initial Decision of the OAL as the final decision in this case. The petition was dismissed.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It
has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.
February 27, 2019
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 4389-18
Agency Dkt. No. 36-2/18
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
David Moy,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Township of
Maple Shade, Burlington County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law
have been reviewed. 	The parties did not file exceptions to the Initial Decision. 	In this case, the
petitioner is challenging the Maple Shade School District’s attendance policy and the care of school
property policy. The petitioner further contends that the Superintendent violated District policy.
Upon a comprehensive review of the record, the Commissioner concurs with the
Administrative Law Judge – for the reasons thoroughly outlined in the Initial Decision – that Board
of Education is entitled to summary decision. Accordingly, the recommended decision of the ALJ is
adopted for the reasons expressed therein and the petition of appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.1
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	February 27, 2019
Date of Mailing: 	February 27, 2019
1 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to P.L. 2008, c.
36 (N.J.S.A 18A:6-9.1).
New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04389-18
AGENCY DKT. 36-2/18
DAVID MOY,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
TOWNSHIP OF MAPLE SHADE,
BURLINGTON COUNTY,
Respondent.
David Moy, petitioner, pro se
Victoria S. Beck, Esq., for respondent (Parker McCay, P.A., attorneys)
Record Closed: November 29, 2018 	Decided: January 14, 2019
BEFORE SUSAN L. OLGIATI, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The 	petitioner, 	David 	Moy, 	challenges 	the 	attendance 	and 	care 	of 	school
property 	policies 	of 	the 	respondent, 	Maple 	Shade 	School 	District 	Board 	of
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04389-18
2
Education2(District) and argues that the Superintendent of Schools violated the District’s
policy regarding the duties of the superintendent.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 12, 2018, petitioner filed a petition with the Department of Education
challenging respondent’s policies. 	The Commissioner transmitted the matter to the
Office of Administrative Law, where it was filed on March 26, 2018, for determination as
a contested case. 	N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15; N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -13. 	The matter was
assigned to this ALJ in July 2018, and multiple status conferences were held with the
parties. 	On November 5, 2018, the Board filed a motion for summary decision3. 	On
November 	17, 	2018, 	petitioner 	filed 	a 	letter 	in 	opposition 	to 	the 	motion 	and 	on
November 21, 2018, the District filed a letter brief in reply to petitioner’s letter.4 	On
November 29, 2018, a final status conference regarding the motion for summary
decision was held and the record closed on that date.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
In response to the District’s motion for summary decision petitioner filed a one
paragraph letter stating “…I’m reaffirming that Ms. Beck and the Maple Shade BOE has
failed to address ALL items in the original petition. I’m asking that her motion be denied
for the above mentioned reasons.” 	Petitioner provided no statement of facts, affidavit,
nor certification supporting his opposition to the motion. Nor did he dispute the District’s
statement of facts or the certification of Superintendent of Schools, Beth Norcia, in
support 	of 	the 	District’s 	motion. 	The 	below facts 	are 	gleaned from 	the parties’
submissions and exhibits attached thereto.
2 Pled as the Board of Education of the Township of Maple Shade, Burlington County.
3 On or about March 19, 2018, prior to the matter being transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law for hearing
as a contested case, the District filed a motion to dismiss with the Department of Education.
4 On November 5, 2018, petitioner sent an email advising “I’m reaffirming that Ms. Beck has failed to answer or
address items in my original petition and her latest motion also supports my case in regard to policy 5513. I’m
asking that her motion be denied.” Thereafter, by letter dated November 15, 2018, this ALJ confirmed the briefing
schedule in this matter including that petitioner had until November 25, 2018, to file a formal response to the
motion.
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04389-18
3
1. 	In January 2018, the implementing regulation of the District’s attendance
policy-5200 was revised. The key revisions related to the “Student Attendance
Policy” section of regulation 5200.
2. 	The definition of the term “Failure Due to Attendance” (FDA) was revised to
remove the condition that a student is placed on FDA status when they
accumulate a specific number of unexcused absences in one marking period.
(Norcia Certification Exhibit A at 9; Exhibit B at 9.)
3. 	There were also revisions to the “Maintaining Academic Credit as it Pertains to
Attendance” provision of the regulation. 	Students who accumulate greater
than four unexcused absences per marking period, no longer receive a grade
of “59” for the marking period. 	Such students will now receive “no credit” for
the marking period. Id. (Exhibit A at 10-11; Exhibit B at 10.)
4. 	The revised regulation allows students to restore their academic credit by
attending a Saturday or Wednesday session. 	It also removes the prior
provision regarding “Mandatory Tutoring” sessions. Id.
5. 	Students are now at risk of earning no credit for the year only if they are on
FDA status and exceed sixteen unexcused absences for the year. Id.
6. 	The revisions address the “Fourth Marking Period” provision of the regulation.
Students placed on FDA status during the fourth marking period are now able
to make up credit by attending a credit completion program. 	Id. (Exhibit A at
11; Exhibit B, at 10.)
7. 	Parents/guardians of students on FDA status receive a notice explaining that
their student did not meet the attendance criteria for the marking period and is
“in 	danger 	of 	not 	earning 	credits 	for 	the 	year 	due 	to 	high
absenteeism/lateness.” The notice requests parents to schedule a meeting to
develop an action plan for improved attendance. 	Parents are further advised
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04389-18
4
that both 	they and 	their 	student must 	log into 	their 	portal 	account and
acknowledge the attendance document before grades can be viewed. (Exhibit
D, Norcia Certification.)
8. 	On September 30, 2014, the Department of Education issued a memo to Chief
School Administrators regarding “Reporting Student Absences.” 	The memo
noted in pertinent part that:
N.J.A.C. 	6A: 	16-7.6(a) 	requires 	each 	district 	board 	of
education to “develop, adopt, and implement policies and
procedures regarding the attendance of students” and these
policies must contain, at a minimum, a “definition of excused
absence that count towards truancy…” See N.J.A.C. 6A:16-
7.6(a)(3). See Exhibit F, Norcia Certification.
9. 	The District’s care of school property policy-5513 and implementing regulation
authorize the imposition of a fine for the loss, damage or defacement of a
textbook and reserves the right to withhold a report card or diploma from any
pupil whose payment of a fine is in arrears. 	(Exhibit H, Norcia Certification.)
While the policy and implementing regulation-5513 reserve the right to withhold
a report card for outstanding fines, it is not the District’s practice to do so. Id.
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Legal Analysis
The issue is whether the respondent, District, should be granted summary
decision in its favor or whether petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his
challenge to District policies.
I. 	Summary Decision Standard
A summary decision may be granted when the papers and discovery that have
been filed show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and
the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. 	N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). 	“An
adverse party in order to prevail must by responding affidavit set forth specific facts
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04389-18
5
showing that there is a genuine issue which can only be determined in an evidentiary
proceeding.” 	Ibid. 	See Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America, 142 N.J.
520 	(1995). 	The 	non-moving 	party 	has 	the 	burden 	“to 	make 	an 	affirmative
demonstration. . . 	that the facts are not as the movant alleges.” 	Spiotta v. William H.
Wilson, Inc., 72 N.J. Super. 572, 581 (App.Div. 1962).
While petitioner challenges the District’s policies on attendance and care of
school property and alleges that the Superintendent violated the District policy on the
Superintendent’s duties, he has not made any declaration to this tribunal that the facts
are not as the movant alleges or set forth any specific facts showing that there is any
material fact in dispute. 	In addition to claiming that the attendance and the care of
school property policies violate N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.6, petitioner also contends that the
attendance policy conflicts with the District’s policy on promotion and retention-5410,
reporting pupil progress- 5420, student discipline/ code of conduct- 5600, and high
school graduation – 5460. 	Aside from invoking these policies, petitioner sets forth no
specific facts explaining the alleged conflicts or showing that a genuine issue of material
fact exists.
Similarly, the petitioner claims that the Superintendent violated the District policy
regarding the duties of a superintendent as it relates to various state statutes and
regulations 	including 	“N.J.S.A 	18A:7A-11; 	N.J.S.A 	18A:17-17; 	N.J.S.A 	18A:17-18;
N.J.S.A 	18A:17-20; 	N.J.S.A 	18A:17-21; 	N.J.S.A 	18A:22-8.1; 	N.J.S.A 	18A:27-4.1;
N.J.S.A 18A:37-4, N.J.A.C. 6A:8-3.1; N.J.A.C 6A: 32-4.1, and N.J.A.C 6A: 32-12-2.”
Here too, aside from citing to these various statutes and regulations, petitioner provides
no facts explaining how the superintendent’s alleged action or inaction, regarding the
challenged policies, implicates or violates his duties in refence to the cited statutes and
regulations. 	Finally, even if petitioner were to set forth facts supporting a policy,
statutory, or regulatory violation by the Superintendent, he would not be entitled to any
relief for same. Evaluation of the superintendent’s performance and any action resulting
therefrom is governed by contract and statute. 	As a result, petitioner is not entitled to
any relief he may seek regarding the Superintendent’s alleged violations, and this
tribunal is without authority to grant same.
Further, even accepting petitioner’s petition to the Department of Education
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04389-18
6
dated February 12, 2018, as opposition to respondent’s motion for summary decision,
there too he fails to set out any genuine issue of material fact which might preclude the
granting of respondent’s motion. Accordingly, petitioner has failed to meet his burden of
proof as required by Spiotta and the matter is ripe for summary decision.
II. 	Mootness
It is well settled law that once a matter becomes moot prior to judicial resolution,
it is appropriate to dismiss. 	Oxfeld v. NJ. State Bd. of Education, 68 N.J. 301 (1975),
Nini v. Mercer County Comm. College, 202 N.J. 98, (2010). 	In Cinque v. New Jersey
Dept. of Corrections, 261 N.J. Super. 242 (App Div. 1993) the Appellate Division
explained that there are two basic reasons for this doctrine:
First, for reasons of judicial economy and restraint, courts
will not decide cases in which the issue is hypothetical, a
judgment cannot grant effective relief, or the parties do not
have concrete adversity of interest. 	Second, it is a premise
of 	the 	Anglo-American 	judicial 	system 	that 	a 	contest
engendered 	by 	genuinely 	conflicting 	self-interests 	of 	the
parties is best suited to developing all relevant material
before the court. (citing to Anderson v. Sills, 143 N.J. Super.
(Ch. Div. 1976) 432, 437.) Id.
A. Attendance Policy
Petitioner 	claims 	that 	the 	District’s 	attendance 	policy 	withholds 	students’
unaltered grades in violation of N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.6 (Conditions for access to student
records.) 	His challenge to the attendance policy, specifically provisions relating to FDA
status and maintaining academic credit, are however moot because the implementing
regulation of attendance policy-5200 has been revised to modify or eliminate the
challenged provisions.5
5 If petitioner contends that the revised attendance policy/implementing regulation continues to violate the regulation
on access to student grades he may wish to file a new petition.
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04389-18
7
Additionally, petitioner’s claims that the attendance policy/regulation improperly
withholds students’ grades are moot because grades are available to students and
parents/guardians online via their portal accounts.
Finally, petitioner claims that the current version of the attendance policy is not
posted on the District’s website. 	Aside from failing to set forth any specific facts
opposing the District’s claim that the revised attendance policy/regulation have been
posted on its website, petitioner fails to cite to any legal authority which requires the
District to do so. Thus, petitioner’s claims regarding the attendance policy are moot.
B. Care of School Property Policy
Petitioner contends that the District’s care of school property policy-5513 violates
N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.6 (Conditions for access to student records.) Pursuant to the District’s
policy, the board of education authorizes the imposition of a fine for the loss, damage,
or defacement of a textbook and reserves the right to withhold a report card or diploma
from any pupil whose payment of a fine is in arrears.
Despite petitioner’s contentions, he has produced no evidence that the District
has engaged in the practice of withholding report cards of students with outstanding
fines for damage to school property. 	Moreover, petitioner did not oppose or otherwise
challenge the certification of Superintendent Norcia in which she stated that while the
policy reserves the District’s right to withhold report cards due to outstanding fines, it is
not the District’s practice to do so. 	Thus, petitioner has not demonstrated an adversity
of interest between the parties on this issue.
III. 	Presumption of Correctness
It is well settled in New Jersey that decisions of local boards of education are
entitled to a presumption of correctness and are to stand undisturbed unless shown to
be “patently arbitrary, without rational basis or induced by improper motives.” J. M., by
His Guardian, D. M. v. Hunterdon Central Regional High School District, Hunterdon
County, 96 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 415, 419; R. A. M. and C. A. M. v. Board of Educ. of the
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04389-18
8
Township of Tabernacle, 94 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 573, 576 (citing, Kopera v. West Orange
Bd. of Educ., 60 N.J. Super. 288 (App. Div. 1960)). 	See, Boult v. Board of Educ. of
Passaic City, 136 N.J.L. 521 (E. & A. 1948); Fraser v. State Bd. of Educ., 133 N.J.L. 15
(Sup. Ct. 1945); Offhouse v. State Bd. of Educ., 131 N.J.L. 391 (Sup. Ct. 1944);
Greenway v. Board of Educ. of the City of Camden, 129 N.J.L. 461 (E. & A. 1943).
Petitioner bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
respondent’s action was “arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.” J.M., 96 N.J.A.R.2d at
419.
N.J.A.C 6A:16-7.6 directs that boards of education shall develop policies and
procedures regarding student attendance. 	The District’s attendance policy-5200 and
its implementing regulation are in keeping with the directive of this regulation.
Similarly, N.J.S.A. 18A:34-2, provides that every board of education shall make
rules for the safekeeping and proper care of textbooks, and shall keep an account of all
moneys expended for textbooks and supplies. 	The District’s policy on care of school
property is consistent with the directive of N.J.S.A. 18A: 34-2. 	The District’s policy is
also consistent with case law. 	In Ballato v. Board of Education of the City of Long
Branch, Monmouth County, 1990 S.L.D. 1296, the Commissioner of Education held that
it was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable for a board to withhold a diploma from a
student who is otherwise qualified if financial obligations exist for loss or damage to
property. 	Id. (at 1300.) 	Even if petitioner had presented evidence that the District was
exercising its right to withhold report cards due to outstanding fines for damage to
school property, such action would be consistent with applicable statutory and case law.
Thus, petitioner has failed to meet his burden that the attendance and the care of
school property policies are arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
Conclusions
I CONCLUDE that there exists no genuine issue of material fact. 	I further
CONCLUDE that the District has met its burden of proof that it is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law; therefore, its motion for summary decision is GRANTED.
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04389-18
9
ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the District’s motion for summary decision is GRANTED
and petitioner’s appeal is DENIED.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This 	recommended 	decision 	may 	be 	adopted, 	modified 	or 	rejected 	by 	the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: 	BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES
AND DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500, marked "Attention: Exceptions." A copy of any exceptions must be sent to
the judge and to the other parties.
January 14, 2019
DATE 	SUSAN L. OLGIATI, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04389-18
10
SLO/vj
APPENDIX
EXHIBITS
For petitioner:
Petition of Appeal to the Commissioner of Education of New Jersey, February 12,
2018.
Letter requesting that the Board’s motion for summary decision be denied, dated
November 17, 2018.
For respondent:
Brief in support of motion for summary decision, dated November 2, 2018
Letter brief in reply to petitioner’s opposition to the motion, dated November 21,
2018.

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