J.L., on behalf of minor child, J.L. v. Board of Education of the Borough of Riverton, Burlington County, 10/31/25 (#516-25)

516-25
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 13211-25
Agency Dkt. No. 223-7/25
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
J.L., on behalf of minor child, J.L.,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Borough of Riverton,
Burlington County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL),
the exceptions filed by petitioner pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and the Riverton Board of
Education’s (Board) reply thereto, have been reviewed and considered.1
Petitioner appealed the Board’s determination that her child, J.L.,2 committed an act of
harassment, intimidation, and bullying (HIB) when he called another student a liar. 	The
Administrative 	Law 	Judge 	(ALJ) 	found 	that there was 	no 	evidence of 	a 	distinguishing
characteristic, as required by the Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act (Act). 	Accordingly, the ALJ
reversed the Board’s decision.
1 Petitioner filed a sur-reply to the Board’s reply, which was not considered because sur-replies are not
permitted under the applicable regulations.
2 As petitioner and her child share initials, references herein to “J.L.” will mean petitioner’s child, and
petitioner will be referred to as “petitioner.”

2
The Board did not take exception to the ALJ’s decision. Upon review, the Commissioner
concurs with the ALJ that there is no evidence of a distinguishing characteristic and that the
Board’s decision must therefore be reversed.
Petitioner also did not take exception to the ALJ’s conclusion. However, in her exceptions,
petitioner requests that the Board be required to pay for J.L. to attend school in another district
as a consequence for its actions. 	According to petitioner, she “had to” remove J.L. from the
Board’s schools because “he could not get the education he is entitled to due to the false
allegations against him.”3
In response, the Board argues that the decision to withdraw J.L. from its schools was solely
petitioner’s and that the Board is prepared to re-admit J.L. at any time. The Board notes that
petitioner had previously requested that the Board pay for J.L. to attend school in another
district, but withdrew that request during the course of the proceedings, and it was therefore
not part of the ALJ’s decision and not properly raised as an exception. The Board also contends
that there is no legal authority to order a public school district to send a student to another
district because its HIB decision was reversed.
The Commissioner concludes that there is no basis in the Act to order a board of
education to pay for a student to attend school in another district because it made a HIB
determination that was later reversed. Even in matters where a parent requested such a remedy
for a child who was a victim of an act of HIB, the Commissioner has found that the Act does not
provide for an out-of-district placement. 	J.R. o/b/o P.R. v. Bd. of Educ. of Westampton,
Commissioner Decision No. 24-25 (Jan. 21, 2025). With regard to the alleged aggressor, the Act
3 Petitioner later emailed the Office of Controversies and Disputes to withdraw this request.

3
provides that a board’s decision may be appealed to the Commissioner, but it does not provide
that an out-of-district placement may be imposed when a board of education’s decision is
reversed. The standard remedy granted in cases of reversal is that references to the incident be
removed from the student’s records. 	As such, petitioner’s request for an out-of-district
placement for J.L. is denied.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter. The Board
is ordered to remove all references to the HIB incident at issue from J.L.’s records.
IT IS SO ORDERED.4
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	October 31, 2025
Date of Mailing: 	November 3, 2025
4 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
9.1. Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days
from the date of mailing of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 13211-25
AGENCY DKT. NO. 223-7/25
J.L. ON BEHALF OF MINOR CHILD, J.L.,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
THE BOROUGH OF RIVERTON,
Respondent.
J.L., petitioner, on behalf of minor child, J.L., pro se
Susan Hodges, Esq., for respondent (Parker McCay, P.A., attorneys)
Record Closed: September 22, 2025 	Decided: September 24, 2025
BEFORE TRICIA M. CALIGUIRE, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner J.L., on behalf of minor child J.L., challenges the decision of respondent,
the Board of Education of the Borough of Riverton (Board), that J.L. engaged in an act of
harassment, intimidation, or bullying (HIB) under the New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of
Rights Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13 to -37.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 13211-25
2
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 4, 2024, petitioner filed a petition of appeal with the New Jersey
Department of Education (DOE), Office of Controversies and Disputes. On July 17, 2025,
DOE transmitted the due-process petition to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL),
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15, and N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -23. 	On July 28, 2025,
petitioner filed an application for emergent relief, and on July 29, 2025, the request for
emergent relief was transmitted to the OAL. 	On August 6, 2025, after a prehearing
conference, petitioner withdrew the emergent petition (OAL Dkt. No. EDU 13172-25).
On August 11, 2025, a prehearing order was issued in the due process proceeding,
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 13211-25, and the hearing was scheduled for August 22, 2025.
On August 21, 2025, the parties participated in a prehearing telephone conference,
during which petitioner requested leave to file a motion for summary decision. This motion
was filed on August 22, 2025. 	On September 15, 2025, respondent filed a brief in
opposition to the motion for summary decision. On September 16, 2025, petitioner filed
a reply. 	On September 22, 2022, without leave, respondent filed a supplemental reply
and certification in response to petitioner’s reply brief. On September 22, 2025, petitioner
submitted a final letter in response, clarifying the relief requested, and the motion is now
ripe for review.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION
Based on the documents filed in this matter by the parties, the following FACTS
are undisputed, and therefore, I FIND:
1. 	Petitioner is the parent of J.L., a twelve-year-old boy who was enrolled in sixth
grade at Riverton Middle School during the 2024–2025 school year.
2. 	E.Q.1 is a twelve-year-old girl who was also enrolled in sixth grade at Riverton
Middle School during the 2024–2025 school year.
1 E.Q. is alternately referred to as “L.Q.” in some documents, “L.” being a nickname.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 13211-25
3
3. 	The incidents involved in this matter took place during the 2024–2025 school year.
4. 	Prior to April 2, 2025, on a weekend, outside of school, J.L. and E.Q. were involved
with other Riverton students on a group chat (using their individual cell phones to
participate).
5. 	Prior to April 2, 2025, E.Q. claimed that J.L. sent her an inappropriate image via
the chat.
6. 	Prior to April 2, 2025, J.L. denied sending an inappropriate image to E.Q. (or any
person) via the chat and called E.Q. a “liar” for accusing him of doing so.
7. 	In school, on April 2, 2025, in the classroom, the teacher overheard J.L. and E.Q.
discussing E.Q.’s allegations and heard J.L. call E.Q. a “liar.”
8. 	In school, on or about April 2, 2025, witnesses, including students and teachers,
heard J.L. repeatedly call E.Q. a “liar.”
9. 	At least two other students were heard in the school on or about April 2, 2025,
calling E.Q. a “liar.” The District did not initiate HIB proceedings against any other
student.
10. The Riverton Middle School administration conducted a HIB investigation and as
a result, determined that J.L. engaged in an act of HIB.
11. The decision of the Riverton Middle School administration was submitted to the
Board which, at the May 27, 2025 Board meeting, determined that J.L. engaged in
an act of HIB of E.Q. By letter dated May 28, 2025, J.L.’s parents were notified of
the Board decision. This appeal followed.
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary decision is the well-recognized administrative counterpart to summary
judgment, a procedure for resolving cases in which the facts that are crucial to the
determination of the matters at issue are not actually in dispute. 	By applying the
applicable law and standard of proof to the undisputed facts, a decision may be reached
in a case without the necessity of a hearing at which evidence is presented and testimony
is taken. N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5. Here, petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 13211-25
4
decision of the Board finding that J.L. engaged in HIB of E.Q. was arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable. Titusville Acad. v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., EDU 00651-06, Initial Decision
(May 21, 2007), adopted, Comm’r (July 6, 2007), <http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/ collections/
oal/>; Cath. Fam. & Cmty. Servs. v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., EDU 01051-01, Initial Decision
(Jan. 14, 2003), adopted, Comm’r (Mar. 3, 2003), adopted, State Bd. of Educ. (July 2,
2003), <http://www.nj.gov/education/legal/>.
The regulations provide that the decision sought by the movant “may be rendered
if the papers and discovery which have been filed, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party
is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). The rule further provides
that an adverse party must respond by affidavit setting forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue that can only be determined at an evidentiary hearing. Ibid. The
OAL rule is modeled on New Jersey Court Rule 4:46-2. The New Jersey Supreme Court
has explained that when deciding a motion for summary judgment under R. 4:46-2,
a determination whether there exists a “genuine issue” of
material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the
motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential
materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational
factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the
non-moving party.
[Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540
(1995).]
The parties agree as to the facts described above. The issue in dispute is whether
J.L.’s action in school on April 2, 2025, is HIB of another student, E.Q. I CONCLUDE that
there is no dispute as to the material facts and the issue raised by the motion for summary
decision can be decided as a matter of law.
When a local board of education acts within its discretionary authority, its decision
is entitled to a presumption of correctness and will not be disturbed unless there is an
affirmative showing that the decision was “patently arbitrary, without rational basis or
induced by improper motives.” Kopera v. Bd. of Educ. of W. Orange, 60 N.J. Super. 288,

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 13211-25
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294 (App. Div. 1960). Furthermore, “where there is room for two opinions, action is not
arbitrary or capricious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration,” and the
Commissioner will not substitute his judgment for that of the board. Bayshore Sewerage
Co. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 122 N.J. Super. 184, 199 (Ch. Div. 1973), aff’d, 131 N.J. Super.
37 (App. Div. 1974). Regarding HIB determinations, this standard has been explained as
requiring a petitioner to “demonstrate that the Board acted in bad faith, or in utter
disregard of the circumstances before it.” 	G.H. & E.H. ex rel. K.H. v. Bd. of Educ. of
Borough of Franklin Lakes, Bergen Cnty., EDU 13204-13, Initial Decision (Feb. 24, 2014),
adopted, Comm’r (Apr. 10, 2014), <https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/>.
The Act defines HIB as:
[A]ny gesture, any written, verbal or physical act, or any
electronic communication, whether it be a single incident or a
series of incidents, that is reasonably perceived as being
motivated either by any actual or perceived characteristic,
such as race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender,
sexual 	orientation, 	gender 	identity 	and 	expression, 	or 	a
mental, 	physical 	or 	sensory 	disability, 	or 	by 	any 	other
distinguishing 	characteristic, 	that 	takes 	place 	on 	school
property, at any school-sponsored function, on a school bus,
or off school grounds as provided for in section 16 of P.L.
2010, c.122 (C.18A:37-15.3), that substantially disrupts or
interferes with the orderly operation of the school or the rights
of other students and that:
a. 	a 	reasonable 	person 	should 	know, 	under 	the
circumstances, 	will 	have 	the 	effect 	of 	physically 	or
emotionally harming a student or damaging the student's
property, or placing a student in reasonable fear of
physical or emotional harm to his person or damage to
his property;
b. 	has the effect of insulting or demeaning any student or
group of students; or
c. 	creates a hostile educational environment for the student
by interfering with a student's education or by severely or
pervasively causing physical or emotional harm to the
student.
[N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14.]

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 13211-25
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The above requirements were detailed in the prehearing order issued to the
parties, making clear that to uphold the Board’s finding of HIB, three elements under the
Act must be satisfied. First, the substantiated conduct must be reasonably perceived as
being motivated by any actual or perceived characteristic expressly identified in the
statute, or by any other distinguishing characteristic. 	Second, the conduct must
substantially disrupt or interfere with the rights of other students or the orderly operation
of the school. Ibid. Third, one of the three conditions set forth in subsections (a), (b), and
(c) must be satisfied. Ibid.; Wehbeh v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Verona, Essex Cnty.,
2020 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 50 (Feb. 4, 2020).
Here, there is no evidence J.L.’s conduct was motivated by an actual or perceived
distinguishing characteristic of E.Q. 	The Board argues that J.L. “determined to target
E.Q. in school for the perceived characteristic of being a ‘liar’,” but without any legal
support that holding yourself out as truthful is a characteristic for which a person can be
protected by the Act. Resp’t’s Br. (Sept. 15, 2025), at 4. Petitioner argues that J.L. was
the one who was being truthful, albeit in a discourteous manner. 	See Ltr. Reply Br. of
Pet’r (Sept. 15, 2025) (Pet’r’s Reply Br.), at 1. 	Conduct—even harmful or demeaning
conduct—that is motivated only by a personal dispute does not come within the statutory
definition of bullying. J.R. ex rel. P.R. v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of Westampton, 2024 N.J.
AGEN LEXIS 1042 (Oct. 31, 2024) (dismissed on mootness), modified, Comm’r (Jan. 21,
2025) (citing K.L. v. Evesham Twp. Bd. of Educ., 423 N.J. Super. 337, 351 (App. Div.
2011)).
The Commissioner has consistently held that a finding of HIB requires the alleged
bully to be motivated by an actual or perceived characteristic of the victim, even when the
actor would be subject to other discipline under school policy. See S.A. v. Bd. of Educ.
of Moorestown, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2114 (App. Div. 2019) (upholding Board
finding of no HIB because even if the teacher of the alleged victim “was insensitive or
even unkind, there is no evidence [the teacher] was prompted by any actual or perceived
characteristic, such as race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual
orientation, gender identity and expression, or a mental, physical, or sensory disability, or
by any other distinguishing characteristic”); A.P. ex rel. A.P. v. Burlington Bd. of Educ.,

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 13211-25
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Comm’r Decision No. 307-24 (Aug. 23, 2024), <https://www.nj.gov/education/legal>
(“even if true, the lunch aide targeting [the alleged victim] due to the aide’s personal
history 	with 	petitioner, 	while 	inappropriate, 	does 	not 	constitute 	a 	distinguishing
characteristic under N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14”); N.M. ex rel. E.M. v. Voorhees Twp. Bd. of
Educ, Comm’r Decision No. 305-23 (Oct. 13, 2023), <https://www.nj.gov/education/legal>
(“[w]hile certainly inappropriate, the other student’s conduct toward [the alleged victim] in
the kickball line does not constitute HIB under the Act”); R.Z. & L.D. v. Bd. of Educ. of
Northern Valley Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 2025 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 78 (Feb. 12, 2025),
adopted, 	Comm’r 	(Apr. 	28, 2025) 	(coach’s actions, 	while 	inappropriate, 	were 	not
motivated by alleged victim’s learning disability and therefore, no HIB was found), and
M.A.T. ex rel. M.T. v. Bd. of Educ of the Twp. of Holland, EDU 07053-24, Initial Decision
(Jan. 28, 2025), adopted, Comm’r (Mar. 17, 2025) (sensitivity of the alleged victim to the
word “garbage” is not a distinguishing characteristic and therefore, use of the word, even
though meant to distress victim, was not HIB).
In its brief opposing summary decision, the Board alleges that J.L. targeted E.Q.
because he perceived her as being a liar, not because he believed she was lying. Resp’t’s
Br. at 4.2 The Board gives this twelve-year-old boy too much credit in its attempt to turn
a personal dispute over social media and “what did he or didn’t he send to whom” into an
HIB violation. The Board concedes that other students voiced their agreement that E.Q.
had lied (or was continuing to lie once at school) about the events of the previous
weekend by also calling E.Q. a liar. Curiously, the Board excuses its failure to similarly
charge those students with HIB on the grounds that only J.L. continued after being asked
by a teacher to stop. Id. at 5. If calling someone a liar is evidence of the perception that
the person is a liar, and as the Board contends, “will lead to [the] perception that [the
person’s] statements, however innocuous, may not be relied upon,” then the number of
times the pejorative is used should be inconsequential. Id. at 6. Review of the undisputed
facts leads to the conclusion that J.L. was not trying to convince anyone that E.Q. is
unreliable generally, but that he accused her of not being honest specifically the previous
2 Respondent states that “it was in the wake of this dispute [over the group chat] that J.L. determined to
target E.Q. in school for the perceived characteristic of being a ‘liar’.” Resp’t’s Br. at 4. Incredibly, the Board
seems to be saying that the out-of-school argument over the group chat gave J.L. the opportunity to expose
to all the sixth grade what he believed is E.Q.’s true character.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 13211-25
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weekend and as the same story—about J.L.—was discussed in the classroom, a classic
interpersonal dispute which courts routinely refuse to characterize as HIB.
In the absence of a distinguishing characteristic, I CONCLUDE that the Board’s
determination 	that 	J.L. 	performed 	an 	act 	of 	HIB 	was 	arbitrary, 	capricious, 	and
unreasonable, and in disregard of the circumstances involved and, therefore, shall be
reversed and removed from J.L.’s record.3
ORDER
For the above reasons, I ORDER that the May 27, 2025, decision of the respondent
Board of Education of the Borough of Riverton that J.L. engaged in harassment,
intimidation, 	and/or 	bullying 	of 	E.Q., 	a 	classmate 	at 	Riverton 	Middle 	School, 	is
REVERSED and shall be removed from J.L.’s record.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
3 Petitioner initially requested placement of J.L. in an out-of-district public school in a neighboring district
at Board expense but withdrew that request. Pet’r’s Supp. Ltr. (Sept. 22, 2025). In her petition, petitioner
also asked for an apology from the Board, the school administration, and the current PTO president, but no
longer stands by that request. See Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 1.

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Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF
THE 	DEPARTMENT 	OF 	EDUCATION. 	Exceptions 	may 	be 	filed 	by 	email 	to
ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to Office of Controversies
and Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500. A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other parties.
September 24, 2025
DATE 	TRICIA M. CALIGUIRE, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties: