Dawn Haynes v. Board of Education of the City of Newark, Essex County, 4/7/25 (#117-25E)

117-25E
OAL Dkt. No. 03817-25
Agency Dkt. No. 52-2/25
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Order on Emergent Relief
Dawn Haynes,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the City of Newark, Essex
County,
Respondent.
The record of this emergent matter, the sound recording of the hearing at the Office of
Administrative Law (OAL), and the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
have been reviewed.
Petitioner, Dawn Haynes, seeks an Order directing the Newark Board of Education (Board)
to resume payment of her attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with a School Ethics complaint
brought against her while she was serving as a member of the Board. On November 26, 2024,
the Board rescinded a prior resolution authorizing its payment of petitioner’s counsel fees.
Petitioner asserts that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20, the Board is required to finance her
representation in the underlying ethics matter, which is still ongoing.
Petitioner filed a motion for emergent relief with the Commissioner, and the matter was
transmitted to the OAL. After reviewing the written submissions and oral arguments, the ALJ

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granted petitioner’s request for emergent relief and reinstated the original resolution authorizing
payment of petitioner’s counsel fees on a monthly basis.
Upon review, the Commissioner disagrees with the ALJ that petitioner has demonstrated
entitlement to emergent relief. 	In accordance with N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b), a grant of emergent
relief is considered an extraordinary remedy that can only be issued upon a finding that petitioner
has met the four-pronged standard set forth in Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982). To obtain
emergent relief, petitioner must establish that: (1) she will suffer irreparable harm if the
requested relief is not granted; (2) the legal right underlying her claim is settled; (3) she has a
reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the underlying claim; and (4) she will suffer
greater harm than respondent will suffer if the requested relief is not granted. Id. at 132-34;
N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b).
The controlling statute regarding the indemnification of a Board member is N.J.S.A.
18A:12-20, which provides in relevant part:
Whenever a civil, administrative, criminal or quasi-criminal action or other legal
proceeding has been or shall be brought against any person for any act or omission
arising out of and in the course of the performance of his duties as a member of a
board of education. . . the board of education shall defray all costs of defending
such action, including reasonable counsel fees and expenses, together with costs
of appeal, if any, and shall save harmless and protect such person from any
financial loss resulting therefrom.
Therefore, indemnification under N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20 is required only for conduct that arises out
of and in the course of the performance of the board member’s duties.
Case law makes it clear that petitioner’s indemnification claim is not ripe for review at
this time. In Robert Curcio v. Bd. of Educ. of the South Orange-Maplewood School District, Essex
Cty., a former school employee sought an order requiring the board of education to indemnify

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him under N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6.1 	OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04142-24 (Initial Decision May 22, 2024),
adopted, Commissioner Decision No. 239-24 (June 24, 2024). In Curcio, at the time the petition
was filed with the Commissioner, no court proceedings or discovery had taken place regarding
the underlying complaint. The ALJ concluded, and the Commissioner affirmed, that petitioner’s
claim was not fit for judicial review because additional factual development was required
regarding whether petitioner was acting within the scope of his employment when he committed
the conduct alleged in the complaint. 	Further, the ALJ concluded, and the Commissioner
affirmed, that indemnification should be determined later when more facts were available. Ibid.
Similarly, in the instant matter, petitioner’s indemnification claim may be revisited once the facts
in the underlying ethics matter are further developed.
In the Order granting emergent relief, the ALJ acknowledged that in two matters brought
by other members of the Board, the Commissioner had concluded that those petitioners’ claims
were not settled because it was not established that their actions arose out of and in the course
of the performance of their duties as members of the Board. See Murray-Thomas v. Bd. of Educ.
of the City of Newark et al., Commissioner Decision No. 57-25E (Feb. 24, 2025); Williams v. Bd. of
Educ. of the City of Newark et al., Commissioner Decision No. 58-25E (Feb. 24, 2025).
Nonetheless, the ALJ found that petitioner’s circumstances differ from those of the petitioners
in Murray-Thomas and Williams because, as to Haynes, the Board’s resolution specifically cites
to the language of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20, which indicates that indemnification is required for any act
1 Both N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6 (“Indemnity of officers and employees”) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20 (“Indemnity of members of
boards of education) require indemnification for an “act or omission arising out of and in the course of performance
of” the duties of the individual’s position. While there are some differences between the two statues that are not
relevant to this matter, the Commissioner concludes that the use of the same language in this portion of each statute
warrants applying the reasoning of the Curcio decision here.

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or omission arising out of and in the course of the performance of duties as a member of the
Board. 	According to the ALJ, there can therefore be no “dispute that the Board has already
considered and determined that Ms. Haynes was acting out of and in the course of the
performance of her duties as a member when she took the actions that resulted in ethics
charges.” Initial Decision, at 9-10. As such, the ALJ found that the Commissioner’s reasoning in
Murray-Thomas and Williams, as well as analysis in Curcio, did not apply. However, the authority
to make the final determination regarding whether petitioner was acting out of and in the course
of the performance of her duties as a member of the Board belongs to the Commissioner, not
the Board.2 And, just as in Murray-Thomas and Williams, the Commissioner finds that further
proceedings are required to make that determination, such that petitioner has failed to
demonstrate that her right to indemnification is well-settled.
Accordingly, petitioner’s request for emergent relief is denied.3 This case shall continue
at the OAL with such proceedings as the parties and the ALJ deem necessary to bring it to closure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	April 7, 2025
Date of Mailing: 	April 7, 2025
2 For this reason, the Commissioner disagrees with the ALJ’s statement that petitioner’s claim is not whether there
should be indemnification, but “whether the Board could unilaterally terminate their already established obligations
under N.J.S.A. 18A:20.” Initial Decision at 6. The Board’s obligations under N.J.S.A. 18A:20 have not already been
established.
3 Because all Crowe factors must be satisfied to obtain emergent relief, the Commissioner need not analyze the
remaining three factors. The Commissioner does not find Waste Management of N.J., Inc. v. Union Co. Utilities
Authority, 399 N.J. Super. 508 (App. Div. 2008), cited by the ALJ, to be applicable. The public policy in favor of board
member indemnification, on which the ALJ heavily relied, does not “greatly require” the grant of emergent relief in
this matter, as indemnification payment can be made following the conclusion of the proceedings if appropriate,
thereby meeting the goals of the indemnification statute.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ORDER GRANTING
EMERGENCY RELIEF
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 03817-25
AGENCY DKT. NO. 52-2/25
DAWN HAYNES,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
CITY OF NEWARK, ESSEX COUNTY,
Respondents.
______________________________________
Calvin W. Souder, Esq., for petitioner (Souder Law Group, LLP, attorneys)
Lester E. Taylor, III, Esq., Esq. for respondents (Taylor Law Group, LLC,
attorneys)
BEFORE WILLIAM J. COURTNEY, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, Dawn Haynes brings this motion for emergent relief seeking an Order
directing the Board of Education of the City of Newark (“Board”) to reinstate a rescinded
resolution (the “Original Resolution”) that authorized payment of the counsel fees and
costs she incurred in defending a school ethics complaint brought against her while
serving as a member of the Board. The Original Resolution was based on the mandate

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 03817-25
2
in N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20 requiring a board of education to defray all costs of defending a
civil, administrative, criminal or quasi criminal action or other legal proceeding brought
against any person for an act or omission arising out of and in the course of their
performance of their duties as a member of a board of education.
The board maintains it had the right to rescind the Original Resolution authorizing
the payment of reasonable counsel fees and costs associated with petitioner’s defense
“upon learning that Petitioner’s legal position in defense of the school ethics complaint is
directly contrary to the Board’s legal interests, and, if Petitioner is successful in this
position, the Board’s interests would be severely compromised.”
FACTUAL DISCISSION
On February 23, 2023, in accordance with their obligations under N.J.S.A. 18A:12-
20, the Board adopted four separate resolutions authorizing the payment of counsel fees
and costs associated with the defense of an ethics complaint filed against four sitting
members of the Board, one of whom was petitioner, Dawn Haynes. (See Exhibit A). The
ethics complaint, which is the subject of a separate proceeding before a different
Administrative Law Judge, was brought by the principal of a public high school known as
the Newark School of Global Studies (“NSGS”) in connection with efforts made by the
four Board members to investigate allegations of bias and harassment at NSGS. 	The
resolutions remained in effect for over one year and nine months during which time the
Board members’ costs and counsel fees related to the defense of the ethics complaint
were paid. 	On November 26, 2024, the District rescinded the three outstanding
resolutions1.
In response to the Board’s recission of the resolutions, two of the remaining three
Board 	members 	(Crystal 	Williams 	and 	A’Dorian 	Murray-Thomas) 	filed 	emergent
applications seeking essentially to reinstate the Original Resolution that authorized the
payment of their defense costs. 	Both of those emergent applications were heard by
1 At some point in time, the complaint against one of the four Board members was resolved and the Ethics
complaints against the other three, one of whom was petitioner Dawn Haynes, continued.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 03817-25
3
Andrew M. Baron, ALJ. Judge Baron issued his ruling on the Murray-Thomas application
on January 8, 2025. (See Exhibit B). His decision on the Williams application was issued
on January 28, 2025. (See Exhibit C). 	Both decisions concluded that the standards for
granting emergent relief identified in Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982) had been
established, and that emergent relief was warranted. Accordingly, both decisions granted
the petitioner’s application for emergent relief as it pertained to the original resolution
authorizing the payment of reasonable counsel fees, paid on a regular basis on the
district’s monthly bill list to defend against the original ethics complaint.
As indicated above, the only reason provided by the Board (in their opposition to
this application) for rescinding the Original Resolution to pay legal fees and costs was
that they learned petitioner’s legal defense in the ethics matter was directly contrary to
the Board’s legal interests. However, a review of Judge Baron’s January 8, 2025 decision
in Murray-Thomas motion, reveals that the following additional information was provided
to Judge Baron by the Board:
Somewhere along the line following the August 2024
payment, the district learned that in connection with [Murray-
Thomas’s] defense against the [ethics] complaint, she through
her counsel had issued a subpoena to a third-party consultant
retained by the district seeking to secure a document that the
district had previously classified as “confidential.”
The 	district 	only 	learned 	about 	the 	document
subpoenaed in a roundabout way since it was not notified or
copied by petitioner’s counsel on the subpoena that went out.
As a result, additional litigation has ensued, with the attorney
for the consultant filing a ‘Motion to Quash” the subpoena,
which necessitated as an interested party, the district filing a
Motion to Intervene in the ethics matter since it previously
classified the document as “privileged” and did not want it
released or disclosed. It is unclear why other alternate means
of securing the document were not explored by petitioner’s
counsel.
[See Exhibit B, p.4]

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 03817-25
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The information provided to Judge Baron in the Murray-Thomas application leaves
little doubt that that the issuance of a subpoena by attorney for Murray-Thomas is the
basis for the Board’s recission of the Original Resolution authorizing the payment of legal
services and costs to defend the ethics complaint against Ms. Haynes. However, after a
review of all the documents and pleadings submitted in support and in opposition of this
application for emergent relief, I FIND no credible evidence that petitioner Haynes had
anything to do with the issuance of the subpoena that the Board believes is adverse its
interest. I also FIND that the Board has failed to provide any credible evidence that Ms.
Haynes has taken any “legal position” in the defense of the school ethics complaint that
is directly contrary to the Board’s legal interests.
On February 26, 2025, almost a month after Judge Baron issued his decision in
the Williams matter, a separate Verified Petition and the instant Notice of Motion for
Emergent relief was filed by Calvin Souder, Esq of the Souder Law Group, LLP on behalf
of Ms. Haynes. Ms. Williams and Ms. Murray-Thomas were both represented by Janelle
Edwards-Stewart, Esq. of Porzio, Bromberg and Newman, P.C. The fact that Ms. Haynes
was not represented by the same attorney who represented the other two Board members
is 	important 	because 	according 	to 	Judge 	Baron’s 	decision, 	it 	was 	the 	attorney
representing Murray-Thomas (who was the same attorney representing Williams) who
issued the subpoena that the Board is relying upon to justify their decision to rescind the
Original Resolution authorizing the payment of Ms. Haynes’s costs and attorney fees. I
FIND no credible evidence has been presented that would indicate that either Ms. Haynes
or her attorney had any involvement in or knowledge of the issuance of the subpoena
challenged by the Board.
Ms. Haynes filed her Verified Petition and Motion for Emergent Relief on February
26, 2025. 	The Verified Petition Alleged that the Board Ceased their indemnification of
Ms. Haynes as required by N.J.S.A 18A:12-20 and that the Board is legally estopped from
supplementing its resolution to provide reasons for the decision to rescind the Original
resolution after the fact. In her motion she seeks an Order compelling the Board to
reinstate their obligation under the Original resolution to indemnify her concerning the
costs and legal fees associated with her defense of the ethics matter. In support of her
Motion, she provided a copy of Judge Barron’ February 24, 2025 decision in the Williams

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 03817-25
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matter (see Exhibit C). 	Ms. Haynes represented in her verified petition that identical
petitions for emergent relief were filed by Williams and Murray-Thomas and that Judge
Baron had found that in both of those cases the standard for emergent relief prescribed
by Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982) had been met and that by doing so, he had
returned the petitioners to “the original status quo.” Accordingly, Ms. Haynes now seeks
return to the original status quo by seeking the resumption of mandatory payment for the
defense costs and fees she continues to incur in the ongoing ethics case.
Unknown to Ms. Haynes or her counsel, two days before the filing of her Verified
Petition and Motion for Emergent Relief, the Acting Commissioner of Education entered
and Order which reversed Judge Baron’s January 8, 2025 Order and denied Murray-
Thomas’s request for emergent relief. (See Exhibit D). 	In His Order, the Acting
Commissioner 	disagreed 	with 	Judge 	Baron 	that 	petitioner 	Murray-Thomas 	had
demonstrated entitlement to emergent relief. He stated that in accordance with N.J.A.C.
6A:3-1.6(b), a grant of emergent relief is considered an extraordinary remedy and can
only be issued upon a finding that the petitioner has met the four-pronged standard set
forth in Crowe v. DeGioia. In his review of the Crowe standards, he found that petitioner
Murray-Thomas had not met the requirement that she show the legal right underlying her
claim is settled.
In the course of analyzing this standard, the Acting Commissioner referred to
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20 as the “the controlling statute regarding the indemnification of a Board
member.” In his review of the statute he concluded that indemnification is required only
for conduct that “arises out of and in the course of the performance of the board member’s
duties.” The Acting Commissioner then reasoned (citing page 6 of the January 8, 2025
Order) that although Judge Baron indicated that Murray-Thomas was acting under the
purview of her sworn duties, that fact has not yet been established. He went on to state
that 	“[f]further 	proceedings 	are 	required 	to 	determine 	whether 	[petitioner 	Murray-
Thomas’s] conduct in the underlying ethics matter arose out of and in the course of her
duties as a board member.”
Given the plain language in the Acting Commissioner’s decision, I FIND that that
when the Acting Commissioner was determining whether the legal right to Murray-

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 03817-25
6
Thomas’s claim was settled, he was not considering the claim she was asserting. 	The
claim asserted in both the Williams and Murray-Thomas application had nothing to do
with whether there should be indemnification or whether their claims for indemnification
had been settled. 	The decision to indemnify had already been made on February 23,
2023¸ when Original Resolution authorizing the payment of defense costs and fees. 	The
claim asserted in the two prior applications and the claim raised in the Haynes application
for emergent relief is whether the Board could 	unilaterally terminate their already
established obligations under N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20 because they believe a Board member
has taken a legal position in defense of the school ethics complaint is directly contrary to
the Board’s legal interests. Accordingly, when determining under Crowe if the legal right
to Ms. Haynes’ claim is settled, I FIND that the claim at issue is whether taking a legal
position in defense of ethics charges that is directly contrary to the Board’s legal interests
exempts the Board from complying with their legal obligations under N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20
and thus a permissible basis for unilaterally terminating the Original Resolution. This, of
course, is assuming that the Board can first prove that Ms. Haynes has taken a legal
position that is directly contrary to the Board’s legitimate legal interests.
LEGAL STANDARD
Where authorized by law and where irreparable harm will result without an
expedited decision granting or prohibiting some action or relief connected with a
contested case, emergency relief pending a final decision on the whole contested case
may be ordered upon the application of a party. N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.6(a). 	With respect to
school laws in particular, the Commissioner has jurisdiction to hear and determine all
controversies and disputes arising under school laws, except higher education, or under
the rules of the State board or of the Commissioner. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9. Where the subject
matter of the controversy is a particular course of action by a district board of education
or any other party subject to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner, the petitioner may
include with the petition of appeal, a separate motion for emergent relief or a stay of that
action pending the Commissioner's final decision in the contested case. 	N.J.S.A. 6A:3-
1.6(a). 	A motion for a stay or emergent relief must be accompanied by a letter
memorandum or brief which must address the following standards to be met for granting
such relief pursuant to Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982):

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 03817-25
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1. 	The petitioner will suffer irreparable harm if the requested relief is
not granted;
2. 	The legal right underlying petitioner's claim is settled;
3. 	The petitioner has a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the
underlying claim; and
4. 	When the equities and interests of the parties are balanced, the
petitioner will suffer greater harm than the respondent will suffer
if the requested relief is not granted.
N.J.A.C 6A:3-1.6(b)
Although it is generally understood that all Crowe factors must weigh in favor of
injunctive relief, in Waste Management of New Jersey, Inc. v. Union County Utilities
Authority, 399 N.J. Super. 508 (App. Div. 2008) it was recognized that
A court may take less a less rigid view than it would after as
final 	hearing 	when 	the 	interlocutory 	injunction 	is 	merely
designed to maintain the status quo. General Elec. Co. v.
Gem Vacuum Stores, Inc., 36 N.J. Super. 234, 236-37, 115
A.2d 626 (App.Div.1955). The issuance of an interlocutory
injunction must be squarely based on an appropriate exercise
of sound judicial discretion. N.J. State Bar Ass'n v. Northern
N.J. Mortgage Assocs., 22 N.J. 184, 194, 123 A.2d 498
(1956); Bancroft & Sons Co. v. Shelley Knitting Mills, Inc., 268
F.2d 	569, 	573 	(3d 	Cir.1959), 	which--when 	limited 	to
preserving the status quo during the suit's pendency--may
permit 	the 	court 	to 	place 	less 	emphasis 	on 	a
particular Crowe factor 	if 	another 	greatly 	requires 	the
issuance of the remedy. Ibid.
By the same token, in some cases, such as when the
public interest is greatly affected, a court may withhold relief
despite a substantial showing of irreparable injury to the
applicant. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440, 64 S.
Ct. 660, 675, 88 L. Ed. 834, 857 (1944). As a result, it was
recognized 	in Yakus that 	courts, 	in 	the 	exercise 	of 	their
equitable powers, "may, and frequently do, go much farther
both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 03817-25
8
interest than they are accustomed to go when only private
interests are involved." Id. at 441, 64 S. Ct. at 675, 88 L. Ed.
at 858 (quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515,
552, 57 S. Ct. 592, 601, 81 L. Ed. 789, 802 (1937)).
[Id. at 520-21]
In Garden State Equality v. Dow, 216 N.J. 314 (2013), the New Jersey Supreme
Cour recognized that in acting only to preserve the status quo, the court may place less
emphasis on a particular Crowe factor if another greatly requires the issuance of the
remedy. 	It also recognized that when a case presents an issue of “significant public
importance”, a court must consider the public interest in addition to the traditional Crowe
factors. Id at 320-321, citing McNeil v. Legis. Apportionment Comm’n, 176 N.J. 484
(2003).
The New Jersey Legislature long ago established public policy in favor of
encouraging and in fact requiring boards of education to indemnify individuals most of
whom serve voluntarily as members of local boards of education for legal fees in certain
types of legal proceedings, including but not limited to formal grievances filed in the form
of ethics complaints against sitting and/or former school board members. See N.J.S.A.
18A:12-20 et. seq. 	Accordingly, a board member seeking indemnification is not simply
requesting monetary relief. 	Indemnification under is a mandatory requirement and a
matter of public policy. I FIND this public policy substantially outweighs the Boards claim
that continued compliance with N.J.S.A.18A:12-20 negatively impacts the public interest.
No credible evidence has been presented that would indicate that Ms. Haynes’ actions
cause the issuance of the subpoena or, as the Board asserts, required the expense of
public funds to intervene in the ethics matter to challenge the subpoena.
Pursuant to N.J.S.A.18A:12-20, boards of education are required to indemnify a
board member if a complaint is filed against them in connection with the board member’s
duties. See Quick v. Old Bridge 308 N.J. Super, 338. (App. Div 1998). The law is liberally
construed in favor of covering a board member’s counsel fees, regardless of the outcome
of the case against them. (Emphasis added). See also, Errington v. Mansfield Twp. Bd.
of Ed. 100 N.J. Super. 130 (App. Div. 1986).

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The policy in favor of covering a board member’s counsel fees also applies to
administrative matters Matthews v. Englewood, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 01228-08 (2010).
In Opposition to the present motion for emergent relief, the Board argues that this
motion must be denied for the same reason the Murray-Thomas matter was dismissed
because this case contains all the same questions of fact and law. I FIND this argument
to be unpersuasive. The questions of fact here are not the same as the facts contained
in either of the other two matters because the issuance of the subpoena, which triggered
the recission at issue, was not the result of any action taken by Ms. Haynes or her
attorney. Moreover, no facts have been offered, and no evidence has been provided that
would show that either Ms. Haynes or her attorney colluded with anyone else to suggest
or secure the issuance of the subpoena.
Turning to the Board’s assertion that this case contains the same question of law
and the inference that all three cases must end with the same result, I again disagree.
First, the Murray-Thomas case is the only one that has been decided by the Acting
Commissioner. 	As indicated above, the legal right that must be deemed settled in the
analysis of the Crowe factors is petitioner’s legal right to have the indemnification
continue. 	The determination as to whether the petitioner is entitled to indemnification
under N.J.A.C. 18A: 12-20 has already been made. One needs only to look at the plain
language contained in all three of the 2/23/23 resolutions (See Exhibit A) to confirm that
the Board was aware indemnification is only required when the act or omission in question
arose out of and in the course of the performance or the Board member’s duty as a
member of the Board. The third paragraph in each of the 1/23/23 Resolutions reads as
follows:
WHEREAS, 	N.J.S.A. 	18A:12-20 	requires 	the 	Board 	to
indemnify members of the Board for any act or omission
arising out of and in the course of the performance of her
duties as a member of the board of education.
The WHEREAS provisions in a resolution, also known as the preamble to the resolution,
consist of statements of background information and reasons why the resolution should
be adopted. 	Given this language, there is no logical way to dispute that the Board has

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 03817-25
10
already considered and determined that Ms. Haynes was acting out of and in the course
of the performance of her duties as a member when she took the actions that resulted in
ethics charges. The Board’s argument that petitioners’ request for emergent relief must
be denied because the same has not been determined is without merit.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
In Ms. Haynes application for emergent relief, she seeks injunctive relief requiring
the Board to continue paying the attorney’s fees and costs associated with an ethics
complaint filed by a District employee and prohibiting the Board for taking any future
action that will interfere with her attorney client relationship.
Analysis Of The Crowe Factors
1. 	Irreparable Harm
For the same reasons Judge Baron found in the Murray-Thomas and Williams
matters, I FIND that Ms. Haynes has met her burden of proof in having met all 4 of the
Crowe standards. I further FIND irreparable harm will undoubtably occur to Ms. Haynes
case if indemnification for legal defense costs are not granted. The relief she is seeking
is not merely monetary in nature as the Board maintains. Rather, she seeks the ability to
defend herself in an ongoing ethics matter which, if not defended, is likely to result in a
finding that will damage her reputation. 	The recission of the Original Resolution also
affects her ability to assert a robust defense against a claim filed against her based on
conduct she performed in the course of her duties as a Board member. Money damage
is also not an issue in the ethics matter and Ms. Haynes is not seeking indemnification
for money damages. 	Moreover, because legislature has established a public policy in
favor of encouraging and in fact requiring boards of education to indemnify board
members in these types of proceedings, Ms. Haynes has a right to be defended and is
seeking enforcement of that right in this emergent application.
Ms. Haynes’ public policy right to be defended was specifically recognized by the
Board in their November 23, 2023 Resolution. 	The Resolution specifically cited to their

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obligations under N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20 to provide that defense. The injunctive relief sought
here is not to establish that her right to this relief exists before that right can be determined
at a final hearing. Her right to relief has already been established by the resolution of the
Board. The relief sought here is the vacation of the resolution rescinding that right and to
enjoin any further interference with that right until a full hearing on the Verified Petition
can be held. In other words, Ms. Haynes is seeking injunctive relief to maintain the status
quo.
2. 	The Legal Right Underlying Petitioner’s Claim Is Settled
The claim at issue is Ms. Haynes right to continued indemnification of the 	legal
costs and attorney fees she is incurring in the defense of ethics charges brought against
her as a sitting Board member. 	N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20 establishes the right she seeks to
enforce. I FIND that the November 23, 2023 resolution was passed by the Board pursuant
to and in accordance with N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20 and established her right to the to claim for
indemnification. I also FIND that the Board has provided no credible evidence that action
or inaction exempts them form their mandatory obligations under N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20.
While I do recognize that the Acting Commissioner of Education found in the
Murray-Thomas matter that her claim was not settled because it was not established that
she was “acting under the purview of her sworn duties”, there is nothing in the record
before me in this matter that would compel a similar finding. 	Indeed, the record before
me indicates that there was a specific finding by the Board itself, memorialized in the
November 23, 2023 resolution, that Ms. Haynes was acting “out of and in the course of
the performance of her duties as a member of board of education” at the time the act or
omission at issue occurred. Unlike the decision in Robert Curcio v. The Bd. of Educ. of
the South Orange-Maplewood School District, Essex County, OAL DKT.NO. EDU 04142-
24 (initial Decision May 22, 2024) adopted, Commissioner Decision No. 239-24 (June
2024), where there had been no determination that petitioner was acting within the scope
of his duties, a determination has already been made that Ms. Haynes’ conduct arose out
of and in the course of the performance of her duties.

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12
The only challenge the Board has made to Ms. Haynes’ right to continued
indemnification is that she took a position in defense of the school ethics complaint that
was contrary to the Board’s interests. There has been nothing provided by the Board that
convinces this tribunal that this claimed conflict of interest prevents them from complying
with their acknowledged and mandated obligations under N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20.
3. 	The 	Petitioner 	Has 	A 	Likelihood 	Of 	Prevailing 	On 	The 	Merits 	Of 	The
Underlying Claim
Based 	upon 	the 	public 	policy 	established 	by 	N.J.S.A. 	18A:12-20, 	the
acknowledgment of the Board that Ms. Haynes is entitled to indemnification and the fact
that the Board was indemnifying her for a year and nine months, I FIND it is likely that
Ms. Haynes will succeed on the merits of her claim. As indicate above, there has been
nothing provided by the Board that convinces this tribunal that their claimed conflict of
interest exempts them from complying with their mandatory obligations under N.J.S.A.
18A:12-20.
4. 	When The Equities And Interests Of The Parties Are Balanced, The Petitioner
Will Suffer Greater Harm Than The Respondent Will Suffer If The Requested
Relief Is Not Granted.
Public policy is well established that a public official who gets sued or as in this
case is charged with an ethics violation is entitled to a defense and to be indemnified by
the governing body unless their acts were ultra vires or outside the scope of their duties.
The Board has already acknowledged that Ms. Haynes is entitled to indemnification, and
Ms. Haynes is now requesting injunctive relief to maintain the status quo.
In opposition to Ms. Haynes’ request, the Board asserts that she has taken a
position in the ethics matter that is contrary to the interests of the Board which in turn
justifies their cessation of her mandatory indemnification. 	Because they have provided
no details regarding harm that this alleged conflict of interest has had on the Board and
because I FIND there is no credible evidence in the record to show that the Board would

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13
be subject to any harm if the agreement to indemnify continues, I FIND that the balancing
of equities and interests weighs in favor of Ms. Haynes.
In reaching this conclusion, I have also considered additional information cited
above from Judge Baron’s decision in the Williams matter concerning actions that the
Board claims they were required to take in response to a subpoena by Williams’ counsel
in the ethics matter. The Board claims the issuance if the subpoena necessitated them
to intervene in the ethics matter, presumably join in a motion to quash the subpoena that
had already been filed by the party that received the subpoena, because the Board had
originally designated the requested document as confidential. I FIND that there has been
no credible evidence presented that would indicate that either Ms. Haynes or her attorney
were involved in any way in subpoenaing the document.
In addition to finding that Ms. Haynes has met all the standards set forth in Crowe,
because her application was for injunctive relief to maintain the status quo, I also FIND
that her meeting all four standards was not necessary. 	Given the individual strength of
each factor, even if less or no emphasis was placed on one, the remaining factors would
suffice 	to 	require 	the 	issuance 	of 	the 	relief 	sought 	by 	Ms. 	Haynes. 	See 	Waste
Management of New Jersey, Inc. v. Union County Utilities Authority, Supra, at 520-521.
Finally, I FIND the Board’s argument that the emergent relief requested by Ms.
Haynes be denied because her current attorney is not the same law firm that was
authorized by the original resolution to receive payment of legal fees and costs to be
without merit. 	The firm originally authorized to receive payment of costs and fees in
Resolution 15.2 (See Exhibit A) was Souder Shabazz & Woolridge Law Group (“Souder
Shabazz”). 	As a member of Souder Shabazz, Calvin W. Souder, Esq. has been
representing Ms. Haynes. Apparently, Souder Shabazz has recently realigned and Calvin
W. Souder, Esq. continues to represent Ms. Haynes but now through Souder Law Group,
Inc., I FIND that this change in the structure of the law firm representing Ms. Haynes has
no impact on the Board’s continuing obligation to indemnify Ms. Haynes.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 03817-25
14
For all of the reasons stated above, I CONCLUDE that relief sought by Ms. Haynes is
appropriate and necessary and that the status quo should be maintained until a final
decision on the verified petition.
ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the petitioner’s application for emergent relief is
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the original February 23, 2023 resolution is reinstated and for the
reasons set forth herein, the November 24, 2024 resolution rescinding the agreement is
deemed null and void; and it is further
ORDERED, that the original February 23, 2023 resolution be and hereby is
amended to substitute the Souder Law Group, LLP as approved by counsel for Dawn
Haynes; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Board of Education is enjoined from any further interference
with petitioner’s attorney client relationship; and it is further
ORDERED that a telephone status conference in this matter shall be held on April
3, 2025 at 3:30 PM. PLEASE DIAL IN FOR THE CONFERENCE Toll Free Number: 1-
866-561-8735; Participant Code: 98897440.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 03817-25
15
This Order on application for emergency relief may be adopted, modified or
rejected by the COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who/which
by law is authorized to make a final decision in this matter. 	The final decision shall be
issued without undue delay but no later than forty-five days following the entry of this
order. 	If the COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION does not
adopt, modify or reject this order within forty-five days, this recommended order shall
become a final decision on the issue of emergent relief in accordance with N.J.S.A.
52:14B-10.
March 10, 2025 	_____________________________
DATE 	WILLIAM J. COURTNEY, ALJ
db