June 29, 2026- State of New Mexico ex rel. Thomas McGill v. John Bassett, No. A-1-CA-42344

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number:
Filing Date: June 29, 2026
Court of Appeals of New Mexico Filed 6/29/2026 10:29 AM
Mark Reynolds
No. A-1-CA-42344
STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex rel. THOMAS MCGILL,
Plaintiff,
JOHN BASSETT, Individually, and JOHN BASSETT, in his capacity as Mayor for the Town of Edgewood,
Defendant,
14 15
GOVERNING BODY for the Town of Edgewood,
Plaintiff/Intervenor-Appellee,
V. JOHN BASSETT, Individually, and JOHN BASSETT, in his capacity as Mayor for the Town of Edgewood,
Defendant,
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 V. 9 10 11 12 13 and
16 17 18 19 20 21

v.	1
JOSEPHINE E. BASSETT, Individually;	2
JOSEPHINE C. BASSETT, or her successor-in-	3
office, as Trustee of the BASSETT TRUST, u/t/a	4
April 30, 2000; JOSEPHINE C. BASSETT,	5
or her successor-in-office, as Trustee of the	6
SURVIVOR’S TRUST, u/t/a January 30, 2005;	7
and EUGENE BASSETT,	8
Defendants-Appellants.	9
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY	10
Maria Sanchez-Gagne, District Court Judge	11
VanAmberg, Rogers, Yepa, Abeita,	12
Gomez & Wilkinson, LLP	13
Ronald J. VanAmberg	14
Santa Fe, NM	15
for Appellee	16
Patterson Real Bird & Rasmussen LLP	17
Frances C. Bassett	18
Louisville, CO	19
for Appellants	20

OPINION	1
DUFFY, Judge.	2
{1} 	Defendants Josephine Bassett1 and Eugene Bassett filed this appeal pursuant	3
to NMSA 1978, Section 38-2-9.1 (2001), the New Mexico statute prohibiting	4
strategic litigation against public participation (Anti-SLAPP statute). Defendants	5
argue the district court erred by ruling that the Anti-SLAPP statute does not apply	6
and 	denying 	their 	motions 	for 	summary 	judgment. 2 Because 	we 	conclude	7
Defendants have not identified any protected “conduct or speech undertaken or made	8
in connection with a public hearing or public meeting,” see § 38-2-9.1(A), we	9
dismiss Defendants’ appeal as premature.	10
BACKGROUND	11
{2} 	Defendants’ appeal stems from a lawsuit filed in February 2020 by three	12
residents of Edgewood against the then-Mayor of the Town of Edgewood, John	13
Bassett, along with the Governing Body for the Town of Edgewood and Defendants	14
Josephine Bassett and Eugene Bassett, who are the mother and brother, respectively,	15
1 Defendants’ briefing states that Josephine passed away during the pendency
of this appeal. The caption remains unchanged because no suggestion of death or
motion under Rule 12-301 NMRA has been filed.
2 Defendants also argue that the district court erred by denying their joint
motion to strike and their request for attorney fees and costs. However, we do not
address either of these issues within this opinion because our appellate jurisdiction
under Section 38-2-9.1(C) is limited to the special motions described in Section 38-
2-9.1(B). See Valenzuela v. My Way Holdings, LLC, 2024-NMCA-009, ¶ 23, 541
P.3d 191.

2
of John Bassett. The initial complaint alleged claims for quo warranto, declaratory	1
judgment, writ of mandamus, and fraud, and was later amended to include an unjust	2
enrichment claim against Defendants and a qui tam claim for violation of the state’s	3
Fraud Against Taxpayers Act (FATA), NMSA 1978, §§ 44-9-1 to -14 (2007, as	4
amended through 2015), against John Bassett and Josephine Bassett. Upon the entry	5
of a district court order for partial summary and default judgment in the action, John	6
Bassett was removed from office in November 2020. Plaintiffs then voluntarily	7
dismissed Defendants from the action in February 2022.	8
{3} 	However, in February 2023, this Court reversed the district court’s order on	9
the basis that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over John Bassett and	10
remanded the case for further proceedings. See State ex rel. McGill v. Bassett, 2023-	11
NMCA-033, 528 P.3d 739. Upon remand and following a change in the Town’s	12
leadership, the Town became an intervening plaintiff in the action and filed a	13
complaint that included a claim for unjust enrichment against Defendants Josephine	14
Bassett and Eugene Bassett. The Town’s complaint also included a FATA claim	15
against John Bassett and Josephine Bassett. The Town acknowledged John Bassett	16
as the main actor in the alleged fraud and later stipulated to the dismissal of that	17
claim as against Josephine. As a result, the Town’s only remaining claim against	18
Josephine Bassett and Eugene Bassett—which sits at the center of this appeal—is an	19

3
unjust enrichment claim relating to the Town’s installation of a sewer collection line	1
extension in 2018-19 servicing properties owned by Defendants.	2
{4} 	The sewer line extension was installed near the northeast quadrant of the	3
Interstate 40 and N.M. State Road 344 interchange and runs through property owned	4
by Defendants. At a public meeting held on June 20, 2018, the town council voted	5
3-to-1 to approve construction of Phase 1 of the sewer line extension, which was	6
referred to at the time as the “sewer line construction on Church, Cactus, and Main,”	7
in reference to the roads located north, northeast, and east of the northeast quadrant	8
of the I-40/NM-344 interchange. Then-Mayor John Bassett was present at the	9
meeting but did not participate in the vote. Neither Josephine nor Eugene Bassett	10
claim to have been in attendance at the June 20, 2018, meeting. The Town’s	11
complaint asserted the following factual allegations to support its unjust enrichment	12
claim against Defendants:	13
Defendants Josephine, Eugene and John Bassett are property owners	14
along 	with 	the 	Bassett 	Trust 	of 	properties 	with 	the 	Town 	of	15
Edgewood[,] which would benefit significantly if sewer lines were	16
extended to some or all of their properties by opening up development	17
possibilities.	18
In around 2013, the Bassetts became aware of the Town’s efforts at	19
expanding the sewer system and began their own efforts to have the	20
Town locate the sewer lines so that they benefited Bassett property.	21
In 2016, [John] Bassett became the mayor and began efforts to	22
manipulate the Town process so that Bassett property could benefit	23
from the sewer line extensions.	24

4
[T]o aid in the effort to direct the sewer lines to Bassett property,	1
Josephine Bassett executed some 5 sewer line easements across Bassett	2
property in favor of the Town prepared by Smith Engineering [at] Town	3
expense. These easements were intended to accommodate sewer lines	4
that would service Bassett property.	5
[A]t Town expense, sewer lines were installed at a time and place not	6
authorized by the Town[.] Thus, at Town expense and as a result of	7
[John] Bassett’s fraud, deceit and misrepresentations, [John] Bassett	8
was able [to] maneuver[] the Town process for the financial benefit of	9
himself, Josephine Bassett, Eugene Bassett and the Bassett Trust.	10
After construction it was realized that Phase 1 sewer lines were placed	11
in the Bassett easements so that the lines were inside of Bassett property	12
and doubled the development capacity for the property. Further, the	13
Town lost the benefit of having the lines within a road right-of-way[,]	14
which would provide greater public access.	15
The foregoing are the only allegations in the complaint against Josephine or Eugene	16
Bassett relating to the location and installation of the sewer line extension.	17
{5} 	In response to the Town’s complaint, Josephine and Eugene each filed a	18
motion for summary judgment in which they raised the New Mexico Anti-SLAPP	19
statute. Defendants argued that the unjust enrichment claim should be dismissed	20
under the Anti-SLAPP statute because they were “being sued for constitutionally	21
protected speech and conduct,” which they “undertook in relation, or response, to	22
the Edgewood town council meeting on June 20, 2018”—the meeting at which the	23
council voted to approve the 2018-19 sewer line extension.	24
{6} 	At the hearing on the motions, the Town argued that it sued Defendants	25
Josephine and Eugene Bassett for unjust enrichment “because their brother or son	26

5
manipulated the process as relates to sewer line priority, funding, and location” to	1
benefit Bassett property. The Town suggested that Defendants received a benefit	2
from having access to public sewer lines because they planned to develop the	3
property, and “it’s a matter of common sense that if you have access to [a] public	4
sewer, you’re going to be benefitted much more than having to . . . dig septic	5
systems, particularly if you’re going to do a major development.” The Town alleged	6
that it had limited funding for sewer line development, and the town council created	7
location priorities. According to the Town, John overrode those priorities to have the	8
sewer line moved south through Bassett property to add additional sewer taps for the	9
property. The Town explained that it brought a claim for unjust enrichment to	10
recover its limited funds, and included Josephine, Eugene, and the Bassett trusts and	11
limited liability companies as parties because each was presumably a beneficiary of	12
John Bassett’s manipulation—though, since Defendants’ motions were filed before	13
discovery, the Town indicated it had yet to confirm who owned the benefitted	14
properties and would have liked to have gotten that information through discovery	15
before responding to the motions.	16
{7} 	Following the hearing, the district court denied Defendants’ motions. The	17
court found that the Anti-SLAPP statute was inapplicable because the Town’s claim	18
“is an equitable claim for [u]njust [e]nrichment relating to the placement of the sewer	19
line and does not relate to any claim for damages resulting from actions taken by	20

6
Josephine Bassett or Eugene Bassett at any [c]ouncil meeting.” Defendants then filed	1
this appeal, seeking an expedited interlocutory review under the Anti-SLAPP statute.	2
See § 38-2-9.1(C).	3
DISCUSSION	4
{8} 	On appeal, Defendants argue the district court erred in ruling that the Anti-	5
SLAPP statute was inapplicable 	and 	in 	denying their motions 	for summary	6
judgment. “[B]efore we reach the merits of Defendants’ appeal, we must determine	7
whether [Defendants engaged in conduct or speech that] fall[s] within the procedural	8
protections of the Anti-SLAPP statute granting any party the right to an expedited	9
appeal from a trial court order on a special motion.” Chandler v. Advance N.M. Now	10
PAC, 2021-NMCA-017, ¶ 6, 488 P.3d 691 (alterations, omission, internal quotation	11
marks, and citation omitted); § 38-2-9.1(C). If the claims do not fall within the	12
purview of the Anti-SLAPP statute, then this Court does not have jurisdiction to	13
consider the merits of the district court’s ruling. See Chandler, 2021-NMCA-017,	14
¶ 20; see also Ferebee v. Hume, 2021-NMCA-012, ¶¶ 7, 28, 485 P.3d 778 (holding	15
that the defendants were not entitled to avail themselves of the expedited appeal right	16
provided by Section 38-2-9.1(C), and the appeal was therefore premature because	17
the order appealed from was otherwise nonfinal). “The question of jurisdiction is a	18
controlling consideration that must be resolved before going further.” Ferebee,	19

7
2021-NMCA-012, ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). “We review	1
jurisdictional questions de novo.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).	2
{9} 	We begin our review of the jurisdictional question with an overview of the	3
Anti-SLAPP statute before turning to Defendants’ arguments about why it should	4
apply in this case. “The Legislature enacted the Anti-SLAPP statute with the policy	5
goal of protecting its citizens from lawsuits in retaliation for exercising their right to	6
petition and to participate in quasi-judicial proceedings.” Cordova v. Cline, 2017-	7
NMSC-020, ¶ 19, 396 P.3d 159; NMSA 1978, § 38-2-9.2 (2001). To accomplish	8
this goal, “[t]he Anti-SLAPP statute provides certain procedural protections to	9
persons who engage in conduct or speech made in connection with specified public	10
hearings or public meetings.” Chandler, 2021-NMCA-017, ¶ 7; § 38-2-9.1(A)-(C).	11
Those protections include an expedited ruling on special motions, costs and attorney	12
fees incurred in pursuing the dismissal, and a right to an expedited interlocutory	13
appeal:	14
A. 	Any action seeking money damages against a person for	15
conduct or speech undertaken or made in connection with a public	16
hearing or public meeting in a quasi-judicial proceeding before a	17
tribunal or decision-making body of any political subdivision of the	18
state is subject to a special motion to dismiss, motion for judgment on	19
the pleadings, or motion for summary judgment that shall be considered	20
by the court on a priority or expedited basis to ensure the early	21
consideration of the issues raised by the motion and to prevent the	22
unnecessary expense of litigation.	23
B. 	If the rights afforded by this section are raised as an	24
affirmative defense and if a court grants a motion to dismiss, a motion	25

8
for judgment on the pleadings or a motion for summary judgment filed	1
within ninety days of the filing of the moving party’s answer, the court	2
shall award reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred by the moving	3
party in defending the action. If the court finds that a special motion to	4
dismiss or motion for summary judgment is frivolous or solely intended	5
to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable	6
attorney fees to the party prevailing on the motion.	7
C. 	Any party shall have the right to an expedited appeal from	8
a trial court order on the special motions described in Subsection B of	9
this section or from a trial court’s failure to rule on the motion on an	10
expedited basis.	11
Section 38-2-9.1(A)-(C) (emphasis added).	12
{10} 	Because the Anti-SLAPP statute protects petitioning “conduct or speech	13
undertaken or made in connection with a public hearing or public meeting,” see § 38-	14
2-9.1(A), the starting point for our review is to “identify the challenged activities of	15
the target of the SLAPP suit in relation to their First Amendment protections.”	16
Cordova, 	2017-NMSC-020, 	¶ 18; 	see 	also 	Chandler, 	2021-NMCA-017, 	¶ 12	17
(observing that Section 32-8-9.1(A) protects “all activities related to the public	18
hearing or public meeting, even if they do not occur in the hearings or meetings	19
themselves” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Then, to determine	20
whether the conduct or speech “is of the type the Legislature intended to protect with	21
the right to an expedited appeal when it passed the Anti-SLAPP statute, we consider	22
whether Defendants’ conduct or speech was ‘in connection with’ any of the	23
proceedings they identify for purposes of our Anti-SLAPP statute.” Chandler, 2021-	24
NMCA-017, ¶ 11 (quoting § 38-2-9.1(A)). “[T]o fall under the ‘in connection with’	25

9
definition of petitioning under the Anti-SLAPP statute, a communication must be	1
made to influence, inform, or at the very least, reach governmental bodies—either	2
directly or indirectly.” 	Chandler, 	2021-NMCA-017, ¶ 14 (alterations, internal	3
quotation marks, and citation omitted). “The key requirement of this definition of	4
petitioning is the establishment of a plausible nexus between the statement and the	5
governmental proceeding.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).	6
{11} 	Turning to the activities Defendants claim are challenged by the suit,	7
Defendants 	argue 	that 	“Josephine 	and 	Eugene 	both 	petitioned 	the 	Town 	of	8
Edgewood to extend sewer lines to an area of town that could service their	9
properties.” Defendants rely on the following conduct, which they contend is “in	10
connection with” the June 20, 2018 public meeting where the Edgewood town	11
council voted to approve construction of the 2018-19 sewer line extension:	12
(1) a November 19, 2007 joint letter to the Town of Edgewood signed by	13
Josephine Bassett and a neighbor seeking access to municipal sewer lines for	14
their properties and pledging to grant sewer line easements in return for access	15
(2) Josephine and Eugene Bassett’s signatures on a citizens’ petition presented	16
to the Town in 2014, urging the Town to seek funding for the extension of	17
municipal 	sewer 	lines 	to 	the 	northeast 	quadrant 	of 	the 	I-40/NM-344	18
interchange and Josephine Bassett’s signature on a similar citizens’ petition	19
presented to the Town in 2016;	20
(3) Eugene Bassett’s attendance at a 2014 town council meeting to advocate	21
in support of the sewer-line extension;	22
(4) Josephine Bassett’s communications with the staff and engineers for the	23
Town between 2017 and 2018 regarding municipal sewer line easements	24
across her property;	25

10
(5) Josephine Bassett’s donation of temporary and permanent easements	1
across her property to the Town in 2018; and	2
(6) Josephine and Eugene Bassett’s familial association with former Mayor	3
John Bassett.	4
Our task is to determine whether there is a link between these activities and the June	5
20, 2018 public meeting. See Chandler, 2021-NMCA-017, ¶ 16.	6
{12} 	The first three actions involve petitioning conduct that occurred many years	7
before the June 20, 2018 meeting, and “[w]e see no indication that [this] conduct . . .	8
was intended to influence, inform, or reach” the Town council in connection with	9
the June 20, 2018 meeting. See id. First, though Josephine cosigned a letter to the	10
Town on November 19, 2007, requesting sewer line access for properties owned by	11
her and a neighbor and offering to grant utility easements in return for access,	12
Defendants do not argue how this conduct related in any way to the public meeting	13
that occurred over a decade later. There is no indication that this letter initiated the	14
June 20, 2018 public meeting, cf. Cordova, 2017-NMSC-020, ¶ 21, and Defendants	15
have not asserted that this letter was intended to directly or indirectly influence,	16
inform, or reach the Town with respect to the vote that occurred at a public meeting	17
ten years later. See Chandler, 2021-NMCA-017, ¶ 14. Second, Josephine and	18
Eugene each signed citizens’ petitions in 2014 urging the Town to seek funding for	19
sewer line extensions to the northeast quadrant near the I-40/NM-344 interchange,	20
and Josephine also signed a similar citizens’ petition in 2016. But, as of the June 20,	21

11
2018 meeting, the Town had already sought and obtained funding for the wastewater	1
and sewer line extensions and was in the process of getting state environmental	2
agency approval of bids for the construction, and thus we can discern no “link or	3
association” between these petitions and the June 20, 2018 public hearing. See id.	4
¶ 12 (“The plain language of the statute tells us that the conduct or speech at issue	5
must be linked to or associated with ‘a public hearing or public meeting in a quasi-	6
judicial proceeding’ in order to be ‘in connection with’ those proceedings.” (quoting	7
§ 38-2-9.1(A))). Third, while Defendant Eugene Bassett attended an August 2014	8
town council meeting at which the subject of Edgewood’s wastewater system was	9
discussed, Defendants do not explain how this conduct can be said to relate to the	10
June 	20, 	2018, 	public 	meeting. 	See 	Chandler, 	2021-NMCA-017, 	¶ 14.	11
Consequently, while these actions may well be petitioning activity, we cannot	12
conclude that they were undertaken “in connection with” the June 20, 2018, meeting.	13
{13} 	Likewise, Defendants have not shown how the fourth and fifth activities, both	14
of which relate to easements, constitute petitioning conduct or speech made in	15
connection with the June 20, 2018 meeting. Defendants alleged that Josephine was	16
approached by engineers with a request for sewer line easements in 2017 and, in	17
response, she granted the easements as a donation to public use. Then, in January	18
2018, Josephine again donated an easement after receiving a letter from the Town	19
requesting the easement. Defendants argue that the easements constitute political	20

12
speech and “the First Amendment’s protection extends to Josephine’s generous	1
donation of public utility easements.” But this Court has previously held that “New	2
Mexico’s Anti-SLAPP statute does not expressly apply to the exercise of free	3
speech,” but rather, only to “petitioning, made for the purpose of directly or	4
indirectly influencing, informing, or reaching governmental bodies.” See id. ¶ 19;	5
see also Cordova, 2017-NMSC-020, ¶ 19 (explaining that the purpose of the Anti-	6
SLAPP statute is to protect citizens in exercising their right to petition and to	7
participate in quasi-judicial proceedings and public hearings). Like in Chandler,	8
Defendants have characterized their conduct not as petitioning, “but as an exercise	9
of constitutionally protected free speech.” See Chandler, 2021-NMCA-017, ¶ 19. As	10
with Chandler, we conclude that the Anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to such	11
conduct. Id.	12
{14} 	The sixth and final “activity” relied on by Defendants is their familial	13
association with former-Mayor John Bassett. Defendants argue their association is	14
protected by the First Amendment and federal case law establishing the right of	15
association. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 918-19	16
(1982) (“The First Amendment . . . restricts the ability of the State to impose liability	17
on an individual solely because of [one’s] association with another.”). However, just	18
as with the general exercise of free speech discussed above, New Mexico’s Anti-	19
SLAPP statute does not expressly apply to the right of association, and “we decline	20

13
to add such language into the statute.” See Chandler, 2021-NMCA-017, ¶ 19; see	1
also Cordova, 2017-NMSC-020, ¶ 19.	2
{15} 	For all of these reasons, we conclude that none of the conduct or speech	3
identified by Defendants can be said to have been “undertaken or made in connection	4
with” the June 20, 2018 public meeting. Section 38-2-9.1(A). “As Defendants’	5
conduct or speech does not fall within the protections of the Anti-SLAPP statute, we	6
do not have jurisdiction to address the district court’s ruling” on the merits of	7
Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment. See Chandler, 2021-NMCA-017, ¶ 20.	8
{16} 	As a final matter, we pause to clarify that although we affirm the district	9
court’s conclusion that the Anti-SLAPP statute does not apply, the district court’s	10
framing of its conclusion—that the complaint does not “relate to any claim for	11
damages resulting from actions taken by [Defendants] at any [c]ouncil meeting”—	12
appears to conflict with Cordova and Chandler, which made clear that the Anti-	13
SLAPP statute “includes all activities related to the public hearing or public meeting,	14
even if they do not occur in the hearings or meetings themselves.” Chandler, 2021-	15
NMCA-017, ¶ 12 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);	16
Cordova, 2017-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 21-22.3 Even so, our review is de novo and, having	17
3 Defendants devoted a portion of their briefing to argue why the conduct at
issue in this case is immunized under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Because we conclude Defendants’ conduct is
not petitioning conduct within the procedural protections of the Anti-SLAPP statute,
we need not proceed to a Noerr-Pennington analysis in this appeal. See Cordova,

14
reviewed the conduct identified by Defendants based on the standard articulated in	1
Cordova and Chandler, we have independently concluded that the Anti-SLAPP	2
statute is inapplicable. See Strata Prod. Co. v. Mercury Expl. Co., 1996-NMSC-016,	3
¶ 12, 121 N.M. 622, 916 P.2d 822 (“We are not bound, however, by the trial court’s	4
legal conclusions and may independently draw our own conclusions of law on	5
appeal.”); C.R. Anthony Co. v. Loretto Mall Partners, 1991-NMSC-070, ¶ 18, 112	6
N.M. 504, 817 P.2d 238 (stating that “an appellate court need not defer to the trial	7
court’s conclusions of law”).	8
CONCLUSION	9
{17} 	For the above reasons, we dismiss Defendants’ appeal of the district court’s	10
denial of their motions for summary judgment as premature, and remand to the	11
district court for further proceedings.	12
{18} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	13
_________________________	14
MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge	15
2017-NMSC-020, ¶ 24 (“While the Anti-SLAPP statute provides the procedural
protections 	[the 	p]etitioners 	require, 	the 	Noerr-Pennington 	doctrine 	is 	the
mechanism that offers [the p]etitioners the substantive First Amendment protections
they seek.”); Ferebee, 2021-NMCA-012, ¶ 26 (declining to proceed to a Noerr-
Pennington analysis after reaching a conclusion that the Anti-SLAPP statute did not
apply to the conduct at issue); Valenzuela, 2024-NMCA-009, ¶¶ 31-47.

—

4

I CONCUR:

SHAMMARA H. HENDERSON, Judge

KRISTOPHER N. HOUGHTON, Judge, specially concurring

15

16
HOUGHTON, Judge (specially concurring).	1
{19} 	I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion. I write separately,	2
however, because I believe the majority’s rationale improperly limits the conduct	3
and speech protected by New Mexico’s Anti-SLAPP statute, as established by	4
Cordova, 2017-NMSC-020, ¶ 19. I would hold, instead, that Defendants failed to	5
show, as a matter of undisputed material fact, that their protected activity was the	6
target of the Town’s unjust enrichment action.	7
{20} 	The majority acknowledges that Defendants may have engaged in “petitioning	8
conduct” by sending letters, signing petitions, and attending a public hearing in an	9
effort to convince the Town to extend its sewer line to and through Defendants’	10
properties. Maj. op. ¶ 12. But the majority says it cannot conclude the conduct was	11
done “in connection with” the public town council meeting held on June 20, 2018,	12
because it “occurred many years before” and “Defendants do not explain how this	13
conduct can be said to relate to [it].” Maj. op. ¶ 12. Accordingly, the majority	14
concludes that “Defendants’ conduct or speech does not fall within the protections	15
of the Anti-SLAPP statute.” Maj. op. ¶ 15. This reasoning is inconsistent with our	16
precedent and sets too high a bar for litigants seeking the protection of the Anti-	17
SLAPP statute.	18
{21} 	We have previously been cautioned against narrowly construing the activities	19
protected by the Anti-SLAPP statute. In Cordova, our Supreme Court reversed this	20

17
Court for holding that the Anti-SLAPP statute did not apply because a recall	1
petitioning process under the Local School Board Member Recall Act triggered a	2
“sufficiency hearing before a district court,” which this Court held was “not a public	3
meeting or quasi-judicial proceeding as defined by the Anti-SLAPP statute.” 2017-	4
NMSC-020, ¶ 22 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Our Supreme	5
Court held that “[t]he Court of Appeals erred when it focused solely on the	6
sufficiency hearing before the district court.” Id. It explained that “[s]uch a narrow	7
interpretation 	of the language of the Anti-SLAPP statute is 	contrary to 	the	8
Legislature’s broad intent to protect citizens exercising their right to petition—here	9
the right to engage in the recall process—from SLAPP suits.” Id. Our Supreme Court	10
concluded: “[W]e hold that the Legislature intended the Anti-SLAPP statute to	11
protect individuals, like [the p]etitioners, from lawsuits intended to chill their	12
participation in recall proceedings.” Id. ¶ 23.	13
{22} 	Consistent with Cordova, this Court has further defined conduct made “in	14
connection with” as that which is “made to influence, inform, or at the very least,	15
reach governmental bodies—either directly or indirectly.” Chandler, 2021-NMCA-	16
017, ¶ 14 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 	see id. 	(“The key	17
requirement of this definition of petitioning is the establishment of a plausible nexus	18
between the statement and the governmental proceeding.” (internal quotation marks	19
and citation omitted)). This Court explained that “this expansive definition comports	20

18
with Cordova’s inclusion of activities that, although conducted outside the potential	1
sufficiency hearing’s proceedings, sought to initiate a process by which an elected	2
official may [be] recalled.” Chandler, 2021-NMCA-017, ¶ 14.	3
{23} 	In light of the broad interpretation of “in connection with,” I do not see how	4
Defendants’ lobbying and petitioning efforts, which were meant to convince the	5
Town to extend the sewer line, lack a plausible nexus to the June 20, 2018 town	6
council meeting, where that action was ultimately approved. I do not believe	7
Defendants needed to have requested a specific hearing, or that a specific hearing	8
needed to have been scheduled, for Defendants’ activities to fall under the Anti-	9
SLAPP statute, as the majority suggests. The conduct merely needed to be “engaged	10
in for the purpose of petitioning or participating in proceedings before a local or state	11
governmental tribunal.” Id. ¶ 15. There is no dispute that Defendants very much	12
intended “to influence, inform, or . . . reach” the Town and convince it to extend the	13
sewer line to and through their property. See id. ¶ 14.	14
{24} 	The majority’s opinion has the potential to undermine protection for conduct	15
at the heart of the most classic of SLAPP suits. See Frederick M. Rowe & Leo M.	16
Romero, 	Resolving Land-Use Disputes by Intimidation: SLAPP Suits in New	17
Mexico, 32 N.M. L. Rev. 217, 218 (2002) (“The typical SLAPP suit involves citizens	18
opposed to a particular real estate development.” (internal quotation marks and	19
citation omitted)). For example, the municipal approval process for a development	20

19
can take years and involve scores of public hearings and proceedings, and citizen	1
opposition can take many forms during that process. See Cordova, 2017-NMSC-	2
020, ¶ 19 (“The specific protection in the Anti-SLAPP statute for participation in	3
public hearings before tribunals . . . [should] protect citizens’ testifying, debating,	4
complaining, campaigning, lobbying, litigating, appealing, demonstrating, and	5
otherwise invoking the law on public issues.” (internal quotation marks and citation	6
omitted)). The majority implies that New Mexico’s Anti-SLAPP statute does not	7
protect citizen opposition to a development project if it is not directed at a specific	8
public hearing or proceeding, rather than the process as a whole. Maj. op. ¶ 15. It	9
also suggests that the passage of time between the citizens’ activity and the	10
government’s ultimate decision diminishes the protections afforded by the Anti-	11
SLAPP statute. Maj. op. ¶ 12. Under the majority’s view, these citizens would not	12
be protected by the Anti-SLAPP statute from a retaliatory suit brought by the	13
developer to punish their previous opposition.	14
{25} 	Rather 	than 	unnecessarily 	narrowing 	our 	Supreme 	Court’s 	broad	15
interpretation of “in connection with” and undermining the Anti-SLAPP Act’s	16
important protections, I would instead focus on the lack of nexus, in this case,	17
between the Town’s suit for unjust enrichment and Defendants’ lobbying and	18
petitioning activity. I would hold that Defendants in this particular case—as a matter	19
of undisputed fact—have failed to show the Town targeted them for their petitioning	20

20
conduct. See § 38-2-9.1(A) (defining a SLAPP suit as “[a]ny action seeking money	1
damages against a person for conduct or speech undertaken or made in connection	2
with a public hearing or public meeting in a quasi-judicial proceeding” (emphasis	3
added)).	4
{26} 	As the majority explains, the only live claim the Town maintains against	5
Defendants is one for unjust enrichment. Maj. op. ¶ 3. But the elements of unjust	6
enrichment do not expressly target petitioning or lobbying activity, unlike claims	7
classically associated with SLAPP suits. Compare Sloane v. Rehoboth McKinley	8
Christian Health Care Servs., Inc., 2018-NMCA-048, ¶ 25, 423 P.3d 18 (explaining	9
that “[t]he elements of unjust enrichment are: (1) another has been knowingly	10
benefitted at one’s expense (2) in a manner such that allowance of the other to retain	11
the benefit would be unjust” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), with	12
Cordova, 	2017-NMSC-020, 	¶ 	26 	(associating 	SLAPP 	suits 	with 	“tortious	13
interference 	with 	contract 	and 	with 	business 	relations/economic 	advantage,	14
defamation, violation of civil rights, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of	15
emotional distress” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Unsurprisingly,	16
the Town’s unjust enrichment claim does not mention any of Defendants’ protected	17
activities.	18
{27} 	Lacking a claim that facially targets the protected activity, the only way	19
Defendants can show the Town’s unjust enrichment claim constitutes a SLAPP suit	20

21
is by showing it was filed in retaliation for Defendants’ protected activity. See, e.g.,	1
Ferebee, 2021-NMCA-012, ¶¶ 3-4 (involving claims for improper use of a credit	2
card, forgery, and failure to repay a loan made against an employee who argued	3
under the Anti-SLAPP statute that the claims “were made in retaliation for her	4
declarations to the Department of Commerce”). Because Defendants elected to	5
pursue this claim through summary judgment, Defendants concede they must make	6
that showing as a matter of undisputed fact. This they have not done.	7
{28} 	Defendants claimed the Town brought suit in retaliation for Defendants’	8
protected activity:	9
Although every single landowner along the route of the 2018-[]19	10
sewer extension had at one time or another petitioned the Town . . . for	11
construction of the sewer line extension between Cactus Road and Main	12
Street, my family and I alone have been singled out by the current	13
political leadership of the Town . . . for false and malicious allegations	14
of unjust enrichment.	15
But the Town refuted that motive in its response to Defendants’ motion for summary	16
judgment: “No one is retaliating against [Josephine] Bassett for writing letters or	17
signing 	petitions.” 	In 	support, 	the 	Town 	introduced 	an 	affidavit 	from 	its	18
commissioner, which stated in relevant part: “No petitions, written communications	19
or speech by Josephine or Eugene Bassett is in any way the basis for, or the subject	20
of, this legal action. . . . The Town . . . is not singling out the Bassett family in any	21
way.” The commissioner affirmed that the real motive for the suit was the fact that	22
former “Mayor [John] Bassett diverted the sewer priority onto Bassett lands” and	23

22
that “[m]ost of the Cactus/Main sewer extension borders on, or is built entirely on	1
Bassett property.” Furthermore, Defendants’ assertion that “every single landowner	2
along the route” petitioned for the sewer extension but they alone were sued, tends	3
to undermine Defendants’ claim that the Town retaliated for petitioning or other	4
protected activity.	5
{29} 	As a result, a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether the Town’s	6
action was in retaliation for Defendants’ protected activity. Accordingly, I would	7
hold that Defendants have failed to make the requisite showing that the Town’s	8
action against them for unjust enrichment is a SLAPP suit as contemplated under	9
Section 38-2-9.1(A). Lacking appellate jurisdiction under the Anti-SLAPP statute at	10
this stage, I would dismiss the appeal as premature.	11
____________________________________	12
KRISTOPHER N. HOUGHTON, Judge	13