April 24, 2009 – David Martinez v. Cities of Gold Casino, Pajoaque Pueblo, and Food Industries Self-Insurance Fund, No. 28,762

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: _______________
Filing Date: April 24, 2009
NO. 28,762
DAVID MARTINEZ,
Worker-Appellant,
v.
CITIES OF GOLD CASINO,
POJOAQUE PUEBLO, and
FOOD INDUSTRIES SELF-INSURANCE FUND,
Employer/Insurer-Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ADMINISTRATION
Gregory Griego, Judge
Annie Laurie Coogan
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
Pueblo of Pojoaque Legal Department
Frank A. Demolli
Steffani A. Cochran
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellees

OPINION
VANZI, Judge.
{1} 	David Martinez (Worker) appeals from a compensation order granting only
partial relief. In the proceedings below, the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)
determined that Worker had been wrongfully terminated by his employer, the Cities
of Gold Casino (Casino), which does business as Pojoaque Gaming Inc. (PGI).
Worker claimed he was terminated in retaliation for having filed a workers’
compensation claim. Although the Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) expressly
provides that the remedy for retaliatory discharge is mandatory rehiring, the WCJ
concluded that he lacked authority to award such relief in this case. A separate tribal
entity that had not waived its sovereign immunity was unwilling to reissue the
employment license Worker required to resume his former employment. On appeal,
Worker challenges this aspect of the compensation order as well as the adequacy of
the remedies and cost-sharing provisions established in NMSA 1978, Sections 52-1-
28.1, -28.2, and -54(F) (1990, as amended through 2003) of the Act. We reverse in
part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Worker’s Initial Injury and Workers’ Compensation Claim
{2} 	On February 9, 2006, Worker filed a claim with the Workers’ Compensation
Administration (WCA) against PGI. In his claim, Worker alleged that he suffered an

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“[o]ccupational injury,” to wit, a “tear of [the] ligaments” of his “left foot.” 	This
injury was allegedly sustained while “[m]oving . . . [a money] cart” during the course
of his duties as a “[m]anager—hard and soft count” at the “Cities of Gold Casino
Pojoaque Pueblo.”
{3} 	Named as defendants in Worker’s complaint were the “Cities of Gold Casino,
Pojoaque Pueblo and Food Industries, Industries [sic] Self Insurance Company.”
Despite the fact that only these three entities were named by Worker in his complaint,
the complex nature of the manner in which the Cities of Gold Casino is owned and
operated by the Pojoaque Pueblo (Pueblo) ultimately led to the inclusion of additional
defendants during the WCA proceedings. 	A brief description of the relationships
among the various defendants follows.
B. 	The Defendants
{4} 	The Casino is a commercial business enterprise that is owned and operated by
PGI. PGI is an independent corporation owned by the Pueblo, a federally recognized
Indian tribal government. Pursuant to Pueblo Tribal Council Resolution 2006-134,
the Buffalo Thunder Development Authority (BTDA), a “political subdivision and
unincorporated instrumentality” of the Pueblo, obtained ownership of PGI on
December 8, 2006. In addition to being owned and operated by PGI, an entity owned
by BTDA, which is in turn a political subdivision of the Pueblo, the Casino and its

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operations are heavily influenced by the decisions of yet another independent Pueblo
entity: the Pueblo of Pojoaque Gaming Commission (PPGC). PPGC is the sole entity
responsible for the issuance of gaming licenses that certain employees of the Casino
are required to possess pursuant to the gaming compact (Compact) entered into by the
Pueblo and the State of New Mexico. 	In addition to requiring the Pueblo to issue
certain Casino employees gaming licenses—which, as noted, the Pueblo does through
PPGC—the Compact also requires the Pueblo to provide workers’ compensation
insurance to all employees working at the Casino “through participation in programs
offering benefits at least as favorable as those provided by comparable state
programs.” 	The Food Industries Self Insurance Fund (FISIF) is the workers’
compensation insurance carrier PGI contracted with to provide workers’ compensation
insurance for the employees of the Casino. 	The Casino, PGI, the Pueblo, BTDA,
PPGC, and FISIF were all parties below and are referred to collectively as
“Defendants” when referencing the lower court case.
C. 	Proceedings Before the WCA Regarding Worker’s Injury Claim
{5} 	Once filed, the process of adjudicating Worker’s injury claim began with a
WCA mediation conference in which Worker, his attorney, and attorneys for
Defendants took part. 	At that time, the parties agreed that “the [WCA] does have
jurisdiction over this claim.” 	Aside from this single agreement, the parties were

4
unable to reach a resolution. Thereafter, Casino and FISIF submitted an answer to
Worker’s complaint. At that time, jurisdiction of the WCA was not contested. The
parties subsequently submitted a pretrial order approved by the WCJ, which contained
a stipulation that the “[j]urisdiction of [WCA] is not contested.” The pretrial order
listed Eileen Vialpando (Witness) as one of Worker’s potential witnesses for trial.
The WCJ heard Worker’s claim for medical and compensation benefits and filed a
memorandum opinion stating that Worker was entitled to such benefits and directing
the parties to file requested findings of fact and conclusions of law.
{6} 	Eight days after the WCJ’s opinion was entered, on November 29, 2006, the
PPGC suspended the licenses that Worker and Witness required to perform their
employment duties. Employee and Witness were banned from the premises of the
Casino until further notice. 	On January 25, 2007, both Worker’s and Witness’s
licenses were permanently revoked by PPGC resulting in termination of their
employment with the Casino and the Pueblo.
{7} 	Meanwhile, the WCJ issued an order regarding attorney fees related to worker’s
injury claim. The WCJ found that Worker’s attorney was entitled to $6,500 plus gross
receipts tax. This payment was to be paid equally by Worker and Defendants.
{8} 	The WCJ later issued a compensation order memorializing his previous
memorandum opinion and including findings of fact and conclusions of law. 	The

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WCJ found that the “[WCA] has jurisdiction over the parties” and that the accident
that led to Worker’s injury occurred in the course and scope of Worker’s employment
at the Casino. Based on these findings, the WCJ determined that Worker was entitled
to compensation in the amount of $38.50 per week for 115 weeks, for a total of
$4,427.50.
D. 	Worker’s Bad Faith/Retaliatory Discharge Claim
{9} 	On February 9, 2007, Worker and Witness submitted a joint complaint with the
WCA claiming that the Casino, the Pueblo, and FISIF had engaged in “Bad
Faith/Unfair Claims Processing” and “Retaliation” as a direct result of Worker’s
having filed his initial complaint with the WCA and Witness’s having participated in
those proceedings on Worker’s behalf. 	Worker and Witness further specified that
their November 29, 2006, suspensions and January 25, 2007, terminations were in
violation of Section 52-1-28.1, which prohibits unfair and bad faith claim-processing
practices, and Section 52-1-28.2, which prohibits retaliation against employees
seeking benefits. 	This new complaint was filed under the same WCA number as
Worker’s original complaint, and the matter proceeded accordingly.
{10} 	On April 13, 2007, Worker and Witness submitted an amended claim with the
WCA that was identical to their February 9, 2007, claim in all respects except that it
added PPGC as a defendant. 	Shortly thereafter, counsel from the Pojoaque Legal

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Department submitted an “Entry of Special Appearance” requesting that “Employer”
be dismissed from the proceedings.
{11} 	The motion to dismiss advanced three arguments. The first was based on tribal
sovereign immunity. 	Defendants’ remaining arguments included the following:
Worker failed to exhaust his tribal remedies with respect to the revocation of his
license, and Worker failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted in that
no cause of action existed for Worker to challenge PGI’s submission of materials to
PPGC relating to Worker’s suitability to engage in Class III gaming activities.
{12} 	Defendants then submitted a separate motion to dismiss all claims relating to
Witness. Defendants contended that because Section 52-1-28.1 penalizes employers
for improper claims filed only by injured workers and Section 52-1-28.2 prohibits
retaliatory discharge only against a worker seeking workers’ compensation benefits,
Witness was not entitled to relief under either provision. The WCJ granted the motion
and dismissed the claims raised by Witness on June 18, 2007.
{13} 	On June 4, 2007, the WCJ issued a ruling regarding PGI, PPGC, and FISIF’s
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The WCJ first noted that
neither PGI, the Pueblo, nor FISIF had raised the issue of sovereign immunity prior
to the filing of the first motion to dismiss in April 2007. The WCJ remarked that prior
to the filing of that motion, PGI and FISIF had stipulated that “[j]urisdiction of the

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[WCA] is not contested.” The WCJ also observed that neither PGI nor FISIF raised
sovereign immunity in their answer to Worker’s initial complaint. In light of these
facts, the WCJ concluded that “jurisdiction does exist at least as against [PGI].” The
WCJ then noted that PPGC was first added as a Defendant in the amended complaint,
after Worker’s original injury complaint had been adjudicated. Because PPGC had
not explicitly waived sovereign immunity, the WCJ held that PPGC was entitled to
raise that defense. Accordingly, the WCJ concluded that “the Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction is denied as regards [PGI] but is granted as
regards [PPGC].”
{14} 	Defendants then submitted a motion requesting that the WCJ correct the caption
in the case. 	Counsel for Defendants argued that throughout the proceedings the
Worker’s employer had wrongly been identified as Pojoaque Pueblo and Cities of
Gold Casino. According to counsel for Defendants, PGI was the sole employer during
Worker’s employment at the Casino. Worker submitted a response, expressing no
objection to the addition of PGI as one of the named Defendants but maintaining that
the Casino, PPGC, and the Pueblo should all remain Defendants in the case because,
in his view, all of the named entities were his employer under the Act.
{15} 	On August 14, 2007, in his findings of fact and conclusions of law, the WCJ
ruled that the employer in the case was PGI and that PGI had waived its sovereign

8
immunity by “its actions in voluntarily litigating in this case through a trial and entry
of a [c]ompensation [o]rder” and by “consenting to entry of the [p]re-[t]rial [o]rder of
October 12, 2006, which explicitly noted ‘[j]urisdiction of the [WCA] is not
contested.’” 	On the other hand, the WCJ concluded that because the Pueblo and
PPGC had not waived their sovereign immunity, claims against them were “barred.”
{16} 	The WCJ issued a memorandum opinion on February 29, 2008, in which the
WCJ restated that PPGC was never Worker’s employer and that PPGC was immune
from suit pursuant to its status as a tribal entity possessing sovereign immunity. With
respect to PGI, however, the WCJ again concluded that it had waived its sovereign
immunity by submitting to the jurisdiction of the WCA through participation in the
proceedings related to Worker’s injury claim. The WCJ further concluded that PGI
had provided material misinformation to PPGC that subsequently resulted in PPGC’s
terminating Worker’s license, which in turn led to the termination of Worker’s
employment with PGI. This chain of events, the WCJ concluded, directly resulted
from Worker’s having filed his initial claim with the WCA and constituted both bad
faith and retaliation by PGI. Accordingly, PGI’s actions were in violation of Section
52-1-28.1, and Worker was entitled to a 25 percent increase in his initial compensation
award. 	The WCJ further found that PGI, by retaliating against Worker, acted in
violation of Section 52-1-28.2 and, as such, the WCJ imposed a penalty against PGI

1 We note that Worker indicated that his additional fee request would result in	17
a total award of $19,500. Given that he had previously been awarded $6,500 and was	18
9
of $2,500 payable to the WCA pursuant to the remedy provisions in Section 52-1-
28.2(C) and (D). Finally, the WCJ concluded that despite the fact that Section 52-1-
28.2(B) explicitly requires employers who retaliate against employees for seeking
workers’ compensation benefits to rehire, the WCJ had no authority to order PGI to
do so. The WCJ explained that “[i]n order for [PGI] to rehire . . . Worker, Worker
must be appropriately licensed by [PPGC].” “The [WCA] cannot require the [PPGC]
to license Worker.” On April 1, 2008, the WCJ issued a compensation order in which
he restated the conclusions noted immediately above.
E. 	Attorney Fees
{17} 	After the WCJ issued his compensation order, Worker submitted proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to attorney fees on the bad faith
and retaliation claims. Therein, Worker noted that he had previously been awarded
$6,500 in attorney fees as a result of the WCJ’s initial compensation order relating to
his workplace injury claim. 	Worker then pointed out that with respect to the bad
faith/retaliation claim alone, Worker had amassed $20,858.38 in attorney fees.
Accordingly, in addition to the $6,500 previously awarded, Worker requested an
award of $12,500 in attorney fees, for a total award equivalent to the maximum award
permitted under the Act of $19,000.1

requesting an additional $12,500, Worker was requesting a total award of only	17
$19,000. This conclusion is consistent with the provisions set forth in NMSA 1978,	18
52-1-54(I) (2003), which caps attorney fees at $19,000.	19
10
{18} 	Worker then argued, assuming the WCJ was willing to grant his additional
attorney fees request, that the Act’s cap and its requirement of a 50-50 split of the fees
would be unjust and unconstitutional, pursuant to Mieras v. Dyncorp, 1996-NMCA-
095, 122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518. The same day Worker submitted his attorney fees
request, the WCJ issued his order. The WCJ awarded Worker $12,500 as requested.
The WCJ took judicial notice of the chilling effect of miserly fees on representation
but found that the $12,500 award was reasonable and appropriate.
F. 	Worker’s Appeal
{19} 	Worker timely filed a notice of appeal with this Court. The notice referred only
to Worker; Witness was not mentioned. A docketing statement was filed with this
Court a month later. Within the docketing statement, Worker made several arguments
pertaining to the applicability of the WCA provisions to Witness.
II. 	DISCUSSION
{20} 	The parties contest five issues: 	(1) whether the provisions and remedies set
forth in Sections 52-1-28.1 and -28.2 are applicable to Witness, (2) whether the WCA
has subject matter jurisdiction to order Defendants to rehire Worker as required by
Section 52-1-28.2(B), (3) whether Worker’s failure to exhaust tribal remedies

11
precludes this Court from exercising its jurisdiction, (4) whether the remedies and
damages set forth in Sections 52-1-28.1 and -28.2(B) are adequate and constitutional,
and (5) whether the attorney fees cap provision in Section 52-1-54(I) is constitutional
in light of the provision requiring that the cost of any award be divided equally
between the employer and the employee.
A. 	Applicability of Provisions to Witness
{21} 	Although the applicability of Sections 52-1-28.1 and -28.2(B) to Witness is a
compelling question, we conclude that it is not properly before us. The procedural
rules governing appeals to this Court from the WCA are clear: “[a]ny party in interest
may, within thirty days of mailing of the final order of the workers’ compensation
judge, file a notice of appeal with the court of appeals.” NMSA 1978, § 52-5-8(A)
(1989). The WCJ dismissed Witness’s claims with prejudice on June 18, 2007. That
order constituted a final order with respect to Witness’s claims. See Rule 1-054(B)(2)
NMRA (“When multiple parties are involved, judgment may be entered adjudicating
all issues as to one or more, but fewer than all parties. Such judgment shall be a final
one unless the court, in its discretion, expressly provides otherwise and a provision to
that effect is contained in the judgment.”). 	Witness did not file a notice of appeal
within thirty days of that order. Although Worker’s notice of appeal was timely filed,
Witness was not named in the notice. “[T]ime and place requirements for filing the

12
notice of appeal are mandatory preconditions to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.”
Williams v. Rio Rancho Pub. Schs., 2008-NMCA-150, ¶ 15, 145 N.M. 214, 195 P.3d
879. We therefore decline to consider Witness’s claims.
B. 	Whether the WCJ Has the Authority to Order Worker’s Employer to
Rehire Worker
1. 	Sovereign Immunity
{22} 	We review de novo the legal question of whether an Indian tribe, or an entity
under the tribe’s control, possesses sovereign immunity. See Gallegos v. Pueblo of
Tesuque, 2002-NMSC-012, ¶ 6, 132 N.M. 207, 46 P.3d 668. As previously noted,
there are several tribal-controlled entities involved in the ownership of the Casino. As
a federally recognized Indian tribe, the Pueblo undisputedly possesses sovereign
immunity. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978). PGI is
“a tribally chartered corporation” created by, but independent of, the Pueblo. PGI was
incorporated by the Pueblo under Section 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA),
25 U.S.C. § 477 (1990). 	Corporations formed under Section 17 enjoy sovereign
immunity and may independently waive such protection. Sanchez v. Santa Ana Golf
Club, Inc., 2005-NMCA-003, ¶ 6, 136 N.M. 682, 104 P.3d 548 (filed 2004). 	The
PPGC and other gaming commissions like it are “strictly regulatory [entities that
conduct] oversight to ensure compliance with tribal, federal, and, if applicable, state
laws and regulations.” 	Kosiba v. Pueblo of San Juan, 2006-NMCA-057, ¶ 11, 139

13
N.M. 533, 135 P.3d 234 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As such, the
PPGC 	also 	possesses 	sovereign 	immunity, 	and 	that 	immunity 	may 	also 	be
independently waived. 	See id. 	Finally, BTDA is an unincorporated political
subdivision of the Pueblo and itself possesses sovereign immunity which it may
waive. See Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe of Mescalaro Reservation, 673 F.2d
315, 320 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that resort hotel complex was a sub-entity of the
tribe and thus entitled to sovereign immunity). Having discussed the various tribal
entities involved, we now address the implications of these findings with regard to
whether Worker is entitled to be rehired or, as the Defendants indicate, whether this
Court is precluded from enforcing the rehire provision of the Act because PPGC has
not waived its sovereign immunity.
{23} 	We begin by addressing Worker’s arguments that the WCJ did have authority
to require the Pueblo and the PPGC to rehire him. Worker first argues that this case
is analogous to Lucero v. City of Albuquerque, 2002-NMCA-034, ¶ 17,132 N.M. 1,
43 P.3d 352, wherein this Court rejected the city’s contention that a workers’
compensation judge lacked the authority to order the city to rehire a worker under
NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-50.1 (1990). That particular section of the Act requires
employers to rehire workers who have been injured as a consequence of their
employment if a position is available and if the injured worker is capable of fulfilling

14
the duties of that available position. Section 52-1-50.1(A). Worker analogizes the
present matter to 	Lucero because, like the city of Albuquerque in that case,
Defendants in the present matter contest the authority of the WCJ. We find Lucero
to be distinguishable.
{24} 	The issue in Lucero was whether a workers’ compensation judge had the
authority to enforce provisions of the Act where, due to lack of clarity in the Act itself,
the Act suggested that only the director of the WCA had the authority to enforce the
particular provisions at issue in that case and that the provisions could be enforced
only by way of a fine rather than by mandatory rehiring. 2002-NMCA-034, ¶¶ 18-20.
Unlike Lucero, the issue in the present case is not who has the authority to enforce a
particular WCA provision or the means of enforcing that provision, but whether the
Act itself is applicable to the Pueblo or PPGC. Nowhere in Lucero did the city of
Albuquerque argue that the Act was inapplicable to it as an entity; it merely disputed
the manner in which the Act itself functioned.
{25} 	Worker’s second argument regarding the WCJ’s authority to order the Pueblo
and PPGC to rehire him is premised on Doe v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 2007-NMSC-008,
141 N.M. 269, 154 P.3d 644. In Doe, our Supreme Court concluded, after a lengthy
and thoughtful discussion of the legislative history of the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act (IGRA), that “state courts have jurisdiction over personal injury actions filed

15
against Pueblos arising from negligent acts alleged against casinos owned and
operated by the Pueblos and occurring on pueblo lands.” Id. ¶ 1. The Court reached
this conclusion by finding that “[n]othing in the language of IGRA prohibits
jurisdiction shifting.” Id. ¶ 13. The term “jurisdiction shifting,” the Court explained,
referred to the principle that, rather than “Congress allocating jurisdiction between the
tribes and states” in the IGRA, Congress thought it more appropriate to permit the
tribes and states themselves to negotiate jurisdictional questions given the “diverse
interests of tribes and states” with respect to gaming. Id. ¶¶ 31-33. Worker, relying
on this language, highlights that the Compact requires the Pueblo to possess workers’
compensation insurance. 	Thus, Worker contends, in agreeing to carry workers’
compensation insurance, the Pueblo, PPGC, and PGI have all agreed to submit to the
jurisdiction of the WCA to fully comply with the mandates of the provisions set forth
in the Act and have waived their sovereign immunity with respect to the WCA’s
enforcement of the Act. We find this argument unpersuasive.
{26} 	The compact language at the heart of Doe clearly delineated that with respect
to personal injury claims by visitors to the Santa Clara Pueblo gaming facilities, state
district courts had jurisdiction. 	Id. ¶ 8 (stating that “for the limited purpose of
personal injury actions involving visitor safety, the parties to the Compact agreed to
state court jurisdiction”). 	In contrast, the compact language at issue in this case

16
merely 	states 	that 	the 	Pueblo 	shall 	provide 	“to 	all 	employees 	of 	a 	gaming
establishment 	employment 	benefits, 	including, 	at 	a 	minimum 	. 	. 	. 	workers’
compensation insurance through participation in programs offering benefits at least
as favorable as those provided by comparable state programs.” 	Noticeably absent
from this language is any identification of where jurisdiction might lie when and if a
workers’ compensation claim is filed by an employee of PGI. 	Doe 	is thus
inapplicable. Ultimately, we understand Worker to contend that the Pueblo, PPGC,
and PGI have implicitly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the WCA by virtue
of having agreed to provide workers’ compensation insurance. This proposition was
previously addressed and rejected by this Court. See Sanchez, 2005-NMCA-003, ¶¶
17-18 	(“Plaintiff 	urges 	th[is] Court 	to hold 	that 	[the 	d]efendant’s 	voluntary
participation in New Mexico’s workers’ compensation program serves as a waiver of
immunity . . . [W]e conclude that waivers of sovereign immunity cannot be created
by implication through activities such as participation in the state’s workers’
compensation program.”).
Worker’s final argument seems simply an appeal to common sense:
[T]he Pueblo of Pojoaque can not [sic] assert sovereign immunity
and[/]or lack of subject matter jurisdiction with respect to some
provisions of the New Mexico Workers[’] Compensation Statute when
it both participated in extensive proceedings before the WCA and
purchased an insurance policy for workers[’] compensation benefits filed
at the WCA for its employees.

17
We disagree with the latter portion of Worker’s argument that the purchasing of a
workers’ compensation insurance policy implicitly requires a tribe or tribal entity to
surrender to state court jurisdiction. Our discussion of Sanchez and our conclusion
that voluntary participation in workers’ compensation does not act as a waiver of
sovereign immunity sufficiently disposes of this contention. However, there is merit
to Worker’s assertion that PGI, having submitted to the jurisdiction of the WCA and
complied with certain provisions of the WCA, cannot assert sovereign immunity with
respect to other portions of the Act.
{27} 	Throughout all of the proceedings, Defendants have consistently maintained
that the decision to suspend and revoke Worker’s gaming license was carried out by
PPGC and that PPGC had never, during the course of any proceedings with respect
to Worker, waived its sovereign immunity. We agree. The WCJ correctly found that
PPGC possesses sovereign immunity and never waived that immunity during the
proceedings before the WCA. However, we do not interpret this finding to conflict
with the conclusion that PGI has waived its sovereign immunity. As we noted above,
incorporated tribal entities are free to waive their immunity independent of the tribe
itself 	and 	the 	other 	tribal 	entities 	derived 	from 	that 	tribe. 	See 	Sanchez,
2005-NMCA-003, ¶ 6. Defendants explicitly note in their answer brief that
PGI Inc. chose [not to] raise the defense of sovereign immunity during
the 	initial 	WCA 	benefits 	hearing 	because 	the 	issue 	was

18
Worker/Appellant’s employment benefits. 	In contrast, the Pueblo of
Pojoaque and the PPGC raised sovereign immunity after the issue
became the regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the PPGC when
considering whether the Worker/Appellant’s conduct was suitable to
hold a Class III gaming license within the Pueblo of Pojoaque.
Having previously established that the immunity of tribal entities is possessed
independently by each entity, Defendant’s statement amply demonstrates that
although PPGC and the Pueblo are immune from suit in this matter, PGI waived its
sovereign 	immunity 	with 	respect 	to 	the 	adjudication 	of 	Worker’s 	claims.
Accordingly, although neither the WCA nor this Court may order PPGC to reissue
Worker his former employment license, we do not believe this precludes the WCJ
from ordering PGI to rehire Worker.
2. 	Rehire Provision
{28} 	Section 52-1-28.2(B) prohibits employers from engaging in retaliatory firings
and requires employers to rehire workers when they engage in such activity. 	The
language of that provision is as follows: “Any person who discharges a worker in
violation of Subsection A of this section shall rehire that worker pursuant to the
provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act . . . and the New Mexico Occupational
Disease Disablement Law . . . provided the worker agrees to be rehired.” 	Id.
(emphasis added). 	The record reflects that the WCJ found that Worker was
discharged in violation of Section 52-1-28.2(A).

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{29} 	As noted by our Supreme Court, by enacting Section 52-1-28.2(B), “the
[L]egislature expressly set out the clear mandate” that the act of retaliatory discharge
is a clear violation of public policy. Michaels v. Anglo Am. Auto Auctions, Inc., 117
N.M. 91, 92, 869 P.2d 279, 280 (1994). The remedy set forth by the Legislature for
a violation of this public policy is equally clear: mandatory rehiring. The language
in Section 52-1-28.2(B) specifically states that an employer who engages in retaliatory
discharge “shall rehire” that employee. 	The use of the word “shall” imposes a
mandatory, not discretionary, requirement. See NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-4(A) (1997)
(explaining that “‘[s]hall’ and ‘must’ express a duty, obligation, requirement or
condition precedent”). That the Legislature implemented a mandatory remedy in this
circumstance follows naturally from the fact that, as noted by the Supreme Court of
Hawaii, anti-retaliation provisions in workers’ compensation laws are critical to the
very solvency of workers’ compensation regimes.
The purpose of [the anti-retaliation] statute is to preserve the
integrity of the workers’ compensation law by protecting employees
from retaliatory discharges. If an employer could, with impunity, coerce
an employee into foregoing his rights, the employer would be able to
destroy the function of the law and circumvent an obligation imposed
upon him by the [L]egislature.
Puchert v. Agsalud, 677 P.2d 449, 457 (Haw. 1984).
{30} 	Given the mandatory language of Section 52-1-28.2(B), the seriousness of the
public policy at issue, and the conclusiveness of the finding by the WCJ that Worker’s

20
employment was terminated as a consequence of his filing a claim with the WCA, this
Court concludes that PGI must rehire Worker. As noted in our earlier discussion of
the principles of sovereign immunity, sovereign immunity does not preclude this
Court from issuing such an order to PGI. We are confident that Section 52-1-28.2(B)
provides the WCJ with authority to require PGI to comply with such an order because,
as the Ohio court of appeals noted, “one may infer that the intent of the [retaliatory
discharge provision] is to return the employee to the same position as he would have
been had he not been discharged.” Mechling v. K-Mart Corp., 574 N.E.2d 557, 559
(Ohio Ct. App. 1989). As we previously stated, given the unique facts presented in
this matter, this requires PGI to provide Worker with a position of employment that
is substantially equivalent to the position he formerly held in terms of pay and
benefits. 	The WCJ concluded that he was prevented from ordering PGI to rehire
Worker, as is required under Section 52-1-28.2(B), because such an order would
require PPGC to reissue Worker a gaming license. 	On this record, we are in no
position to consider details such as this that might be involved in rehiring Worker.
We conclude only that, given PGI’s violation of Section 52-1-25.2(B), PGI must
rehire Worker in accordance with the mandatory provisions of that statute.
C. 	Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies

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{31} 	The Pueblo and PPGC contend that given the “unique nature of licensing in
gaming,” this Court should adopt the exhaustion rule set forth in National Farmers
Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). Having already
determined that the Pueblo and PPGC possess sovereign immunity which has not been
waived, we do not reach Defendants’ argument concerning exhaustion of tribal
remedies as it relates to gaming licenses.
D. 	Adequacy of The Bad Faith and Retaliatory Discharge Remedies
{32} 	Worker next argues that the damages available under the WCA for a worker
subjected to a retaliatory discharge and bad faith claim processing by an employer are
“grossly inadequate.” He asserts that this Court should interpret Section 52-1-28.2 to
require Worker’s employer to pay Worker “all the lost wages the [Worker] suffer[ed]
as a result of the retaliatory discharge.” “Statutory interpretation is an issue of law,
which we review de novo.” State v. Duhon, 2005-NMCA-120, ¶ 10, 138 N.M. 466,
122 P.3d 50.
{33} 	In support of his argument, Worker relies heavily on Michaels, where our
Supreme Court instructed that the application of Section 52-1-28.2 should be liberally
construed and adopted the tort of retaliatory discharge as a remedy available
independent of the remedies provided under the Act, which are otherwise exclusive.
Michaels, 117 N.M. at 94, 869 P.2d at 282. Worker’s reliance on Michaels to support

22
his argument is misplaced. 	That case itself resulted in the expansion of available
remedies to a worker subjected to a retaliatory discharge by authorizing workers to
pursue a tort action for retaliatory discharge in the district courts. 	Id. 	The Court’s
recognition of the independent tort action was premised, in part, on the observation
that the harm caused by a retaliatory discharge includes much more than the mere loss
of employment.
A worker wrongfully discharged, even if eventually rehired, will incur
damages in the form of lost wages from the date of discharge to the date
of rehiring. If the issue is contested it could take up to a year or more
before he or she is reemployed. Additionally, if the employee were to
search for a new job, there would be the cost and inconvenience of
searching for a new job or moving costs. Awarding civil damages not
only vindicates the state’s interest in enforcing public policy but also
adequately redresses the harm to the individual naturally flowing from
the violation of public policy.
Id. at 93, 869 P.2d at 281. The above clearly demonstrates that Michaels provided the
remedies that Worker argues this Court should interpret Section 52-1-28.2 to include
by implication. Accordingly, we reject his request to interpret that section to include
remedies beyond those expressly provided in the Act.
E. 	Attorney Fee Cap
{34} 	Finally, Worker argues that the cap on attorney fees in Section 52-1-54(I) is
unconstitutional because Section 52-1-54(J) requires that these fees be borne both by
the worker and his employer equally. Worker asserts that “[i]t is immaterial whether

23
one uses the rational basis or intermediate scrutiny test[;] . . . no governmental interest
is served when a claimant who wins his case pays his attorney more money than he
wins and loses his job and the bad faith actor [e]mployer escapes virtually unscathed.”
We apply de novo review. 	See generally New Mexicans for Free Enter. v. City of
Santa Fe, 2006-NMCA-007, ¶ 45, 138 N.M. 785, 	126 P.3d 1149 (“We review
constitutional challenges to a statute de novo.”).
{35} 	Worker acknowledges that our Supreme Court has previously addressed and
rejected challenges to the constitutionality of the fee limitations in Section 52-1-54(I).
See Wagner v. AGW Consultants, 2005-NMSC-016, ¶ 3, 137 N.M. 734, 114 P.3d
1050. Nevertheless, Worker requests that, rather than following the majority opinion
in Wagner, we instead adopt the dissenting opinion in which Justice Bosson argued
that the fee cap was unconstitutional even under intermediate level of scrutiny. Id. ¶
36 (Bosson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). We have no authority to do
as Worker requests. See Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 718, 507 P.2d 778, 779
(1973) (“[A] court lower in rank than the court which made the decision invoked as
a precedent cannot deviate therefrom and decide contrary to that precedent[.]”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 	While we acknowledge that
Worker’s challenge to both the fee splitting provision in Section 52-1-54(J) and the
attorney fees cap distinguishes his argument somewhat from that raised by the worker

24
in Wagner, we nonetheless conclude that the outcome in Wagner is controlling and
determinative. 	There, our Supreme Court observed that the worker had failed to
submit crucial evidence, including arguments that the fee cap provision
is an arbitrary and irrational means to achieve the [s]tate’s objectives.
For instance, there is no evidence in the record to suggest either what
percentage of claimants approach or reach the fee limitation at the
administrative level, or the typical amount of time expended by attorneys
either at the administrative level or on appeal . . . [or that the amount
specified in the fee cap provision] has been insufficient to cover
workers’ attorney fees at the administrative and appellate levels.
Wagner, 2005-NMSC-016, ¶ 28. 	Absent such evidence, the Wagner Court was
compelled to deny the constitutional challenge advanced in that case. Id. ¶¶ 29, 31.
Similarly, aside from his bare assertions that the fee splitting and fee cap provisions
render the attorney fees award provisions “unfair and unjust,” Worker has equally
failed to adequately explain how the fee splitting provision in connection with the
attorney fee cap is not rationally related to the purposes of the state’s objectives.
Accordingly, we reject Worker’s arguments.
III. 	CONCLUSION
{36} 	We hold that Section 52-1-28.2(B) provides the WCJ with authority to require
PGI to rehire Worker, and we reverse the WCJ’s findings to the extent they contradict
this conclusion. We affirm on the remainder of the issues presented on appeal.
{37} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.

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_______________________________
LINDA M. VANZI, Judge
WE CONCUR:
___________________________________
CYNTHIA A. FRY, Chief Judge
___________________________________
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge