September 03, 2009 – Crystal Hunnicutt v. Regina Ryanczak Sewell, Individually; and Regina Ryanczak Sewell, Attorney at Law, P.C.; Twelfth Judicial District Court; and Administrative Office of the Courts for the State of New Mexico, as primary contracting parties with Regina Ryanczak Sewell and/or Regina Ryanczak Sewell, Attorney at Law, P.C.; and Lynn Jessen, in her individual and official capacity; Ida Lujan, in her individual capacity; Angela Adams, in her individual capacity; Mary Dale Bolson, in her individual capacity; John and Jane Does 1-10, in their individual capacities; John Doe 11; John Doe 12; and New Mexico Children, Youth & Families Department, No. 28,343

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: __________
Filing Date: 	September 3, 2009
NO. 28,343
CRYSTAL HUNNICUTT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
REGINA RYANCZAK SEWELL, Individually; and
REGINA RYANCZAK SEWELL, Attorney at Law, P.C.;
TWELFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT; and
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS FOR
THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO, as primary contracting
parties with Regina Ryanczak Sewell and/or Regina
Ryanczak Sewell, Attorney at Law, P.C.; and LYNNE
JESSEN, in her individual and official capacity; IDA
LUJAN, in her individual capacity; ANGELA ADAMS,
in her individual and official capacity; MARY DALE
BOLSON, in her individual capacity; JOHN AND JANE
DOES 1-10, in their individual capacities; JOHN DOE
11; JOHN DOE 12; and NEW MEXICO CHILDREN,
YOUTH & FAMILIES DEPARTMENT,
Defendants-Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY
James A. Hall, District Judge
Law Offices of Nancy L. Simmons, P.C.
Nancy L. Simmons
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellant

Michael Dickman
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellees Twelfth Judicial District Court,
Administrative Office of the Courts,
John Doe 11, and John Doe 12

OPINION
CASTILLO, Judge.
{1} 	Plaintiff appeals the district court’s order dismissing the case against the
Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), the Twelfth Judicial District Court
(TJDC), and John Does 11 and 12 (John Does) (collectively Defendants). Because
we hold that each of these Defendants were entitled to judicial immunity, the
complaint was properly dismissed as to them, and we affirm the district court.
I. 	BACKGROUND
{2} 	The following facts are drawn from the pleadings filed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff
was the subject of an abuse and neglect proceeding that resulted in her placement with
adoptive parents. Plaintiff’s adoptive mother relinquished custody of Plaintiff to the
Children, Youth and Families Department (Department) in October 2005. In May
2006, the Department initiated a petition for court-ordered family services on
Plaintiff’s behalf. 	The district court appointed an attorney (Attorney) to represent
Plaintiff during that proceeding pursuant to a youth-attorney contract. In November
2006, Attorney moved to withdraw as Plaintiff’s counsel, and the district court entered
an order of withdrawal. 	On January 5, 2007, the matter was dismissed because
Plaintiff reached the age of eighteen.
{3} 	Plaintiff originally filed a complaint for damages against Attorney and
injunctive relief against AOC. 	She alleged breach of contract, breach of fiduciary

2
duty, 	legal 	malpractice, 	violations 	of 	the 	Unfair 	Trade 	Practices 	Act, 	and
abandonment. AOC filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court
granted with permission for Plaintiff to file an amended complaint within seven days.
In her first amended complaint, Plaintiff sought damages against AOC and added
defendants, including the Department, the TJDC, various state employees, and John
Does 1 through 10. Sometime later, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint with
additional claims that included yet more defendants—among them John Does 11 and
12.
{4} 	Specific to the appeal before us are the allegations regarding the youth-attorney
contract and the allegations regarding constitutional violations. 	In her second
amended complaint, Plaintiff alleged that she was a third-party beneficiary to the
youth attorney contract and that TJDC and AOC breached that contract by failing to
oversee Attorney’s performance and by failing to ensure that substitute counsel was
provided after Attorney was allowed to withdraw. 	As to the John Does, Plaintiff
alleged that they violated her constitutional rights by failing to (1) arrange for
competent counsel for Plaintiff, (2) oversee Attorney’s representation of Plaintiff, and
(3) secure substitute counsel for Plaintiff after Attorney was allowed to withdraw.
{5} 	Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint and argued
that they were protected from Plaintiff’s allegations by absolute judicial immunity and

3
by qualified immunity or, in the alternative, that the complaint failed to state a
contract claim against AOC and TJDC. After a hearing on Defendants’ motion, the
district court granted the motion and entered an order dismissing the complaint as to
Defendants. Plaintiff appeals from that order.
{6} 	The district court’s order did not affect Plaintiff’s complaint against Attorney.
Consequently, Plaintiff’s current appeal relates only to the allegations brought against
Defendants.
II. 	DISCUSSION
{7} 	On appeal, both parties maintain the positions that were developed below.
Plaintiff’s appeal is based on the two sets of allegations contained in the second
amended complaint: 	the breach of contract claim against TJDC and AOC and the
constitutional claims against John Does. Defendants maintain that they are immune
from Plaintiff’s allegations or, in the alternative, that the complaint failed to state a
contract claim against AOC and TJDC. 	Because we conclude that Defendants are
entitled to judicial immunity, we do not need to consider Defendants’ remaining
arguments.
A. 	Standard of Review
{8} 	“In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule
1-012(B)(6) NMRA . . ., we take the well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint as

4
true and test the legal sufficiency of the claims.” Envtl. Control, Inc. v. City of Santa
Fe, 2002-NMCA-003, ¶ 6, 131 N.M. 450, 38 P.3d 891 (filed 2001). We also review
questions of immunity de novo. See Starko, Inc. v. Gallegos, 2006-NMCA-085, ¶ 11,
140 N.M. 136, 140 P.3d 1085 (“The applicability of qualified immunity is a question
of law that we review de novo.”); Candelaria v. Robinson, 93 N.M. 786, 789, 606
P.2d 196, 199 (Ct. App. 1980) (identifying issues of absolute immunity as questions
of law). 	We begin by examining whether Defendants are immune from suit: 	if
immunity is applicable in the present case, it is a bar to suit and therefore a threshold
issue. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985) (“[T]he essence of absolute
immunity is its possessor’s entitlement not to have to answer for his conduct in a civil
damages action.”); Leach v. N.M. Junior Coll., 2002-NMCA-039, ¶¶ 11, 19, 132 N.M.
106, 45 P.3d 46 (explaining that the Eleventh Amendment and qualified immunity
protect not only against liability, but from the burden of litigation).
B. 	Judicial Immunity
{9} 	Judicial immunity was developed to preserve the “autonomy and integrity of
the judiciary” so that “persons who are integral to the judicial process [are] able to
perform their functions without the intimidating effect of potential lawsuits.” Collins
ex rel. Collins v. Tabet, 111 N.M. 391, 398, 806 P.2d 40, 47 (1991) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). 	Over time, judicial immunity has been extended to

5
“various persons whose adjudicatory functions or other involvement with the judicial
process have been thought to warrant protection from harassment, intimidation, or
other interference with their ability to engage in impartial decision-making.” 	Id. at
396, 806 P.2d at 45. These persons are absolutely immune “from liability for their
actions taken in performance of their roles as integral parts of the judicial process.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 	Thus, in order to determine
whether Defendants are entitled to absolute judicial immunity, we apply a functional
test to determine whether the acts alleged by Plaintiff were judicial functions. See id.
We recognize that there are two causes of action—breach of contact against AOC and
TJDC and constitutional claims against John Does. These claims arise from the same
alleged functions: finding counsel, ensuring counsel’s compliance with the youth-
attorney contract, and securing replacement counsel after Attorney was allowed to
withdraw. 	These 	functions, 	Plaintiff 	argues, 	are 	purely 	administrative—not
judicial—in nature. 	See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988) (stating that
“[a]dministrative decisions, even though they may be essential to the very functioning
of the courts, have not similarly been regarded as judicial acts”). 	We are not
persuaded that the alleged functions in the present case are merely administrative acts.
{10} 	According to the Children’s Code, NMSA 1978, §§ 32A-1-1 to -24-5 (1993,
as amended through 2009), the appointment, oversight, and withdrawal of counsel are

6
within the control of the court. Section 32A-3B-8(C) provides that “[i]n proceedings
on a petition alleging a family in need of court-ordered services, the court shall
appoint . . . an attorney for a child fourteen years of age or older at the inception of the
proceedings.” In an abuse and neglect proceeding, the court is specifically required
to oversee an appointed attorney’s performance: “The court shall assure that . . . the
child’s attorney zealously represents the child.” Section 32A-4-10(F). In addition,
“[a]n attorney who has entered an appearance or who has been appointed by the court
to represent a party in a children’s court proceeding shall continue such representation
until relieved by the court, unless a substitution of counsel is filed not less than fifteen
. . . days prior to the adjudicatory hearing.” Rule 10-165(B) NMRA. Unless such
substitution of counsel is filed, “no attorney or firm who has entered an appearance
in a children’s court proceeding may withdraw as counsel without a written order of
the court.” 	Rule 10-165(C). 	Thus, the court bears the statutory responsibility in
children’s court proceedings for appointing counsel, ensuring the competence of
counsel, and for permitting counsel to withdraw. As a result, these are judicial and not
administrative functions.
{11} 	Despite the language of the statutes and rules, Plaintiff argues that the alleged
acts are not judicial functions because the Legislature appropriates funds to AOC, in
collaboration with local district courts, to maintain the system. Specifically, Plaintiff

7
contends that her allegations have no “direct relationship to the judge’s order of
appointment[] and cannot be properly considered a judicial function that would entitle
[Defendants] to judicial immunity.” In this way, Plaintiff argues that AOC is similar
to the Public Defender Department, which receives appropriations to implement the
public defender system. For support, Plaintiff cites State ex rel. Quintana v. Schnedar
(Quintana), 115 N.M. 573, 855 P.2d 562 (1993). In Quintana, our Supreme Court
considered whether the courts have the authority to order the Public Defender
Department “to represent a particular ‘indigent’ defendant when [that d]epartment
decides that a particular defendant is not indigent and therefore not entitled to its legal
services.” 	Id. at 574, 855 P.2d at 563. Plaintiff states that Quintana stands for the
proposition that “the Public Defender, not the court, was responsible for implementing
the indigent defense system.” 	Nowhere, however, does Quintana suggest that
appointing and overseeing counsel is not a judicial function. In fact, Quintana does
not consider the doctrine of judicial immunity at all. Further, Quintana appears to
support Defendants’ position. 	Although the Court acknowledged that the Public
Defender Department is responsible for adopting standards for determining whether
a defendant is indigent, the Quintana Court further concluded that the district courts
are free to depart from those standards in order to “ensure the fundamental right to
counsel through its inherent authority to safeguard constitutional requirements.” Id.

8
at 578, 855 P.2d at 567. Thus, Quintana affirms that the district courts are responsible
for safeguarding the constitutional right to counsel.
{12} 	Instead of relying on Quintana for direction with regard to judicial immunity,
we look to Collins, which addresses the question of absolute judicial immunity and
adjudicatory function in the context of the appointment of a guardian ad litem.
Collins, 111 N.M. at 393, 806 P.2d at 42. 	The Collins Court concluded that a
guardian 	ad 	litem 	benefits 	from 	absolute 	judicial 	immunity 	under 	certain
circumstances, depending on the function. 	Id. at 395, 806 P.2d at 44. 	Absolute
immunity attaches to a guardian ad litem when the appointment “contemplates
investigation on behalf of the court into the fairness and reasonableness of the
settlement in its effect on the minor.” Id. If the appointment of the guardian “does
not contemplate actions on behalf of the court but instead representation of the minor
as an advocate, or if the guardian departs from the scope of appointment as a
functionary of the court and instead assumes the role of a private advocate for the
child’s position, then the guardian is not immune.” Id.
{13} 	In the present case, there is no allegation that Defendants departed from the
scope of their duties as functionaries of the court. 	Plaintiff appears to argue that
because she has alleged that Defendants acted unconstitutionally or breached the
youth-attorney contract, the actions could not have been judicial and do not bear “any

9
direct relationship to the judge’s order of appointment.” We are unpersuaded. When
evaluating whether judicial immunity applies, we do not examine the allegations of
improper or illegal conduct. Rather, we focus on the role that the individual claiming
immunity played and evaluate whether that role was integral to the judicial process.
See id. at 396, 806 P.2d at 45 (citing cases that utilize a “functional approach” to
immunity); see also Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199-200 (1985) (noting that
judicial immunity applies to judicial acts “however erroneous the act may have been,
and however injurious in its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 	Having already determined that
Defendants’ functions were judicial, we hold that Defendants are entitled to absolute
judicial immunity.
{14} 	Plaintiff cites Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2004), but Plaintiff’s
argument related to Mitchell is unclear. 	Nevertheless, we observe that this case
outlines two tests under which the question of judicial immunity may be evaluated.
According to the Mitchell Court, a defendant is entitled to absolute judicial immunity
when a defendant’s role is “functionally comparable to that of a judge” or when a
defendant’s action is “integrally related to an ongoing judicial proceeding.” Id. at 172
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We have already considered judicial
function, and now we turn to evaluate whether Defendants’ actions were integrally

10
related to an ongoing judicial proceeding. 	“In order to be entitled to absolute
immunity under this test, the official must be engaged in acts that are integrally related
not simply to the judicial process in general but to a concrete judicial case or
controversy.” Id. at 174.
{15} 	In Mitchell, the plaintiff—an attorney—sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
damages based on the defendants’ refusal to recertify the plaintiff to act as court-
appointed counsel for indigent defendants. 	Mitchell, 377 F.3d at 159. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the defendants, who served on a committee
to screen applicants, were not entitled to judicial immunity. 	Id. at 161, 172.
Regarding the integrally related action analysis, the court determined that the
defendants’ function of formulating a list of qualified attorneys was “not related to
any particular criminal prosecution” and that even the rejection of the plaintiff’s
particular application for certification did not affect a particular case, as the plaintiff
was permitted to conclude the cases to which he had already been assigned. 	Id. at
174. 	As a result, the court determined that the defendants’ function was not
“integrally related to any specific judicial proceeding.” Id.
{16} 	In the present case, Defendants’ functions were inherently related to a specific
judicial proceeding. The district court had already appointed Attorney to represent
Plaintiff. 	Plaintiff’s claim was premised on acts and omissions related to that

11
appointment, specifically that Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with effective
counsel and failed to provide replacement counsel after Attorney was allowed to
withdraw from service. Thus, Plaintiff is arguing that Defendants were responsible
for monitoring the effectiveness of Attorney and the status of Plaintiff’s representation
for the duration of the case. Unlike the Mitchell committee’s obligation to provide a
general list from which the court could—but was not required—to make selections at
the appropriate time, Plaintiff contends that Defendants had an obligation in this
judicial proceeding to take specific oversight actions. We conclude that Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendants were based on actions integrally related to Plaintiff’s
particular case and, therefore, under the second test in Mitchell, Defendants were
entitled to judicial immunity.
{17} 	Based on either theory—judicial function or integrally related actions—we
conclude that Defendants are shielded from suit by judicial immunity for the actions
alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint.
III. 	CONCLUSION
{18} 	We affirm the district court.
{19} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.

12
________________________________
CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judge
WE CONCUR:
__________________________________
JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
__________________________________
LINDA M. VANZI, Judge