December 18, 2025- Air Vent, Inc. v. Powermax Electric Co., LTD, Guangdong, No. A-1-CA-42334

Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication
with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly
in Odyssey.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO	1
Opinion Number: __________	2
Filing Date: December 18, 2025	3
No. A-1-CA-42334	4
INTERINSURANCE EXCHANGE	5
OF THE AUTOMOBILE CLUB,	6
Plaintiff,	7
v.	8
GILBRALTAR INDUSTRIES, INC.,	9
Defendant,	10
and	11
AIR VENT, INC.,	12
Defendant/Cross-Claimant-Appellant,	13
v.	14
POWERMAX ELECTRIC CO., LTD,	15
GUANGDONG,	16
Cross-Defendant-Appellee,	17
and	18
KING OF FANS, INC.; DM (ASIA) LIMITED;	19
and DOES 1 TO 10,	20
Cross-Defendants.	21
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 12/18/2025 7:52 AM

2
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY	1
Beatrice J. Brickhouse, District Court Judge	2
Conklin, Woodcock, Ziegler & Hazlett, P.C.	3
John K. Ziegler	4
Taylor F. Hartstein	5
Albuquerque, NM	6
for Appellant	7
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP	8
Judy C. Selmeci	9
New York, NY	10
Coleman Proctor	11
Dallas, TX	12
for Appellee	13

OPINION	1
HANISEE, Judge.	2
{1} 	Appellant Air Vent, Inc. (AVI) appeals the district court’s dismissal of their	3
cross-claims 	against 	Appellee 	Powermax 	Electric 	Co., 	Ltd., 	Guangdong	4
(Powermax). Both AVI and Powermax are defendants in a products liability lawsuit	5
regarding a defective fan motor that allegedly led to a house fire in Albuquerque,	6
New Mexico. AVI argues that Powermax, a Chinese company, established sufficient	7
minimum contacts with New Mexico to allow the district court to exercise specific	8
personal jurisdiction. Agreeing, we reverse and remand.	9
BACKGROUND	10
{2} 	In 2021, plaintiff Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club, an	11
insurance carrier, filed a complaint on behalf of its insured, claiming damages from	12
a house fire caused by a defective ventilation fan allegedly designed, manufactured,	13
assembled, 	marketed, 	distributed, 	or 	sold 	by 	several 	defendants, 	including	14
Powermax and AVI. A couple months later, AVI filed cross-claims against	15
Powermax, alleging that to the extent that plaintiff insurance carrier was able to	16
prove that the fan in question was an AVI product and that it was defective, any	17
alleged defect would have arisen solely from the fan motor, which was designed,	18
manufactured, and supplied by Powermax. In 2023, Powermax moved to dismiss	19
AVI’s cross-claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. Last year, the district court	20

2
granted the motion. AVI appeals, arguing that it had presented a prima facie case	1
that personal jurisdiction may be asserted over Powermax in New Mexico.	2
{3} 	In support of its argument, AVI contends that Powermax purposefully availed	3
itself of the New Mexico market through placing its products into a nationwide	4
stream of commerce. In the district court and now on appeal, AVI specifically alleges	5
the following: (1) Powermax sold fan motors to intermediaries in the United States;	6
(2) Powermax itself shipped its fan motors from China directly to AVI through U.S.	7
ports, though some of its sales were arranged through a third-party customer known	8
as Direct Marketing Asia, Ltd.; (3) Powermax has a joint venture relationship with	9
Florida-based supplier, King of Fans; (4) Powermax’s website states that Powermax	10
has an “important status in . . . American markets”; (5) Powermax’s website lists a	11
U.S. phone number; (6) Powermax maintains worldwide insurance coverage; (7)	12
Powermax’s products are designed to comply with U.S. safety standards; (8)	13
Powermax sold 99 percent of its products in the United States through stores	14
including Home Depot, Lowe’s, Grainger, Harbor Freight, and Wal-Mart; and (9)	15
Powermax sold 2.8 million electric fan motors to AVI during the at-issue time	16
period. To determine whether the district court was correct to grant Powermax’s	17
motion to dismiss, we examine the legal landscape that governs personal jurisdiction	18
in New Mexico. We then explain the proffered law and consider the allegations in	19
determining whether Powermax is subject to personal jurisdiction in New Mexico.	20

3
DISCUSSION	1
{4} 	Whether a party “is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New Mexico	2
courts is a question of law we review de novo.” Chavez v. Bridgestone Americas	3
Tire Operations, LLC, 2023-NMCA-022, ¶ 6, 527 P.3d 652. “Further, where, as	4
here, the district court base[d] its ruling on the parties’ pleadings, attachments, and	5
non[]evidentiary hearings, we construe those pleadings and affidavits in the light	6
most favorable to the complainant.” Id. (alterations, internal quotation marks, and	7
citation omitted). “We construe the pleadings and affidavits in the light most	8
favorable to the complainant, and the complainant need only make a prima facie	9
showing that personal jurisdiction exists.” Sproul v. Rob & Charlies, Inc., 2013-	10
NMCA-072, ¶ 6, 304 P.3d 18 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).	11
{5} 	New Mexico courts “may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a	12
nonresident defendant if that defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of	13
conducting 	activities 	within 	[New 	Mexico], 	thus 	invoking 	the 	benefits 	and	14
protections of its laws. [T]he central feature of minimum contacts is the requirement	15
of purposeful availment.” Chavez, 2023-NMCA-022, ¶ 7 (alteration, omission,	16
internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Thus, specific personal jurisdiction	17
analysis is somewhat like a series of nesting dolls: To determine specific personal	18
jurisdiction, we look to minimum contacts. To determine minimum contacts, we	19

4
look to purposeful availment. What we look to in determining purposeful availment	1
is the precise question presented by this case.	2
{6} 	The parties sharply disagree over the proper basis for purposeful availment,	3
clashing over whether placing a product in the nationwide stream of commerce	4
suffices. We observe, however, that the United States Supreme Court has not	5
recently tussled over whether stream of commerce theory can be included in the	6
purposeful availment analysis, let alone rejected stream of commerce theory	7
outright, as Powermax implies. Rather, the United States Supreme Court has simply	8
leaned into purposeful availment as a predicate to specific personal jurisdiction. See	9
Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 359 (2021) (“The	10
defendant . . . must take some act by which [they] purposefully avail[] [themselves]	11
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum [s]tate.” (internal quotation	12
marks and citation omitted)). As part of the purposeful availment analysis, this Court	13
has implicitly adopted the United States Supreme Court’s approach found in World-	14
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) 1 and in doing so	15
acknowledged the continued viability of stream of commerce theory found therein:	16
1 We acknowledge the somewhat-splintered landscape regarding stream of
commerce found in plurality United States Supreme Court opinions since World-
Wide Volkswagen—see Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102
(1987); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011)—and in New
Mexico’s plurality opinion in Sproul. See 2013-NMCA-072. In Sproul, both Judge
Vanzi’s opinion and then-Judge Vigil’s special concurrence helpfully detailed the
United States Supreme Court’s “splintered view” regarding stream of commerce.

5
[I]f the sale of a product . . . is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises	1
from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or	2
indirectly, the market for its product in other [s]tates, it is not unreasonable to	3
subject it to suit in one of those [s]tates if its allegedly defective merchandise	4
has there been the source of injury to its owner or to others. The forum [s]tate	5
does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal	6
jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of	7
commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in	8
the forum [s]tate.	9
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98; see also Chavez, 2023-NMCA-022,	10
¶¶ 6, 9 (acknowledging that personal jurisdiction may exist under a stream of	11
commerce theory). We therefore begin by explaining the United States Supreme	12
Court’s and New Mexico’s approach to determining specific personal jurisdiction.	13
We then mention the parties’ opposing views and address their arguments. We	14
See id. ¶ 19. But Judge Vanzi ultimately relied on World-Wide Volkswagen, noting
that “because the plurality opinions in [Asahi and J. McIntyre Machinery] are not
the precedential holdings of the Court, a defendant’s contacts with New Mexico
continue to be evaluated by the stream of commerce standard as described in World-
Wide 	Volkswagen.” 	Sproul, 	2013-NMCA-072, 	¶ 19. 	Judge 	Vigil 	specially
concurred, implicitly verifying World-Wide Volkswagen when he explained that the
facts of Sproul did not require this Court to reject or adopt any view of the United
States Supreme Court, but that the defendant’s conduct and activities were sufficient
to confer specific jurisdiction under either the majority opinion in World-Wide
Volkswagen or the plurality opinions of Asahi and J. McIntyre Machinery. Sproul,
2013-NMCA-072, ¶ 48 (Vigil, J., specially concurring).
Because the most recent United States Supreme Court majority opinion on the
subject, World-Wide Volkswagen, is still good law, however, and because this Court
has issued binding precedent acknowledging stream of commerce since Sproul, see
Chavez, 2023-NMCA-022, ¶¶ 6, 9, we simply rely on World-Wide Volkswagen and
Chavez to guide our analysis here.

6
conclude by analyzing whether the district court has personal jurisdiction over	1
Powermax.	2
I. 	The Legal Landscape of Specific Personal Jurisdiction	3
{7} 	New Mexico courts “may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a	4
nonresident defendant if that defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of	5
conducting activities [in New Mexico], thus invoking the benefits and protections of	6
its laws.” Chavez, 2023-NMCA-022, ¶ 7 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and	7
citation omitted). New Mexico’s most recent precedent on the issue of what	8
establishes purposeful availment follows:	9
As explained recently by the United States Supreme Court, a defendant	10
is considered to have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of	11
conducting activities within the forum state—and, in turn, establishing	12
the minimum contacts necessary to be subject to specific personal	13
jurisdiction—where the defendant’s contacts are “the defendant’s own	14
choice 	and 	not 	random, 	isolated, 	or 	fortuitous,” 	and 	where 	the	15
defendant “deliberately reached out beyond its home—by, for example,	16
exploiting a market in the forum state or entering a contractual	17
relationship centered there.” Further, “there must be an affiliation	18
between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, an	19
activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum state and is	20
therefore subject to the state’s regulation.”	21
Id. ¶ 8 (alterations omitted) (quoting Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 359-60). In sum,	22
New Mexico, like the United States Supreme Court, bestows specific personal	23
jurisdiction on courts when (1) defendants purposefully avail themselves of the	24
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state and (2) a plaintiff’s claims	25
are affiliated with or arise out of that purposeful availment. See id. Additionally, as	26

7
part of the first prong, “[o]ur courts may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over	1
a defendant despite the absence of continuous and systematic contacts if the	2
defendant has certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that the	3
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and	4
substantial justice and the cause of action is related to those contacts.” Id. ¶ 7	5
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The parties do not dispute the second	6
prong, whether AVI’s claims arise out of Powermax’s contacts with New Mexico.	7
We therefore focus our analysis on the first prong.	8
{8} 	In determining purposeful availment, the first prong, this Court aligns with	9
the United States Supreme Court in weighing whether a defendant “established	10
numerous purposeful contacts in New Mexico to do business in the state.” Id. ¶ 9;	11
see also Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 359-60 (affirming that specific personal	12
jurisdiction depends on a defendant’s having sufficient contacts with the forum	13
state). Courts analyze whether such contacts are “the defendant’s own choice and	14
not random, isolated, or fortuitous,” and whether the defendant “deliberately reached	15
out beyond its home—by, for example, exploiting a market in the forum state or	16
entering a contractual relationship centered there.” Chavez, 2023-NMCA-022, ¶ 8	17
(alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Our state’s jurisprudence	18
also affirms the viability of stream of commerce considerations in its purposeful	19
availment 	analysis, 	specifically 	that 	“personal 	jurisdiction 	may 	exist 	over 	a	20

8
nonresident defendant that ‘delivers its products into the stream of commerce with	1
the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum state.’” Id.	2
¶ 9 (quoting Sproul, 2013-NMCA-072, ¶ 20).	3
A. 	AVI and Powermax Harbor Conflicting Views on Stream of Commerce	4
Theory	5
{9} 	AVI argues that Powermax purposefully availed itself of the New Mexico	6
market by placing its products into the national stream of commerce, citing Sproul	7
for legal support that stream of commerce theory is a viable way to establish	8
purposeful availment. AVI encourages our continued adherence to Sproul, which,	9
acknowledging the fractured nature of then-current United States Supreme Court	10
opinions, noted the continued viability of stream of commerce theory found in	11
World-Wide Volkswagen. See Sproul, 2013-NMCA-072, ¶¶ 17, 20-26. AVI goes on	12
to argue that the district court erred when it relied on a case, J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd.	13
v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011), that veers away from stream of commerce theory,	14
since J. McIntyre Machinery is merely a plurality opinion.2
15
{10} 	But Powermax points to recent state and federal case law that, Powermax	16
argues, indicates a departure from stream of commerce theory. Powermax introduces	17
two cases that, in its view, support the position that stream of commerce theory can	18
no longer be a part of the purposeful availment analysis. See Bristol-Myers Squibb	19
2 Powermax’s and the district court’s reliance on J. McIntyre Machinery is
discussed in the next section.

9
Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 582 U.S. 255 (2017); Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. 351.	1
Powermax asks this Court to “formally reject” Sproul, to “align New Mexico law	2
with the U[nited] S[tates] Supreme Court’s current . . . approach under Bristol-	3
Myers and Ford [Motor Co.],” and to “ensure compliance with due process and	4
harmonize New Mexico law with the evolution” of specific personal jurisdiction	5
jurisprudence.	6
{11} 	In sum, AVI urges us to reaffirm that stream of commerce theory can be part	7
of the purposeful availment analysis; Powermax asks us to reject stream of	8
commerce theory altogether, claiming it has been abandoned. Yet Powermax	9
misrepresents specific personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, and neither party cites	10
New Mexico’s most recent, binding precedent on the matter, see Chavez, 2023-	11
NMCA-022, ¶¶ 7, 10, which recognizes stream of commerce theory within specific	12
personal jurisdiction analysis.	13
{12} 	First, Powermax misrepresents specific personal jurisdiction jurisprudence by	14
arguing that Ford Motor Co. and Bristol-Myers reject the idea that stream of	15
commerce theory can be a part of the purposeful availment analysis. However, Ford	16
Motor Co. and Bristol-Myers merely focus on the second prong of the specific	17
personal jurisdiction analysis, which may explain the absence of discussion on the	18
stream of commerce in both. In Bristol-Myers, the issue is whether there was “a	19
connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue,” 582 U.S. at 265, and	20

10
in Ford Motor Co., the issue is whether the requirement that there be a connection	1
included a causation element. 592 U.S. at 361-62. It is therefore inaccurate to imply	2
that the holdings of Ford Motor Co. and Bristol-Myers—which, again, revolve	3
around the second prong of the specific personal jurisdiction analysis—remove	4
stream of commerce theory, a component of the first prong of the analysis, from our	5
jurisprudence 	or 	support 	the 	district 	court’s 	finding 	that 	it 	lacked 	personal	6
jurisdiction over Powermax. As stated, it is the first prong that is at issue in our	7
inquiry.	8
{13} 	Second, this Court’s jurisprudence post Bristol-Myers and Ford Motor Co.—	9
which Powermax, AVI, and the district court all omitted from their arguments—	10
further suggests that stream of commerce theory has yet to be extinguished. See	11
Chavez, 2023-NMCA-022, ¶ 9 (implicitly affirming the viability of stream of	12
commerce considerations in purposeful availment analysis). Accordingly, there is	13
no need to resolve a debate the law has already settled; we simply apply existing	14
precedent.	15
B. 	J. McIntyre Machinery Is a Nonprecedential Plurality Opinion That	16
Predates Current Precedent	17
{14} 	In addition to mischaracterizing United States Supreme Court and New	18
Mexico precedent on specific personal jurisdiction, Powermax insists 	that 	J.	19
McIntyre Machinery “squarely rejected” the stream of commerce theory found in	20
Sproul and World-Wide Volkswagen. Powermax argues that J. McIntyre Machinery	21

11
“reflects the current state of the law” in New Mexico. However, because both Sproul	1
and Chavez postdate J. McIntyre Machinery and because J. McIntyre Machinery is	2
a nonprecedential plurality opinion of the United States Supreme Court, we agree	3
with AVI that the district court’s and Powermax’s reliance on J. McIntyre Machinery	4
was misplaced.	5
C. 	Additional 	Case 	Law 	Integrates 	Rather 	Than 	Rejects 	Stream 	of	6
Commerce Theory	7
{15} 	Beyond Bristol-Myers and Ford Motor Co., the New Mexico state and federal	8
cases Powermax cites to support its assertion that Sproul and stream of commerce	9
theory are no longer good law are likewise inapposite. Specifically, Grano v. HCA	10
Healthcare, 	Inc., 	A-1-CA-39669, 	mem. 	op. 	(N.M. 	Ct. 	App. 	Apr. 	12, 	2023)	11
(nonprecedential) and Trei v. AMTX Hotel Corp., 2014-NMCA-104, 336 P.3d 393,	12
simply reiterate well-established standards of specific personal jurisdiction analysis	13
rather than abandon Sproul’s stream of commerce reasoning as Powermax avers.	14
Grano and Trei affirm that courts examine fact-bound issues on a case-by-case basis	15
to determine whether a defendant “purposefully directed its activities at New	16
Mexico,” Grano, A-1-CA-39669, mem. op. ¶ 8, or “purposely established contact	17
with New Mexico.” Trei, 2014-NMCA-104, ¶ 6. We disagree with Powermax that	18
Grano and Trei repudiate either stream of commerce theory or Sproul. Rather, both	19
cases cite Sproul and implement its guidance, as do we. See Grano, A-1-CA-39669,	20

12
mem. op. ¶ 8; Trei, 2014-NMCA-104, ¶¶ 5-6. Furthermore, Grano is not binding on	1
this Court.	2
II. 	Powermax Purposefully Availed Itself of the New Mexico Market	3
{16} 	We next analyze whether Powermax purposefully availed itself of the New	4
Mexico market. In response to Powermax’s request that we “ensure compliance with	5
due process and harmonize New Mexico law with the evolution” of specific personal	6
jurisdiction jurisprudence, we answer that to do so we must uphold current	7
jurisprudence, not abandon it.3 Therefore, we structure our analysis as we must—	8
within the confines of existing New Mexico and United States Supreme Court	9
precedent.	10
{17} 	As mentioned, to be subject to specific personal jurisdiction, a defendant must	11
have “purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities” within	12
New Mexico and the claims in the litigation must arise out of or relate to the	13
defendant’s conduct directed at that state.4 Chavez, 2023-NMCA-022, ¶ 8. Again	14
focusing on the first prong, “we look at what activities the defendant directed toward	15
New Mexico” to determine purposeful availment. Id. ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks	16
3We also note that to do as Powermax asks would impinge upon the most
recent specific personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, see Chavez, 2023-NMCA-022,
and exceed this Court’s purview.
4The due process consideration that extends out of the first prong, whether
exercising specific personal jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice, is addressed in the final section of this opinion.

13
and citation omitted). Applying this specific personal jurisdiction framework, we	1
compare this case with others to determine whether personal jurisdiction over	2
Powermax existed. See Sproul, 2013-NMCA-072, ¶ 17 (“Whether or not personal	3
jurisdiction exists over a particular defendant is decided on a case-by-case basis.”).	4
Finally, “[w]e construe the pleadings and affidavits in the light most favorable to the	5
complainant [AVI], and [AVI] need only make a prima facie showing that personal	6
jurisdiction exists.” Id. ¶ 6 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Dismissal	7
is proper only if all the specific facts that AVI alleges “collectively fail to state a	8
prima facie case for jurisdiction” over Powermax. See id.	9
{18} 	In Sproul, the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction primarily because	10
it was found to have sufficient minimum contacts with New Mexico under stream of	11
commerce theory.5 See id. ¶ 7. There, the defendant, a bicycle parts manufacturer	12
known as Joy Co., was—like Powermax—a foreign corporation with its principal	13
place of business in China and operating under the laws of the Republic of China.	14
Id. ¶ 28. Joy Co. had agents and suppliers in the United States that distributed parts	15
that 	Joy 	Co. 	manufactured, 	and 	Joy 	Co. 	knew 	that 	products 	bearing 	their	16
5Although some of their reasoning differed, Judge Vanzi and Judge Vigil (in
his special concurrence) agreed that there was enough conduct and activity by the
defendant to confer specific jurisdiction on the New Mexico district court under a
theory of stream of commerce. See 2013-NMCA-072, ¶ 7; see also id. ¶¶ 47-53
(Vigil, J., specially concurring) (explaining that conduct was also sufficient under a
“purposefully directed” test (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

14
manufactured bicycle parts were sold worldwide. Id. ¶ 29. Joy Co. complied with	1
United States safety standards. Id. ¶ 30. Joy Co. had a “full-time marketing and sales	2
employee” who, though located in California, sold Joy Co. products and provided	3
customer service and support to Joy Co.’s clients in New Mexico. Id. ¶ 28. This	4
Court held that the plaintiff had made a prima facie showing that personal	5
jurisdiction was proper in New Mexico. Id. ¶ 45. Importantly, like the case here,	6
there was no dispute in Sproul about the litigation arising out of or relating to	7
Sproul’s activities in New Mexico. The plaintiff was injured in New Mexico by a	8
Sproul product. The sole controversy was whether Sproul had established minimum	9
contacts with New Mexico by availing itself of the New Mexico market.	10
{19} 	In Chavez, Bridgestone, a tire manufacturer and the defendant, operated a	11
“copyrighted, interactive website in New Mexico to solicit business and establish	12
channels of communication with New Mexico residents.” 2023-NMCA-022, ¶ 9.	13
The record showed that Bridgestone was also a “frequent litigant in New Mexico	14
courts.” Id. This Court held that Bridgestone had established “numerous purposeful	15
contacts” sufficient to establish minimum contacts with New Mexico and that those	16
contacts were sufficiently related to the litigation because the plaintiff was injured	17
by a Bridgestone product in New Mexico—even though the plaintiff resided in	18
another state and had not purchased or serviced the defective Bridgestone product in	19
New Mexico.	20

15
{20} 	The similarities between the facts of the present appeal and the facts of Sproul	1
and Chavez support the conclusion that AVI has made a prima facie case with respect	2
to purposeful availment and therefore minimum contacts. Powermax is alleged to	3
have sold fan motors to intermediaries in the United States, including 2.8 million	4
fans to AVI during the at-issue time period; is alleged to have suppliers and joint	5
venture relationships in the United States that distribute its products nationally; is	6
not only aware of its presence throughout many states in America but claims an	7
“important status” in American markets; has a website that touts this status and lists	8
a U.S. phone number, offering nationwide customer service availability; maintains	9
worldwide insurance coverage, that, while not specific to New Mexico, presumably	10
protects New Mexicans and Powermax from insurance claims by New Mexicans;	11
complies with U.S. safety standards; and sells its products through stores like Home	12
Depot, Lowe’s, Grainger, Harbor Freight, and Wal-Mart.	13
{21} 	In our view, these actions are precisely the “efforts of the manufacturer or	14
distributor to serve directly or indirectly[] the market for its product in other [s]tates”	15
that the United States Supreme Court held warrants the exercise of personal	16
jurisdiction 	in 	World-Wide 	Volkswagen. 	444 	U.S. 	at 	296-97. 	Additionally,	17
Powermax’s contacts with New Mexico seem to be of its “own choice and not	18
random, isolated, or fortuitous.” Chavez, 2023-NMCA-022, ¶ 8. They are evidence	19
of Powermax “deliberately reach[ing] out beyond its home” and “exploiting [the	20

16
New Mexico] market.” Id. Viewing the allegations and evidence in favor of AVI as	1
the complainant, we hold that AVI has met its burden of showing that personal	2
jurisdiction exists. See Sproul, 2013-NMCA-072, ¶ 6 (“[T]he complainant need only	3
make a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists.” (internal quotation	4
marks and citation omitted)).	5
III. 	Exercising Personal Jurisdiction Over Powermax Would Not Offend	6
Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice	7
{22} 	“The United States Supreme Court has held that even if a defendant has	8
established sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state, the Due Process	9
Clause forbids the assertion of personal jurisdiction over that defendant under	10
circumstances that would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial	11
justice.” Id. ¶ 35 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord World-Wide	12
Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292. The question is whether the relationship	13
between the defendant and the forum state is such that it is “reasonable to require	14
the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.” World-Wide	15
Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292 (text only) (citation omitted). To answer, we	16
balance five factors: “the burden on the defendant, New Mexico’s interest, the	17
plaintiff’s interest, the interest in an efficient judicial system, and the interest in	18
promoting public policy.” Zavala v. El Paso Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 2007-NMCA-149,	19
¶ 12, 143 N.M. 36, 172 P.3d 173.	20

17
{23} 	We conclude that asserting jurisdiction over Powermax is fair and reasonable.	1
As stated, AVI has made a prima facie case of purposeful availment. AVI has an	2
interest in adjudicating a controversy that involves the sale of a product and an	3
ensuing injury for which Powermax claims indemnity. The State of New Mexico	4
likewise has a substantial interest in protecting its residents from property damage	5
allegedly caused by defective products. Finally, because the property damage caused	6
by the allegedly defective Powermax product occurred in New Mexico, litigating the	7
controversy in New Mexico promotes efficient resolution of controversies as well as	8
public policy. For these reasons, requiring Powermax to litigate in New Mexico does	9
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice and is not	10
unreasonable.	11
CONCLUSION	12
{24} 	We reverse and remand.	13
{25} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	14
_____________________________	15
J. MILES HANISEE, Judge	16
WE CONCUR:	17
____________________________	18
ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge	19
____________________________	20
JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge	21