June 03, 2009 – State of New Mexico v. Anthony Reyes, No. 26,593

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number:
Filing Date: June 3, 2009
NO. 26,593
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-A ppellee,
V.
ANTHONY REYES,

Defendant: A ppellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF GRANT COUNTY
J.C. Robinson, District Judge

Gary K. King, Attomey General
Anita Carlson, Assistant Attomey General
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender
Joseph P. Walsh, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

OPINION
KENNEDY, Judge.
{1} 	Defendant presents to us a novel argument, seeking suppression of the
evidence under the Fourth Amendment, on the ground that the police officer, who
performed the traffic stop and subsequent arrest of Defendant, was without the
authority to do so because he had failed to obtain his officer certification within the
statutory time limit prescribed by NMSA 1978, Section 29-7-6(B) (1993), of the Law
Enforcement Training Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, §§ 29-7-1 to -13 (1969, as
amended through 2003). 	Due to the specific arguments presented and developed
below and on appeal, we limit our review to the narrow question of statutory
construction. Under the facts presented by this case, we are not persuaded that the
Legislature intended to preclude the officer from performing the duties of his
employment with the police department. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
{2} 	Defendant entered a conditional plea agreement in which he pleaded no contest
to the offenses of possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia, admitted
to being a habitual offender, and reserved the right to appeal the denial of his
suppression motion.
{3} 	The facts are undisputed. Defendant does not challenge the officer’s conduct

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during the stop and arrest. 	On May 30, 2005, Officer Gomez pulled Defendant over
for speeding on his motorcycle in Hurley, New Mexico. In the course of the traffic
stop, Officer Gomez discovered that Defendant’s driver’s license had been revoked
and arrested him. Officer Gomez asked Defendant if he had anything in his pockets,
to which Defendant responded that he had a glass pipe. 	During the search of
Defendant’s pockets incident to his arrest, Officer Gomez found the glass pipe and a
substance that Defendant admitted was methamphetamine.
{4} 	Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, however, and argued that Officer
Gomez was not a certified officer and that his position should have been forfeited
because the Act requires an officer who does not obtain certification within one year
to forfeit his position. 	See § 29-7-6(B). 	Therefore, Defendant argued that Officer
Gomez had no more authority than an ordinary citizen to stop and arrest Defendant
and that the officer’s actions in this case exceeded the scope of permissible law
enforcement by ordinary citizens. 	The State argued that Officer Gomez was not
required to forfeit his position and therefore had the authority to stop Defendant,
because his employment history with police agencies where he had been employed
complied with the statutory time frame contemplated by the Legislature in enacting
the applicable provision of the Act.
{5} 	The district court held a hearing on the motion, at which Defendant and the

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State asserted conflicting interpretations of the statutory provision, both relying upon
The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress and ruled that Officer
Gomez had worked reasonably and in good faith toward completing all relevant
training and that the policies underlying the statute would not be furthered by granting
Defendant’s motion.
{6} 	In addition to addressing the parties’ arguments interpreting the statute, the
district court expressed doubt that the Legislature contemplated invalidating an arrest
for a technical violation of the Act. The court noted the lack of injury suffered by
Defendant or the public as a result of Officer Gomez’s lack of certification at the time
of the arrest and observed that “Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were never
violated [by the o]fficer.”
{7} 	We share the concerns that caused the district court to question Defendant’s
ability to challenge Officer Gomez’s certification status and his authority to act in an
official capacity. We also recognize a question concerning the applicability of the
exclusionary rule to a technical violation of the Act in the absence of officer
misconduct. 	The district court, however, never expressed its concerns in terms of
whether Defendant had standing to question these facts or whether the exclusionary
rule is the appropriate remedy for a violation of the Act. In fact, the court commented
at the hearing that there is no problem with the exclusionary rule in this case.
{8} 	In addition, the parties never addressed Defendant’s standing to enforce the

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statute or whether suppressing the evidence was an appropriate remedy for an alleged
technical violation of the statute. Defendant’s brief in chief makes no argument that
the Legislature intended to empower members of the public to enforce the statute and
makes no argument that enforcement of the Act by suppressing the evidence is
appropriate. 	The State raises these matters for the first time in its answer brief.
Defendant’s reply brief responds to these issues only to argue that the State may not
raise standing for the first time on appeal. 	We see no reason to address these
questions.
{9} 	We do not further analyze this case as presented by the parties and interpret the
statutory provision at issue, assuming without deciding that Defendant has an
enforceable right under the statute that may be enforced by the exclusionary rule.
DISCUSSION
{10} 	We treat a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress as a mixed question
of fact and law, reviewing the factual findings for substantial evidence and reviewing
legal conclusions de novo. 	State v. Garcia, 2005-NMSC-017, ¶ 27, 138 N.M. 1, 116
P.3d 72. Because resolution of this appeal only requires us to interpret the Act, the
question is purely legal, and our review of the district court’s decision is de novo. See
State v. Padilla, 2008-NMSC-006, ¶ 7, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.3d 299.
{11} 	“The primary goal in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the Legislature's
intent.” 	State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, ¶ 6, 134 N.M. 172, 74 P.3d 1064. 	Of
course, we begin with the plain language of the statute to determine whether to

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enforce the statute as written. Padilla, 2008-NMSC-006, ¶ 7. “If the language of the
statute is ‘doubtful [or] ambiguous, or an adherence to the literal use of the words
would lead to injustice, absurdity, or contradiction,’ the court should reject the plain
meaning rule in favor of construing the statute ‘according to its obvious spirit or
reason.’” Id. (citation omitted); see State v. Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, ¶¶ 	8, 10, 136
N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022 (stating that not only is it our “ultimate goal . . . to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the Legislature,” but the court will “reject[] a
formalistic and mechanical statutory construction when the results would be . . .
contrary to the spirit of the statute” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
{12} 	Defendant’s challenge to Officer Gomez’s authority to pull him over is based
on Section 29-7-6(B) which provides:
A person employed as a police officer by any law enforcement
agency in this state shall forfeit his position unless, no later than twelve
months after beginning his employment as a police officer, the person
satisfies the qualifications for certification set forth in Subsection A of
this section and is awarded a certificate attesting to that fact.
Defendant argues that Officer Gomez violated the Act because he failed to obtain
certification within this one-year time frame and that he was therefore required to
forfeit his position as an officer and, therefore, did not have the authority to pull him
over for a minor traffic offense.
{13} 	The parties have stipulated to and the district court found Officer Gomez’s

1 It is unclear whether Defendant sees this forfeiture as permanent or just	18
precluding active duty employment until training could be completed. Our opinion	19
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employment history to be as follows. Starting on December 10, 2002, Officer Gomez
was employed by the Santa Clara Police Department and attended the police academy.
On February 4, 2003, after two months of employment he dropped out of the police
academy due to traffic violations. 	For about two years thereafter, he obtained
different employment, including work as a detention officer and as a member of the
Army National Guard, for which he did not need police training. In January 2005,
Officer Gomez restarted his career as a police officer by re-enrolling in the police
academy and obtaining a job as an officer with the Hurley Police Department. On
May 30, 2005, after four months of employment with the Hurley Police Department
and while he was still in the police academy, Officer Gomez stopped Defendant for
speeding and arrested him for riding his motorcycle with a revoked license. Officer
Gomez completed his training in the police academy in June 2005 and received his
police certification on December 14, 2005, within twelve months of his employment
with the Hurley Police Department but more than two years after he had first been
employed as a police officer with the Santa Clara Police Department.
{14} 	Defendant reads the statute narrowly to require that Officer Gomez receive his
certification within twelve months of his initial employment with law enforcement in
Santa Clara back in December 2002 or forfeit his position as an officer.1 Because

draws no such distinction.	20
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Officer Gomez did not obtain his certification within that time, Defendant argues that
Officer Gomez had no more authority to stop and arrest Defendant than would an
ordinary citizen and argues that a citizen could not have stopped and arrested him for
a minor traffic offense. Defendant argues that his interpretation and application of the
statutory provision serves the policy behind the Act: “to have trained law enforcement
officers out on the streets patrolling the area and protecting the community.”
{15} 	Initially, we observe that the facts of this case do not fit squarely within a literal
reading of the statute. Officer Gomez was not employed by any police department
and had no position to forfeit twelve months after he began his employment with the
Santa Clara Police Department. Our obligation is to apply the statutory language to
the facts in a manner that best effectuates the legislative intent. 	See Padilla, 2008-
NMSC-006, ¶ 10. We agree with Defendant that the legislative purpose of the statute
is to have trained law enforcement personnel performing the duties of police officers.
See § 29-7-2 (establishing the “‘New Mexico law enforcement academy’ . . . to
provide a planned program of basic law enforcement training and in-service law
enforcement training for police officers and to furnish instruction and seminars to
constantly upgrade law enforcement within the state”). We also agree with the district
court that the legislative intent was to provide a reasonable but definite time by which

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police officers must be trained and certified, without frustrating police departments’
recruitment of certifiable officers.
{16} 	The State points out that an application of Defendant’s interpretation of the
statute to these facts would have prohibited the Hurley Police Department from hiring
Officer Gomez because of his two-month long employment with the Santa Clara
Police Department two years earlier. We agree that applying Defendant’s arguments
would have this effect. 	In addition, Defendant’s arguments would either prohibit
Officer Gomez from ever working in law enforcement or require him to have obtained
certification before he could have been employed by the Hurley Police Department.
We are not persuaded that the Legislature intended to cripple the ability of police
departments to hire officers in this manner, particularly under these circumstances.
See Padilla, 2008-NMSC-006, ¶ 7 (“If the language of the statute is doubtful,
ambiguous, or an adherence to the literal meaning of the words would lead to
injustice, adsurdity, or contradiction, the court should reject the plain meaning rule in
favor of construing the statute according to its obvious spirit or reason.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). Had the Legislature intended such a dramatic
result, we believe it would have explicitly provided for it.
{17} 	The State argues that a more reasonable application of the statute, which would
effectively accomplish the intent of the Legislature, would provide “a new twelve-

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month period” to obtain certification beginning when Officer Gomez was hired as an
officer in Hurley. As the State points out, Defendant’s narrow interpretation of the
statute and its application to the facts of this case defeats the obvious spirit of the Act
and would preclude a person who begins a career as a police officer, leaves for a short
period of time, and then resumes a career as an officer from ever obtaining
certification 	within 	the 	twelve 	months 	required 	by 	statute. 	See 	Smith,
2004-NMSC-032, ¶¶ 8, 10 (noting that we will reject a formalistic construction of a
statute when doing so would be contrary to the obvious spirit of the statute). While
we are mindful of Defendant’s argument that this interpretation would permit an
officer, not fully trained and qualified, to move from one police department to another
to avoid the statutory certification requirement, this is not the situation with which we
are faced in this case. There is no indication that Officer Gomez left his position with
the Santa Clara Police Department in an attempt to circumvent the twelve-month
certification requirement. Instead, after Officer Gomez left his position with the Santa
Clara Police Department he did not work in any capacity that demanded police officer
certification for two years. When he resumed service as a law enforcement officer,
he obtained his training through the police academy and became a certified officer
within the statutorily required twelve-month period. We are not persuaded that the
Legislature intended to prohibit Officer Gomez from executing the powers and

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responsibilities of a police officer at the time of Defendant’s stop and arrest merely
because he started working as an officer, changed careers for a short time, and then
again became a police officer. We therefore hold that an officer like Officer Gomez
who becomes employed as a police officer after a break in service that was not
intended to circumvent the certification requirement is provided twelve months from
the date of his or her new employment to obtain certification under Section 29-7-6(B).
CONCLUSION
{18} 	For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion
to suppress the evidence.
{19} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge
WE CONCUR:
________________________________
CYNTHIA A. FRY, Chief Judge

JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
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