S058346, Opinion — State v. Kurtz

65
Argued and submitted November 9, 2010, decision of Court of Appeals reversed;
judgment of circuit court affirmed March 25, 2011
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
THOMAS EVERETT KURTZ,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 05FE0031; CAA132184; SC S058346)
249P3d1271
In January 2005, a Warm Springs Indian Reservation tribal police officer
observed defendant commit a traffic offense while driving within the reservation.
The officer followed defendant in his marked patrol car with its lights activated,
but defendant did not stop for the officer until both vehicles had crossed the reser-
vation's boundary into Jefferson County. Defendant went on to resist the officer's
efforts to take him into custody, and, as a result, was charged with attempting to
elude a police officer, ORS 811.540, and resisting arrest by a peace officer, ORS
162.315. At trial, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that,
because the arresting officer was a tribal policeman, Oregon law did not recognize
him as either a police or peace officer with regard to the specific state crimes at
issue in the case. The trial court denied defendant's motion and convicted him of
both charges. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
judgment. After examining the statutes defining "police officer" and "peace officer"
for purposes of ORS 811.540 and ORS 162.315, the Court of Appeals concluded that
(1) "police officer" meant a law enforcement official employed by a state, county, or
municipal government entity and (2) "peace officer" meant a law enforcement
agent whose authority was designated by Oregon law. Because the tribal police-
man who had arrested defendant fit neither category, the Court of Appeals rea-
soned, defendant could not, as a matter of law, have committed a crime that
required him to interact directly with a "police officer" or "peace officer" as one of its
primary elements. The state subsequently petitioned for review. Held: The deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed. The legislature has recognized that tribal police are an integral part of
Oregon's public safety system and that, because they are involved in the official
enforcement of Oregon laws as part of their duties, they warrant the same treat-
ment as any other Oregon police officer for purposes of training, certification, and
discipline. Given that legislative recognition and because tribal police share the
common characteristic of enforcing Oregon law with the other types of officers
listed as examples in the relevant statutes, the legislature intended to include
tribal law enforcement officers within the definitions set out in those statutes for
"police officer" and "peace officer."
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the circuit
court is affirmed.

66 	State v. Kurtz
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Janet A. Klapstein, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for petitioner on review. With her on the
brief were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
Marc D. Brown, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public
Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause for respondent on
review. With him on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief
Defender.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Durham, Balmer,
Kistler, Walters, and Linder, Justices.**
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judg-
ment of the circuit court is affirmed.
* 	Appeal from Jefferson County Circuit Court, Daniel Ahern. Judge. 233 Or
App 573, 228 P3d 583 (2010).
** Gillette, J., retired December 31, 2010, and did not participate in the deci-
sion of this case. Landau, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of
this case.

Cite as 350 Or 65
DE MUNIZ~ C. J.
Warm Springs Tribal Police Officer Davino observed
defendant commit a traffic violation on the Warm Springs
Indian Reservation and signaled defendant to stop his vehi-
cle. Defendant did not stop his vehicle until after he had
crossed the reservation boundary into Jefferson County. Dur-
ing the traffic stop, an altercation occurred between Davino
and defendant. 	As a 	result, 	defendant was charged in
Jefferson County Circuit Court with fleeing or attempting to
elude a police officer, ORS 811.540, and resisting arrest by a
peace officer, ORS 162.315. At trial, defendant moved for a
judgment of acquittal on both charges, arguing that Davino
was neither a "police officer" for purposes of ORS 811.540 nor
a "peace officer" for purposes of ORS 162.315. 1 The trial court
denied defendant's motion and found defendant guilty on
both charges.
Defendant appealed, 	and 	the 	Court of Appeals
reversed defendant's convictions, concluding that, because
Davino was a tribal police officer and not a police officer
employed by an Oregon governmental unit, Davino was nei-
ther a "police officer" nor a "peace officer" for purposes of the
fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer statute and the
resisting arrest statute. State v. Kurtz, 233 Or App 573, 228
P3d 583 (2010). This court allowed the state's petition for
review to 	consider whether the legislature 	intended to
include tribal police as "police officers" and "peace officers"
within the relevant statutes. As we will explain, we conclude
that, for purposes of the crimes of fleeing or attempting to
elude a police officer and resisting arrest, the legislature
intended the statutory terms "police officer" and "peace offi-
cer" to include tribal police officers such as Davino. We there-
fore reverse the Court of Appeals decision and affirm the trial
court's judgment.
We take the facts from the record and the Court of
Appeals opinion:
"The case was tried to the court, and the court made the fol-
lowing factual findings:
1 The relevant statutes are set out in full later in the opinion.

State v. Kurtz
"'Joseph Davino is a full time commissioned officer
working for the Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs.
Officer Davino was hired by Warm Springs on October
25, 2004.
"'[Defendant] is a non-Indian who lives on the Warm
Springs Indian Reservation.
"'* * * * *
"'During Officer Davino's shift on January 19, 2005,
he observed a vehicle driven by [defendant] on Highway
26. 'l'he two were traveling in opposite directions and
Officer Davino thought [that defendant] was appearing
to hide from him as they passed.
" 'Officer Davino turned his vehicle around and fol-
lowed the car driven by [defendant]. Officer Davino tes-
tified that he followed the vehicle for approximately one
mile and the driver and passenger appeared nervous.
" 'At a point very close to the reservation boundary
[defendant] turned around to look at Officer Davino.
When [defendant] turned around, his vehicle went
across the center line and into the oncoming traffic lane
of travel.
" 'Officer Davino activated his overhead lights to
stop the vehicle driven by [defendant] for a traffic
offense committed in the officer's presence.
" 'The vehicle didn't respond to the overhead lights
and proceeded to go over the bridge across the Deschutes
River that is the boundary of the Reservation.
" 'Officer Davino activated his siren near the boat
entrance to the Deschutes River which is located off the
Reservation and at this point believed that he had prob-
able cause to stop the vehicle for the crime of Attempt to
Elude Police with a Vehicle.
"'The driver of the vehicle eventually pulled over.
The passenger in the vehicle fled by foot. The driver of
the vehicle [defendant] was detained at gun point and
placed under arrest.'
"Defendant subsequently resisted arrest and was subdued
with the assistance of additional tribal police officers and
pepper spray. Davino was driving a marked Warm Springs
patrol car and wearing his Warm Springs Police uniform at

Cite as 350 Or 65
the time of the traffic stop. Davino was not deputized by the
Jefferson County Sheriff nor had he attended the Oregon
Police Academy at that time."
Kurtz, 233 Or App at 575-76 (quoting the trial court's find-
ings of fact; brackets in original).
On appeal, the Court of Appeals separately analyzed
the statutes describing "police officer" and "peace officer" to
determine whether the legislature intended to include tribal
police within those statutory terms. The Court of Appeals
first considered whether Davino was a "police officer" under
ORS 801.395. 2 In doing so, the Court of Appeals-identifying
a common characteristic shared by the officers listed in the
statute--concluded 	that 	tribal 	police 	fell 	within 	the
dictionary definition of "police officer" and shared many of
same functions as the listed officers, i.e., enforcing laws,
maintaining order, and working for a governmental entity
responsible for those functions. However, that court con-
cluded that the term "police officer," as used in ORS 801.395,
was limited to officers employed by a governmental entity of
the State of Oregon, or a county or city within the state. The
Court 	of Appeals 	reasoned 	that, 	because 	Davino 	was
employed by the Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs, a
separate sovereign, Davino was not a police officer within the
meaning of ORS 801.395, and therefore defendant had not
attempted to elude a "police officer" in violation ORS 811.540.
Id. at 582.
The Court of Appeals turned next to the definition of
"peace officer," set out in ORS 161.015(4), observing that the
types of law enforcement officers identified in that statute
also shared a common limiting characteristic-they were all
agents of an Oregon governmental entity whose authority
was designated by Oregon law. Viewed in that light, the
Court of Appeals reasoned that the concluding phrase in ORS
161.015(4)-"and such other persons as may be designated
by law"-was meant to include only those officers designated
2 Throughout its opinion, the Court of Appeals used the current version of ORS
801.395. At the time of defendant's crimes, however, a slightly different version of
the statute was in place. Because the differences between the two versions do not
affect the disposition of this case, this opinion will, for the reader's convenience,
also use the most recent version of ORS 801.395.

70 	v. Kurtz
as "peace officers" by state law. The Court of Appeals held
that, because no Oregon statute designated tribal police as
"peace officers," Davino was not a "peace officer" within the
meaning of ORS 161.015(4) and, therefore, defendant had
not resisted arrest by a peace officer in violation of ORS
162.315. Id. at 584. As noted, we allowed the state's petition
for review to determine whether the legislature intended to
include tribal police as "police officers" and "peace officers" in
the pertinent statutes.
On review, the state argues that, in restricting both
statutory terms to "agent[s] of an Oregon governmental
entity," the Court of Appeals erroneously ignored the most
common characteristic of all the types of law enforcement
officers listed in ORS 801.395 and ORS 161.015(4)-all are
law enforcement officers whose central duties are to enforce
state and local laws. For his part, defendant reiterates that
Davino was not a "police officer" or a "peace officer" because
"tribal police" are not (1) expressly listed under the pertinent
statutes, (2) employed by an Oregon governmental entity, or
(3) deputized or commissioned by an Oregon law enforcement
agency. To resolve the parties competing arguments, we turn
first to the relevant statutes.
The crime of fleeing or attempting to elude a police
officer is part of the Oregon Vehicle Code and is set out in
ORS 811.540. That statute provides, in part:
"(1) 	A person commits the crime of fleeing or attempt-
ing to elude a police officer if:
"(a) 	The person is operating a motor vehicle; and
"(b) 	A police officer who is in uniform and prominently
displaying the police officer's badge of office or operating a
vehicle appropriately marked showing it to be an official
police vehicle gives a visual or audible signal to bring the
vehicle to a stop, including any signal by hand, voice, emer-
gency light or siren, and either:
"(A) 	The person, while still in the vehicle, knowingly
flees or attempts to elude a pursuing police officer[.]"
For purposes of ORS 811.540, the term "police officer" is
defined in ORS 801.395, which provides:

Cite as 350 Or 65
" 'Police officer' includes a member of the Oregon State
Police, a sheriff, a deputy sheriff, or a city police officer, a
Port of Portland peace officer or a law enforcement officer
employed by a service district established under ORS
451.410 to 451.610 for the purpose of law enforcement
services."
(Emphasis added.)
The crime of resisting arrest is part of the Oregon
Criminal Code and is set out in ORS 162.315, which provides,
in part:
"(1) 	A person commits the crime of resisting arrest if
the person intentionally resists a person known by the per-
son to be a peace officer or parole and probation officer in
making an arrest.
"* * * * *
"(3) 	It is no defense to a prosecution under this section
that the peace officer or parole and probation officer lacked
legal authority to make the arrest or book the person,
provided the officer was acting under color of official
authority."
For purposes of that statute, the term "peace officer" is
defined in ORS 161.015(4), which provides:
" 'Peace officer' means a sheriff, constable, marshal,
municipal police officer, member of the Oregon State Police,
investigator of the Criminal Justice Division of the Department
of Justice or investigator of a district attorney's office and
such other persons as may be designated by law." 3
(Emphasis added.)
We observe, as did the Court of Appeals, that a tribal
police officer is not explicitly listed in either statute as a
"police officer" or a "peace officer." The question, then, is
whether the legislature nevertheless intended to include a
3 Unlike ORS 801.395, which uses the verb "includes" to identify some, but not
all of the persons who are "police officer[s]," ORS 161.015(4) uses the verb "means"
to define the term "peace officer" as being one of the kinds of officials listed. Defen-
dant argues that using the verb "means" generally signals an intent to make the
statutory list exhaustive. That may be true in some contexts. However, that is not
the case here, because the legislature included the phrase "and such other persons
as may be designated by law," which signals an intent to make the list
nonexhaustive.

72 	Kurtz
tribal police officer within the meaning of those statutes.4 To
discern the legislature's intent, we consider the statutory
text, context, and any relevant legislative history. State v.
Gaines, 346 Or 160, 172, 206 P3d 1042 (2009).
The legislature in ORS 801.395 has provided a list of
examples of law enforcement personnel who are included
within the scope of the categorical term "police officer." The
term "includes" in that statute indicates that the phrase
"police officer" can embrace persons beyond those that the
statute expressly lists. To determine the intended scope of
the categorical term "police officer," we first must consider
the functions that a "police officer" carries out. That inquiry
leads us to the ordinary meaning of"police officer." See State
v. Briney, 345 Or 505, 511, 200 P3d 550 (2008) (words of com-
mon usage are given their plain and ordinary meaning).
The dictionary definition for "police officer" is "a
member 	of a 	police 	force." 	Webster's 	Third 	New 	lnt'l
Dictionary 1754 (unabridged ed 2002). "Police force," in turn,
is defined as "a professional body of trained officers * * *
entrusted by government with the maintenance of public
peace and order, the enforcement oflaws, and the prevention
and detection of crime." Id. "Peace officer" is similarly defined
as "a civil officer (as a sheriff, constable, policeman) whose
duty is to preserve the public peace." Id. at 1660.
Those definitions encompass tribal police officers.
The Warm Springs tribal police are part of an extensive tribal
law enforcement department that includes a 60-mernber
police force, a correctional division, a fish and game division,
and a detectives division. Tribal police are charged with
maintaining public peace and order on the Warm Springs
reservation by enforcing local tribal law, federal law, and
Oregon laws. 5 Warm Springs tribal police receive the same
4 We note that the officers listed in ORS 161.015(4) are either the same, or of
the same character, as the officers listed in ORS 801.395. Both lists, for example,
include sheriffs, members of the Oregon State Police, and city or municipal police
officers.
5 Tribal courts have criminal jurisdiction over all offenses committed by
Indians in each tribe's respective Indian country lands. 25 USC § 1301(2). Tribal
courts, however, do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit
crimes in Indian country. Olipha.nt v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 US 191, 212, 98
S Ct 1011, 55 L Ed 2d 209 (1978). Instead, the federal government has jurisdiction

Cite as 350 Or 65
training as other Oregon police officers-when hired, they
must complete a nine-month program that includes attend-
ing the Oregon Department of Public Safety Standards and
Training Academy and receiving field training. At the end of
that program, tribal police officers are certified by the Oregon
Department of Public Safety Standards and Training.
Despite those characteristics-shared with the offi-
cers listed in the pertinent statutes-the Court of Appeals
concluded that tribal police officers were not included within
the statutory term "police officer" for purposes of the Oregon
Vehicle Code because:
"the term 'police officer' is defined by ORS 801.395 by ref-
erence to law enforcement officials of the State of Oregon
and governmental entities organized under state law. The
context of the use of the term 'police officer' as defined by
ORS 801.395 is that the officer be an agent of an Oregon
governmental entity. Because we conclude that Davino was
not an agent of an Oregon governmental entity and, there-
fore, was not a 'police officer' within the meaning of the stat-
ute, defendant did not violate ORS 811.540 in seeking to
elude a 'police officer,' and the trial court erred in not grant-
ing his motion for judgment of acquittal on the fleeing and
eluding charge."
Kurtz, 233 Or App at 582. Similarly, the Court of Appeals
concluded that Davino was not a "peace officer" for purposes
of the resisting arrest statute because:
"a 'peace officer' under ORS 161.015(4) is a law enforcement
official who is 'designated by [Oregon] law.' Any designa-
tion of Davino under tribal law is insufficient to qualify him
as a 'peace officer' under ORS 161.015(4)."
Id. at 584 (brackets in original). For the reasons that follow,
we disagree with the Court ofAppeals. 6
over Indian country criminal offenses committed by non-Indians against Indians
pursuant to18 USC § 1152, and the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 USC § 13. Those
statutes incorporate criminal offenses set forth under state law. Each state has
exclusive jurisdiction over criminal offenses occurring within Indian country that
are committed by non-Indians against non-Indians. Solem u. Bartlett, 465 US 463,
465 n 2, 104 S Ct 1161, 79 L Ed 2d 443 (1984).
6 Unlike the Court of Appeals, which separately analyzed the terms "police offi-
cer" and "peace officer," as we will explain, determining the legislature's intended
meaning of "police officer" also determines the legislature's intended meaning of
"peace officer."

74 	State v. Kurtz
As we have noted, ORS 801.395 provides a nonexclu-
sive list of examples of persons who are "police officers," but
the statute does not expressly define the functions that a
police officer fulfills. The plain meaning of "police officer"
indicates that a police officer is a member of a professional
body of trained officers entrusted by government with law
enforcement and other related functions. In construing the
term "police officer," we must take care not to narrow the
scope of the term that the legislature has used and thereby
distort the legislative intent. Nothing in the ordinary mean-
ing of the term "police officer" indicates that the legislature
meant to exclude a Warm Springs tribal police officer from
the scope of the statutory term "police officer."
We turn next to the interpretive influence of the
nonexclusive list of examples of a "police officer" set out in
ORS 801.395. This court has developed certain principles
that pertain to the interpretation of statutory text that con-
sists of a general term accompanied by examples of the gen-
eral term. One such principle, ejusdem generis, serves to con-
fine the interpretation of the general term according to one or
more common characteristics of the listed examples.
For example, in Bellika v. Green, 306 Or 630, 762
P2d 997 (1988), a statute required landlords to maintain a
rented dwelling unit "in a habitable condition." The statute
went on to define several specific conditions that would make
a dwelling unit uninhabitable, including one that required
the "grounds" of a dwelling unit to be kept "free from all accu-
mulations of debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents and ver-
min***." Id. at 634 (quoting ORS 91. 770(1)(£)). The plaintiff
claimed that she was injured when she stepped into a par-
tially concealed hole in the yard of a rented dwelling. She
asserted that the landlord had violated the general statutory
requirement that the property be maintained in a "habitable
condition" even though the concealed hole on the grounds did
not amount to the sort of problem (i.e., accumulated garbage)
that the statute specifically addressed. This court rejected
that claim, reasoning that the legislature's specification of
examples of an uninhabitable dwelling unit meant that
"other shortcomings of residential premises must pose dan-
ger to health or safety of the same kind and as serious as

Cite as 350 Or
those which the specific requirements of [the statutory sub-
sections] are meant to prevent." Id. at 636.
Bellika illustrates one way in which the legislature
can confine the scope of a general term (there, "uninhabita-
ble") by defining the specific conditions that render a dwell-
ing unit "uninhabitable." Other cases demonstrate how the
same principle applies in other contexts. See Lewis v. CIGNA
Ins. Co., 339 Or 342, 351, 121P3d1128 (2005) (in applying
statutory criterion, "personal and telephonic interviews and
other formal or informal information gathering techniques,"
the categorical phrase, "other * * * information gathering
techniques" did not include an independent medical exami-
nation under principle of ejusdem generis); Vannatta 	v.
Keisling, 324 Or 514, 533, 931 P2d 770 (1997) (in applying
law prohibiting "all undue influence [in elections], from
power, bribery, tumult, and other improper conduct[,]" the
general phrase "other improper conduct" referred only to
improper conduct of the same kind as that listed in the spe-
cific examples).
The legislature, however, can alter the calculus by
signaling that it does not intend to confine the scope of a gen-
eral term in a statute according to the characteristics oflisted
examples. Typically, statutory terms such as "including'' and
"including but not limited to," when they precede a list of
statutory examples, convey an intent that an accompanying
list of examples be read in a nonexclusive sense. In that con-
text, we continue to "give interpretive weight to all the words
that the legislature used," including both the general term
and any specific examples. Schmidt v. Mt. Angel Abbey, 347
Or 389, 404, 223 P3d 399 (2009). As Schmidt goes on to
explain,
"That does not mean, of course, that the specific exam-
ples constitute the universe of items to which the general
term refers; rather, it means only that our interpretation of
the general term includes consideration of those specific
examples."
Id. (footnote omitted). Applying those principles to a statute
defining "sexual exploitation," Schmidt stated:
"The legislature provided that 'sexual exploitation'
includes, but is not limited to, the conduct enumerated in

State v. Kurtz
the statute. As a result, we cannot interpret the term as
encompassing only the conduct in the listed examples."
Id. at 405 (emphasis in original).
We return to ORS 801.395. That statute, as noted,
lists several examples of law enforcement officers, but does
not refer expressly to their official functions except by their
title, e.g., "a sheriff, a deputy sheriff, or a city police officer
* * *." The statute's examples refer expressly to the specific
employer of two categories of police officers, i.e., "a Port of
Portland 	peace 	officer" 	and "a 	law 	enforcement 	officer
employed 	by 	a 	service 	district 	established under 	ORS
451.410 to 451.610 for the purpose oflaw enforcement pur-
poses." The statute refers in general terms to the employer of
two categories of police officers, i.e., a member of the Oregon
State Police and a "city" police officer. The statute does not
mention the employer of two categories of police officer, i.e., a
sheriff and a deputy sheriff.
When examining the characteristics of a list of
examples, for purposes of statutory interpretation, "the court
seeks to find if it can, a common characteristic among the
listed examples." Id. (emphasis in original). The legislature's
composition of the listed examples in ORS 801.395 indicates
that it relied more heavily on the categorical term "police offi-
cer," not the listed examples, to convey the definition and
functions embraced by that term. Moreover, the legislature's
varying or nonexistent references to the entity that might
employ a police officer also suggest that the legislature
accorded greater significance to the law enforcement func-
tions embraced by the plain meaning of "police officer" rather
than on a police officer's employment relationship with a par-
ticular unit of state or local government. Consequently, we
have difficulty concluding that employment by an entity cre-
ated by Oregon law is a common characteristic that the
examples in ORS 801.395 impose on every "police officer." As
Schmidt indicated, we cannot interpret "police officer" as
encompassing only employees of state or local governments.
Id. Rather, "police officer," according to its ordinary meaning,
embraces a professional law enforcement officer entrusted by
government with the maintenance of public peace and order,

Cite as 350 Or 65 (2011) 	77
the enforcement of laws, and the prevention and detection of
crime. That meaning includes a Warm Springs tribal police
officer.
Two statutes, in particular, demonstrate the correct-
ness of our conclusion. ORS 181.610(14), the statute defining
"police officer" for purposes of police training and certifica-
tion, includes tribal police within that definition and author-
izes tribal police officers to attend the Oregon Department of
Public Safety Standards and Training Academy and to
be trained 	and certified 	as 	public safety officers. 	ORS
181.610(14) provides, in part:
" 'Police officer' means an officer, member or employee of
a law enforcement unit who is employed full-time as a peace
officer commissioned by a city, port, school district, mass
transit district, county, county service district authorized to
provide law enforcement services under ORS 451.010,
Indian reservation, the Criminal Justice Division of the
Department of Justice, the Oregon State Lottery Commission
or the Governor or who is a member of the Department of
State Police and who is responsible for enforcing the crimi-
nal laws of this state or laws or ordinances relating to air-
port security or is an investigator of a district attorney's
office if the investigator is or has been certified as a peace
officer in this or any other state."
(Emphasis added.)
ORS 236.350(3)(a) also includes tribal police within
the definition of "Public Safety Officer" for purposes of disci-
plinary actions involving public safety officers. 7 That statute
provides:
7 ORS 236.360 provides, in part:
"(1) Employers of public safety officers shall adopt written procedures to
implement the provisions of ORS 236.350 to 236.370.
"(2) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, the following safe-
guards apply when a public safety officer is under investigation concerning a
matter that the officer reasonably believes may lead to economic sanctions or
dismissal from employment and is subject to an interview by the officer's
employer:
"* * * * *
"(4) Disciplinary action may not be taken against a public safety officer
without just cause."

78 	State v. Kurtz
" 'Public safety officer' means:
"(a) 	A member of a law enforcement unit who is
employed full-time as a peace officer commissioned by a
city, port, school district, mass transit district, county,
Indian reservation, the Criminal Justice division of the
Department of Justice, the Oregon State Lottery Commission
or the Governor and who is responsible for enforcing the
criminal laws of this state or laws or ordinances relating to
airport security."
(Emphasis added.)
Nevertheless, defendant asserts that, if tribal police
are included within the definition of "police officer" and
"peace officer," for purposes of this case, the effect will be to
also include police of any federally recognized tribe in the
nation, law enforcement officers from other states and police
officers from other nations. We disagree that our decision in
this case has the far reaching effects defendant describes.
Tribes are limited sovereigns for whom the laws of
the state in which they are located generally apply, unless
those laws are preempted by federal law or somehow infringe
on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be governed by them. 8 Although Indian tribes may retain
a form of sovereignty and self-governance, they are also sub-
stantially connected in a variety of governmental spheres
with the state in which they are geographically located. That
is particularly true with regard to public safety. Tribal offi-
cers are often the first responders to investigate offenses that
occur on the reservation, even if it is ultimately determined
that jurisdiction lies in state or federal court. See Cohen's
Federal Handbook of Indian Law,§ 9.07, p 763 (2005 ed) (so
stating).9 Similarly, and as a practical matter, fresh pursuit
8 The parties here do not argue that the statutes at issue are preempted or
otherwise infringe on the tribe's right to self-govern. We, therefore, assume with-
out deciding that the statutes at issue apply. We note that the complexity ofindian
law means that there is no single rule by which to resolve the question of when a
particular state law applies to tribal reservations or to tribal members. That deter-
mination depends on the type of state law at issue, the existence of related tribal
and federal law, and other factors. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448
US 136, 142, 100 S Ct 2578, 65 L Ed 2d 665 (1980).
9 This case, however, does not involve a jurisdictional question. The parties
agree that the charged crimes occurred in Jefferson County and that the circuit

Cite as 350 Or 65 (2011) 	79
is often necessary to enforce traffic laws, due to the mobility
of the violators and the risk they can pose to public safety. 10
Tribal land-which in this case includes part of Highway
26-could become dangerous territory if drivers were allowed
to commit a crime or traffic offense on the reservation and
then attempt to flee, elude, or resist arrest by tribal officers,
knowing that they could not be prosecuted in state court for
those acts. 11
Defendant's arguments and the Court of Appeals
decision that tribal police are not "police officers" for purposes
of enforcing this state's criminal laws would create a jurisdic-
tional void for offenses by non-Indians against tribal police
officers in which a victim's status as a police officer is an ele-
ment of the crime. See, e.g., ORS 811.535 (failure to obey
police officers); ORS 811.540 (fleeing or attempting to elude
court had jurisdiction over defendant. We mention it here to note that determining
appropriate jurisdiction for criminal acts committed on an Indian reservation is
dependent on a number of factors including whether the crime was committed on
the reservation, whether the offender was Indian or non-Indian, the nature of the
criminal act, and the applicability of Public Law 280.
10 Under ORS 133.430, out-of-state officers in fresh pursuit of a fleeing suspect
have the same authority to arrest and hold the suspect as any Oregon police officer.
Out-of-state officers do not lose their status as police officers, or peace officers,
when crossing jurisdictional boundaries. ORS 133.430 provides:
"Any member of a duly organized state, county or municipal peace unit of
another state of the United States who enters this state in fresh pursuit, and
continues within this state in such fresh pursuit, of a person in order to arrest
the person on the ground that the person is believed to have committed a felony
in the other state has the same authority to arrest and hold such person in cus-
tody as has any member of any duly organized state, county or municipal peace
unit of this state to arrest and hold in custody a person on the ground that the
person is believed to have committed a felony in this state."
The Warm Springs Tribal Code also includes a fresh pursuit provision, which per-
mits officers to issue a citation at a place beyond their jurisdictional authority
when a person commits a traffic offense in the officer's presence and at a place
where the officer had jurisdiction, as long as the officer arrests or cites the person
at the conclusion of a continuous pursuit. WSTC § 310.120(1).
11 'fhe United States Supreme Court has affirmed the authority of tribal police
to stop and detain non-Indian offenders who violate state law on Indian land. See
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 US 438, 456 n 11, 117 S Ct 1404, 137 L Ed 2d 661
(1997) ("We do not here question the authority of tribal police to * * * detain and
turn over to state officers nonmembers stopped on the highway for conduct violat-
ing state law."); see also Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F2d 1176, 1179-80 (9th
Cir 1973) (noting that tribal authorities retain sovereign power to exclude non-
tribal members who violate state or federal law from tribal lands by delivering
offenders to proper authorities).

State v. Kurtz
police officers); ORS 807 .620, ORS 162.385 (giving false infor-
mation to a police officer or peace officer); ORS 162.315
(resisting arrest); ORS 162.367 (criminal impersonation of a
peace officer). It is highly doubtful that the legislature
intended such a result.
To the contrary, the legislature has recognized that
tribal police are an integral part of the public safety system in
this state and, because they are entrusted by government
with the enforcement of Oregon laws, they should be treated
as police officers for purposes of training, certification, and
discipline. Similarly, given that legislative recognition and
because tribal police share a common functional characteris-
tic with the law enforcement officers listed as examples in
ORS 801.395, we conclude that the legislature intended to
include tribal police officers who are authorized to enforce
Oregon law within the statutory definition of "police officer."
Because the legislature intended to include a tribal police
officer as a "police officer" for purposes of the enforcement of
the state traffic and criminal laws at issue in this case, we
conclude that a tribal police officer therefore is "designated
by law" as a "peace officer" under ORS 161.015(4).
The Court of Appeals 	erred in concluding that
Davino was not a "police officer" or a "peace officer" for pur-
poses of the crimes for which defendant was charged and
convicted.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.