S057752, Opinion — Patton v. Target Corp.

230
On certified question from United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit;
certification order dated September 2, 2009; certification accepted October 7, 2009;
argued and submitted ,June 8, certified question answered November 12, 2010
James PATTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
TARGET CORPORATION,
Defendant,
v.
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Intervenor.
(USCA 08-35177; SC S057752)
242P3d 611

Cite as 349 Or 230 	231
CJS, Damages § 11 7.
En Banc
Rolf C. Moan, Supreme Court Coordinator, Office of the
Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief
for plaintiff-intervenor. With him on the brief were John R.
Kroger, 	Attorney 	General, 	and 	Jerome 	Lidz, 	Solicitor
General.
Michael A. Griffin, of Jackson Lewis LLP, Seattle, argued
the cause and filed the brief for defendant. With him on the
brief was John M. Cowden. Lori Irish Bauman, of Ater
Wynne LLP, Portland, for plaintiff James Patton, adopted
the brief of Michael A. Griffin.
Jennifer J. 	Middleton, 	of Chanti 	& 	Middleton, 	PC,
Eugene, 	filed 	the brief for amicus curiae 	Oregon Trial
Lawyers Association.
GILLETTE, J.
The certified question is answered.

232 	Patton v. Target Corp.
GILLETTE, J.
This case is before the court on a certified question of
Oregon law from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. See Patton v. Target Corp., 580 F3d 942 (9th
Cir 2009) (certifying question); ORS 28.200 - 28.255 (grant-
ing authority to answer certified questions and describing
procedure). Plaintiff Patton sued his employer, defendant
Target, in the United States District Court for the District of
Oregon for wrongful discharge, alleging that Target demoted
and later fired him because of his service in the National
Guard. Patton alleged that Target's acts violated both federal
and state law. A jury found in Target's favor on Patton's fed-
eral claim, but in Patton's favor on his state law claim. The
jury awarded Patton approximately $85,000 in compensatory
damages and $900,000 in punitive damages. Under ORS
31. 735, set out post, the state would be entitled to 60 percent
of any eventual punitive damages payment.
After the verdict was rendered, but before judgment
was entered in the case, Patton and Target reached a settle-
ment and jointly moved the court to approve a stipulated
judgment dismissing the case. The terms of the settlement
have not been disclosed, but it is undisputed that the settle-
ment does not include any payment for punitive damages
and, hence, there is no provision in the settlement for any
payment to the state. The state moved to intervene in the
case in order to object to the stipulated final judgment. The
state argued that the settlement was reached without regard
to the state's interest in a share of the punitive damages
award under ORS 31. 735(1), which provides that, "[u]pon the
entry of a verdict including an award of punitive damages,
the Department of Justice shall become a judgment creditor
as to the punitive damages portion of the award." The court
granted that motion, concluding that the state had a signifi-
cant protectable statutory interest, but did not make a ruling
as to the nature and scope of that interest under ORS 31.735.
The state then filed a complaint in intervention.
There, the state argued that it had a vested interest in 60 per-
cent of the jury's punitive damages award, that the parties
therefore were precluded from settling the case without its
consent, and that the court should reject the settlement. The

Cite as 349 Or 230 (2010) 	233
district court ultimately held that the state did not have a
vested or enforceable property right in any punitive damages
award until a final judgment was entered awarding such
damages, and, therefore, the state's consent to a settlement
was not required. Patton u. Target Corp., No 03-CV-1722-BR,
WL 361201 (D Or, Feb 8, 2008). For that reason, the court
granted the original parties' motion to approve the stipulated
judgment and it dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Id.
The state sought reconsideration, and the district court
affirmed its earlier decision.
The state appealed the district court's ruling to the
Ninth Circuit, arguing that, under ORS 31.735(1), the state
became a judgment creditor upon the entry of a verdict-
before the entry of a judgment-and, therefore, the state's
consent was required for any settlement that would reduce or
eliminate the state's share of punitive damages awarded by
the verdict. The Ninth Circuit concluded that ORS 31. 735 did
not clearly indicate what powers the legislature intended the
state to possess as a prejudgment ')udgment creditor," and
that the correct interpretation of ORS 31. 735 was an impor-
tant and unanswered question of Oregon law that would be
dispositive in the case. Patton, 580 F3d at 947-48. Accord-
ingly, the Ninth Circuit certified to this court the following
question:
"When a jury has returned a verdict that includes an award
of punitive damages under Oregon law, is the State of
Oregon's consent necessary before a court may enter a judg-
ment giving effect to any settlement between the parties
that would result in a reduction or elimination of the puni-
tive damages to which the State would otherwise be enti-
tled under Oregon Revised Statutes§ 31.735?"
580 F3d at 948-49. This court accepted the certified question.
We begin, as usual, by considering the text and con-
text of the statute at issue. Since 1987, Oregon has had a
"split recovery" statute that requires that a part of any puni-
tive damages award be paid into the state's crime victim com-
pensation account. In its current iteration, that statute is
codified at ORS 31. 735 and provides:
"(1) 	Upon the entry of a verdict including an award of
punitive damages, the Department of Justice shall become

234 	Patton v. Target Corp.
a judgment creditor as to the punitive damages portion of
the award to which the Criminal Injuries Compensation
Account is entitled pursuant to paragraph (b) of this subsec-
tion, and the punitive damage portion of an award shall be
allocated as follows:
"(a) 	Forty percent shall be paid to the prevailing party.
The attorney for the prevailing party shall be paid out of the
amount allocated under this paragraph, in the amount
agreed upon between the attorney and the prevailing party.
However, in no event may more than 20 percent of the
amount awarded as punitive damages be paid to the attor-
ney for the prevailing party.
"(b) 	Sixty percent shall be paid to the 	Criminal
Injuries Compensation Account of the Department of
Justice Crime Victims' Assistance Section to be used for the
purposes set forth in ORS chapter 147. However, ifthe pre-
vailing party is a public entity, the amount otherwise pay-
able to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Account shall
be paid to the general fund of the public entity.
"(2) 	The party preparing the proposed judgment shall
assure that the judgment identifies the judgment creditors
specified in subsection (1) of this section.
"(3) 	Upon the entry of a verdict including an award of
punitive damages, the prevailing party shall provide notice
of the verdict to the Department of Justice. In addition,
upon entry of a judgment based on a verdict that includes
an award of punitive damages, the prevailing party shall
provide notice of the judgment to the Department of
Justice. The notices required under this subsection must be
in writing and must be delivered to the Department of
Justice Crime Victims' Assistance Section in Salem, Oregon
within five days after the entry of the verdict or judgment.
"(4) 	Whenever a judgment includes both compensa-
tory and punitive damages, any payment on the judgment
by or on behalf of any defendant, whether voluntary or by
execution or otherwise, shall be applied first to compensa-
tory 	damages, 	costs 	and court-awarded attorney fees
awarded against that defendant and then to punitive dam-
ages awarded against that defendant unless all affected
parties, including the Department of Justice, expressly
agree otherwise, or unless that application is contrary to
the express terms of the judgment.

Cite as 349 Or 230 	235
"(5) 	Whenever any judgment creditor of a judgment
which includes punitive damages governed by this section
receives any payment on the judgment by or on behalf of
any defendant, the judgment creditor receiving the pay-
ment shall notify the attorney for the other judgment cred-
itors and all sums collected shall be applied as required by
subsections (1) and (4) of this section, unless all affected
parties, including the Department of Justice, expressly
agree otherwise, or unless that application is contrary to
the express terms of the judgment."
The state argues that subsection (1) of ORS 31.735,
which makes the Department of Justice a "judgment credi-
tor" at the time that a verdict is entered, clearly demon-
strates that the legislature intended to give the state a pro-
tected interest in its share of the punitive damages award.
The state acknowledges that the text of subsection (1) creates
some ambiguity about the extent of the rights that the state
possesses at that point, but argues that the legislative history
makes it plain that the legislature intended to prevent par-
ties from entering into post-verdict settlements that reduce
or eliminate the state's share of a punitive damages award
without its consent. Patton and Target, for their part, con-
tend that, in common understanding and under applicable
statutory definitions of the key terms in ORS 31.735, the
notion of a "judgment creditor" is meaningless before a judg-
ment has been entered and, even if the legislature intended
to give the state the rights of a judgment creditor before a
judgment has been entered, going so far as to include a right
to block a settlement that did not protect its rights, the leg-
islature failed to express that intent in the words of ORS
31.735.
It is helpful to begin our analysis of ORS 31. 735 by
examining the historical development of that statute. As
noted, the legislature created the split recovery scheme in
1987, making it part of chapter 18, dealing with judgments. 1
Or Laws 1987, ch 77 4, § 3. At that time, former ORS 18.540
(the original split recovery statute) provided, simply, that
half of any part of a punitive damages award remaining after
the plaintiffs attorney was paid was to be paid to a state
1 In 2003, forimr ORS 18.540 was moved to a newly created chapter-chapter
31-and renumbered as ORS 31.735.

236 	Patton v. Target Corp.
crime victim compensation fund. 2 Subsequently, in 1990, the
Court of Appeals held, in Eulrich v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 103
Or App 610, 613, 798 P2d 715 (1990), that, under that stat-
ute, the state had no right to any part of a punitive damages
award until a fund that was capable of distribution was cre-
ated. In 1991, and apparently in response to that holding, the
legislature amended former ORS 18.540 to add the following,
among other provisions:
"Upon the entry of a judgment including an award of puni-
tive damages, the Department of Justice shall become a
judgment creditor as to the punitive damages portion of the
award** *."3
Or Laws 1991, ch 862, § 1.
The phrase 'judgment creditor" was not defined in
the statute in 1991, nor is it today. 4 However, there is no indi-
cation that, at the time of the 1991 amendments, the legisla-
ture intended that phrase to be understood other than
according to its common and usual meaning-that is, as a
term that was intrinsically dependent on the existence of a
judgment. At that time, Black's Law Dictionary defined
"judgment" as the
"final decision of the court resolving the dispute and deter-
mining the rights and obligations of the parties. The law's
last word in a judicial controversy, it being the final deter-
mination by a court of the rights of the parties upon matters
submitted to it in an action or proceeding."
2 Former ORS 18.540 (1987) provided:
"The punitive damage portion of an award shall be distributed as follows:
"(l) The attorney for the prevailing party shall be paid the amount agreed
upon between the attorney and the prevailing party.
"(2) One-half of the remainder shall be paid to the prevailing party.
"(3) One-half of the remainder shall be paid to the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Account to be used for the purposes set forth in ORS chapter
147."
3 Former ORS 18.540 (1991) also included provisions, among others, requiring
the party preparing the proposed judgment to ensure that the judgment identified
all judgment creditors, and requiring the prevailing party to provide notice of any
judgment that included punitive damages to the Department of Justice. Or Laws
1991, ch 862, § 1.
4 In fact, chapter 18 included no definitions whatsoever until 2003. Or Laws
2003, ch 576, § 1 (adding ORS 18.005, which sets out definitions).

Cite as 349 Or 230 	237
Black's Law Dictionary 841-42 (6th ed 1990). "Judgment
creditor" was defined as "[a] person in whose favor a money
judgment is entered or a person who becomes entitled to
enforce it." Id. at 844-45. Those concepts are consistent with
the common understanding of the phrase ''judgment creditor"
today. See Black's Law Dictionary 921 (9th ed 2009) (''judg-
ment creditor" is a person with "a legal right to enforce exe-
cution of a judgment for a specific sum of money"); see also
Webster's Third New lnt'l Dictionary 1223 (unabridged ed
2002) (''judgment creditor" is "creditor having a legal right to
enforce execution of a judgment for a sum of money"). It also
is consistent with later-enacted definitions of key words and
phrases set out in ORS chapter 18. For example, chapter 18
defines the term "judgment" as follows:
" 'Judgment' means the concluding decision of a court on
one or more requests for relief in one or more actions, as
reflected in a judgment document."
ORS 18.005(8). "Judgment document," in turn, is defined as
"a writing in the form provided by ORS 18.038 that incorpo-
rates a court's judgment." ORS 18.005(9). In addition, ''judg-
ment remedy" is defined to include the "ability of a judgment
creditor to enforce a judgment through execution." ORS
18.005(1l)(a).
In 1995, the legislature again amended former ORS
18.540, changing the word ''judgment" in the first sentence of
subsection (1) to "verdict," so that that subsection provided
that, "upon entry of a verdict including an award of punitive
damages, the Department of Justice shall become a judgment
creditor as to the punitive damages portion of the award."
Former ORS 18.540(1) (1995) (emphasis added); Or Laws
1995, ch 688, § 1. 5 At that time, the legislature did nothing to
5 In addition to that change, the 1995 amendment increased the state's share of
the punitive damages award from 50 to 60 percent, former ORS 18.540(b) (1995);
limited the amount of the punitive damages award that the prevailing party's
attorney was entitled to receive, former ORS 18.540(a) (1995); and required the
prevailing party to notify the Department of Justice of the entry of a verdict award-
ing punitive damages,former ORS 18.540(3) (1995). Or Laws 1995, ch 688, § 1. The
1995 amendment to subsection (3) actually erroneously required the prevailing
party, on "entry of a verdict including an award of punitive damages," to "provide
notice of the judgment to the Department of Justice." Former ORS 18.540(3) (1995)
(emphasis added). That error was corrected in 1997. Or Laws 1997, ch 73, § 1. The
1997 version provided (and continues to provide):

238 	Patton v. Target Corp.
signal that it intended to alter the common understanding of
any term used in the statute. That is, without changing the
definition of the word "judgment" or the phrase 'judgment
creditor," or otherwise clarifying through definitions or in
some other way what it intended to accomplish, the legisla-
ture purported to make the state a judgment creditor upon
entry of a verdict, before there is any judgment in a case.
The state suggests that, although chapter 18 ''gen-
erally declares that judgment creditor' status is created by a
judgment," the more "particular intent" to give the state
rights at the time of a verdict reflected in chapter 31 renders
"the more general provisions in chapter 18 * * * essentially
irrelevant." (Emphasis in original.) That is, according to the
state,
"although chapter 18 * * * suggests that a judgment cred-
itor' generally is a creditor whose entitlement to a debt is
documented by a 'concluding' judgment, chapter 18 makes
no effort to apply any such definition to ORS 31.735 or to
any other provision outside of chapter 18. Similarly, noth-
ing in ORS 31. 735, and nothing in any other portion of
chapter 31, purports to incorporate definitions from chap-
ter 18. In short, nothing in chapter 18 suggests that the
legislature was without authority to declare, via ORS
31.735, that the state becomes a 'judgment creditor'-as a
matter oflaw-upon entry of a punitive-damages verdict."
That argument does not advance the state's position. As our
description of the historical development of ORS 31.735
makes clear, at the time that the legislature made the state a
'judgment creditor" upon entry of a judgment that included a
punitive damages award in 1991, the split recovery statute
was a part of chapter 18. As we explained above, although the
definitions set out in ORS 18.005 were not part of chapter 18
in 1991 or 1995, those definitions are consistent with the
common understanding of the relevant terms at that time. It
"Upon the entry of a verdict including an award of punitive damages, the pre-
vailing party shall provide notice of the verdict to the Department of Justice. In
addition, upon entry of a judgment based on a verdict that includes an award
of punitive damages, the prevailing party shall provide notice of the judgment
to the Department of Justice."
Former ORS 18.540(3) (1997).

Cite as 349 Or 230 (2010) 	239
is true that, when former ORS 18.540 was renumbered as
ORS 31.735 in 2003, the legislature did not expressly make
applicable the newly enacted definitions set out in ORS
18.005. However, it goes without saying that the mere fact
that the split recovery statute was renumbered in 2003 and
now is found in chapter 31 has no bearing on the intent of the
legislature in 1991or1995, when it enacted the amendments
at issue in this case.
Of course, the legislature is free to define words to
mean anything that it intends them to mean, including
defining words "in a manner that varies from a dictionary
definition or common understanding." Cook 	v. 	Workers'
Compensation Department, 306 Or 134, 143 n 5, 758 P2d 854
(1988) (for purposes of workers' compensation reimburse-
ment, a nurse practitioner is a "doctor or physician" under
applicable statute, which defined "doctor or physician" as
person licensed to practice in the "healing arts"). The prob-
lem, however, is that the legislature never purported to
expand or otherwise redefine the phrase "judgment creditor"
when, in 1995, it changed the word "judgment" to "verdict" in
former ORS 18.540(1), or in 2003, when former ORS 18.540
was renumbered.
The question before the court thus comes down to
what it means for the state to be a ')udgment creditor" before
there is a judgment. The state concedes that it does not mean
that the state has the right to execute on the verdict alone to
collect its share of the punitive damages awarded by the
jury-a right ordinarily associated with the status of judg-
ment creditor. Indeed, collection at the time of the verdict
would seem to be precluded by the fact that, under ORS
31. 730, any award of punitive damages is subject to court
review and reduction if the court determines, inter alia, that
the amount is not within the range that a rational jury would
be entitled to award, or that the defendant has taken reason-
able remedial measures to prevent recurrence of the conduct
that gave rise to the punitive damages award. See ORS
31.730(2) and (3) (so providing). It follows that, upon entry of
a verdict, the state has, at most, an economic expectancy of
60 percent of whatever portion of punitive damages, if any,
eventually is memorialized in a judgment. However, the stat-
ute is silent as to what rights a 'judgment creditor" with such

240 	Patton v. Target Corp.
an expectancy interest deriving from a verdict would have
before entry of judgment.
The state further concedes that ORS 31.735 does not
expressly define the extent of the state's rights as a prejudg-
ment "judgment creditor," but it argues that the plain text of
the statute does give the state a "protected interest" in
60 percent of a punitive damages award upon entry of aver-
dict.6 And that "protected interest," the state asserts, means
that the parties may not agree to settle a case in such a way
as to reduce or eliminate the state's share of any punitive
damages award. The problem with the state's position is that
nothing in ORS 31. 735(1)-where the "judgment creditor"
status at issue in this case is created-speaks to, much less
expressly requires the state's consent to, a settlement. By
contrast, subsections (4) and (5) each provide that certain
actions may not be taken "unless all affected parties, includ-
ing the Department of Justice, expressly agree otherwise." 7
6 The state has abandoned the argument, which it made in the federal district
court, that it has a "vested" interest in its share of a punitive damages award. It
was correct to do so. As this court explained inDeMendoza v. Huffman. 334 Or425,
449, 51P3d1232 (2002), in the context of a discussion of the constitutionality of for-
mer ORS 18.540.
"The question is whether a vested property right in a punitive damages award
can accrue before entry of a final judgment for the purposes of Article I, section
18. The answer is that it cannot."
(Emphasis in original.) As the court further stated,
" 'A vested right must be something more than a mere expectation based upon
the anticipated continuance of existing laws; it must have become a title legal
or equitable to the present or future enjoyment of property.' "
Id., quoting Coshun v. Hurlburt et al., 102 Or 240, 243, 201P870 (1921).
7 Subsection (4) provides:
"Whenever a judgment includes both compensatory and punitive damages,
any payment on the judgment by or on behalf of any defendant * * * shall be
applied first to compensatory damages, costs and court-awarded attorney fees
awarded against that defendant and then to punitive damages awarded
against that defendant unless all affected parties, including the Department of
Justice, expressly agree otherwise***."
(Emphasis added.) Similarly, subsection (5) provides:
"Whenever any judgment creditor of a judgment which includes punitive
damages governed by this section receives any payment on the judgment by or
on behalf of any defendant, the judgment creditor receiving the payment shall
notify the attorney for the other judgment creditors and all sums collected
shall be applied as required by subsections (1) and (4) of this section, unless all
affected parties, including the Department of Justice, expressly agree other-
wise***."
(Emphasis added.)

Cite as 349 Or
In our view, that contrast prevents us from reading the word-
ing in subsection (1) as making the state's consent a prereq-
uisite to any post-verdict settlement between the parties.
As noted above, however, the state contends that, to
the extent that its rights as a prejudgment ')udgment credi-
tor" under ORS 31.735 remain undefined after an examina-
tion of the text of that statute, the legislative history fleshes
out the nature of its protected interest. 8 The legislative
history that the state asserts to be compelling was quoted
at 	length 	in 	a 	recent Court of Appeals 	opinion, MAN
Aktiengesellschaft v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 218 Or App 117,
179 P3d 675 (2008), rev dismissed, 346 Or 214 (2009). In par-
ticular, the state points to certain statements made to a com-
mittee of the 1995 legislature. First, with respect to the pro-
posed amendment to change, among other things, the word
')udgment" to "verdict" in former ORS 18.540(1), Senator
Miller commented,
" 'I heard Attorney General Kulongoski describe that in
some situations after a verdict is reached that maybe the
parties go back and rework the settlement***. The State's
interest in these awards sometimes is defeated by some
maneuvering that seems to enrich and maybe even more
than-windfall might be a kind of a gentle phrase to
describe the activity but it seems like maybe the plaintiff
and their lawyer come out a lot better than perhaps they
should.'"
MAN Aktiengesellschaft, 218 Or App at 128, quoting Tape
Recording, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil Process,
SB 482, Feb 27, 1995, Tape 28, Side A (statement of Randy
Miller). In addition, John DiLorenzo, a spokesperson for the
sponsor of the amendment, testified the same day as follows:
It is also noteworthy that, as the emphasized wording above highlights, the
state's express consent only is required when there is a judgment in the case-that
is, a time when a "judgment creditor" ordinarily has rights.
8 Under ORS 174.020(3), the court may consider legislative history to the
extent it deems appropriate to assist in its construction of a statute. See State v.
Gaines, 346 Or 160, 166, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (construing ORS 17 4.020 to that
effect). Accordingly, we consider the legislative history that the state has presented
to us in this case. Id. (court may limit its consideration oflegislative history to the
information provided by the parties; court need not independently research legis-
lative history).

242 	Patton v. Target Corp.
" 'The Attorney General's right does not vest until after the
judgment is entered. And so if the parties are smart and if
there is a large punitive damages award entered, the par-
ties will sit down and construct a* * * settlement which will
provide that no final judgment will be awarded or that they
will stipulate to a final judgment that will provide an award
of general damages of a certain amount. And parties do that
quite often, by the way, because they like to avoid the
expense of appeal potentially. But they can under the pres-
ent statute essentially cut out the Attorney General from
that portion of the award because again, the Attorney
General does not have the right to intervene until the judg-
ment is entered.' "
Id. (statement of John DiLorenzo). Finally, DiLorenzo also
made the following statement:
"I don't think you can discount too much* * *what happens
to parties when the verdict comes in and before judgment is
rendered. There is a real incentive for both parties to settle
the case and to change the judgment around a little bit so
that the Attorney General does not take half of whatever is
available."
Tape Recording, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil
Process, SB 482, Feb 27, 1995, Tape 27, Side B.
Although the comment of a single legislator at one
committee hearing generally is of dubious utility in deter-
mining the intent of the legislature in enacting a statute (and
the comment of a nonlegislator witness even less helpful), 9
we can agree that those passages clearly describe a problem
that the legislature appears to have been attempting to
address: Under the 1991 version of the statute, the parties to
litigation sometimes eliminated the state's potential interest
in a punitive damages award by settling the case before a
judgment was entered. The passages quoted above do speak
directly about the state's interest in a punitive damages
award being "defeated" and the parties sometimes achieving
9 See Thompson u. IDS Life Ins. Co., 274 Or 649, 652-53, 549 P2d 510 (1976)
(whether or not comment before legislative committee could be construed as favor-
ing one interpretation of statute, "it is only the comment of one individual and of
little or no help in determining legislative intent"); State v. Guzek, 322 Or 245, 260,
906 P2d 272 (1995) (nonlegislat-Or's statements say little about the intent of the
Oregon Legislative Assembly as a whole).

Cite as 349 Or 230 (2010) 	243
a "windfall." However, that legislative history does not dis-
close how the legislature intended to solve that problem. The
state's argument, essentially, is that the legislature clearly
intended to give the state some right that it did not have
before the amendment, and because, in the state's view, the
best way to address the legislature's clear concern over col-
lusive settlements was to give the state the right to block all
settlements, then that right must be what the legislature
intended to confer.
The problem, however, is that there is an unbridged
gap between what the legislature is said to have intended
and what the words that the legislature chose to use actually
do: The statute simply does not create any right or rights in
the state as a prejudgment 'judgment creditor" to accomplish
that possible objective. Moreover, even assuming, arguendo,
that the legislative history showed that the legislature did
intend to enable the state to block parties from settling with-
out its consent by bestowing "judgment creditor" status on
the state upon entry of a verdict that includes punitive dam-
ages, the method that the legislature chose--changing the
word 'judgment" to "verdict" in subsection (1)-failed to
"translate [that] intent into operational language" to accom-
plish that goal. Monaco v. US Fidelity & Guar., 275 Or 183,
188, 550 P2d 422 (1976). The court is "not at liberty to give
effect to any supposed intention or meaning in the legisla-
ture, unless the words to be imported into the statute are, in
substance at least, contained in it." Whipple v. Howser, 291
Or 475, 480, 632 P2d 782 (1981) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). As we have discussed, the statute
does not provide that the state's consent to a settlement is
required, although it does plainly require the state's consent
to the application of payments made by or on behalf of a
defendant after judgment. ORS 31.735 (4) and (5). Thus, even
if the legislative history clearly suggested that the 1995
amendment was intended to require the state's consent to
settlement, "the words to be imported into the statute" are
not, in substance, contained in it.
In this case, it simply is not possible for us to con-
clude that ORS 31.735 as presently worded makes the state's
consent necessary before a court may enter a judgment giv-
ing effect to a settlement between the parties that would

244 	Patton v. Target Corp.
reduce or eliminate punitive damages to which the state
otherwise would be entitled, even if that is what the legisla-
ture intended. The answer to the certified question is "no."
The certified question is answered.