Karim v. Jobson

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, Board of Patent Appeals
<! and Interferences

* Informative

1 BoxInterferences@uspto.gov Opinion Paper 99
2 Te: 571-272-4683 Entered: 28 February 2007
3
4 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
5 BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES
6
7
8 Patent Interference 105,376 McK
9 Technology Center 1600

10

11

12 KHALID KARIM and ALLA E.M. ADRIS,

13

14 Patent 6,143,921,

15 Junior Party,

16 V

17

18 SIMON JOBSON and DERRICK WATSON,

19

20 Application 09/985,274,

21 Senior Party.

24 Before: FRED E. McKELVEY, Senior Administrative Patent Judge, and
25. LEEE. BARREIT and RICHARD TORCZON, Administrative Patent
26 Judges.

27

28 McKELVEY, Senior Administrative Patent Judge; joined by BARRETT,
29 Administrative Patent Judge.

30

31 MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

32

33 A. Introduction

34 On 11 October 2006, the Board entered a decision on motions

35 andissued an order to show cause why a judgment should not be entered
36 consistent with the views set out ina MEMORANDUM OPINION and
37. ORDER accompanying the decision on motions. Paper 95, page 48.

38 Kanm timely filed a response. Paper 96, filed 30 November 2006.

2
Jobson elected not to file a response.	1
Upon consideration of the Karim Response, the Board entered an	2
order inviting Jobson to reply to the Karim Response. Paper 97, entered	3
15 December 2006.	4
Jobson timely filed a reply. Paper 98, filed 17 January 2007.	5
6
B. The issue	7
The issue before us is whether we should enter judgment without	8
deciding all motions, thereby leaving certain issues for resolution by the	9
Examiner upon resumption of ex parte prosecution of the involved Jobson	10
application.	11
12
C. Findings of fact	13
Details of the interference can be found in our MEMORANDUM	14
OPINION and ORDER entered in support of the decision on motions and	15
order to show cause. Paper 95.	16
17
Issues Decided	18
In our decision on motions we made the following decisions.	19
1. A Karim reissue application was added to the interference	20
and reissue application claims 1-2, 5-17 and 20-34 were designated as	21
corresponding to the count. Paper 95, page 46. We now note that reissue	22
claims 4 and 17 should not have been designated as corresponding to the	23
count, because they are the same as Karim patent claims 4 and 17 which	24
have not been designated as corresponding to the count. See the	25
REDECLARATION (Paper 100) entered concurrently herewith.	26
2. Karim patent claim 1 and Karim reissue claim 1 are	27
unpatentable over the prior art. We reached our unpatentability holding after	28

3
(1) construction of the scope of Karim patent claim 1 and Karim reissue	1
claim 1, (which are identical in scope) and (2) taking into account	2
admissions made by Karim. Paper 95, see inter alia pages 24-28.	3
3. Karim patent claims 2, 5-16 and 20 and Karim reissue	4
claims 2, 5-16 and 20-34 are unpatentable for failure to comply with the	5
enablement requirement of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112. More	6
specifically, the enabling description in the Karim patent is not	7
commensurate in scope with the breadth of those claims. Paper 95, see inter	8
alia pages 28-31.	9
4. Jobson is entitled to a constructive reduction to practice as	10
early as the filing date of its PCT International Application, filed 5 August	11
1997. Paper 95, see inter alia pages 8 and 44.	12
5. Karim does not allege a date of invention prior to the date	13
accorded Jobson. Paper 95, see inter alia page 46. Accordingly, Karim	14
cannot prevail on priority.	15
6. Karim patent and reissue claims 3-4 and 17-19 should never	16
have been, and are not, designated as corresponding to the count and	17
therefore were not “involved” in the interference within the meaning of	18
35 U.S.C. § 135(a). There is no interference-in-fact between (1) Karim	19
patent and reissue claims 3-4 and 17-19 and any Jobson claim designated as	20
corresponding to the count.	21
Issues not decided	22
Certain issues were left undecided despite briefing by the parties.	23
Those issues include the following issues.	24
1. Jobson Motion 3 for judgment against Karim based on	25
alleged unpatentability over the prior art. The issue was deemed moot given	26
that we had already determined that the Karim claims were unpatentable	27

4
over the prior art (claim 1) or were unpatentable for lack of enablement (the	1
remaining involved Karim claims).	2
2. Karim motion for judgment against Jobson based on an	3
alleged lack of written description and Karim motion for judgment against	4
Jobson based on an alleged lack of enablement were denied to the extent that	5
we found Jobson adequately described at least one embodiment within the	6
scope of the count on a date prior to any date of invention alleged by Karim.	7
The motions were otherwise dismissed without prejudice to further	8
consideration by the Examiner upon resumption of ex parte proceedings.	9
3. Karim motion for judgment against Jobson based on alleged	10
unpatentability over the prior art was dismissed without prejudice to further	11
consideration by the Examiner upon resumption of ex parte proceedings.	12
4. Karim motion to substitute new counts was dismissed	13
because Karim has no patentable claim which could be designated as	14
corresponding to either one of the two proposed counts. One condition for	15
substituting a new count is that the moving party has at least one patentable	16
claim which can be designated as corresponding to the new count.	17
Karim and Jobson positions	18
Karim maintains that we should have decided the motions raising	19
unpatentability issues against Jobson. Karim further maintains that we	20
should apply our lack of enablement holding to the Jobson claims involved	21
in the interference. Jobson disagrees.	22
23
C. Discussion	24
Why are we exercising discretion to not decide certain issues?	25
We agree with our appellate reviewing court that unless a reason is	26
apparent, it is generally appropriate to explain an exercise of discretion.	27

5
Cf. Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 224 F.3d 1328, 1333, 56 USPQ2d	1
1208, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (ordinarily courts of appeals frown on	2
unexplained exercises of discretion by trial judges; sometimes, however, the	3
explanation is apparent). What follows is our explanation of why we will	4
exercise discretion in this interference to enter judgment without deciding all	5
issues raised and briefed by the parties.	6
7
What is an application v. patent interference?	8
During the course of examination of a patent application, an	9
interference between the application and a patent may be needed when an	10
applicant has otherwise patentable claims and both the application and the	11
patent are claiming patentably indistinct inventions as defined in 37 C.F.R.	12
§ 41.203(a) (2006). Assuming the application is otherwise allowable, it is	13
not in the public interest for the Director to issue a second patent leaving the	14
public to wonder which patentee would be the proper patentee to approach	15
for a license. Hence, the Congress determined that an interference between	16
an application and a patent may be conducted in the USPTO before the	17
Board. 35 U.S.C. § 135(a).	18
Up until 1984, a complication existed in interference practice. The	19
Board of Patent Interferences lacked jurisdiction to consider patentability	20
over the prior art. See, e.g., Glass v. DeRoo, 239 F.2d 402, 112 USPQ 62	21
(CCPA 1956). In 1984, Congress amended the patent law to permit	22
patentability over the prior art to be considered in an interference. Pub. L.	23
98-622, §§ 105 and 202, 98 Stat. 3385-86 (Nov. 8, 1984). Specifically,	24
Congress provided that in an interference a newly created Board of Patent	25
Appeals and Interferences shall decide priority of invention (a function	26
previously performed by the Board of Patent Interferences) and may decide	27

6
patentability (a function previously performed by the Board of Appeals).	1
35 U.S.C. § 135(a). A pre-1984 inability to consider patentability over the	2
prior art resulted in inefficiencies in resolving interferences. Under pre-1984	3
practice, during the interlocutory phase of an interference if an application	4
claim was found to be unpatentable over the prior art during an interference,	5
the interference was “dissolved” 1 and ex parte prosecution resumed. If the	6
applicant overcame the prior art upon resumed ex parte prosecution, the	7
interference had to be reinstituted. The patentability of a patent claim over	8
the prior art could not be considered in an interference. These inefficiencies	9
were removed by Congress in 1984.	10
Under post-1984 practice, sometimes an interference can be resolved	11
on the basis of unpatentability without any need to reach priority. Berman v.	12
Housey, 291 F.3d 1345, 63 USPQ2d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Sometimes it is	13
necessary to resolve the patentability of less than all of the claims. Noelle v.	14
Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343, 69 USPQ2d 1508 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Other times,	15
a decision on priority resolves the interference without a need to reach	16
patentability issues. In re Sullivan, 362 F.3d 1324, 70 USPQ2d 1145 (Fed.	17
Cir. 2004). On yet other occasions, both priority and patentability are	18
resolved. Perkins v. Kwon, 886 F.2d 325, 12 USPQ2d 1308 (Fed. Cir.	19
1989). What issues are decided, and in what order, manifestly depends on a	20
case-by-case analysis. 37 C.F.R. § 41.125(a) (2006).	21
1 An allegation that an application was unpatentable over the prior art was
raised by a motion. 37 C.F.R. § 1.231(a)(1) (1984). If the prior art also
applied to the patent, the motion would not be considered. If the motion was
granted by the primary examiner, the interference would be “dissolved.”
37 C.F.R. § 1.231(d) (1984). Under post-1984 interference practice an
interference is no longer “dissolved.” See Parks v. Fine, 783 F.2d 1036,
1037, 228 USPQ 677, 678 (Fed. Cir. 1986), amending, 773 F.2d 1577, 227
USPQ 432 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

7
At the end of the day an application v. patent interference is needed	1
only if the Examiner encounters an application claiming the same patentable	2
invention as a patent. If the patent claims are cancelled as a result of an	3
interference, then the Examiner is free to “ignore” the patent claims because	4
there is no longer a patent “claiming” the same patentable invention. The	5
Examiner can continue the ex parte examination, including taking such steps	6
as (1) rejecting claims, including those of an applicant who prevails in an	7
interference, 2 or (2) passing the application to issue if the claims in the	8
application are otherwise patentable. An interference is therefore part of the	9
overall examination process.	10
What the Examiner needs to know from an application v. patent	11
interference is: Do the patent claims stand in the way of issuing a patent to	12
the applicant? If the patentee “loses” 3 the interference, the patent claims are	13
cancelled and the answer is “No.” 35 U.S.C. § 135(a). If the applicant	14
“loses” the interference, then the answer is “Yes.” A determination of	15
unpatentability might, or might not, resolve a priority question. Once the	16
Examiner gets a “yes” or a “no,” that is all the Examiner needs and that it is	17
all the Director needs to carry out statutory duties to examine patent	18
applications which became involved in an interference.	19
2 See, e.g., In re Saunders, 219 F.2d 455, 104 USPQ 394 (CCPA 1955)
(claims of party awarded priority rejected); Krasnow v. Bender, 170 F.2d
560, 79 USPQ 78 (CCPA 1948) (prosecution may be reopened after
favorable decision in an interference; the Patent Office is not bound to issue
a patent to an applicant who prevails in an interference proceeding).
3 It is worth noting that there is no “winner” in an interference. There are
only “losers.” A party who loses an interference loses its right to the claims
involved in the interference. 35 U.S.C. § 135(a). A party who wins an
interference may not get a patent at all. See n.2, supra.

8
It is not uncommon to find interference parties treating an interference	1
as either a pre-grant opposition proceeding or a post-grant cancellation	2
proceeding and expecting that all issues briefed be decided. Interferences	3
are not post-grant cancellation proceedings like those available in	4
trademarks. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1064 [Section 14 of the Lanham Act].	5
Interferences are not pre-grant opposition proceedings like those available in	6
trademarks. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1063 [Section 13 of the Lanham Act]. It	7
is true that Congress has authorized reexamination proceedings where	8
limited issues can be raised and participation by a third-party is limited.	9
However, in patent cases Congress has yet to authorize what might be	10
characterized as “full-blown” inter partes pre-grant oppositions or post-grant	11
cancellation proceedings.	12
Some practitioners have expressed the opinion that the reason some	13
motions may not be decided is because “the Board is trying to get out of	14
work.” For example, one author has colorfully stated: the Board “fights ...	15
to avoid the work.” 4 We disagree. The USPTO, including the Board, has	16
what has been characterized as “an enormous volume of work.” See Judge	17
Newman’s dissenting opinion in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Pharmachemie	18
B.V., 361 F.3d 1343, 1351, 70 USPQ2d 1097, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Our	19
approach is to resolve interferences in a just, speedy and inexpensive	20
manner. 37 C.F.R. § 41.1(b) (2006). By resolving interferences in an	21
efficient manner, it is true that some “work” may be avoided in a particular	22
interference if a particular motion is not decided. When that motion is not	23
decided, resources become available to handle the “enormous volume of	24
4 Gholz, A Critique of the New Rules and the New Standing Order in
Contested Case/Interference Practice, 87 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 62,
70 (2005).

9
work” involved in an increasing ex parte and interferences docket.	1
Performing unnecessary “work” in one interference prevents us from taking	2
up other interferences and ex parte cases thereby denying prompt attention	3
to other deserving applicants and patentees who appear before us, all of	4
whom pay user fees so the USPTO can have the fiscal resources to carry out	5
its functions.	6
Sometime we find it appropriate to leave unresolved issues for further	7
consideration by the Examiner upon resumption of ex parte prosecution. It	8
may be true that both Examiners and the Board have technical knowledge	9
and legal knowledge. However, Examiners have expertise in examining	10
patent applications. The Board has expertise in handing interferences.	11
There can be an advantage in allowing an Examiner to consider a	12
patentability issue rather than having the Board do so when an interference	13
is otherwise resolved. First, the ex parte examination process is inherently a	14
more efficient process vis-à-vis the inter partes interference process.	15
Second, because the Examiner works day-to-day in the art, the Examiner	16
may be in a good position to know of a prior art reference which may	17
provide a complete answer to an argument presented by an applicant in	18
support of patentability. We are told, however: that the Examiner is likely	19
to pass the case to issue without considering patentability issues referred to	20
the Examiner by the Board or “examiners don’t have the requisite time to	21
deal with complicated issues in prosecution in an ex parte manner.” 5 We	22
disagree. A complete answer can be found in the following observation of	23
5 Gholz, Participation By A Victorious Interferent In the Losing
Interferent’s Post-Interference Prosecution, Intellectual Property Today,
page 39 (Jan. 2007).

10
the Federal Circuit in Haley v. Department of the Treasury, 977 F.2d 553,	1
558 (Fed. Cir. 1992):	2
“There is a strong presumption in the law that administrative	3
actions are correct and taken in good faith.” Sanders v. United	4
States Postal Service, 801 F.2d 1328, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1986).	5
More specifically, “[i]t is well established that there is a	6
presumption that public officers perform their duties correctly,	7
fairly, in good faith, and in accordance with law and governing	8
regulations and the burden on the plaintiff to prove otherwise.”	9
Parsons v. United States, 670 F.2d 164, 166 (Ct. Cl. 1982)	10
(citing United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1,	11
14-15 (1926).	12
13
See also Clemmons v. West, 206 F.3d 1401, 1403-4 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Union	14
Pacific R.R. v. United States, 847 F.2d 1567, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Cook v.	15
United States, 855 F.2d 848, 849 (Fed. Cir. 1988); and American Hoist &	16
Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360, 220 USPQ 763, 771	17
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting deference due to a qualified government agency	18
presumed to have properly done its job). We are confident that the	19
examiners in the USPTO are deserving of the presumption expressed by the	20
Federal Circuit and we decline to make any assumption that an examiner	21
would not conduct the Government’s business consistent with the	22
presumption expressed in Haley.	23
Another factor we take into account is whether continuing an	24
interference may lead to additional term adjustment. An applicant, but not a	25
patentee, involved in an interference is entitled to term adjustment if the	26
applicant ultimately receives a patent. 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(C)(i). A	27
decision to terminate an interference which answers the “yes” or “no” for the	28
Examiner can be justified if failing to terminate the interference leads to	29
possible additional patent term adjustment. In this particular interference,	30

11
patent term adjustment is not a concern because Jobson has filed a terminal	1
disclaimer in the involved Jobson application and therefore would not be	2
entitled to patent term adjustment.	3
Yet another and related factor is the expiration of any term of any	4
patent which may be issued post-interference. The CCPA had occasion to	5
address the “term” with respect to reissue applications in In re Pritchard,	6
463 F.2d 1359, 1361, 175 USPQ 17, 19 (CCPA 1972) (there is an obvious	7
public interest in unnecessary postponement of the beginning of the running	8
of the term of a patent resulting from an application in interference	9
proceedings) and Pritchard v. Loughlin, 361 F.2d 483, 487, 149 USPQ 841,	10
844 [headnote 1] (CCPA 1966) (interference proceedings involving reissue	11
should be handled expeditiously inasmuch as the term of any reissue patent	12
is running). An application with a terminal disclaimer is situated in a	13
position similar to a reissue application—the term of any patent has been set	14
before the patent issues.	15
16
What about this case?	17
In this interference, we have been able to answer the “yes” or “no”	18
question for the Examiner by holding that Karim’s involved claims (i.e., the	19
Karim claims corresponding to the count) are unpatentable (1) over the prior	20
art (claim 1), (2) for lack of enablement commensurate in scope with the	21
breadth of the claims (the remaining involved Karim claims) and (3) based	22
on priority (all involved Karim claims). In essence, we have answered “No”	23
using a belt (patentability) and suspenders (priority) to support the answer.	24
With the “No”, the Examiner can now finish examination of the involved	25
Jobson application. Karim has no inherent right to participate in that	26
examination as though examination were a pre-grant opposition. In this	27

12
respect, it is worth noting that after the amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) in	1
1984, Congress has since explicitly admonished against pre-issuance	2
oppositions for published applications. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 122(c), which	3
was enacted after the 1984 amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 135(a). At this point,	4
Karim would appear to stand in no better position than had its claims been	5
cancelled pre-interference via a reexamination proceeding filed by some	6
third-party other than Jobson.	7
Karim maintains the prior art applicable to Karim is the same as that	8
applicable to Jobson and therefore we should hold Jobson’s claims	9
unpatentable.6 However, one piece of prior art available against Karim	10
which is not available against Jobson is the Jobson published PCT	11
application. Further, Jobson never admitted that the prior art rendered any	12
Jobson claim unpatentable regardless of how a Karim or Jobson claim is	13
6 Karim continues to insist that Jobson’s application claims are “invalid.”
We do not know why Karim continues to mischaracterize patentability as
invalidity. The Congress has determined that we have authority to look into
patentability. Compare (1) 35 U.S.C. § 135(a), which nowhere mentions
“invalidity” but does authorize patentability determinations with (2)
35 U.S.C. § 282 providing invalidity defenses. Patentability is not the same
thing as validity. For one thing, the burden of proof on patentability before
the Board is preponderance of the evidence. Bruning v. Hirose, 161 F.3d
681, 48 USPQ2d 1934 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The burden of proof in an
“invalidity” setting, e.g., a civil action for patent infringement, is clear and
convincing. 	American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d
1350, 220 USPQ 763 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 	We believe parties, as well as the
Board, should use suitable statutory language when addressing issues in an
interference and before the USPTO in general. Calling a mule a camel just
because both have four legs and can be used to transport material can lead to
confusion and misunderstanding. Maybe we could better make our point if
the next time a party files a motion for judgment based on a claim being
“invalid” we either (1) dismiss the motion as not authorized or (2) hold the
moving party to clear and convincing proofs.

13
construed. The unpatentability admission by Karim applies only to Karim	1
and cannot apply to Jobson who made no such admission. Whether the	2
Examiner finds Jobson’s claims unpatentable over the National Distiller and	3
Research Disclosure documents, particularly in light of any observation	4
made by Karim as to those documents, is a different issue than the prior art	5
unpatentability issue resolved against involved Karim claim 1 and involved	6
reissue Karim claim 1.	7
Karim makes a similar line of argument with respect to our holding	8
that Karim’s involved claims are unpatentable based on a lack of enablement	9
commensurate in scope with the breadth of the claims. To be sure, the	10
Karim claims and the Jobson claims are essentially identical. However, a	11
review of the respective specifications of the Karim patent and the Jobson	12
application will reveal that Karim and Jobson address the problem to be	13
solved (use of a catalyst to prevent or minimize production of carbon	14
monoxide in the first step) with different catalysts. It does not per se follow	15
that issues associated with that scope of enablement in the Karim	16
specification are the same as the scope of enablement of the Jobson	17
specification. Moreover, since Jobson did not “lose” the interference, there	18
is no estoppel as to Jobson. 37 C.F.R. § 41.127(a) (2006). Jobson will be	19
free to amend claims in response to any rejection by the Examiner. While	20
responsive motions may be used in an interference to amend claims, 7 the	21
amendment process is less efficient in interference practice than it is in ex	22
parte practice.	23
Karim bottoms its unfairness argument on some decisions of the	24
Federal Circuit, including (1) Schulze v. Green, 136 F.3d 786, 791, 45	25
7 Karim took advantage of an ability to “amend” its patent claims by filing
a reissue application containing claims not present in the Karim patent.

14
USPQ2d 1770, 1774 (Fed. Cir. 1998) and (2) Wu v. Wang, 129 F.3d 1237,	1
1241, 44 USPQ 1641, 1642 (Fed. Cir. 1997).	2
Karim tells us that those decisions compel a different result. We	3
disagree. Our starting point in discussing the Federal Circuit opinions is a	4
recognition that a decision should be read to see: “What was the precise	5
holding of the court?” Decisions of courts, like decisions of the Board, are	6
supported by an opinion. Opinion writing is not as easy as counsel might	7
think!	8
An opinion is written with a certain set of facts in mind. In the	9
process of writing an opinion, a statement believed to be entirely appropriate	10
at the time but later turns out to be an “over-statement”. Another set of facts	11
comes along and the tribunal looking at its prior opinion discovers that its	12
opinion was “too broad” and inappropriately “covers” a situation which the	13
tribunal had not considered or appreciated at the time the opinion was	14
written. One can see an evolution in Federal Circuit opinions of the	15
principles first articulated by the Federal Circuit in Perkins v. Kwon,	16
886 F.2d 325, 12 USPQ2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1989). We understand the	17
Federal Circuit’s opinion-writing process and fully sympathize with the	18
difficulties associated with writing opinions. We urge counsel to likewise	19
appreciate those difficulties when citing cases to us and ask that counsel not	20
“over-cite” an opinion for a proposition not decided by the opinion.	21
The precise holding in Perkins v. Kwon, 886 F.2d 325, 12 USPQ2d	22
1308 (1989) was the following: The Board did not err when it decided that	23
the involved claims of Kwon were unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.	24
§ 102(b)/103 after it had decided that the involved claims of Perkins were	25
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (because Perkins “lost” on the issue	26
of priority). Nothing more and nothing less was decided. Perkins did not	27

15
decide, and consistent with Article III of the Constitution could not have	1
decided, that under some other circumstances, the Board should or should	2
not decide a different case in any particular manner. Consistent with Anglo-	3
Saxon jurisprudence, the Federal Circuit issued an opinion addressing its	4
rationale. As we indicated earlier, opinion writing is not as easy as it might	5
appear. One can debate the proposition that perhaps statements made in	6
Perkins were not necessary to support its decision. Those statements,	7
however, have been used by counsel appearing before as gospel to argue that	8
every time an issue is fully briefed, the Board must decide the issue. Even if	9
one assumes that the Federal Circuit made a statement which might give that	10
impression, it made no such holding in Perkins. Subsequent Federal Circuit	11
decisions involving different facts will immediately confirm the precise	12
nature of the Perkins holding.	13
In 1997, the Federal Circuit had before it Wu v. Wang, 129 F.3d 1237,	14
44 USPQ2d 1641 (Fed. Cir. 1997), which is often cited to us for the	15
proposition that we must decide all briefed issues. In entering its final	16
decision in an interference, the Board held that (1) all of junior party Wang’s	17
involved claims were unpatentable over the prior art and (2) some of senior	18
party Wu’s claims were unpatentable over the prior art and some were not.	19
Wu appealed to the Federal Circuit seeking review of the Board’s decision	20
to the extent it held some of Wu’s claims to be unpatentable. Wang did not	21
cross appeal. Rather, Wang filed a notice of election to have all further	22
proceedings conducted under 35 U.S.C. § 146. Wang then sought judicial	23
review under § 146 in the Central District of California to challenge the	24
Board’s holding that some of Wu’s claims were patentable. Wu moved to	25
have the Federal Circuit maintain jurisdiction over the appeal, essentially	26
asking the Federal Circuit to ignore the notice of election. Wu also filed a	27

16
“protective” civil action under § 146 in the District of Columbia. Wu took	1
the position that Wang was a third-party protester at this point since it had	2
not appealed the adverse decision holding its claims unpatentable. The	3
Federal Circuit found that Wang (1) was an “adverse” party, (2) was entitled	4
to file a notice of election and (3) could properly seek judicial review of the	5
Board’s holding that some of Wu’s claim were patentable. The Federal	6
Circuit agreed that Wang was entitled to challenge any part of the Board’s	7
decision with which Wang was dissatisfied. The holding of the Federal	8
Circuit was that (1) the notice of election should not be dismissed, (2) the	9
appeal should be dismissed and (3) judicial review should take place in a	10
civil action under § 146 in the District of Columbia.	11
In Wu, the Federal Circuit notes that “[s]ignificantly, the interference	12
was not terminated once it became clear that Wang would not be entitled to	13
a patent.” 129 F.3d at 1241, 44 USPQ2d at 1644. 	The Federal Circuit did	14
not hold that the Board erred in considering all patentability issues. Nor did	15
the Federal Circuit have before it the hypothetical question of whether the	16
Board might have erred if it had declined to consider a patentability issue.	17
Wu provides little, if any, comfort for Karim.	18
Nine years after Perkins, the Federal Circuit had occasion to consider	19
Schulze v. Green, 136 F.3d 786, 45 USPQ2d 1770 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The	20
issue in Schulze was whether the Board erred in terminating an interference	21
when the Board gave less than clear notice to Schulze as to how a motion for	22
judgment based on alleged improper inventorship was to be renewed and	23
then declined to permit Schulze to raise the issue. On the “peculiar” facts,	24
the Federal Circuit felt that the Board’s actions amounted to a default	25
judgment. The Federal Circuit ordered that the Board set a fixed time for	26
Schulze to refile its motion, the court being careful not to tell the Board what	27

17
that time should be. The court went to say that the case shall not be returned	1
to ex parte examination respecting the inventorship issue. While the	2
USPTO accepted the court’s “no ex parte examination” order as the law of	3
the case, it not apparent how a “no ex parte examination” issue could have	4
been ripe given that the Board had not yet set a time and Schulze had not yet	5
renewed its motion. In any event, the Federal Circuit itself noted that the	6
Schulze facts were “peculiar” and we are of the view that the Schulze facts	7
are not remotely the same as the facts in this case. Karim lost this	8
interference on the merits.	9
After Schulze comes Berman v. Housey, 291 F.3d 1345, 63 USPQ2d	10
1023 (Fed. Cir. 2002). One issue decided in Berman v. Housey was whether	11
the Board erred (i.e., abused its discretion,) in declining to consider	12
Berman’s motion for judgment based on alleged unpatentability having	13
granted Housey’s motion for judgment based on a failure to comply with	14
35 U.S.C. § 135(b). The Federal Circuit found no error. The Federal circuit	15
acknowledged a USPTO rule which provided in relevant part that the Board	16
(1) may take up motions for decision in any order, (2) may grant, deny or	17
dismiss any motion and (3) may take such other action which will secure the	18
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the interference. 291 F.3d at	19
1352, 63 USPQ2d at 1028, citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.640(b) (2001), now 37	20
C.F.R. § 41.125(a) (2006). Responding to Berman’s arguments bottomed on	21
earlier cases and addressing Perkins, Wu, Schulze and some other cases, the	22
Federal Circuit observed that those cases stand for the proposition that if, in	23
a properly declared interference, an issue of priority or patentability is fairly	24
raised and fully developed on the record, then the Board has the authority to	25
consider that issue even after the Board determines that one party is not	26

18
entitled to its claims. Nowhere does the Federal Circuit state that the Board	1
is always required to do so.	2
As we see it, by the time Berman v. Housey arrived at the courthouse	3
door, the Federal Circuit came to appreciate that statements (not holdings) in	4
some of its earlier cases were probably being misinterpreted by the	5
practicing bar. In large measure, that misinterpretation was put to rest in	6
Berman v. Housey. No one should fault the path the Federal Circuit took to	7
get to its observations in Berman v. Housey. Writing opinions is not an easy	8
task. But, to the conscientious tribunal, statements subject to	9
misinterpretation in earlier opinions come to be clarified in subsequent cases	10
so that the law can evolve in an orderly manner. Cf. Eberhart v. United	11
States, 546 U.S. 12, __, 126 S. Ct. 403, 407 (2005) (Supreme Court	12
acknowledged that an error by 7th Cir. “was caused in large part by	13
imprecision in our prior cases.”).	14
The next case worthy of discussion is In re Sullivan, 362 F.3d 1324,	15
70 USPQ2d 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Despite its ex parte-like name, Sullivan	16
was an appeal from a decision entered in an interference. Sullivan felt its	17
opponent failed to comply with 35 U.S.C. § 135(b), but at the same time	18
conceded that it could not prevail on priority. The Board terminated the	19
interference on the basis of Sullivan’s concession and left to the Examiner a	20
decision whether an ex parte § 135(b) rejection should be made against	21
Sullivan’s opponent. The Federal Circuit found no abuse of discretion by	22
the Board in referring a possible § 135(b) rejection to the Examiner. In	23
Sullivan, a so-called threshold motion was referred to the Examiner after it	24
was determined that the moving party is not entitled to a patent based on	25
priority. The difference here is that Karim is not only not entitled to its	26
patent based on priority, but also on unpatentability (prior art and lack of	27

19
enablement). Like Sullivan, Karim’s allegations of unpatentability based on	1
lack of a written description (a threshold issue) and lack of enablement (not	2
necessarily a threshold issue) have been referred to the Examiner for further	3
consideration by the Examiner. Unlike Sullivan, Karim’s motion for	4
judgment based on lack of written description and lack of enablement were	5
considered at least to the extent that we determined that Jobson’s involved	6
and PCT applications contain an enabling description of an embodiment	7
within the scope of the court.	8
The applicable precedent demonstrates that there are any number of	9
scenarios which can arise and that the Federal Circuit will give the Board a	10
wide latitude to conduct its affairs. Only in Schulze did the court find it	11
necessary to correct what it felt was an abuse of discretion caused in no	12
small part by confusing orders entered by the Board and following entry of	13
those confusing orders entry of a “default” judgment.	14
15
The merits	16
In its response, Karim presents arguments maintaining that we erred	17
on the merits in entering the unpatentability over the prior art and lack of	18
enablement holdings.	19
A first argument is that we misinterpreted the scope of Karim’s	20
claim 1. Repeating many of the arguments made in its motion and reply,	21
Karim in essence attempts to reargue and urge the claim construction	22
previously advanced. We have already explained why a claim construction	23
under the broadest reasonable construction rule leads to the result we	24
reached. We find it unnecessary to repeat our analysis.	25
A second argument is that Karim’s claims not limited to particular	26
catalysts comply with the enablement requirement of the first paragraph of	27

20
35 U.S.C. § 112. Alternatively, the enablement holding should be applied to	1
Jobson. We have already explained why the enablement issue with respect	2
to Jobson should be considered by the Examiner. Karim maintains that	3
before its claims may be held “invalid” (meaning unpatentable), it must first	4
be proven that there are actually other First Catalysts which are not enabled	5
by Karim’s specification. Paper 96, pages 8-9. We have no idea where	6
Karim gets the notion Karim advances before us. Karim’s expert testified	7
that (1) catalytic activity is not predictable and (2) before Karim he knew of	8
no way to produce the result Karim seeks. The expert’s testimony is	9
substantial evidence to sustain a lack of enablement commensurate in scope	10
with the breadth of the claims holding. To be sure, one skilled in the art	11
(1) could pick any catalyst, (2) try it in Karim’s process and (3) see if carbon	12
monoxide is produced. But, where would one skilled in the art start beyond	13
the catalysts described in the Karim patent? A patent is rewarded for the	14
successful conclusion to an endeavor, not as a hunting license to keep every	15
one out of the field while other suitable catalysts are discovered post-Karim.	16
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536, 86 S. Ct. 1033, 1042 (1966).	17
18
D. Order	19
Upon consideration of the record, Karim’s response (Paper 96) and	20
Jobson’s reply (Paper 98), and for the reasons given, it is	21
ORDERED that Karim has not overcome the order to show	22
cause.	23
FURTHER ORDERED that judgment should be entered against	24
Karim for the reasons given in the Decision on Motions (Paper 95).	25
FURTHER ORDERED that the interference is redeclared in a	26
separate paper (Paper 100).	27

1 FURTHER ORDERED that judgment is entered in a separate
2 paper (Paper 101).

21

22
TORCZON, Administrative Patent Judge, concurring.	1
Judge McKelvey's diplomatic opinion understates the problems	2
inherent in the cases Karim cites for the proposition that a patentability issue	3
raised in an interference should be resolved in the interference: Schulze v.	4
Green, 136 F.3d 786, 45 USPQ2d 1770 (Fed. Cir. 1998), and Wu v. Wang,	5
129 F.3d 1237, 44 USPQ2d 1641 (Fed. Cir. 1997). As Judge McKelvey	6
explains, whether a patentability question is reached is necessarily a matter	7
of case-management discretion. Unfortunately, Karim's view of the law is	8
widely held and is the source of continuing administrative difficulties for the	9
Board.	10
The problem with the widely held view that all patentability issues	11
should always be decided in an interference is that it flies in the face of the	12
legislative intent underlying the revision to 35 U.S.C. 135(a) two decades	13
ago. The Board was given jurisdiction to reach patentability to expedite	14
interferences, not to prolong them. This is why the jurisdiction to reach	15
patentability in § 135(a) is phrased permissively. In the present case, the	16
question that must be resolved (i.e., is there a priority question that prevents	17
the issuance of a patent to an applicant) has been answered. Hence, whether	18
the Board should reach additional patentability questions at the cost of	19
prolonging the proceeding is not a question of what Karim would like, but	20
rather a question of sound case management.	21
The origin of the problem ultimately traces to dicta in Perkins v.	22
Kwon, 886 F.2d 325, 12 USPQ2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The question	23
actually presented in Perkins is the opposite of the one presented here: in	24
Perkins, priority had already been decided, yet the Board decided	25
patentability anyway. By affirming the Board decision to reach	26
patentability, the court answered the question actually before it in the	27

23
affirmative. Unfortunately, the opinion then went beyond the question	1
presented to state that patentability should always be decided. A statement	2
directed to a factual situation not before the court, and thus not actually in	3
issue, is dictum. It is important to distinguish an opinion's holding from its	4
dicta. Delta and Pine Land Co. v. Sinkers Corp., 177 F.3d 1343, 1349,	5
50 USPQ2d 1749, 1753 (Fed. Cir. 1999), citing United States Nat'l Bank of	6
Ore. v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am. Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 463 n.11, 113	7
S. Ct. 2173, 2186 n.11 (1993).	8
In fairness to the court, the dicta in Perkins was consistent with the	9
Board's practice at the time to try to resolve all issues. The problem with	10
this approach was that the pendency of interferences continued to be as long	11
as they were before Congress tried to remedy the pendency problem despite	12
the Office's commitment to reduce pendency to about two years. 37 C.F.R.	13
§ 1.610(c) (1985). Plainly, the comprehensive approach the Office pursued	14
until the late 1990s was frustrating the legislative intent of obtaining quicker	15
resolution of priority contests. 8 In retrospect, it was naive to have thought	16
interferences could routinely be both fast on priority and comprehensive on	17
patentability.	18
While many cases subsequently cited the Perkins dicta, with two	19
exceptions, the cases were like Perkins in that a mandatory reading of the	20
8 The perception of delay in priority contests continues to be widespread.
E.g., Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 966, 76 USPQ2d
1914, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (characterizing such delays as "notorious").
Under the more focused approach adopted in 1998, interference pendency
has drifted downward until now the vast majority of interferences are
resolved within the prescribed two years. If Karim's view were to prevail,
the delays would again become notorious.

24
dicta was beyond the actual holding of the case. 9 The exceptions are	1
Berman v. Housey, 291 F.3d 1345, 63 USPQ2d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2002), and	2
Schulze.	3
Berman dealt with the statutory construction problem raised in the	4
Perkins dicta. The "may determine questions of patentability" language in	5
§ 135(a) is not at odds with the "shall…determine…patentability" language	6
of 35 U.S.C. 6(b) because the statutes are doing different jobs.	7
Section 135(a) permits the Board to decide patentability during an	8
interference, while § 6(b) restricts determination of patentability to the	9
Board rather than the Director. In Berman, the court declined to follow the	10
Perkins dicta as Judge McKelvey explains above.	11
Schulze is the one case where the Perkins dicta appears to have	12
affected the holding in the case. In Schulze, the court held that any	13
patentability question fairly raised in an interference must be decided.	14
Schulze had filed a defective motion to correct inventorship, which had been	15
dismissed in view of its defects. The Board proceeded to enter judgment	16
against Schulze under 35 U.S.C. 102(f) because the Schulze application	17
named the wrong inventors. The court remanded the case to the Board for	18
resolution of the inventorship question. Significantly, although the decision	19
turned on interpretation of agency practice, the agency was not present (even	20
as an amicus curiæ) to explain its practice. Hence, if Schulze is taken at face	21
9 Wu is a typical example. In Wu, the Board issued judgment against both
parties on the basis of unpatentability. In a twist on Perkins, Wu argued that
once Wang lost on patentability the Board should not have proceeded to
decide the patentability of Wu's claims. As in Perkins, the question was not
whether the Board had to decide patentability but rather whether it could do
so after the other party had lost.

25
value, then it presents the curious situation of a court mandating agency	1
behavior in future cases without consulting the affected agency.	2
What makes the Schulze holding odd is that the Board did determine	3
the patentability question raised. What the Board did not do (according to	4
the court) was offer Schulze an adequate opportunity to cure the	5
patentability problem. 10 The court appears to have thought that the Board	6
abused its discretion in not resolving the inventorship issue before issuing	7
judgment on the basis of incorrect inventorship. Unfortunately, the court	8
turned to the Perkins dicta (at the behest of the parties and without guidance	9
from the Office) and characterized the issue as a failure to reach	10
patentability. While the Schulze holding is unquestionably law of the case,	11
the reasons the court gave for the holding are difficult to reconcile with the	12
facts of the case (as the court stated them) or with Board practice then or	13
now. Schulze cannot be read as prohibiting the agency from adjusting its	14
practice in future cases. 11
15
An irony of the Schulze holding is that the other party, Green, had	16
already lost on priority and did not appeal. Consequently, if the Board had	17
declined to decide the patentability motion but rather had let Schulze resolve	18
10 The present rules explicitly provide for "responsive motions", including a
motion to change inventorship, in the face of a pleading or motion.
37 C.F.R. § 41.121(a)(2) (2006).
11 In Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 479 n.2, 42 USPQ2d 1550, 1554 n.2
(Fed. Cir. 1997), the court noted an Office rule amendment that purported to
have "set aside" a decision of the court. The court stated that the Office
could not set aside a court precedent, but could change its own practice if it
had a good reason to do so. In 1998, the Board changed its approach to
patentability in interferences precisely because it could not reconcile an
expansive approach to patentability with the long-standing Office goal of
two-year average pendency.

26
the inventorship before an examiner as Schulze proposed, the appeal (and	1
the troublesome holding) in Schulze would never have come about. The	2
paradoxical effect of requiring the Board to reach any patentability issue that	3
is fairly raised will be that the Board will have to become much more	4
restrictive in authorizing any patentability motion at all lest it prove to be the	5
rate-limiting step. Case management takes place inside a broader context	6
than the wishes of a party in a particular case. Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman	7
Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1549-1550, 221 USPQ 1, 10 (Fed. Cir.	8
1984). Reading court precedents as broad mandates about what must or	9
must not be done in managing a case, divorced from the facts of a particular	10
case, is counterproductive.	11

27
cc (via Electronic Mail):	1
2
Counsel for Karim	3
(real party in interest	4
Saudi Basic Industries Corporation):	5
6
William J. Spatz, Esq.	7
Albert B. Chen, Esq.	8
KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS & FRANKEL LLP	9
1177 Avenue of the Americas	10
New York, NY 10036	11
12
Tel: 	212-715-9100 (main)	13
Tel: 	212-715-9257 (Spatz)	14
Tel: 	202-715-9412 (Chen)	15
Fax: 	212-715-8000	16
17
Email: 	wspatz@kramerlevin.com	18
Email: 	achen@kramerlevin.com	19
20
Counsel for Jobson	21
(real party in interest	22
BP Chemicals Limited):	23
24
Leonard C. Mitchard, Esq.	25
Mary J. Wilson, Esq.	26
NIXON & VANDERHYE, PC	27
11 th Floor	28
901 North Glebe Road	29
Arlington, VA 22203-1808	30
31
Tel: 	703-816-4000 (main)	32
Tel: 	703-816-4005 (Mitchard)	33
Tel: 	703-816-4011 (Wilson)	34
Fax: 	703-816-4100	35
36
Email: 	lcm@nixonvan.com	37
Email: 	mjw@nixonvan.com	38
39