William J. Murray v. Jennifer A. Bromley

Supreme Court
No. 2007-162-Appeal.
(PC 01-1840)
NOTICE: 	This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to
notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250
Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-
3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
William J. Murray 	:
v. 	:
Jennifer A. Bromley. 	:

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Supreme Court
No. 2007-162-Appeal.
(PC 01-1840)
Present: Williams, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Suttell, and Robinson, JJ.
O P I N I O N
Justice Suttell, for the Court. 	After a jury returned a verdict awarding him $0 in
damages, the plaintiff, William J. Murray, moved for a new trial. 	The defendant, Jennifer A.
Bromley, now appeals from the Superior Court order granting the plaintiff’s motion. 	This case
came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show
cause why the issues raised in the appeal should not summarily be decided. After reviewing the
record and considering the parties’ oral and written submissions, we are satisfied that the appeal
may be decided without the necessity of further briefing or argument. For the reasons stated in
this opinion, we affirm the order of the Superior Court.
Facts and Procedural History
This case stems from a rear-end automobile accident in which defendant’s vehicle struck
the car Mr. Murray was driving on the Route 195 entrance ramp from Friendship Street in
Providence on November 5, 1999. Ms. Bromley conceded liability and the case was tried before
a jury on the issue of damages only. At trial, Mr. Murray testified that his “neck snapped on the
headrest” and then his head went “forward and back again.” 	The plaintiff stated that he
immediately felt pain in the back of his neck and his neck felt as if he had been “hit with a
William J. Murray 	:
v. 	:
Jennifer A. Bromley. 	:

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baseball bat.” Although plaintiff reported his neck pain to police at the scene, plaintiff refused to
take the ambulance offered to him to receive medical treatment, and instead returned to work.
Mr. Murray testified that on the next day he noticed a painful lump at the top of his spine.
The lump on his spine and the pain caused him to seek the care of a doctor. The plaintiff had an
MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) examination, which showed he had suffered a “couple
herniated disks” in his back. 	Several months later, Mr. Murray sought treatment from another
doctor because he felt he was not seeing results under the first doctor’s care. The second doctor
who treated plaintiff injected shots of hydrocortisone directly into plaintiff’s neck to relieve his
symptoms. 	Mr. Murray testified that initially this treatment alleviated his symptoms, but over
time the treatment’s effectiveness diminished. The second doctor also prescribed OxyContin, a
potent pain medication, for plaintiff. 	In addition, Mr. Murray started seeing a chiropractor for
the pain in his shoulders and neck. 	According to plaintiff, the chiropractic treatments did give
him some relief on the day the treatments were administered, but the relief was short-lived and
the pain returned the next day.
In April 2005, nearly six years after the automobile collision, Mr. Murray underwent
surgery to treat his neck and shoulder pain. 	After the surgery, plaintiff reported a “50, [to] 60
percent” improvement in the pain in his neck and shoulders. 	He also said the surgery allowed
him to take approximately one-third of the amount of pain medication he was taking before the
operation. 	The plaintiff sought employment after his surgery,1 but he said he had difficulties
because of his physical limitations. At the time of trial, plaintiff testified that he was working as
a cleaner at a hospital in Providence, but hoped to get another job at the same hospital working
with the boilers as a boiler operator.
1 The plaintiff no longer was employed at the job he held at the time of the accident because of
circumstances not related to his injuries.

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Mr. Murray’s physical limitations did not keep him from enjoying his former recreational
activities. The plaintiff testified that he continues to ride his motorcycle, although he no longer
rides his motorcycle on “long hauls.” The plaintiff also said that he tries to live as normal a life
as possible, stating “I can’t change my life. I don’t have a maid to do my laundry, carry beer into
the house or do any of these things. It’s me and my wife.”
At trial, plaintiff presented Peter Pizzarello, M.D., an orthopaedic surgeon, as an expert
witness. Doctor Pizzarello reviewed plaintiff’s medical records and physically examined him on
June 13, 2006. 	Doctor Pizzarello testified that, in his opinion, the accident caused plaintiff to
require cervical disk surgery, which consisted of removing two disks from plaintiff’s back and
then fusing his spine—using bone, titanium screws, and titanium plates. 	He also testified that
plaintiff suffered continuous right-shoulder pain as a result of the accident. 	Doctor Pizzarello
concluded that Mr. Murray would be in pain for the rest of his life because of the injuries he
suffered in the rear-end collision.
Ms. Bromley presented Edward Feldmann, M.D., a neurologist, as an expert witness.
The defendant’s expert witness testified that, in his opinion, plaintiff suffered a soft-tissue injury
or a muscle strain after the accident. 	Doctor Feldmann stated that, because plaintiff underwent
surgery on his spine several years after the accident and the surgery was on a part of his spine
that would not normally be injured by this type of accident, he concluded that plaintiff suffered a
soft-tissue injury, and not a spinal injury, as a result of the accident. 	Doctor Feldmann further
opined that the surgery was likely performed for a condition that was not related to the accident.
Ms. Bromley testified on her own behalf, describing the accident as happening when she
“took [her] foot off of [her] brake and began to inch forward. While [she] was doing that, [she]
briefly looked left to see if there was traffic if [she] could merge and when [she] looked back,

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Mr. Murray had stopped and that’s when [they] had impact.” The defendant also stated that she
was going under ten miles per hour when their cars collided, and that her airbags did not deploy.
After deliberating on the case, the jury awarded Mr. Murray $0 in damages as a result of
the accident. The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the jury’s verdict shocked
the conscience. The trial justice agreed with plaintiff, stating that the verdict “demonstrates the
jury proceeded from a clearly erroneous basis in assessing the fair amount of compensation due
to plaintiff as a result of the subject accident.” 	An order granting plaintiff’s motion for a new
trial was entered on November 16, 2006, and defendant timely appealed.
Standard of Review
The role of a trial justice in considering a motion for a new trial is well-established.
“When ruling on a motion for a new trial, the trial justice acts as a ‘superjuror’ and ‘should
review the evidence and exercise his or her independent judgment “in passing upon the weight of
the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.”’” Seddon v. Duke, 884 A.2d 413, 413 (R.I.
2005) (mem.) (quoting Franco v. Latina, 840 A.2d 1110, 1111 (R.I. 2004)). In carrying out the
function of “superjuror,” the trial justice should adhere to the following principles:
“The trial justice may accept some or all of the evidence. 	[She]
may reject evidence that is impeached or contradicted by other
positive testimony or circumstantial evidence. 	Or [she] may
disregard 	testimony 	that 	contains 	inherent 	improbabilities 	or
contradictions or which is totally at variance with undisputed
physical facts or laws. 	[She] may also add to the evidence by
drawing proper inferences.” 	Candido v. University of Rhode
Island, 880 A.2d 853, 856 (R.I. 2005) (quoting Marcotte v.
Harrison, 443 A.2d 1225, 1232 (R.I. 1982)).
A trial justice may set aside a verdict “when [her] judgment tells [her] that it is wrong because it
fails to respond truly to the merits of the controversy and to administer substantial justice and is

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against the fair preponderance of the evidence.” Candido, 880 A.2d at 856 (quoting Barbato v.
Epstein, 97 R.I. 191, 194, 196 A.2d 836, 837 (1964)).
A trial justice may disregard an award of damages and grant a new trial thereon,
however, “only if the award shocks the conscience or indicates that the jury was influenced by
passion or prejudice or if the award demonstrates that the jury proceeded from a clearly
erroneous basis in assessing the fair amount of compensation to which a party is entitled.”
English v. Green, 787 A.2d 1146, 1150 (R.I. 2001) (quoting Dilone v. Anchor Glass Container
Corp., 755 A.2d 818, 820-21 (R.I. 2000)).
On appeal, this Court “will affirm a trial justice’s decision on a motion for a new trial as
long as the trial justice conducts the appropriate analysis, does not overlook or misconceive
material evidence, and is not otherwise clearly wrong.” Morrocco v. Piccardi, 674 A.2d 380, 382
(R.I. 1996). “[W]hen we review a trial justice’s ruling on a motion for a new trial, we afford it
‘great weight.’” Bajakian v. Erinakes, 880 A.2d 843, 851-52 (R.I. 2005) (quoting Sarkisian v.
NewPaper, Inc., 512 A.2d 831, 835 (R.I. 1986)).
Discussion
We have reviewed carefully the trial justice’s decision on the motion for a new trial, and
we conclude that she adhered to the appropriate standards and properly articulated the basis for
her findings that the jury’s verdict cannot stand based upon the testimony and evidence at trial.
Therefore, we will affirm the trial justice’s decision unless we find that she misconceived
material evidence or otherwise clearly was wrong. See Candido, 880 A.2d at 857.
The trial justice gave a thorough discussion of the evidence and witness testimony when
ruling on the motion. 	She began her analysis by stating that the jury award “shock[s] the
[conscience] of this Court and clearly demonstrates the jury proceeded from a clearly erroneous

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basis in assessing the fair amount of compensation due to plaintiff as a result of the subject
accident.” 	To support her conclusion, she offered that “[e]ven the defendant’s own expert
witness * * * opined that plaintiff suffered an injury albeit a soft tissue injury.” The trial justice
rejected the opinion of Dr. Feldmann because she “felt he was not a credible witness in this
case,” stating that he “came across as a hired gun willing to say anything favorable to the
defendant’s position.”
The trial justice found that Dr. Pizzarello was “far more credible,” and she noted that he
was critical of the treatment plaintiff initially received and, particularly, the dosage of pain
medication plaintiff was given. The trial justice also found Mr. Murray to be a credible witness
who was “pleasant and appeared sincere.” She also thought the jury should have been impressed
by his efforts to remain employed in spite of his pain. 	Significantly, the trial justice found
defendant’s testimony minimizing the impact during the accident to be “self-serving,” and she
found that the testimony “did not provide a credible, reliable basis for the jury to conclude that
plaintiff’s injuries were not caused by the accident.” 	The trial justice also referred to
photographs of plaintiff’s automobile introduced into evidence depicting significant damage,
including the apparent dislodgement of the driver’s seat from the automobile frame.
In conclusion the trial justice stated that “[w]hen the foreperson stood up and answered
the question [about the amount of damages] zero, the only persons in the room who could not
have been knocked over by a feather and whose jaws were not dropped were the jurors
themselves.” 	She 	found, 	therefore, 	that 	“[t]he 	jury 	totally 	disregarded 	the 	evidence,
misconstrued it, ignored my instructions on law. The verdict was clearly as a result of prejudice
* * * toward the plaintiff and sympathy toward the defendant.”

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After having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial justice did not
misconceive 	or 	overlook 	material 	evidence 	and 	she 	was 	not 	otherwise 	clearly 	wrong.
Accordingly, we discern no basis upon which to subvert her ruling.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the order of the Superior Court granting
Mr. Murray a new trial. 	The record may be returned to the Superior Court for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

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COVER SHEET
TITLE OF CASE: 	William J. Murray v. Jennifer A. Bromley
DOCKET SHEET NO.: 	2007-162-A
COURT:Supreme
DATE OPINION FILED: 	April 23, 2008
Appeal from
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 	SuperiorCounty: Providence
JUDGE FROM OTHER COURT: 	Judge Netti C. Vogel
JUSTICES: 	Williams, CJ., Goldberg, Flaherty, Suttell, and Robinson, JJ.
WRITTEN BY: 	Justice Paul A. Suttell, for the Court
ATTORNEYS:
For Plaintiff: 	Dennis S. Baluch, Esq.
ATTORNEYS:
For Defendant: 	Peter A. Clarkin, Esq.