Keitt v. City of Columbia

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Betty J. Keitt, Appellant,

v.

City of Columbia, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2014-000961

Appeal From Richland County
Alison Renee Lee, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-059
Heard December 8, 2015 – Filed February 17, 2016

AFFIRMED

Julius Wistar Babb, IV, and J. Lewis Cromer, both of J.
Lewis Cromer & Associates, LLC, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

W. Allen Nickles, III, of Nickles Law Firm, of Columbia,
for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Betty J. Keitt appeals the circuit court's order granting the City
of Columbia's motion for summary judgment on her claim for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy. On appeal, Keitt argues the circuit court
erred in finding (1) Keitt had an existing remedy under the South Carolina
1
Whistleblower Act and (2) a claim of wrongful termination in violation of public
policy is not available to an at-will employee when the employee has a statutory
remedy. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:

As to Issue 1: Turner v. Milliman, 392 S.C. 116, 122, 708 S.E.2d 766, 769 (2011).
("Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits,
and discovery on file show there is no genuine issue of material fact such that the
moving party must prevail as a matter of law."); McLendon v. S.C. Dep't of
Highways & Pub. Transp., 313 S.C. 525, 526 n.2, 443 S.E.2d 539, 540 n.2 (1994)
(noting "the denial of a motion to dismiss does not establish the law of the case and
the issue raised by the motion can be raised again at a later stage of the
proceedings"); Barron v. Labor Finders of S.C., 393 S.C. 609, 614, 713 S.E.2d
634, 636 (2011) ("An at-will employee may be terminated at any time for any
reason or for no reason, with or without cause."); Taghivand v. Rite Aid Corp., 411
S.C. 240, 243, 768 S.E.2d 385, 387 (2015) ("However, our adherence to the at-will
employment doctrine is not without limits."); Mason v. Mason, 412 S.C. 28, 63,
770 S.E.2d 405, 423 (Ct. App. 2015), cert. dismissed (July 31, 2015) ("Where the
retaliatory discharge of an at-will employee constitutes violation of a clear mandate
of public policy, a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge arises."); Stiles v.
Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 335 S.C. 222, 228, 516 S.E.2d 449, 452 (1999) (explaining
the public policy "exception [to the at-will employment doctrine] is not designed to
overlap an employee's statutory or contractual rights to challenge a discharge, but
rather to provide a remedy for a clear violation of public policy where no other
reasonable means of redress exists" (Toal, J., concurring)); § 8-27-20(A) ("No
public body may dismiss . . . an employee . . . because the employee files a report
with an appropriate authority of wrongdoing."); § 8-27-30(A) (providing an
employee is entitled to bring an action against his employer under the
Whistleblower Act when he is terminated within one year of reporting alleged
wrongdoing); Lawson v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 340 S.C. 346, 350, 532 S.E.2d 259,
261 (2000) ("[W]hen a statute creates a substantive right (i.e. the Whistleblower
Act) and provides a remedy for infringement of that right, the plaintiff is limited to
that statutory remedy."); id. (stating that when an employee "alleges a wrongful

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S.C. Code Ann. §§ 8-27-10 through -60 (Supp. 2015).
discharge only on the ground of his whistleblowing, he is limited to his remedy
under the Whistleblower Act").

As to Issue 2: Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613,
518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (noting an appellate court need not address an
appellant's remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive).

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, A.C.J., and WILLIAMS and THOMAS, JJ., concur.