Collins v. Collins

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT
BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Stephanie Collins, Respondent.

v.

Gary Collins, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2018-000252

Appeal From Anderson County
David E. Phillips, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-110
Heard October 13, 2020 – Filed April 7, 2021

AFFIRMED

James Calhoun Pruitt, Jr. and Joshua Brent Raffini, both
of Pruitt & Pruitt, of Anderson, for Appellant.

Samuel C. Weldon, of Greenville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this divorce action, Gary Collins (Husband) argues the family
court erred in (1) assigning a value to real property that was outside of the range of
competent testimony presented at trial and (2) ordering a lump sum payment that in
effect required him to sell assets. Additionally, he asserts the attorney's fees
awarded to Stephanie Collins (Wife) should be reviewed in light of any changes
made on appeal. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:

1. As to whether the family court erred in assigning a value to real property that
Husband contends was outside of the range of competent testimony presented at
trial: Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 386, 709 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2011) (holding the
appellate court reviews decisions of the family court de novo); id. at 385, 391, 709
S.E.2d at 651-52, 655 (noting the appellate court generally defers to the findings of
the family court regarding credibility because the family court is in a better
position to observe the witness and his or her demeanor); id. at 388-89, 709 S.E.2d
at 653-54 (stating the party contesting the family court's decision bears the burden
of demonstrating the family court's factual findings are not supported by the
preponderance of the evidence); Toler v. Toler, 292 S.C. 374, 378, 356 S.E.2d 429,
432 (Ct. App. 1987) ("In making an equitable distribution of marital property, the
family court must . . . determine the fair market value of the property . . . ."); Roe
v. Roe, 311 S.C. 471, 478, 429 S.E.2d 830, 835 (Ct. App. 1993) ("The [family]
court is given broad discretion in valuing marital property."); Abercrombie v.
Abercrombie, 372 S.C. 643, 647, 643 S.E.2d 697, 699 (Ct. App. 2007) ("[A]
property owner is competent to offer testimony as to the value of his property.");
Fields v. Fields, 342 S.C. 182, 190, 536 S.E.2d 684, 688 (Ct. App. 2000) ("The
family court . . . is free to choose between competing valuations."); Pirri v. Pirri,
369 S.C. 258, 264, 631 S.E.2d 279, 283 (Ct. App. 2006) ("In the absence of
contrary evidence, the court should accept the value the parties assign to a marital
asset." (quoting Noll v. Noll, 297 S.C. 190, 194, 375 S.E.2d 338, 340-41 (Ct. App.
1988))); Lewis, 392 S.C. at 393, 709 S.E.2d at 656 ("A family court may accept the
valuation of one party over another, and the court's valuation of marital property
will be affirmed if it is within the range of evidence presented." (quoting Pirri, 369
S.C. at 264, 631 S.E.2d at 283)); Teeter v. Teeter, 408 S.C. 485, 497, 759 S.E.2d
144, 150 (Ct. App. 2014) ("In South Carolina, marital property subject to equitable
distribution is generally valued at the divorce filing date. However, the parties
may be entitled to share in any appreciation or depreciation in marital assets
occurring after a separation but before divorce." (quoting Burch v. Burch, 395 S.C.
318, 325, 717 S.E.2d 757, 761 (2011))).

2. As to whether the family court erred in ordering a lump sum payment that
Husband contends in effect required him to sell assets: Clark v. Clark, 430 S.C.
167, 176, 843 S.E.2d 498, 503 (2020) ("[F]lexibility must exist to allow our family
court judges (and appellate courts under de novo review) discretion to fashion
equitable relief under the facts and circumstances presented." (quoting Moore v.
Moore, 414 S.C. 490, 525 n.12, 779 S.E.2d 533, 552 n.12 (2015))); id. at 176-77,
843 S.E.2d at 503 (providing our supreme court "value[s] flexibility in how the
family court apportions the parties' marital assets"); Murphy v. Murphy, 319 S.C.
324, 329, 461 S.E.2d 39, 41 (1995) ("[The family court] may use any reasonable
means to divide the property equitably . . . ."); Wilburn v. Wilburn, 403 S.C. 372,
389, 743 S.E.2d 734, 743 (2013) ("Although the order stated the lump sum
payment could be satisfied through the sale of the home, it also gave Husband the
option of paying Wife within ninety days presumably from other funds or the
liquidation of another asset. It was Husband's choice as to how to satisfy the
obligation.").

3. As to whether the attorney's fees awarded to Wife should be reviewed in light of
any changes made on appeal: Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335
S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (noting an appellate court need not
review remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive of the
appeal).

AFFIRMED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.