Rickenbaker v. Schumacher Homes of South Carolina Inc.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Marjorie Faye Rickenbaker and Steve L. Rickenbaker,
Respondents,

v.

Schumacher Homes of South Carolina, Inc., Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2019-000598

Appeal From Dorchester County
Walter H. Sanders, Jr., Special Referee

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-243
Submitted June 1, 2021 – Filed June 30, 2021

AFFIRMED

M. Dawes Cooke, Jr. and Kenneth Michael Barfield, both
of Barnwell Whaley Patterson & Helms, LLC, of
Charleston; and Anna Louise Strandberg, of Greenville,
NC, all for Appellant.

John E. Parker and William Franklin Barnes, III, both of
Peters Murdaugh Parker Eltzroth & Detrick, PA, of
Hampton, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Schumacher Homes of South Carolina, Inc. (Schumacher)
appeals the special referee's order awarding $71,249.99 in actual damages to
Marjorie Faye Rickenbaker and Steve L. Rickenbaker (collectively, the
Rickenbakers). Schumacher argues the special referee (1) lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to issue the award and (2) erred by awarding damages without
evidence to support the award amount.1 We affirm.

1. The circuit court properly issued an order of reference to a special referee
pursuant to Rule 53(b), SCRCP. See Rule 53(b) ("In an action where the parties
consent, in a default case, or an action for foreclosure, some or all of the causes of
action in a case may be referred to a master or special referee by order of a circuit
judge or the clerk of court."). We find that because Schumacher was in default, the
circuit court had the discretion to refer the issue to a master or a special referee.
Additionally, section 15-31-150 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2020) provides
that section 14-11-60 of the South Carolina Code (2017) does not preclude a circuit
court from appointing a special referee, and Rule 53(b) explicitly states that a
special referee may be appointed by order of the circuit court in default cases. See
§ 15-31-150 ("The provisions of §§ 14-2-50, 14-11-10 to 14-11-90; 14-11-310;
15-31-10 to 15-31-80; 15-39-380 to 15-39-400, and 15-39-490 shall not be
construed as preventing a circuit court from appointing a special referee in the
manner as provided in § 15-31-140.[2] . . . Special referees shall have the same
authority as masters-in-equity and shall be accountable to the appointing court.").
Thus, the special referee had subject matter jurisdiction over the hearing and the
power to conduct the hearing in the same manner as a circuit court. See Smith Cos.
of Greenville, Inc. v. Hayes, 311 S.C. 358, 360, 428 S.E.2d 900, 902 (Ct. App.
1993) ("When a case is referred to a [special referee], Rule 53(c)[, SCRCP,] gives
the [special referee] the power to conduct hearings in the same manner as the
circuit court, unless the order of reference specifies or limits his powers.").

1
In its reply brief, Schumacher argued it was improper for the circuit court to
appoint a special referee outside the county where the action was pending.
Because this issue was not raised in its initial brief, we find the issue was
abandoned. See Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 81, 557
S.E.2d 689, 691-92 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding an issue abandoned when addressed
in a conclusory manner in the initial brief).
2
Section 15-31-140 was repealed by 1985 Act. No. 100, Section 2, eff. July 1,
1985. It was replaced by Rule 53, SCRCP. See § 15-31-150, Editor's Note; 1975
South Carolina Code of Laws Unannotated, Updated through the end of the 2000
Session, South Carolina Legislature, www.scstatehouse.gov/Archives/CodeofLaws
2000/t15c031.php, last visited May 24, 2021.
2. The special referee did not err in determining the award for actual damages.
See Evatt v. Campbell, 234 S.C. 1, 11, 106 S.E.2d 447, 452 (1959) ("Where an
action at law is tried before a [s]pecial [r]eferee, . . . the findings of fact have the
same . . . effect as the verdict of a jury, unless the [special referee] has committed
some error of law leading him to an erroneous conclusion, or unless the evidence is
reasonably susceptible of the opposite conclusion only, his finding of fact must be
accepted by this [c]ourt."); Solley v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, Inc., 397 S.C. 192,
202, 723 S.E.2d 597, 602 (Ct. App. 2012) ("Questions regarding credibility and
weight of evidence are exclusively for the [special referee]."); Mazloom v.
Mazloom, 382 S.C. 307, 320, 675 S.E.2d 746, 753 (Ct. App. 2009) ("If evidence in
the record supports the award for actual damages, this [c]ourt will only review the
award for errors of law."). Marjorie Rickenbacker testified regarding the amounts
that she and her husband spent to repair the home due to mold damage and
supplied names of the companies used and estimates for portions of the home that
had yet to be repaired. Based on her testimony, we find evidence supported the
requested amount of damages and the special referee properly awarded the
Rickenbakers $71,249.99. See Jackson v. Midlands Human Res. Ctr., 296 S.C.
526, 529, 374 S.E.2d 505, 506 (Ct. App. 1988) ("In a default case, the plaintiff
must prove by competent evidence the amount of his damages, and such proof
must be by a preponderance of the evidence."); id. at 529, 374 S.E.2d at 507 ("A
judgment for money damages must be warranted by the proof of the party in whose
favor it is rendered."); Roche v. Young Bros., Inc., of Florence, 332 S.C. 75, 86,
504 S.E.2d 311, 316 (1998) ("The conduct of the trial, including the admission and
rejection of testimony, is largely within the [special referee's] sound discretion, the
exercise of which will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion
or the commission of a legal error that results in prejudice for appellant.").

AFFIRMED.3

WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and HILL, JJ., concur.

3
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.