Kristiane Shirer v. Calhoun County Assessor

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Kristiane M. Shirer, Respondent,

v.

Calhoun County Assessor, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2019-002049

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
Harold W. Funderburk, Jr., Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-330
Submitted July 27, 2022 – Filed August 10, 2022

AFFIRMED

Charles Douglas Rhodes, III, of Pope Flynn, LLC, of
Columbia; and Robert E. Tyson, Jr. and Benjamin Rogers
Gooding, both of Robinson Gray Stepp & Laffitte, LLC,
of Columbia, all for Appellant.

Bates N. Felder, of The Felder Firm, LLP, of St.
Matthews; and Andrew Carl English, III and Harry
Alwyn Dixon, both of Callison Tighe & Robinson, LLC,
of Columbia, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: The Calhoun County Assessor (the Assessor) appeals an order
from the Administrative Law Court (ALC), which found Kristiane M. Shirer was
entitled to have a second dwelling located on the same parcel as her primary
residence assessed at the reduced four percent tax assessment ratio. On appeal, the
Assessor argues the ALC erroneously interpreted section 12-43-220(c)(1) of the
South Carolina Code (Supp. 2021). We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

In 2014 or 2015, Shirer and her husband renovated a structure on the same
property as Shirer's legal residence, expanding it from a 400-square foot structure,
which contained only a kitchen and bathroom, to a structure comprising a total of
approximately 2,000 square feet that contained two bathrooms, a bedroom, "a big
open room," and a storage room. Sometime thereafter, the Assessor determined
the renovated structure was a dwelling that was subject to the six percent tax
assessment ratio. During the hearing before the ALC, Shirer testified the second
dwelling was only used by herself, her husband, and her children and
grandchildren when they visited. Additionally, her husband testified the second
dwelling had never been rented.

The relevant statute provides,

The legal residence and not more than five acres
contiguous thereto, when owned totally or in part in fee
or by life estate and occupied by the owner of the
interest, and additional dwellings located on the same
property and occupied by immediate family members of
the owner of the interest, are taxed on an assessment
equal to four percent of the fair market value of the
property.

See § 12-43-220(c)(1). It is not disputed that the renovated structure constitutes a
dwelling on the same property as the legal residence. Therefore, in order to be
afforded the four percent tax assessment, Shirer was required to establish that the
dwelling was "occupied" by her immediate family members.

Although the Assessor argues the second dwelling must be continually occupied by
one of Shirer's immediate family members, such that it is that family member's
permanent residence, we find that construction of the statute without support. The
statute merely requires the dwelling be "occupied." If the legislature had intended
additional dwellings located on the same property be continuously occupied in
order to satisfy the requirements of the four percent tax ratio, it could have required
any additional dwelling be regarded as a residence or legal residence or qualified
the term "occupied" as it did in other code sections. Compare S.C. Code Ann.
§ 12-37-220(A)(3) and (4) (2014) (providing certain real property is exempt from
ad valorem taxation but the exemption "does not extend beyond the buildings and
premises actually occupied" (emphasis added)), and S.C. Code Ann.
§ 12-43-220(c)(2)(i) (Supp. 2021) ("To qualify for the special property tax
assessment ratio allowed by this item, the owner-occupant must have actually
owned and occupied the residence as his legal residence and been domiciled at that
address for some period during the applicable tax year." (emphasis added)), and
S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-220(c)(2)(6) (2014) ("Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, a purchaser who purchases a residential property intending that
the property shall become the purchaser's primary residence, but subject to
vacation rentals as provided for in Article 2, Chapter 50, Title 27 for no longer than
ninety days, may apply for the four percent assessment ratio when the purchaser
actually occupies the property." (emphasis added)), with § 12-43-220(c)(1).

Accordingly, we hold the ALC did not err by finding Shirer was entitled to have
the second dwelling taxed at the reduced four percent tax assessment ratio. See
CFRE, LLC v. Greenville Cnty. Assessor, 395 S.C. 67, 73, 716 S.E.2d 877, 880
(2011) ("Tax appeals to the ALC are subject to the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)."); id. at 74, 716 S.E.2d at 881 (stating an appellate court reviews the ALC's
decision for errors of law); id. ("Questions of statutory interpretation are questions
of law, which [an appellate court is] free to decide without any deference to the
[ALC]."); Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) ("The
cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the
legislature."); id. ("What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the
best evidence of the legislative intent or will. Therefore, the courts are bound to
give effect to the expressed intent of the legislature." (quoting Norman J. Singer,
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.03 at 94 (5th ed. 1992))); Se.-Kusan, Inc. v.
S.C. Tax Comm'n, 276 S.C. 487, 489, 280 S.E.2d 57, 58 (1981) ("As a general rule,
tax exemption statutes are strictly construed against the taxpayer."); id. ("This rule
of strict construction simply means that constitutional and statutory language will
not be strained or liberally construed in the taxpayer's favor."); id. ("It does not
mean that [an appellate court] will search for an interpretation in [an assessor's]
favor where the plain and unambiguous language leaves no room for
construction."); id. at 489-90, 280 S.E.2d at 58 ("Only when the literal application
of a statute produces an absurd result will we consider a different meaning."); S.C.
Code Ann. § 12-43-220(c)(2)(iv) (Supp. 2021) ("[T]he burden of proof for
eligibility for the four percent assessment ratio is on the owner-occupant . . . .").
AFFIRMED. 1

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and HEWITT, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.