In The Interest of Zakei H.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR
RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2),
SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

In The Interest
of Zakei H., A Juvenile Under The Age of Seventeen, Appellant.

Appeal From Charleston County

Judy L. McMahon, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-580

Submitted December 1, 2011 – Filed
December 20, 2011   

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender M. Celia Robinson, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W.
Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Mark R. Farthing, all of Columbia; and
Solicitor Scarlett A. Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Zakei H. appeals the family court's
order imposing restitution in the amount of $587.00 as a condition of his
probation resulting from his delinquency adjudication arising from his
admission of possession of stolen property.  Zakei H. was arrested and
ultimately adjudicated delinquent after being found in possession of a damaged
moped that had been stolen the previous day.  Zakei H. argues the family court
erred in (1) imposing restitution as a condition of his probation, (2)
admitting a repair estimate submitted by the victim for his damaged moped, and
(3) ordering restitution in the amount of $587.00.  We affirm[1] pursuant to
Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: 

1.  As to whether the family court
erred in imposing restitution as a condition of Zakei H.'s probation based upon
his conviction of possession of stolen property:  S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-7805(A)(3) (current version at S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-1410(A)(3) (2010)) (providing for the imposition of
restitution as a condition of probation in juvenile delinquency cases); In re Terrence M., 368 S.C. 276, 277, 628 S.E.2d 295, 296 (Ct. App. 2006) (imposing
restitution as a condition of probation in a possession of stolen property case
involving a juvenile).

2.  As to whether the family court erred in
admitting a repair estimate proffered by the victim substantiating the amount
of damage done to the stolen moped:  State v. Gulledge, 326 S.C. 220,
228, 487 S.E.2d 590, 594 (1997) (stating that in determining the appropriate
amount of restitution, evidentiary rules do not apply, and the "court may
conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of
information it may consider or the source from which the information may come,
to assist it in determining the amount of restitution to be imposed"); id. at 229, 487 S.E.2d at 594 (noting that although evidentiary rules do not apply
to sentencing hearings, "the admissibility of evidence is limited by
constitutional provisions which require the evidence to be relevant, reliable
and trustworthy"); Rule 1101(d)(3), SCRE (stating the rules of evidence do
not apply to "dispositional hearings in juvenile delinquency
matters"). 

3.  As to whether the family court erred in
ordering restitution in the amount of $587.00:  Gulledge, 326 S.C. at
228, 487 S.E.2d at 594 ("The restitution hearing is part of the sentencing
proceeding.");  Brooks v. State, 325 S.C. 269, 271, 481 S.E.2d 712,
713 (1997) ("A [sentencing court] is allowed broad discretion in
sentencing within statutory limits.");  In re M.B.H., 387 S.C. 323,
326, 692 S.E.2d 541, 542 (2010) ("A sentence will not be overturned absent
an abuse of discretion when the ruling is based on an error of law or a factual
conclusion without evidentiary support."); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-7805(A)(3)
(current version at S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-1410(A)(3) (2010)) (requiring the
family court when "considering the appropriate amount of monetary
restitution to be ordered" to "establish the monetary loss suffered
by the victim and then weigh and consider this amount against the number of
individuals involved in causing the monetary loss, the child's particular role
in causing this loss, and the child's ability to pay the amount over a
reasonable period of time"). 

AFFIRMED.

SHORT,
WILLIAMS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.