In the Matter of: Estate of Florence Petrak Mensch

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD
NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

In the Matter of: Estate of Florence Petrak Mensch

Sterling Raymond Mensch III, individually, as former
Personal Representative of the Estate of Florence Petrak
Mensch and in the former capacity as Agent under a
Power of Attorney for Florence Petrak Mensch,
Appellant,

v.

Shauna M. Waddell, individually and as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Florence Petrak Mensch
and John R. Mensch, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000731

Appeal From Greenville County
Alex Kinlaw, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-384
Heard September 24, 2024 – Filed November 13, 2024

AFFIRMED

Devon Marc Puriefoy, of Truluck Thomason, LLC, of
Greenville, for Appellant.
Knox L. Haynsworth III and Tyler Earl McLeod, both of
Brown Massey Evans McLeod & Haynsworth, LLC, of
Greenville, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: In this probate matter, Sterling Raymond Mensch III, (Sterling),
son of Florence Petrak Mensch and the agent designated in her power of attorney,
appeals the circuit court's order dismissing his appeal as untimely. He also asserts
the probate court's order was not a final order which would deprive the circuit
court of appellate jurisdiction and argues the probate court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the case. We affirm.

As to Sterling's argument the circuit court erred in finding the probate court's order
constituted a final order, we affirm. While the order allowed for adjustment of the
amount of taxes Sterling owed based on a pending appeal to the Internal Revenue
Service, it adjudicated and completely fixed the rights of the parties leaving
nothing further for the probate court to do. See Olson v. Fac. House of Carolina,
Inc., 344 S.C. 194, 213, 544 S.E.2d 38, 48 (Ct. App. 2001) ("Any judgment or
decree, leaving some further act to be done by the court before the rights of the
parties are determined, is interlocutory; but if it so completely fixes the rights of the
parties that the court has nothing further to do in the action, then it is final."
(quoting Adickes v. Allison & Bratton, 21 S.C. 245, 259 (1883) (emphasis added);
Watson v. Underwood, 407 S.C. 443, 458-59, 756 S.E.2d 155, 163 (Ct. App. 2014)
("[A] decree or judgment that leaves in doubt whether the plaintiff will prevail is
not final."); Good v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 201 S.C. 32, 21 S.E.2d 209, 212
(1942) ("[I]t has been laid down that in substance the decision must show
intrinsically and distinctly, and not inferentially, that the matters in the record have
been determined in favor of one of the litigants, or that the rights of the parties in
litigation have been adjudicated." (quoting 2 R.C.L. 32, Appeal and Error § 10)).
As to Sterling's argument the circuit court erred in finding his appeal untimely
because his motion for reconsideration violated Rule 7(b)(1), SCRCP, we affirm.
The lack of specificity in the motion and the absence of other written or oral
argument of counsel did not allow the probate court to "deal with the motion
fairly." Because the motion was properly dismissed, it failed to stay the time to
appeal. See S.C. Code Ann. § 62-1-308(a) (2022) (stating the notice of intent to
appeal a probate court order must be filed within ten days); Rule 59(f), SCRCP
(indicating "[t]he time for appeal for all parties shall be stayed by a timely motion
under this Rule"); Rule 7(b)(1), SCRCP ("An application to the court for an order
shall be by motion . . . shall be made in writing, shall state with particularity the
grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought.") (emphasis added);
Camp v. Camp, 386 S.C. 571, 576 S.E.2d 634, 637 (2010) (finding appellant's
motion for reconsideration did not violate Rule 7(b)(1) because "[t]he trial court's
order denying Father's motion for reconsideration stated that [b]ased on the
arguments of counsel the motion was denied," therefore, "neither party was
prejudiced, and the court dealt with the motion fairly.") (internal quotations
omitted); Nexstar Media Grp., Inc. v. Davis Roofing Grp., LLC, 431 S.C. 593, 601
848 S.E.2d 597, 601 (Ct. App. 2020) (finding the master-in-equity was "in a
position to understand [the appellant's] motion [to reconsider] . . . fairly" after a
hearing on the motion); Operation of the Trial Courts During the Coronavirus
Emergency, S.C. Sup. Ct. Order dated June 15, 2021, (c)(4)(d) (recognizing that
although hearings on motions were generally conducted, if, during the coronavirus
emergency "a judge determine[d] that the motion [wa]s without merit, the motion
[could] be denied without waiting for any return or other response from the
opposing party or parties").
Finally, as to Sterling's argument the probate court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to the hear the causes of action in the case related to pre-death
damages, we affirm. Claims against an agent to whom authority is designated
through a power of attorney are within the probate court's subject matter
jurisdiction. See S.C. Code Ann. § 62-8-401 (Supp. 2018) ("The probate court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts of this State over all subject matter
related to the creation, exercise, construction, and termination of powers of
attorney governed by the provisions of this article."); S.C. Code Ann. § 62-8-
116(a)(4)(5)(6) (2022) ("The following persons may petition a court to construe a
power of attorney or review the agent's conduct, and grant appropriate relief: . . .
(4) the principal's spouse, parent, or adult descendant; (5) an individual who would
qualify as a presumptive heir of the principal; [and] (6) a person named as a
beneficiary to receive any property, benefit, or contractual right on the principal's
death . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 62-8-117 (2022) ("An agent that violates this
article is liable to the principal or the principal's successors in interest for the
amount required to: (1) restore the value of the principal's property to what it
would have been had the violation not occurred; and (2) reimburse the principal or
the principal's successors in interest for the attorney's fees and costs paid on the
agent's behalf.").

AFFIRMED.

KONDUROS, GEATHERS, AND MCDONALD, JJ., concur.