Joshua E. Long v. Jennifer A. Boutelle

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Joshua Edward Long and Adrian Feliciano Long,
Respondents,

v.

Jennifer Ann Boutelle, Appellant.

In the interest of a minor under the age of eighteen.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000657

Appeal From Dorchester County
Randall E. McGee, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-425
Submitted December 12, 2024 – Filed December 30, 2024

AFFIRMED

Jennifer Lynn Mook, of Law Office of Jennifer Mook,
LLC, of Aiken, for Appellant.

Paul William Bradley, of Bradley Law Firm, LLC, of
Charleston, for Respondents.

Kathleen Elisabeth Hoover, of Moncks Corner, as the
Guardian ad Litem.
PER CURIAM: Jennifer Ann Boutelle (Mother) appeals the family court's
termination of her parental rights to her minor child (Child) and grant of adoption
by Adrian Long, Child's stepmother (Stepmother). On appeal, Mother argues the
family court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence showed she willfully
failed to support and visit Child and termination of parental rights (TPR) was in
Child's best interest. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

On appeal from the family court, this court reviews factual and legal issues de
novo. Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011).
Although this court reviews the family court's findings de novo, we are not
required to ignore the fact that the family court, which saw and heard the
witnesses, was in a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign
comparative weight to their testimony. Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 385, 709
S.E.2d 650, 651-52 (2011).

We hold clear and convincing evidence shows Mother willfully failed to support
Child. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2570(4) (Supp. 2024) (stating a statutory
ground for TPR is met when "[t]he child has lived outside the home of either
parent for a period of six months, and during that time the parent has wil[l]fully
failed to support the child"); id. ("Failure to support means that the parent has
failed to make a material contribution to the child's care. A material contribution
consists of either financial contributions according to the parent's means or
contributions of food, clothing, shelter, or other necessities for the care of the child
according to the parent's means."). We acknowledge Mother testified she had
purchased gifts for Child, and she had sent child support payments to Father that
she asserted were cashed late, if they were cashed at all. However, Father believed
he had received only approximately $200 from Mother and last received a payment
in March 2017. Father also testified Mother was $7,075 in arrears, and even
though she may not have explicitly agreed to the amount, Mother indicated she
was in arrears. Further, although there was a dispute regarding the accuracy of the
address Father provided to Mother for sending child support payments, Mother
testified she had never had an issue sending payments to the address he gave her
and none of her payments had been returned to her. Moreover, despite having a
limited income, we hold Mother had the ability to pay child support because she
indicated it was not difficult to support two of her other children on her limited
income, and she was able to pay $100 per month in child support if the court did
not terminate her rights along with an additional $25 towards the arrearages. See
S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Wilson, 344 S.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 580, 582 (Ct.
App. 2001) ("[T]he element of wil[l]fulness must be established by clear and
convincing evidence."); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Parker, 336 S.C. 248, 256, 519
S.E.2d 351, 355 (Ct. App. 1999) ("A parent's conduct which evinces a settled
purpose to forego parental duties may fairly be characterized as 'willful' because it
manifests a conscious indifference to the rights of the child to receive support and
consortium from the parent."). Accordingly, we hold clear and convincing
evidence supports this ground. 1

We also hold TPR and adoption is in Child's best interest. See S.C. Dep't of Soc.
Servs. v. Smith, 343 S.C. 129, 133, 538 S.E.2d 285, 287 (Ct. App. 2000) ("In a
[TPR] case, the best interests of the children are the paramount consideration.");
S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2620 (2010) ("The interests of the child shall prevail if the
child's interest and the parental rights conflict."); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2510
(2010) ("The purpose of [the TPR statute] is to establish procedures for the
reasonable and compassionate [TPR] where children are abused, neglected, or
abandoned in order to protect the health and welfare of these children and make
them eligible for adoption . . . ."). We acknowledge the record shows Father
prevented Mother from exercising her video call visitation, despite her repeated
attempts at exercising it, and Mother testified she attended therapy sessions,
unsuccessfully requested her attorney to change the erroneous requirement for her
to submit to an evaluation at the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC),
and completed an evaluation with another provider. However, Mother had not
seen Child in person for several years at the time of the TPR hearing, and Mother
and Child had some difficulties during video calls when they were permitted.
Further, Mother had approximately four years to complete the court-ordered
evaluation at MUSC and admittedly failed to do so. She also failed to seek to
change the location requirement in the order and did not attempt to gain in-person
visitation with Child or recourse for Father's prevention of video call visitation.
Moreover, the record shows Child and Stepmother have a strong bond, Child refers
to her as her mother, and Child and Stepmother desire a parent-child relationship.
Formalizing Child and Stepmother's relationship will enhance Child's stability and
permanency, which we hold is in Child's best interest. Finally, we hold that
although there is evidence the guardian ad litem sought restraints against Mother in
a previous action, there is no evidence she was biased against Mother in this

1
Because clear and convincing evidence supports one statutory ground for TPR,
we decline to address whether clear and convincing evidence supports the
remaining statutory ground. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Headden, 354 S.C.
602, 613, 582 S.E.2d 419, 425 (2003) (declining to address a statutory ground for
TPR after finding clear and convincing evidence supported another statutory
ground).
action, as she did not seek restraints in this case, she spoke to Mother to ensure she
was aware of this case, and Mother did not seek to have her removed. Based on
the foregoing, we hold TPR and adoption is in Child's best interest.

AFFIRMED. 2

WILLIAMS, C.J., and MCDONALD and TURNER, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.