Troy Wilson v. Carolina Custom Painting and Drywall, LLC

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Troy Wilson, Appellant,

v.

Carolina Custom Painting & Drywall, LLC and Jamie
Singleton, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2021-000266

Appeal From Charleston County
Jennifer B. McCoy, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-356
Heard September 11, 2025 – Filed October 22, 2025

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART

Joshua Thomas Mangan, of Moncks Corner, and David
Alan Nauheim, of Charleston, for Appellant.

Harold Alan Oberman, of Oberman & Oberman, of
Charleston, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: This case arose from a dispute regarding unpaid wages brought by
Appellant Troy Wilson against Respondents Carolina Custom Painting and Drywall,
LLC and Jamie Singleton (collectively, Employer). Wilson appeals the circuit
court's order affirming the magistrate court, arguing the magistrate court erred by
failing to award Wilson treble damages and attorney's fees under the Payment of
Wages Act (the Act)1 and by finding for Employer on its counterclaims. We affirm
in part and reverse in part.

I. Treble Damages and Attorney's Fees

The magistrate court awarded Wilson $432 for unpaid wages under the Act
but declined to award treble damages or attorney's fees. The circuit court affirmed,
and we affirm the circuit court.

The Act applies to all employees in South Carolina. See S.C. § 41-10-20. The
Act, however, does not apply to independent contractors. See Adamson v. Marianne
Fabrics, Inc., 301 S.C. 204, 206–07, 391 S.E.2d 249, 250 (1990) ("The [Act]
governs payment of employee wages whether earned 'on a time, task, piece or
commission basis.' It does not, however, embrace the earnings of independent
contractors."). The Act provides, "In case of any failure to pay wages due to an
employee as required by [the Act,] the employee may recover in a civil action an
amount equal to three times the full amount of the unpaid wages, plus costs and
reasonable attorney's fees as the court may allow." § 41-10-80(C). Whether to
award treble damages is within the trial court's discretion. See Rice v. Multimedia,
Inc., 318 S.C. 95, 99–100, 456 S.E.2d 381, 384 (1995). "An award of treble damages
and attorney's fees is appropriate only when 'there [i]s no good faith wage dispute'
because 'an employer should not be penalized . . . for failure to pay wages upon
assertion of a valid defense to payment.''' Goodwyn v. Shadowstone Media, Inc., 408
S.C. 93, 98, 757 S.E.2d 560, 563 (Ct. App. 2014) (alterations in original) (quoting
Rice, 318 S.C. at 99, 456 S.E.2d at 383). "Thus, the trial court must determine
whether 'a bona fide dispute' exists as to an employee's entitlement to wages before
awarding treble damages or attorney's fees." Id. (quoting Temple v. Tec-Fab, Inc.,
381 S.C. 597, 600–01, 675 S.E.2d 414, 415–16 (2009)). Our supreme court has
noted the purpose of treble damages under the Act is to punish employers who force
employees into the court to litigate unreasonable or bad faith wage disputes, rather
than to deter the litigation of reasonable wage disputes. See Rice, 318 S.C. at 99,
456 S.E.2d at 383 ("[T]he employer is protected from penalties if there is a good
faith dispute over wages allegedly due.").

Here, Employer informed Wilson it would be reducing his paycheck from $18
per hour to $15 per hour after discovering peeling paint on a wall at a jobsite that
had not been sanded properly. Wilson claimed he had not been at this jobsite when

1
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 41-10-10 to -100 (2021).
the walls were sanded, but Employer considered him responsible as the supervisor
or foreman of the jobsite. Employer considered Wilson to be an independent
contractor, and Employer's regular practice was to deduct the cost of defective or
damaged work from the responsible worker's paycheck. Wilson chose to resign, and
Employer withheld his final paycheck. Wilson filed the present action in small
claims court, alleging he was entitled to his unpaid wages as well as treble damages
and attorney's fees under the Act.2 The magistrate court determined there was a bona
fide dispute because (1) Employer withheld wages from Wilson because of defective
work; (2) the withholding aligned with Employer's written policies and procedures;
and (3) Employer had deducted the cost of defective work from Wilson's paycheck
in the past without issue.

We hold the circuit court did not err in affirming the magistrate court's finding
that Employer withheld wages in good faith because Employer believed at the time
it withheld money from Wilson's paycheck that Wilson was an independent
contractor to whom the Act does not apply. 3 See Adamson, 301 S.C. at 206–07, 391

2
Prior to filing the present action, as required by statute, Wilson filed a claim for
unpaid wages with the South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing and
Regulation (LLR) seeking $432 for twenty-four unpaid hours at a rate of $18 per
hour. While investigating Wilson's claim, LLR determined that Employer and
Wilson had an employer-employee relationship and that Wilson had been
mischaracterized as an independent contractor. At the conclusion of its
investigation, LLR cited Employer for five violations of section 41-10-30(A) of the
Act, including failure to give notice of the normal hours, wages, time of payment,
place of payment, and deductions from wages. Additionally, LLR issued Employer
a $100 citation for violating section 41-10-40(D) of the Act by failing to pay Wilson
on the scheduled pay date. Employer subsequently provided LLR with a copy of a
money order payable to Wilson for $432, and LLR found Wilson was paid in full
but paid late. Wilson filed the present action months after Employer mailed the
money order and three months after LLR completed its investigation. At that point,
Wilson had not received the $432. At trial, Singleton (on behalf of Employer)
testified he was "persuaded by [LLR's] inquiry" to pay Wilson and was "willing to
pay the $432[] in unpaid wages." Employer had sent Wilson the money order via
certified mail but made no further effort to pay him. Wilson testified his children
probably mishandled his notice of certified mail.
3
Further, we find it relevant that Employer attempted to pay Wilson his unpaid
wages following the LLR investigation. While we acknowledge that Wilson had yet
to be paid when he initiated this action, this appears to be by his choice—or at least
not because of Employer's actions—given that Employer sent payment to Wilson
S.E.2d at 250 ("The [Act] governs payment of employee wages whether earned 'on
a time, task, piece or commission basis.' It does not, however, embrace the earnings
of independent contractors."); Mathis v. Brown & Brown of S.C., Inc., 389 S.C. 299,
316, 698 S.E.2d 773, 782 (2010) ("[T]he relevant date for determining whether the
employer reasonably withheld wages is the time at which the wages were withheld,
i.e., when the employer allegedly violated the Act."); see Goodwyn, 408 S.C. at 98,
757 S.E.2d at 563 (noting "this court can take its own view of the facts" when
reviewing the award or denial of treble damages (quoting Ross v. Ligand Pharm.,
Inc., 371 S.C. 464, 471, 639 S.E.2d 460, 464 (Ct. App. 2006))).

Thus, we hold a bona fide dispute existed, and as such, the magistrate court
did not abuse its discretion by denying Wilson treble damages and attorney's fees.
For this reason, we hold the circuit court did not err in affirming the magistrate
court's award of $432 to Wilson for unpaid wages and affirm this award. See O'Neal
v. Intermedical Hosp. of S.C., 355 S.C. 499, 509, 585 S.E.2d 526, 531–32 (Ct. App.
2003) ("[A] finding that an employee is entitled to recover unpaid wages is not
equivalent to a finding that there existed no bona fide dispute as to the employee's
entitlement to those wages."); id. at 510, 585 S.E.2d at 532 ("[T]he propriety of treble
damages under the Wage Payment Act turns not on whether an employer is
successful in defending against a suit for nonpayment of wages[] but whether there
existed a bona fide dispute concerning payment of the wages."); A & I, Inc. v. Gore,
366 S.C. 233, 239, 621 S.E.2d 383, 386 (Ct. App. 2005) ("Where the circuit court
has affirmed the magistrate court decision, this court looks to whether the circuit
court order is 'controlled by an error of law or is unsupported by the facts.' (quoting
Parks v. Characters Night Club, 345 S.C. 484, 490, 548 S.E.2d 605, 608 (Ct. App.
2001))); Parks, 345 S.C. at 490, 548 S.E.2d at 608 ("[This court] will presume that
an affirmance by a [c]ircuit [c]ourt of a magistrate's judgment was made upon the
merits where the testimony is sufficient to sustain the magistrate's judgment and
there are no facts that show the affirmance was influenced by an error of law.").

II. Counterclaims

In response to Wilson's complaint in small claims court, Employer filed an
answer and by way of setoff and counterclaims, alleged that Wilson owed Employer

via certified mail and Wilson testified his children "probably" mishandled the notice
of certified mail. Given these facts, we would hesitate to hold Employer forced
Wilson into the court to litigate this wage dispute. See Rice, 318 S.C. at 99, 456
S.E.2d at 383.
in excess of $3,800 under a "contractual arrangement" with Employer and by their
prior course of dealings. Employer asserted Wilson "was responsible for all
materials and labor of any faulty work he performed that was discovered during
inspection" and that he performed faulty work on numerous jobs. The magistrate
court found Employer's counterclaims were "persuasive and proven" and awarded
Employer $3,982, and the circuit court affirmed. We hold the facts do not support
the counterclaims and reverse the award. See Gore, 366 S.C. at 239, 621 S.E.2d at
386 ("Where the circuit court has affirmed the magistrate court decision, this court
looks to whether the circuit court order is 'controlled by an error of law or is
unsupported by the facts.'" (quoting Parks, 345 S.C. at 490, 548 S.E.2d at 608)).

We hold the record lacks sufficient evidence of a contractual agreement
between Wilson and Employer wherein Wilson agreed to be financially liable for
defective work. Employer cannot bring a counterclaim against a statutory employee
for damages under a breach of contract theory based on an unsigned "policies and
procedures document" that expressly applied to independent contractors. The
magistrate court found Wilson was an employee, not an independent contractor, and
Employer did not challenge this finding. Thus, we hold the circuit court erred in
affirming the magistrate court's finding on Employer's counterclaims because the
evidence is insufficient to sustain the magistrate court's order, and we reverse on this
issue. See Parks, 345 S.C. at 490, 548 S.E.2d at 608 ("[This court] will presume that
an affirmance by a [c]ircuit [c]ourt of a magistrate's judgment was made upon the
merits where the testimony is sufficient to sustain the magistrate's judgment and
there are no facts that show the affirmance was influenced by an error of law.").

In sum, we affirm the award of $432 to Wilson for unpaid wages, but we
reverse the award of $3,982 to Employer for its counterclaims.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.

KONDUROS, GEATHERS, and VINSON, JJ., concur.