Dean A. Arender v. Kent H. Oliver

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Jerry Cozby, Plaintiff,

vs.

Kent Huntley Oliver, Thompson Construction Group,
Inc., Curtis Ouellette, and Quality Haulers, Inc.,
Defendants,

of which Kent Huntley Oliver and Thompson
Construction Group, Inc., are Respondents.

AND

Dean Alan Arender and Tamala Arender, Appellants,

vs.

Kent Huntley Oliver, Thompson Construction Group,
Inc., Curtis Kent Ouellette, and DMX Transportation
Services, Inc., Defendants,

of which Kent Huntley Oliver and Thompson
Construction Group, Inc. are Respondents.

AND

Kent Huntley Oliver, Respondent,

vs.

Curtis Kent Ouellette, Quality Haulers, Inc., Dean Alan
Arender, US XPRESS Leasing, Inc., and US XPRESS,
Inc., Defendants,

of which Dean Alan Arender, US XPRESS Leasing, Inc.,
and US XPRESS, Inc., are Appellants.
Appellate Case No. 2024-000742

Appeal From Newberry County
Appeal From Sumter County
R. Kirk Griffin, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 6134
Submitted November 3, 2025 – Filed February 4, 2026

DISMISSED

Mark Steven Barrow and Marshall Collin Crane, both of
Sweeny Wingate & Barrow, PA, of Columbia, for
Appellants Dean A. Arender, US XPRESS Leasing, Inc.,
and US XPRESS, Inc.

James David George, Jr. and Jacob Born, both of
Columbia, for Appellants Dean A. Arender and Tamala
Arender.

G. Murrell Smith, Jr., of Smith Robinson Holler DuBose
Morgan, LLC, of Sumter, Frederick Newman Hanna, Jr.,
of Smith Robinson Holler DuBose Morgan, LLC, of
Columbia, Carl Everette Pierce, II, and Daniel Francis
Lynch, IV, both of Pierce, Sloan, Wilson, Kennedy &
Early, LLC, of Charleston, all for Respondents Kent H.
Oliver and Thompson Construction Group, Inc.

Justin Joaquin Arenas, of Derrick Law Firm, of Conway,
and Joseph V. Camerlengo and Jessica L. Lanifer, both
of Jacksonville, FL, all for Respondent Kent H. Oliver.
THOMAS, J.: Dean Alan Arender, Tamala Arender, US XPRESS Leasing, Inc.,
and US XPRESS, Inc. (Appellants) appeal the circuit court's order granting a
motion for permissive joinder and consolidation filed by Kent Huntley Oliver and
Thompson Construction Group, Inc. (Respondents). We dismiss the appeal as
interlocutory and not immediately appealable.

Four individuals were involved in a multi-vehicle car accident that occurred on
Interstate 26 in Newberry County, and three lawsuits were filed—one in Sumter
County and two in Newberry County.1 Respondents moved to join and consolidate
the two Newberry County actions with the Sumter County action. By order filed
February 13, 2024, the court found the requirements of Rule 20(a) of the South
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure regarding permissive joinder were satisfied.
Thus, the court granted the motion and denied Appellants' motions to reconsider.
This appeal follows.

"An appeal ordinarily may be pursued only after a party has obtained a final
judgment." Hagood v. Sommerville, 362 S.C. 191, 194, 607 S.E.2d 707, 708
(2005). "[A]n appellate court should look to the effect of an interlocutory order to
determine its appealability." Thornton v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Corp., 391 S.C. 297,
304, 705 S.E.2d 475, 479 (Ct. App. 2011). "The right of appeal arises from and is
controlled by statutory law." Hagood, 362 S.C. at 194, 607 S.E.2d at 708. "The
determination of whether a party may immediately appeal an order issued before or
during trial is governed primarily by" section 14-3-330 of the South Carolina
Code. Id. at 195, 607 S.E.2d at 708. Under section 14-3-330, this court reviews on
appeal:

(1) Any intermediate judgment, order or decree in a law
case involving the merits in actions commenced in the
court of common pleas and general sessions, brought
there by original process or removed there from any
inferior court or jurisdiction, and final judgments in such
actions; provided, that if no appeal be taken until final
judgment is entered the court may upon appeal from such
final judgment review any intermediate order or decree
necessarily affecting the judgment not before appealed
from;

1
A fourth action was filed with the Newberry County Arbitration Panel and is not
at issue here.
(2) An order affecting a substantial right made in an
action when such order (a) in effect determines the action
and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be
taken or discontinues the action, (b) grants or refuses a
new trial or (c) strikes out an answer or any part thereof
or any pleading in any action;
(3) A final order affecting a substantial right made in any
special proceeding or upon a summary application in any
action after judgment; and
(4) An interlocutory order or decree in a court of
common pleas granting, continuing, modifying, or
refusing an injunction or granting, continuing, modifying,
or refusing the appointment of a receiver.

S.C. Code Ann. § 14-3-330 (2017) (emphases added).

We first note the order on appeal does not relate to an injunction or appointment of
a receiver. See § 14-3-330(4). It is not a final order made in any special
proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment. See § 14-
3-330(3). Thus, to be immediately appealable under the statute, it must either
involve the merits to meet section 14-3-330(1) or affect a substantial right and "in
effect determine[] the action and prevent[] a judgment from which an appeal might
be taken or discontinue[] the action" under section 14-3-330(2)(a). 2

Involving the Merits

Appellants argue the order is appealable because it involves the merits under
section 14-3-330(1). We disagree.

In reliance on their argument, Appellants cite Wosepka v. Dukart, 160 N.W.2d 217
(N.D. 1968). The court in Wosepka recognized the "general proposition that orders
permitting or refusing the joinder of additional parties are not appealable, but are
reviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Id. at 218 (quoting 16 A.L.R.2d
1023, 1027 (1951)). 3 However, the court held that an order requiring a plaintiff to

2
The order does not grant or refuse a new trial or strike an answer or pleading;
thus, it does not meet subsections (b) or (c) of section 14-3-330(2).
3
16 A.L.R.2d 1023, § 3(a) (1951) now reads: "[I]t is generally held that an order
requiring, or permitting, or refusing to permit, the joinder of additional parties is
not appealable, since it is interlocutory and not final in nature."
make his son a party defendant was immediately appealable because it involved
the merits. Wosepka, 160 N.W.2d at 219. The North Dakota Supreme Court has
since called into doubt the Wosepka decision, stating "Wosepka was decided
almost thirty years ago. Since that time, the finality doctrine, limiting the
appealability of interlocutory issues, has been further developed in North Dakota.
The prevailing rule under this doctrine is that most orders which are not final
judgments are not appealable." Belden v. Hambleton, 554 N.W.2d 458, 460 (N.D.
1996). The court in Belden noted that Wosepka involved a plaintiff being forced to
sue a defendant against his wishes; thus, it did not need to decide if it was still
good law. Id. at 461. In this case, the plaintiffs are not being forced to sue any
defendants against their wishes; rather, Appellants are all already parties.4 We do
not find Wosepka persuasive. Rather, we find the order on appeal does not involve
the merits of this action, which generally involve allegations of negligence.

Substantial Right

Appellants argue the order granting permissive joinder is immediately appealable
under section 14-3-330(2)(a) because it affects a substantial right and determines
the action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal may be taken. We
disagree.

Appellants rely on the South Carolina Supreme Court decisions in Morrow v.
Fundamental Long-Term Care Holdings, LLC 5 and Neeltec Enterprises, Inc. v.
Long 6, both of which we find distinguishable. In Morrow, our supreme court
found that an order bifurcating a trial by requiring a plaintiff to first be successful
in its claim against a nursing home before proceeding against the nursing home's
corporate entity was immediately appealable because the plaintiffs had direct
liability claims against the corporate entity rather than solely vicarious liability
claims. 412 S.C. at 539, 773 S.E.2d at 146 (finding by considering the plaintiffs'
claims as merely vicarious, the order on appeal essentially granted summary
judgment to the corporate entity on the plaintiffs' direct liability claims and
deprived the plaintiffs of bringing their action against the defendant of their
choosing). In Neeltec, our supreme court held an order requiring a plaintiff to
substitute two corporations as defendants in lieu of the individual the plaintiff
originally named in the complaint was immediately appealable because it

4
We address Appellants' argument that they are being forced to sue their
employers against their wishes below.
5
412 S.C. 534, 773 S.E.2d 144 (2015).
6
397 S.C. 563, 725 S.E.2d 926 (2012).
"effectively discontinue[d] [the plaintiff's] suit against [the individual], thus
bringing the order under [section 14-3-330(2)(a)]." 397 S.C. at 566, 725 S.E.2d at
928.

We have found no published opinion in South Carolina reviewing the appealability
of an order granting permissive joinder.7 Furthermore, we find no guidance from
Morrow and Neeltec because the effect of those orders was to deprive the plaintiffs
of the ability to maintain their lawsuits against certain defendants. Accordingly,
we look to the effect of the order on appeal before us. See Morrow, 412 S.C. at
538, 773 S.E.2d at 146 ("[T]he question of whether an order is immediately
appealable is determined on a case-by-case basis."); Thornton, 391 S.C. at 304, 705
S.E.2d at 479 ("[A]n appellate court should look to the effect of an interlocutory
order to determine its appealability . . . ."); State v. Wilson, 387 S.C. 597, 601, 693
S.E.2d 923, 925 (2010) ("The provisions of section 14-3-330 . . . have been
narrowly construed, and the immediate appeal of orders issued before or during
trial generally has not been permitted."). We find the effect of this order is akin to
adding parties to litigation or granting a motion to change venue, neither of which
impacts a substantial right or determines the action and prevents a judgment from
which an appeal may be taken under section 14-3-330(2)(a). See Duncan v. Gov't
Emps. Ins. Co., 331 S.C. 484, 485, 449 S.E.2d 580, 580 (1994) (concluding neither
making a third party a defendant nor granting a request to intervene is immediately
appealable); Wallace K. Lightsey, 15 S.C. Jur. Appeal and Error § 23(a) (Dec.
2025 Update) ("An order joining a party as an additional defendant in an action is
not directly appealable."); id. at § 21(c) ("An order granting or refusing a motion
for change of venue is interlocutory and not immediately appealable."). We find
the order is not immediately appealable under section 14-3-330(2)(a). See Acevedo
v. Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc., 600 F.3d 516, 520 (5th Cir. 2010)
("Ordinarily orders granting or denying joinder or substitution are not final."
(quoting 15B Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Edward H. Cooper, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 3914.18 (2d ed. 2002))); id. (alteration in original)
("Such orders are usually not final because under Rule 21 '[m]isjoinder of parties is
not a ground for dismissing an action.'" (quoting Rule 21, Fed. R. Civ. P.)).

Other Appealability Arguments

7
We note that orders denying joinder are generally not immediately appealable.
See Marshall v. Winter, 250 S.C. 308, 312, 157 S.E.2d 595, 596–97 (1967)
(finding an order denying a motion to bring in additional parties was unappealable
prior to final judgment).
Appellants also argue the order is appealable as violating its substantial right to a
particular mode of trial—a workers' compensation action—by requiring employees
to pursue tort actions against their employers. See Flagstar Corp. v. Royal Surplus
Lines, 341 S.C. 68, 72, 533 S.E.2d 331, 333 (2000) ("Pursuant to § 14-3-330(2),
this Court has held on numerous occasions that when a trial court's order deprives a
party of a mode of trial to which it is entitled as a matter of right, such order is
immediately appealable. . . . Failure to immediately appeal such an order forever
bars appellate review."). In reviewing the order on appeal before us, we find no
creation of any new claims nor any requirement for an employee to maintain tort
actions against an employer. Trying the cases together would not require the
employee-plaintiffs to add claims against their employers, who are defendants for
other drivers involved in the accident. We find no merit to this argument. See
Rule 20(a), SCRCP (governing permissive joinder and stating, "[a] plaintiff or
defendant need not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief
demanded").

Finally, Appellants argue the order is immediately appealable under Simon v.
Strock, 209 S.C. 134, 140, 39 S.E.2d 209, 211 (1946), in which our supreme court
reversed the trial court's order allowing defendants to join the action. However, the
court in Simon did not discuss the appealability of the order on appeal. "The fact
that an appellate court may have decided an appeal of a particular type of order on
the merits is not dispositive of whether the order is appealable when the issue of
appealability was not raised." Breland v. Love Chevrolet Olds, Inc., 339 S.C. 89,
95, 529 S.E.2d 11, 14 (2000).

Here, appealability is determined by section 14-3-330, and we find the order on
appeal does not meet any of the requirements provided in that section. Thus, we
dismiss the appeal as premature.

DISMISSED.8

WILLIAMS, C.J., and CURTIS, J., concur.

8
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.