Paul Randall Gay v. Regina Suzanne Gay

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Paul Randall Gay, Respondent,

v.

Regina Suzanne Gay, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2025-000258

Appeal From Greenville County
Rochelle Y. Conits, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-167
Heard March 10, 2026 – Filed March 31, 2026

AFFIRMED

Richard H. Rhodes and William Hardwick Rhodes, both
of Burts Turner & Rhodes, of Spartanburg, for Appellant.

Gwendolynn Wamble Barrett, of Barrett Mackenzie,
LLC, of Greenville, for Respondent.

Megan Goodwin Burke, of Greenville, for the
Guardian ad Litem.

PER CURIAM: In this family court action, Regina Gay (Mother) appeals the
family court's order awarding the parents joint custody of their minor children,
asserting the court failed to properly apply the seventeen factors set out in South
Carolina Code section 63-15-240 (Supp. 2025) and failed to identify specific
exceptional circumstances to justify joint custody. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND

Paul Gay (Father) and Mother were married on August 9, 2010. The parties share
two children from the marriage: their son, V.R.G., born in 2012, and their
daughter, A.L.G., born in 2014. The parties separated on October 25, 2022.
Father initiated divorce proceedings on the grounds of adultery and requested sole
custody of their minor children. Mother filed an answer and counterclaim seeking
sole custody and a divorce on the same grounds.

The court issued two temporary orders during the pendency of the litigation. On
February 7, 2023, the court issued a temporary order awarding the parties joint
custody with Father having primary placement. Mother was awarded placement of
the children every other weekend from Friday after school until Monday morning.
During the weeks she did not have weekend placement, she would have overnight
visits on Thursdays after school.

The court revised its temporary custody arrangement on August 9, 2023, pursuant
to the guardian ad litem's (GAL) motion for temporary relief. The GAL expressed
concerns related to Father surreptitiously bringing his girlfriend into the marital
home while the children were sleeping and leaving the children unattended in the
evenings while he went out to drink with friends. Under the revised arrangement,
Mother had primary placement and Father had the same visitation scheme
previously awarded to Mother.

At the final merits hearing on April 22–25, 2024, and August 19–20, 2024, the
family court heard testimony from the parties, their witnesses, the parties'
communication therapist, and the GAL. Father requested an alternating
week-to-week joint custody arrangement and Mother requested primary custody.
Mother raised concerns to the court regarding Father's drinking habits. She also
contended that he continued to expose the children to paramours and failed to
adequately supervise the children. Father raised concerns with Mother's failure to
involve him in major decisions regarding the children, and Mother's delegation of
her parental duties to her parents and other parties. Father also raised concerns
about the potential for alienation due to conduct by Mother and her parents. After
carefully considering the evidence presented, the family court found it was in the
children's best interest to grant the parties week-to-week joint custody.
Both parties filed timely motions seeking to alter or amend the final order. By
order dated January 21, 2025, the family court denied the parties' motions on issues
regarding child custody, visitation, and support.1 This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"On appeal from the family court, the appellate court reviews factual and legal
issues de novo." Klein v. Barrett, 427 S.C. 74, 79, 828 S.E.2d 773, 776 (Ct. App.
2019); see also Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593, 596, 813 S.E.2d 486, 487 (2018)
("[T]he proper standard of review in family court matters is de novo, rather than an
abuse of discretion."). "[De novo] review permits appellate court fact-finding,
notwithstanding the presence of evidence supporting the trial court's findings."
Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 390, 709 S.E.2d 650, 654–55 (2011). However, we
are mindful that because family courts are in a better position to evaluate evidence,
we should defer to their custody decisions. Shirley v. Shirley, 342 S.C. 324, 329,
536 S.E.2d 427, 429–30 (Ct. App. 2000). "[A]ppellate court[s] should be reluctant
to substitute [their] own evaluation of the evidence on child custody for that of the
[family] court." Id. at 331, 536 S.E.2d at 430. "Therefore, the appellant bears the
burden of convincing the appellate court that the family court committed error or
that the preponderance of the evidence is against the family court's findings."
Klein, 427 S.C. at 80, 828 S.E.2d at 776.

III. LAW/ANALYSIS

A. Statutory Custody Factors

Mother argues that, although the family court referenced the seventeen statutory
factors, the court failed to apply the factors to the facts of the case.2 We disagree.

1
On reconsideration, the family court judge modified her order to include that the
parties must use in-network medical providers for the children. The court also
modified the parties' visitation schedule based on the agreement of the parties.
2
Mother also raised an argument in her statement of issues that she disagreed with
the court's decision to award Father with final decision-making authority; however,
the brief fails to address the argument. We therefore find this issue has been
abandoned. See Fields v. Melrose Ltd. P'ship, 312 S.C. 102, 106, 439 S.E.2d 283,
285 (Ct. App. 1993) ("An issue raised on appeal but not argued in the brief is
deemed abandoned and will not be considered by the appellate court.").
The family court may award parties joint custody of their children. S.C. Code
Ann. § 63-15-240 (Supp. 2025). When determining custody decisions, "the best
interest of the child is the paramount consideration." Gandy v. Gandy, 297 S.C.
411, 414, 377 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1989); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-230(A) (Supp.
2025). "Custody is based on a determination of the character, fitness, attitude[,]
and inclinations on the part of each parent." Gandy, 297 S.C. at 414, 377 S.E.2d at
313–14. Section 63-15-240 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2025) provides the
family court with guidance on what factors it may use to determine custody:
(B) In issuing or modifying a custody order, the court
must consider the best interest of the child, which may
include, but is not limited to:

(1) the temperament and developmental needs of the
child;

(2) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to
understand and meet the needs of the child;

(3) the preferences of each child;

(4) the wishes of the parents as to custody;

(5) the past and current interaction and relationship of the
child with each parent, the child's siblings, and any other
person, including a grandparent, who may significantly
affect the best interest of the child;

(6) the actions of each parent to encourage the continuing
parent-child relationship between the child and the other
parent, as is appropriate, including compliance with court
orders;

(7) the manipulation by or coercive behavior of the
parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents'
dispute;

(8) any effort by one parent to disparage the other parent
in front of the child;
(9) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in
the life of the child;

(10) the child's adjustment to his or her home, school,
and community environments;

(11) the stability of the child's existing and proposed
residences;

(12) the mental and physical health of all individuals
involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial
parent or other party, in and of itself, must not be
determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial
arrangement is not in the best interest of the child;

(13) the child's cultural and spiritual background;

(14) whether the child or a sibling of the child has been
abused or neglected;

(15) whether one parent has perpetrated domestic
violence or child abuse or the effect on the child of the
actions of an abuser if any domestic violence has
occurred between the parents or between a parent and
another individual or between the parent and the child;

(16) whether one parent has relocated more than one
hundred miles from the child's primary residence in the
past year, unless the parent relocated for safety reasons;
and

(17) other factors as the court considers necessary.

We find the family court fully considered the relevant statutory factors and
weighed the credibility of each party's testimony to find sufficient justification to
award joint custody. See Rice v. Rice, 335 S.C. 449, 458, 517 S.E.2d 220, 225 (Ct.
App. 1999) (finding the "determination of the best interest[s] of the children is an
inherently case-specific and fact-specific inquiry"). The court sufficiently
considered the children's best interests, finding they both seemed to be happy,
loving, and active children who both had great affection for their parents. Both
children were involved in various extracurricular activities, were in therapy, and
were performing well in school. We believe that the court considered each of the
parent's strengths and weaknesses—both admonishing Father for bringing his
children around his girlfriends and for his behavior towards the couple's counselor
and GAL, and Mother for moving the children to new schools without consulting
Father and isolating the children from Father. The family court also found that
both parents exhibited several positive parenting qualities. We agree with the
family court that both parents are devoted to the minor children, have adequate
accommodations, transportation, and ability to care for the children both physically
and financially. After reviewing the record before the family court, we find that
the family court sufficiently considered the statutory factors when weighing its
decision to grant joint custody.

B. Exceptional Circumstances

Second, Mother argues the trial court failed to identify specific exceptional
circumstances to justify awarding joint custody. We disagree.

Section 63-15-210(1) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2025) defines joint
custody as:

[B]oth parents have equal rights and responsibilities for
major decisions concerning the child, including the
child's education, medical and dental care, extracurricular
activities, and religious training; however, a judge may
designate one parent to have sole authority to make
specific, identified decisions while both parents retain
equal rights and responsibilities for all other decisions.
"Although the legislature gives family court judges the authority 'to order joint or
divided custody [when] the court finds it is in the best interests of the
child,' . . . joint or divided custody should only be awarded [when] there are
exceptional circumstances." Patel v. Patel, 359 S.C. 515, 528, 599 S.E.2d 114,
121 (2004) (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-420(42) (Supp. 2003)). "[G]enerally,
joint custody is disfavored" and will be awarded only when exceptional
circumstances dictate that such an arrangement is in a child's best interests. Scott
v. Scott, 354 S.C. 118, 125, 579 S.E.2d 620, 624 (2003); see also Lewis v. Lewis,
400 S.C. 354, 365, 734 S.E.2d 322, 327 (Ct. App. 2012) (noting South Carolina
courts have determined joint custody "is usually considered harmful to and not
conducive to the best interest and welfare of a child"); but see S.C. Code Ann. §
63-15-230(C) (Supp. 2025) ("If custody is contested or if either parent seeks an
award of joint custody, the court shall consider all custody options, including, but
not limited to, joint custody, and, in its final order, the court shall state its
determination as to custody and shall state its reasoning for that decision."
(emphasis added)).

We find the court sufficiently stated specific circumstances to justify awarding
joint legal custody. The court found the following exceptional circumstances:

Both parents are heavily involved with and love their
minor children. Although the parents have much
animosity between them it would be detrimental to the
minor children for either parent to be relegated to an
every other weekend parent. In making this decision, the
[c]ourt has carefully considered the parties' inability to
effectively communicate and work together for the
benefit of the minor children. While the parties' ability to
coparent has been difficult during the pendency of this
action, the [c]ourt has had the benefit of seeing how each
parent treated the other when that parent had primary
custody, and how being in the primary custody of each
parent negatively affected the welfare of the minor
children, as the children missed the other parent and
wanted to spend more time with the other parent, both of
whom have numerous positive attributes that will benefit
their minor children. The [c]ourt in implementing a
shared parenting arrangement is allowing the minor
children to maximize their time with both parents while
trying to keep them out of the middle of the parents'
animosity.
Based on the circumstances in this case, we find the court did not err in finding
joint custody was warranted. We find the court had the special ability to view each
of the parent's performance in a primary custody role, as each parent had the
opportunity to serve as primary custodian during litigation. The court found that
neither parent acted admirably toward the other parent while serving as the primary
custodian. The court also found that both parents are clearly devoted to their
children and deserve more than a standard every-other-weekend visit. We agree
with the court's concerns that each parent may alienate the other if granted sole
custody, and we trust the court's judgment that joint custody would significantly
alleviate this issue. See Scott, 354 S.C. at 126, 579 S.E.2d at 624 (finding
exceptional circumstances existed to grant joint custody where there was a
potential "for the custodial parent to effectively alienate [the child] from the
non-custodial parent" in a sole custody arrangement with the parents).

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the family court's order is

AFFIRMED.

GEATHERS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ. concur.