Pitchford v. Cain

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 608 U. S. Part 2
Pages 391–410
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
THE SUPREME COURT
May 28, 2026
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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OCTOBER TERM, 2025 391
Syllabus
PITCHFORD v. CAIN
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fth circuit
No. 24–7351. Argued March 31, 2026—Decided May 28, 2026
In 2004, two black teenagers, Terry Pitchford and Eric Bullins, robbed a
grocery store near Grenada, Mississippi. During the robbery, Bullins
shot and killed the white store owner. Bullins reached a plea agree-
ment and received a 20-year sentence for the homicide. The State
charged Pitchford with capital murder and sought the death penalty.
During jury selection at Pitchford's trial, the prosecutor used peremp-
tory strikes against four of the fve black potential jurors. As this
Court held in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, the Equal Protection
Clause bars prosecutors from exercising peremptory challenges based
on race. In Batson and subsequent cases, the Court has spelled out a
three-step process for a trial court to determine whether a prosecutor
employed a peremptory challenge based on race. Here, Pitchford's
counsel raised an objection under Batson and made a prima facie show-
ing that the strikes of the four black jurors were based on race (step
one). The trial court asked the prosecutor for race-neutral reasons for
each strike, and the prosecutor offered reasons (step two). The trial
court declared the prosecutor's stated reasons to be race neutral, but
the trial court did not afford defense counsel an opportunity to rebut
the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons as pretextual (step three); nor did
it make any fndings regarding whether the prosecutor's stated reasons
were pretextual. At the close of jury selection, defense counsel sought
to raise the Batson issue again, but the trial court twice cut off defense
counsel. The empaneled jury, consisting of 11 white jurors and 1 black
juror, convicted Pitchford of capital murder and sentenced him to death.
On direct appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that Pitch-
ford had waived his Batson objection by not arguing to the trial court
that the prosecutor's proffered explanations were pretextual. Pitch-
ford later fled a habeas corpus petition in U. S. District Court. Apply-
ing the applicable standard to obtain federal habeas relief under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the District
Court concluded that the Mississippi Supreme Court had unreasonably
applied Batson and had unreasonably determined that Pitchford waived
his Batson objection. The District Court explained that no state court
had conducted the full three-step Batson inquiry, and that the trial court
had “thwarted” the “attempt by Pitchford's counsel to argue pretext.”

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392 PITCHFORD v. CAIN
Syllabus
706 F. Supp. 3d 614, 624. The Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court,
concluding that the Mississippi Supreme Court's waiver fnding was
reasonable.
Held: The Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied the clearly es-
tablished Batson precedents and unreasonably determined that Pitch-
ford waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor's asserted race-
neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes of four black prospective
jurors. Pp. 398–401.
(a) “[T]he job of enforcing Batson rests frst and foremost with trial
judges.” Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U. S. 284, 302. The bedrock prin-
ciple that a party ordinarily must raise an objection in the trial court in
order to preserve the issue for appeal applies in the Batson context.
See Ford v. Georgia, 498 U. S. 411, 423. But here, the Mississippi trial
court erroneously omitted Batson's third step: The trial court did not
afford Pitchford's counsel a suffcient opportunity to rebut the prosecu-
tor's proffered race-neutral reasons for striking the four black jurors
and never determined whether the prosecutor's stated reasons were
pretextual. Pitchford's counsel did not waive the Batson argument.
As the U. S. District Court explained, “Pitchford did object to the expla-
nations provided when he raised the issue again.” 706 F. Supp. 3d, at
624. The Mississippi trial court explicitly assured Pitchford's counsel
that the Batson objection was preserved, stating: “I think you already
made those, and they are clear in the record.” 1 App. 175. Especially
given that specifc assurance by the trial court, it was unreasonable for
the Mississippi Supreme Court to conclude that Pitchford waived the
Batson argument.
The State's argument that Pitchford preserved his Batson objection
but nonetheless somehow waived his Batson pretext argument does not
make much sense and is not a reasonable reading of this record. At
that key point in the jury-selection process—after the prosecutor had
asserted facially race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes—the
Batson objection was a Batson pretext argument. Defense counsel's
rebuttal necessarily would include a pretext argument—specifcally,
that similarly situated white jurors were not challenged by the prosecu-
tor. If allowed to continue, Pitchford could have argued that the prose-
cutor did not challenge white jurors similarly situated to the challenged
black jurors, which is precisely what Pitchford's post-trial motion later
did argue. In this case, the ordinary trial-court procedure for resolving
Batson claims at step three never occurred—notwithstanding the re-
peated efforts of Pitchford's counsel to pursue and preserve the Batson
objection. Pp. 398–401.
(b) The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act standard for
reviewing claims on federal habeas is deferential to the state court, but

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Cite as: 608 U. S. 391 (2026) 393
Syllabus
deference does not mean abdication, and “deference does not by defni-
tion preclude relief.” Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U. S. 231, 240. In light
of the entire record in this case, the Court agrees with the U. S. District
Court that the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied the
clearly established Batson precedents and unreasonably determined
that Pitchford waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor's asserted
race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes of four black prospec-
tive jurors. 28 U. S. C. §§ 2254(d)(1), (2). P. 401.
126 F. 4th 422, reversed and remanded.
Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J.,
fled a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, Alito, and Barrett, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 401.
Joseph J. Perkovich, by appointment of the Court, 607
U. S. 1265, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the
briefs were Joseph C. Welling, John R. Mills, J. Scott Gil-
bert, Jessica L. Ellsworth, Catherine E. Stetson, Jo-Ann
Tamila Sagar, Johannah Cassel-Walker, and Katherine B.
Wellington.
Scott G. Stewart, Solicitor General of Mississippi, argued the
cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Lynn
Fitch, Attorney General of Mississippi, Justin L. Matheny and
Anthony M. Shults, Deputy Solicitors General, Daniel Kim,
Assistant Solicitor General, LaDonna C. Holland and Alli-
son K. Hartman, Special Assistant Attorneys General.
Emily M. Ferguson argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae. With her on the brief were Solici-
tor General Sauer, Assistant Attorney General Duva, Dep-
uty Solicitor General Feigin, and William A. Glaser.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American
Civil Liberties Union Foundation et al. by Katherine L. Pringle, Robert
S. Chang, Cecillia D. Wang, Cassandra Stubbs, Claudia Van Wyk, Megan
D. Byrne, and Arijeet Sensharma; for the Constitutional Accountability
Center et al. by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, Joshua D. Blecher-
Cohen, and Barbara E. Bergman; for Fair and Just Prosecution et al. by
Daniel Woofter and Kevin K. Russell; for the Mississippi Legislative
Black Caucus by Charles L. McCloud, Kimberly Broecker, and W. Tucker
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394 PITCHFORD v. CAIN
Opinion of the Court
Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), this Court held
that the Equal Protection Clause bars prosecutors from ex-
ercising peremptory challenges based on race. In Batson
and subsequent cases, the Court has spelled out how a trial
court should determine whether a prosecutor employed a pe-
remptory challenge based on race. After the defendant
makes a prima facie showing that a peremptory strike was
based on race (step one), the prosecutor must provide a race-
neutral reason for the challenged strike (step two). Then,
at step three, defense counsel has an opportunity to rebut
the prosecutor's race-neutral reason as pretextual, and the
trial court in turn decides whether the prosecutor's race-
neutral reason for striking a juror is pretextual “in light of
all evidence with a bearing on it.” Miller-El v. Dretke, 545
U. S. 231, 252 (2005); see Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U. S.
284, 301–303 (2019); Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U. S. 472, 478–
479 (2008).
Carrington; for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., by
Ashley Burrell, Janai Nelson, Samuel Spital, Daniel Harawa, Catherine
Logue, and Christopher Kemmitt; and for Linda Lee et al. by Amy R.
Upshaw.
A brief of amici curiae urging affrmance was fled for the State of
Alabama et al. by Steve Marshall, Attorney General of Alabama, A. Bar-
rett Bowdre, Solicitor General, Robert M. Overing, Principal Deputy Solici-
tor General, George L. Muirhead, Assistant Solicitor General, and Jordan
Mauldin and Matthew J. Clark, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the
Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Stephen J. Cox
of Alaska, Tim Griffn of Arkansas, James Uthmeier of Florida, Raúl R.
Labrador of Idaho, Theodore E. Rokita of Indiana, Brenna Bird of Iowa,
Kris W. Kobach of Kansas, Liz Murrill of Louisiana, Austin Knudsen of
Montana, Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, Drew Wrigley of North Dakota,
Dave Yost of Ohio, Gentner Drummond of Oklahoma, David W. Sunday,
Jr., of Pennsylvania, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Marty Jackley of
South Dakota, Jonathan Skrmetti of Tennessee, Ken Paxton of Texas, and
John B. McCuskey of West Virginia.
Geoffrey C. Shaw and Elizabeth R. Moulton fled a brief for Habeas
Corpus Scholars as amici curiae.
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Cite as: 608 U. S. 391 (2026) 395
Opinion of the Court
In this capital case, the Mississippi trial court never con-
ducted the essential third step of the Batson inquiry. The
Mississippi Supreme Court affrmed Pitchford's conviction
and death sentence—but only by concluding that Pitchford
had waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor's race-
neutral reasons as pretextual at Batson's third step. On
habeas review, the U. S. District Court determined that
Pitchford had not waived rebuttal and that the Mississippi
Supreme Court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable.
See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). The District Court therefore
granted relief to Pitchford. But the U. S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed. This Court granted certio-
rari, 607 U. S. 1094 (2025), and we now reverse the judgment
of the U. S. Court of Appeals.
I
A
The relevant factual background is as follows: In 2004, two
black teenagers, Terry Pitchford and Eric Bullins, robbed
a grocery store near Grenada, Mississippi—a small town in
Grenada County off I–55 in north-central Mississippi. Gre-
nada County was then about 60 percent white and 40 per-
cent black.
At the time of the robbery in 2004, Bullins was 16, and
Pitchford was 18. During the robbery, Bullins fred three
shots at the store owner, who was a white man, and killed
him. Pitchford v. State, 45 So. 3d 216, 223 (Miss. 2010); 706
F. Supp. 3d 614, 617 (ND Miss. 2023); 126 F. 4th 422, 424
(CA5 2025); Brief for Respondents 5.
Bullins, who fred the fatal shots, reached a plea agree-
ment and received a 20-year sentence for the homicide. 1
App. 294, n. 46. Pitchford also fred a gun, which was loaded
with rat shot. It has been disputed whether he shot at the
store owner or fred his gun into the store foor. Cf. 706
F. Supp. 3d, at 617. In any event, for Pitchford, the State
charged capital murder and sought the death penalty.
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396 PITCHFORD v. CAIN
Opinion of the Court
During jury selection at Pitchford's trial in Mississippi
state court, the prosecutor used peremptory strikes against
four of the fve black potential jurors. In response, Pitch-
ford's counsel raised a Batson objection. 1 App. 167–168.
The trial court asked the prosecutor for race-neutral reasons
for striking each of the four black potential jurors. Accord-
ing to the prosecutor, one had returned 15 minutes late to
court, two others had brothers convicted of violent offenses,
and the fourth, like Pitchford, was young, unmarried, and a
father. Id., at 169–170. As the prosecutor offered reasons
for striking each of the jurors, the trial court declared each
to be race neutral. Upon hearing the prosecutor's reason
for the last strike, the trial court stated that “[t]he Court
fnds that to be race neutral as well,” and pivoted immedi-
ately to the defense's peremptory strikes. Id., at 170. At
that time, the trial court did not afford defense counsel an
opportunity to rebut as pretextual the prosecutor's race-
neutral reasons for striking the four black jurors, nor did the
trial court make any fndings regarding whether the prosecu-
tor's stated reasons were pretextual. In other words, as the
U. S. District Court later explained on habeas review, the
trial court “full-stop ended its Batson analysis” at step two
and never proceeded to step three. 706 F. Supp. 3d, at 623.
At the close of jury selection, defense counsel sought to
raise the Batson issue again. But the trial court twice cut
off defense counsel and ended the inquiry before counsel
could try to rebut as pretextual the race-neutral reasons ar-
ticulated by the prosecution: “I think you already made
those, and they are clear in the record. For the reasons pre-
viously stated, frst the Court fnds there to be no—well, all
the reasons were race neutral as to members that were
struck by the district attorney's offce. And so the, the
Court fnds there to be no Batson violation.” 1 App. 175.1
1 During jury selection, Pitchford also separately raised a fair cross-sec-
tion argument. See, e. g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U. S. 357, 363–364
(1979). That claim is not at issue here.

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Cite as: 608 U. S. 391 (2026) 397
Opinion of the Court
The empaneled jury consisted of 11 white jurors and 1
black juror. The jury convicted Pitchford of capital murder
and sentenced him to death.
In the trial court, Pitchford then fled a motion for a new
trial that raised numerous issues, including Batson. As rel-
evant here, Pitchford advanced the argument that he was
prevented from making during jury selection—that the
prosecutor's stated reasons for the peremptory challenges
were pretextual because the prosecutor “deselected black
people from the jury panel who had the same familial, living,
social or marital circumstances as whites who were not de-
selected, which is a clear violation of Batson and Miller-El.”
1 App. 184. The trial court summarily denied Pitchford's
motion.
B
For the last 20-plus years while in prison, Pitchford has
pursued appellate and collateral challenges to his conviction
and death sentence. In his direct appeal to the Mississippi
Supreme Court, Pitchford renewed his Batson argument—
in particular, that the prosecutor's purported race-neutral
reasons for striking the four black prospective jurors were
pretextual. In a divided opinion, the Mississippi Supreme
Court concluded that Pitchford had waived his Batson objec-
tion by not arguing to the trial court that the prosecutor's
proffered explanations were pretextual. See 45 So. 3d, at
227–228. Justice Graves, joined by Justice Kitchens, dis-
sented, reasoning that Pitchford had not waived his Batson
objection and that the prosecutor's stated reasons for strik-
ing the black jurors were pretextual. Id., at 260–268.
Pitchford later fled a habeas corpus petition in the U. S.
District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi. To
obtain federal habeas relief under the Antiterrorism and Ef-
fective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pitchford was required to
clear a high bar—namely, to establish that the Mississippi
Supreme Court's decision “was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
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398 PITCHFORD v. CAIN
Opinion of the Court
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”
or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceed-
ing.” 28 U. S. C. §§ 2254(d)(1), (2).
Applying that AEDPA standard, the U. S. District Court
concluded that the Mississippi Supreme Court had unreason-
ably applied Batson and had unreasonably determined that
Pitchford waived his Batson objection. The District Court
stated: “Simply put, no state court—whether it be the major-
ity in the Mississippi Supreme Court or the trial court—con-
ducted a full three-step Batson inquiry on the State's use of
its peremptory strikes . . . . The trial court, seemingly eager
to proceed to the case itself, quickly deemed the reasons as
race-neutral and moved on.” 706 F. Supp. 3d, at 626. The
District Court further explained that Pitchford had not
waived his Batson claim. The District Court noted that
Pitchford initially raised a Batson objection. And after the
trial court completed the jury selection process, Pitchford
“raised the issue again and confrmed it was on the record.”
Id., at 624. But the Mississippi trial court “thwarted,” al-
though “likely unintentionally,” the “attempt by Pitchford's
counsel to argue pretext,” thus affording Pitchford “no
chance to rebut the State's explanations and prove purpose-
ful discrimination.” Ibid.
For those reasons, the U. S. District Court ruled that the
Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied the clearly
established Batson precedents and unreasonably determined
that Pitchford had waived his opportunity to rebut the
prosecutor's proffered race-neutral reasons at Batson's third
step. Id., at 627. The U. S. Court of Appeals then reversed
the District Court, concluding that the Mississippi Supreme
Court's waiver fnding was reasonable. See 126 F. 4th,
at 431.
II
As this Court has stated, “America's trial judges operate
at the front lines of American justice,” and “the job of enforc-

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Cite as: 608 U. S. 391 (2026) 399
Opinion of the Court
ing Batson rests frst and foremost with trial judges.”
Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U. S. 284, 302 (2019). But here,
as the U. S. District Court explained, the Mississippi trial
court erroneously omitted Batson's third step: In particular,
the trial court did not afford Pitchford's counsel a suffcient
opportunity to rebut the prosecutor's proffered race-neutral
reasons for striking the four black jurors and never deter-
mined whether the prosecutor's stated reasons were pre-
textual. And as the U. S. District Court further stated,
the Mississippi Supreme Court's conclusion that Pitchford
waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor's proffered
race-neutral reasons was unreasonable.
To be clear, in state and federal courts, a party ordinarily
must raise an objection in the trial court in order to preserve
the issue for appeal. The Batson context is no exception to
that bedrock principle. See Ford v. Georgia, 498 U. S. 411,
423 (1991).2
But as the U. S. District Court explained, “Pitchford did
object to the explanations provided when he raised the issue
again and confrmed it was on the record. Perhaps Pitch-
ford's counsel should have been more assertive, but . . . there
was no waiver by Pitchford.” 706 F. Supp. 3d 614, 624 (ND
Miss. 2023).
Notably, moreover, the Mississippi trial court explicitly as-
sured Pitchford's counsel that the Batson objection was pre-
served. When Pitchford's counsel attempted to raise Bat-
son again after the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations for
the four peremptory strikes of black jurors, the trial court
responded: “I think you already made those, and they are
clear in the record.” 1 App. 175. Especially in light of that
specifc assurance by the trial court, it was unreasonable for
the Mississippi Supreme Court to conclude that Pitchford
waived the Batson argument.
2 In the trial court, a defendant might explicitly waive any Batson objec-
tion or might forfeit a Batson objection by, for example, failing to timely
assert it.
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400 PITCHFORD v. CAIN
Opinion of the Court
To try to overcome those problems with the Mississippi
Supreme Court's waiver determination, the State asserts
that Pitchford's defense counsel preserved a Batson objec-
tion but not a Batson pretext argument. That slices Batson
way too thin. At that key point in the jury-selection proc-
ess—after the prosecutor had asserted facially race-neutral
reasons for the peremptory strikes—the Batson objection
was a Batson pretext argument. In other words, defense
counsel's rebuttal necessarily would include a pretext argu-
ment—specifcally, that similarly situated white jurors were
not challenged by the prosecutor. See Flowers, 588 U. S.,
at 301–302. If allowed to continue, Pitchford therefore
could have argued that the prosecutor did not challenge
white jurors similarly situated to the challenged black jurors,
which is precisely what Pitchford's post-trial motion later did
argue. In that post-trial motion, Pitchford contended that
“the prosecution's state of mind was clearly racially discrimi-
natory as it deselected black people from the jury panel who
had the same familial, living, social or marital circumstances
as whites who were not deselected, which is a clear violation
of Batson and Miller-El.” 1 App. 184. The bottom line:
The State's argument—that Pitchford preserved his Batson
objection but nonetheless somehow waived his Batson pre-
text argument—does not make much sense and is not a
reasonable reading of this record.3
We need not belabor the matter. After a prosecutor as-
serts race-neutral reasons for a peremptory strike, the de-
3 For its part, the dissent speculates that Pitchford's counsel, at step
three, was seeking to make only a statistical argument, not an argument
that similarly situated white jurors were not challenged. Post, at 407–
408 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.). To begin, that speculation does not refect
how the Batson inquiry ordinarily operates. At step three, after the
prosecution has offered its facially race-neutral reasons, defense counsel
typically tries to show (because it is often the only way of proving a Bat-
son violation at step three) that similarly situated white jurors were
treated differently and not challenged. In any event, the more fundamen-
tal point here is that the Mississippi trial court prevented Pitchford's coun-
sel from pursuing a Batson argument at step three.

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Cite as: 608 U. S. 391 (2026) 401
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
fense counsel must at least have an opportunity to argue
that the asserted race-neutral reasons were not the actual
reasons—that is, the reasons were pretextual. Then, the
trial court can determine whether those asserted reasons
were the actual reasons or instead were pretextual. In this
case, whether due to confusion, oversight, an overly hurried
jury selection process, or some other cause, things broke
down, and the ordinary trial-court procedure for resolving
Batson claims at step three never occurred—notwithstand-
ing the repeated efforts of Pitchford's counsel to pursue and
preserve the Batson objection.
To be sure, the AEDPA standard for reviewing claims on
federal habeas is deferential to the state court. See Wil-
liams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412–413 (2000); Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 102–103 (2011); Brown v. Davenport,
596 U. S. 118, 135 (2022); Klein v. Martin, 607 U. S. 213, 220–
221 (2026) (per curiam). But deference does not mean abdi-
cation, and “deference does not by defnition preclude relief.”
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U. S. 231, 240 (2005) (quotation
marks and alteration omitted). In light of the entire record
in this case, we agree with the U. S. District Court that the
Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied the clearly
established Batson precedents and unreasonably determined
that Pitchford waived his opportunity to rebut the prose-
cutor's asserted race-neutral reasons for the peremptory
strikes of four black prospective jurors. 28 U. S. C.
§§ 2254(d)(1), (2).
We reverse the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit and remand the case for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Thomas, Justice
Alito, and Justice Barrett join, dissenting.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (AEDPA), federal courts may grant habeas corpus
relief to state prisoners only in narrowly defned circum-
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402 PITCHFORD v. CAIN
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
stances. Appreciating as much, this Court has repeatedly
overturned lower-court decisions that have failed to respect
AEDPA's constraints. See, e. g., Klein v. Martin, 607 U. S.
213 (2026) (per curiam); Dunn v. Reeves, 594 U. S. 731 (2021)
(per curiam); Mays v. Hines, 592 U. S. 385 (2021) (per cu-
riam). Today, the Court looks past those constraints, and
its own admonitions, to issue a judgment that AEDPA pre-
cludes. Respectfully, I dissent.
I
In 2004, Terry Pitchford and an accomplice robbed a store
in Mississippi. At the end of it, the store's owner, Reuben
Britt, lay dead. Pitchford v. State, 45 So. 3d 216, 222–223
(Miss. 2010) (en banc). A state-court trial followed in which
a jury found Mr. Pitchford guilty of murder and sentenced
him to death, concluding that he “actually killed R[e]uben
Britt, . . . intended the killing of R[e]uben Britt[,] . . . and
. . . contemplated that lethal force would be employed.”
Trial Tr. 812.1
This case concerns what happened during jury selection.
Midway through that process, Mr. Pitchford's trial team ob-
jected that prosecutors were using their peremptory strikes
to exclude black prospective jurors in violation of Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986). 1 App. 167–168.
To resolve objections like that, Batson provides a three-
step framework. First, a defendant must make a “prima
facie showing” that prosecutors have struck prospective ju-
rors “on the basis of race.” Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U. S.
1 To be sure, Mr. Pitchford has advanced various accounts of what hap-
pened the day of the robbery. Initially, he denied he was present at all.
See 1 App. 195. Later, he said he only fred his gun into the foor and did
not shoot Mr. Britt. Ibid.; id., at 329, n. 54. But later still, he acknowl-
edged the existence of “admissible proof ” showing he did shoot Mr. Britt.
Id., at 329; see also Pitchford, 45 So. 3d, at 260. And, whatever his view
of the facts may be, there is no dispute that a jury found he “inten[tion-
ally]” and “actually killed R[e]uben Britt.” Trial Tr. 812.
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Cite as: 608 U. S. 391 (2026) 403
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
472, 476 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). One
common way to meet this burden is statistical—if prosecu-
tors have struck black prospective jurors at a higher rate
than white prospective jurors, that may suggest discrimina-
tion. Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U. S. 284, 302 (2019). An-
other common way to meet this burden is comparative—if
“side-by-side comparisons” show prosecutors have struck
black prospective jurors while accepting similar white pro-
spective jurors, that too may suggest discrimination. Ibid.
Should a defendant make a prima facie case, the court then
moves to step two. There, “the prosecution must offer a
race-neutral basis” for each strike. Snyder, 552 U. S., at
476–477 (internal quotation marks omitted). If the prosecu-
tion does so, the court proceeds to step three: The defendant
can try to rebut the prosecution's race-neutral reasons as
“pretextual, ” and ultimately the court must determine
whether the prosecution's strikes were in fact based on pur-
poseful discrimination. Id., at 477, 485. As at step one, de-
fendants commonly use statistical and comparative juror
arguments at step three.
In this case, Mr. Pitchford made his prima facie case based
on a statistical argument. The prosecution, he noted, had
refrained from striking only “one African-American juror out
of the fve that ha[d] thus far . . . arisen on the venire.” 1
App. 167. And, Mr. Pitchford continued, “this is already a
disproportiona[tely] white jury [pool] for the population of
this county.” Id., at 167–168.
The trial judge agreed that Mr. Pitchford had made a
prima facie case under Batson and thus required the State
to offer race-neutral reasons for each of the peremptory
strikes it had used on black prospective jurors. The State
did so. One prospective juror, it said, had returned late to
court after lunch break and had a history of mental prob-
lems. 1 App. 86–88, 169. Two had brothers who had been
convicted of violent offenses. Id., at 169–170. Another
“had no opinion on the death penalty.” Id., at 170. Plus,
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404 PITCHFORD v. CAIN
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
he was similar to Mr. Pitchford in several ways: They were
“approximately the [same] age,” they “both ha[d] children
about the same age,” and they “both ha[d] never been mar-
ried.” Ibid.
The judge accepted these reasons as race neutral and
directed the parties to resume jury selection. Ibid.
Mr. Pitchford did not object to that direction or otherwise
seek to make a step three showing. Instead, after jury se-
lection concluded, Mr. Pitchford's trial team approached the
bench. There, they sought “to reserve . . . [their] Batson
objection.” Id., at 175. The court agreed the Batson objec-
tion was “in the record,” but “f[ound] there to be no Batson
violation.” Ibid. At that point, defense counsel reiterated
their earlier statistical argument. “[O]ne,” “[a]nd only one,”
of the fnal jury panel selected for service, Mr. Pitchford's
lawyers said, was black even though the “county is approxi-
mately . . . 40 percent black.” Id., at 176.
After that exchange, the case proceeded to trial and, in
the end, the jury returned a guilty verdict. Seeking to undo
that verdict later, Mr. Pitchford fled a motion for a new trial
based in part on his statistical Batson argument. 1 App.
179, 184, 186. But for the frst time, he also briefy intro-
duced a new comparative juror argument, asserting in one
sentence that the prosecution had improperly “deselected
black people from the jury panel who had the same familial,
living, social or marital circumstances as whites who were
not deselected.” Id., at 184.
After the trial court denied Mr. Pitchford's motion, he ap-
pealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court. There, Mr. Pitch-
ford continued to press the statistical argument he had made
during jury selection. Id., at 209–210, 223–225. But now
he directed most of his efforts to the separate comparative
juror argument he introduced for the frst time after trial,
drawing detailed comparisons in his appellate brief between
white jurors who were not struck and the four black jurors
who were. Id., at 210–223.

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Cite as: 608 U. S. 391 (2026) 405
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
The Mississippi Supreme Court analyzed Mr. Pitchford's
Batson claim this way. At step one, the court upheld the
trial court's ruling that Mr. Pitchford's statistical argument
suffced to make out a prima facie case. Pitchford, 45 So. 3d,
at 224–226. It also upheld the trial court's step two ruling
that the prosecution's reasons were race neutral. Id., at
226–227. And when it came to step three, the Mississippi
Supreme Court held that Mr. Pitchford hadn't carried his
ultimate burden to show purposeful discrimination. See id.,
at 227–228.
He hadn't, the court ruled, because he had failed to rebut
the State's step two submission in the trial court. Put sim-
ply, Mr. Pitchford had “waive[d]” any step three argument.
Id., at 227, n. 16 (internal quotation marks omitted). Yes,
Mr. Pitchford “devoted a considerable portion” of his appel-
late brief to a step three comparative juror argument, ex-
panding on the one-sentence version he introduced for the
frst time in his post-trial motion. Id., at 227. But, the
court held, Mr. Pitchford had not adequately presented this
argument to the trial court in the frst instance. Ibid.
And, the court added, it could “not now fault the trial judge
with failing to discern whether the State's race-neutral rea-
sons were overcome by rebuttal evidence and argument
never presented.” Ibid.
Following his loss in state court, Mr. Pitchford sought ha-
beas relief in federal court. Among other things, he argued
that the Mississippi Supreme Court's waiver holding was un-
reasonable. The district court agreed and granted relief,
explaining that it “view[ed] the record a bit differently” than
the Mississippi Supreme Court had. App. to Pet. for Cert.
22. In the district court's view, the state trial court had
“failed to provide” Mr. Pitchford with any “opportunity” to
make a step three argument “rebut[ting]” the prosecution's
proffered race-neutral reasons. Ibid. The Fifth Circuit re-
versed, holding that the Mississippi Supreme Court's waiver
fnding was both reasonable and, indeed, correct. 126 F. 4th

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406 PITCHFORD v. CAIN
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
422, 429, 431 (2025). We granted certiorari. 607 U. S.
1094 (2025).
II
To secure federal habeas relief under AEDPA, Mr. Pitch-
ford must shoulder a considerable burden. Pursuant to 28
U. S. C. § 2254(a), he must prove that he is being held in cus-
tody in violation of the Constitution or federal laws. In this
case, that means Mr. Pitchford must show his trial was in
fact infected by a Batson violation. In addition to that
showing, he must make one of two further showings. Under
§ 2254(d)(1), he must demonstrate that the Mississippi Su-
preme Court's decision “was contrary to, or involved an un-
reasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.”
Or, under § 2254(d)(2), he must demonstrate that the court's
“decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented” in state court. See
Klein, 607 U. S., at 220.
This Court has long recognized the rigor of § 2254(d)'s re-
quirements. Showing legal error, we have said, isn't enough
to satisfy § 2254(d)(1). Instead, a petitioner must demon-
strate that “no fairminded jurist could reach the state court's
conclusion under this Court's precedents.” Brown v. Dav-
enport, 596 U. S. 118, 135 (2022) (internal quotation marks
and alterations omitted). Likewise, to satisfy § 2254(d)(2),
“it is not enough to show that reasonable minds reviewing
the record might disagree about the [factual] fnding in ques-
tion.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead,
the fnding must have so little support in the record that only
an “unreasonable” jurist could make it. § 2254(d)(2); see
also § 2254(e)(1).
As I see things, Mr. Pitchford has failed to satisfy either of
these standards. Start with § 2254(d)(1). The Court today
seems to think the Mississippi Supreme Court “unreason-
ably” applied our clearly established precedents by conclud-
ing that Mr. Pitchford “waived” any step three argument.
Ante, at 401. But in Ford v. Georgia, 498 U. S. 411 (1991), we
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Gorsuch, J., dissenting
said that States enjoy authority to fashion their own preser-
vation rules governing Batson claims. 498 U. S., at 423.
And taking us at our word, the Mississippi Supreme Court
has adopted just such a rule: Any Batson argument not ade-
quately presented in a trial court is “waived.” See Pitch-
ford, 45 So. 3d, at 227, and n. 16 (collecting cases). Nothing
about that rule defes our clearly established precedents.2
Nor does the Mississippi Supreme Court's application of
its rule offend any of our precedents. The court recognized
that Mr. Pitchford had preserved a step one statistical argu-
ment, but held that he had waived the step three compara-
tive juror argument he sought to press on appeal by failing
to raise it during jury selection or trial. See id., at 227–228.
The Court today suggests this analysis “slices Batson . . .
too thin[ly].” Ante, at 400. Yet it nowhere pauses to iden-
tify any of our clearly established precedents the Mississippi
Supreme Court supposedly defed or mistook.
Turn next to § 2254(d)(2). The Court concludes that the
Mississippi Supreme Court's waiver holding rests on an
“unreasonable” reading of the trial record. Ante, at 399.
After all, the Court observes, Mr. Pitchford didn't entirely
forgo a comparative juror argument in the trial court; his
motion for a new trial included a line devoted to just that
topic. Ante, at 400; 1 App. 184. But be that as it may, the
Court does not (and cannot) explain how it was unreasonable
for the Mississippi Supreme Court to determine that
Mr. Pitchford waived a Batson argument he never made dur-
2 Where Mississippi preservation law operates on an argument-by-
argument basis, we have sometimes said ours operates on a claim-by-claim
basis. See Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 513
U. S. 374, 379 (1995). And what Mississippi calls “waiver,” we would ordi-
narily call “forfeiture.” See Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of
Chicago, 583 U. S. 17, 20, n. 1 (2017). But our preferences on these mat-
ters do not bind the State. See Ford, 498 U. S., at 423. And for that
reason, I use the term “waiver” here the same way the Mississippi Su-
preme Court did.
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408 PITCHFORD v. CAIN
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ing jury selection and introduced for the frst time only in a
single sentence in a post-trial motion.
Perhaps sensing the problem, the Court ultimately rests
its § 2254(d)(2) analysis on a different ground. Citing the
exchange that took place at the end of jury selection, the
Court says that the state trial court “explicitly assured” de-
fense counsel that the “Batson objection was preserved.”
Ante, at 399. And this assurance, the Court reasons, must
mean that Mr. Pitchford adequately preserved the step three
comparative juror argument he sought to make before the
Mississippi Supreme Court.
But that much is far from clear. Rather than announcing
an intent to raise a new step three comparative juror argu-
ment at the conclusion of jury selection, Mr. Pitchford's at-
torneys said only that they “want[ed] to reserve . . . [their]
Batson objection,” which sounds like a reference to the step
one statistical argument they had made earlier. 1 App. 175.
Supporting that inference, counsel proceeded to repeat the
same statistical argument they had already made. Id., at
175–176. True, resting on that point alone might not have
been the best move. But considering what happened later,
it hardly seems an unlikely explanation. After his appeal to
the Mississippi Supreme Court failed, Mr. Pitchford sought
state post-conviction relief. And in support of that effort,
one of his trial attorneys expressly represented that she had
“ `failed to challenge the prosecution's reasons as pretextual
at trial' ” and that she “did not . . . do anything to . . . reserve”
the pretext argument Mr. Pitchford sought to press on ap-
peal. App. to Brief for Respondents 40a, 77a.
Of course, Mr. Pitchford now advances a very different
reading of the trial court record. Now, he says his lawyers
did seek to preserve a step three comparative juror argu-
ment at the conclusion of jury selection. To be sure,
Mr. Pitchford admits, his lawyers did not ask the trial court
to compare any seated white juror with any struck black
juror. But, he suggests, that is only because the court cut
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Gorsuch, J., dissenting
off his attorneys and didn't allow them to get the argument
out. See Brief for Petitioner 33–35.
That account is diffcult to credit as well. Not only is it
inconsistent with his own attorney's representation that she
failed to preserve a pretext argument. Nothing in the rec-
ord indicates a trial court seeking to thwart defense counsel's
ability to represent their client. In fact, the record shows
that Mr. Pitchford's attorneys were more than capable of
speaking up when they had something to say. For just one
example, consider the page of the transcript following the
initial Batson exchange. On that one page alone, counsel
cut off another lawyer, raised an objection, and then inter-
rupted the trial judge mid-sentence to make another point.
1 App. 171. There are plenty of other examples like it.
See, e. g., id., at 158–160, 164–165.
Put simply, Mr. Pitchford's account of a muzzled defense
team is hard to square with the record. But even if it were
a plausible account, that still would not be enough. Under
§ 2254(d)(2), a federal habeas petitioner must show not only
that his version of events is plausible. He must show that
the record “compel[s]” it. Rice v. Collins, 546 U. S. 333, 341
(2006). And no matter how generously one interprets the
record in this case, that is a standard Mr. Pitchford cannot
meet. It is just as reasonable, if not more so, to conclude
that Mr. Pitchford's attorneys meant to “reserve” only the
statistical argument they had made at step one—not a step
three comparative juror argument they never mentioned at
any point during jury selection or trial. 1 App. 175. Re-
fecting as much, not only did the Mississippi Supreme Court
read the record differently than Mr. Pitchford now does.
The Fifth Circuit did too, holding that the Mississippi Su-
preme Court's waiver conclusion was not only reasonable but
correct. 126 F. 4th, at 429.
In response to all this, the Court insists that “defense
counsel typically” make a step three comparative juror argu-
ment before the trial court. Ante, at 400, n. 3. Perhaps
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410 PITCHFORD v. CAIN
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
that is right. But the Court points to nothing in the record
showing that Mr. Pitchford's counsel made such an argument
in this case. The Court reasserts, too, its “fundamental
point” that, even if Mr. Pitchford's counsel failed to present
a step three comparative juror argument, it was only because
the trial court “prevented” them from doing so. Ante, at
400, n. 3. But the Court's repetition of its point serves only
to highlight its failure to cite anything in the record support-
ing, much less compelling, its conclusion. See Rice, 546
U. S., at 341.
*
In short, I respectfully dissent because, as I see it, the
Court's opinion errs on the law and the factual record alike.
But if the Court's decision is mistaken, at least its impact is
limited. Precisely because so many of our AEDPA prece-
dents go unmentioned, I do not read today's decision as call-
ing any of them into question. Notably, too, the Court is-
sues a narrow judgment, holding only that Mr. Pitchford did
not waive a step three Batson argument without dictating
what further proceedings may be appropriate on remand
consistent with § 2254.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None

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