CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY et al. v. DOE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

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CASES ADJUDGED
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AT
OCTOBER TERM, 2002
CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
et al. v. DOE, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit
No. 01–1231. Argued November 13, 2002—Decided March 5, 2003
Among other things, Connecticut’s “Megan’s Law” requires persons con-
victed of sexual offenses to register with the Department of Public
Safety (DPS) upon their release into the community, and requires DPS
to post a sex offender registry containing registrants’ names, addresses,
photographs, and descriptions on an Internet Website and to make the
registry available to the public in certain state offices. Respondent
Doe (hereinafter respondent), a convicted sex offender who is subject
to the law, filed a 42 U. S. C. § 1983 action on behalf of himself and simi-
larly situated sex offenders, claiming that the law violates, inter alia,
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The District Court
granted respondent summary judgment, certified a class of individuals
subject to the law, and permanently enjoined the law’s public disclosure
provisions. The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that such disclo-
sure both deprived registered sex offenders of a “liberty interest,” and
violated the Due Process Clause because officials did not afford regis-
trants a predeprivation hearing to determine whether they are likely to
be “currently dangerous.”
Held: The Second Circuit’s judgment must be reversed because due proc-
ess does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material
to the State’s statutory scheme. Mere injury to reputation, even if de-
1

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2 CONNECTICUT DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY v. DOE
Syllabus
famatory, does not constitute the deprivation of a liberty interest. Paul
v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693. But even assuming, arguendo, that respondent
has been deprived of a liberty interest, due process does not entitle him
to a hearing to establish a fact—that he is not currently dangerous—
that is not material under the statute. Cf., e. g., Wisconsin v. Constant-
ineau, 400 U. S. 433. As the DPS Website explains, the law’s require-
ments turn on an offender’s conviction alone—a fact that a convicted
offender has already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to con-
test. Unless respondent can show that the substantive rule of law is
defective (by conflicting with the Constitution), any hearing on current
dangerousness is a bootless exercise. Respondent expressly disavows
any reliance on the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s protections, and maintains that his challenge is strictly a proce-
dural one. But States are not barred by principles of “procedural due
process” from drawing such classifications. Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
491 U. S. 110, 120 (plurality opinion). Such claims “must ultimately be
analyzed” in terms of substantive due process. Id., at 121. Because
the question is not properly before the Court, it expresses no opinion as
to whether the State’s law violates substantive due process principles.
Pp. 6–8.
271 F. 3d 38, reversed.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Con-
nor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 8. Souter, J., filed
a concurring opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p. 9. Stevens,
J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 110.
Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, ar-
gued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were
Gregory T. D’Auria, Associate Attorney General, and Lynn
D. Wittenbrink, Perry Zinn Rowthorn, and Mark F. Kohler,
Assistant Attorneys General.
Solicitor General Olson argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the
brief were Assistant Attorney General McCallum, Deputy
Solicitor General Clement, Gregory G. Garre, Leonard
Schaitman, and Mark W. Pennak.

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3 Cite as: 538 U. S. 1 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
Shelley R. Sadin argued the cause for respondents. With
her on the brief were Drew S. Days III, Beth S. Brinkmann,
Seth M. Galanter, Philip Tegeler, and Steven R. Shapiro.*
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We granted certiorari to determine whether the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit properly en-
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the District of
Columbia et al. by Robert R. Rigsby, Corporation Counsel of the District
of Columbia, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, and Ed-
ward E. Schwab, Senior Assistant Corporation Counsel, and by the Attor-
neys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Bill Pryor of
Alabama, Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Janet Napolitano of Arizona, Bill
Lockyer of California, Ken Salazar of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Dela-
ware, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia,
Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Steve Carter of Indiana,
Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Albert B. Chandler III of Kentucky, Richard
P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Jennifer M.
Granholm of Michigan, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay)
Nixon of Missouri, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of
Nevada, Patricia A. Madrid of New Mexico, Eliot Spitzer of New York,
Robert Torres of the Northern Mariana Islands, W. A. Drew Edmondson
of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Anabelle Rodrı´guez of Puerto Rico,
Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, Mark Barnett of South Dakota,
Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, John Cornyn of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff
of Utah, Jerry W. Kilgore of Virginia, Christine O. Gregoire of Washing-
ton, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, and James E. Doyle of
Wisconsin; for the National Governors Association et al. by Richard Ruda
and James I. Crowley; for the Center for the Community Interest by Rob-
ert J. Del Tufo; and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent
S. Scheidegger.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Association
for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers by David A. Reiser; for the Office of
the Public Defender for the State of New Jersey by Peter A. Garcia, Mi-
chael Z. Buncher, and Brian J. Neff; and for the Public Defender Service
for the District of Columbia et al. by James W. Klein, Samia A. Fam, and
Corinne A. Beckwith.
Lucy A. Dalglish and Gregg P. Leslie filed a brief for the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press as amicus curiae.

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4 CONNECTICUT DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY v. DOE
Opinion of the Court
joined the public disclosure of Connecticut’s sex offender reg-
istry. The Court of Appeals concluded that such disclosure
both deprived registered sex offenders of a “liberty inter-
est,” and violated the Due Process Clause because officials
did not afford registrants a predeprivation hearing to deter-
mine whether they are likely to be “currently dangerous.”
Doe v. Department of Public Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F. 3d 38,
44, 46 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Connecti-
cut, however, has decided that the registry requirement shall
be based on the fact of previous conviction, not the fact of
current dangerousness. Indeed, the public registry explic-
itly states that officials have not determined that any reg-
istrant is currently dangerous. We therefore reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals because due process does
not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not mate-
rial to the State’s statutory scheme.
“Sex offenders are a serious threat in this Nation.” Mc-
Kune v. Lile, 536 U. S. 24, 32 (2002) (plurality opinion).
“[T]he victims of sex assault are most often juveniles,” and
“[w]hen convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are
much more likely than any other type of offender to be re-
arrested for a new rape or sexual assault.” Id., at 32–33.
Connecticut, like every other State, has responded to these
facts by enacting a statute designed to protect its communi-
ties from sex offenders and to help apprehend repeat sex
offenders. Connecticut’s “Megan’s Law” applies to all per-
sons convicted of criminal offenses against a minor, violent
and nonviolent sexual offenses, and felonies committed for a
sexual purpose. Covered offenders must register with the
Connecticut Department of Public Safety (DPS) upon their
release into the community. Each must provide personal in-
formation (including his name, address, photograph, and
DNA sample); notify DPS of any change in residence; and
periodically submit an updated photograph. The registra-
tion requirement runs for 10 years in most cases; those con-

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5 Cite as: 538 U. S. 1 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
victed of sexually violent offenses must register for life.
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54–251, 54–252, 54–254 (2001).
The statute requires DPS to compile the information gath-
ered from registrants and publicize it. In particular, the law
requires DPS to post a sex offender registry on an Internet
Website and to make the registry available to the public
in certain state offices. §§ 54–257, 54–258. Whether made
available in an office or via the Internet, the registry must
be accompanied by the following warning: “ ‘Any person who
uses information in this registry to injure, harass or commit
a criminal act against any person included in the registry
or any other person is subject to criminal prosecution.’ ”
§ 54–258a.
Before the District Court enjoined its operation, the
State’s Website enabled citizens to obtain the name, address,
photograph, and description of any registered sex offender
by entering a zip code or town name. The following dis-
claimer appeared on the first page of the Website:
“ ‘The registry is based on the legislature’s decision to
facilitate access to publicly-available information about
persons convicted of sexual offenses. [DPS] has not
considered or assessed the specific risk of reoffense with
regard to any individual prior to his or her inclusion
within this registry, and has made no determination that
any individual included in the registry is currently dan-
gerous. Individuals included within the registry are in-
cluded solely by virtue of their conviction record and
state law. The main purpose of providing this data on
the Internet is to make the information more easily
available and accessible, not to warn about any specific
individual.’ ” 271 F. 3d, at 44.
Petitioners include the state agencies and officials charged
with compiling the sex offender registry and posting it on
the Internet. Respondent Doe (hereinafter respondent) is
a convicted sex offender who is subject to Connecticut’s Meg-

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6 CONNECTICUT DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY v. DOE
Opinion of the Court
an’s Law. He filed this action pursuant to Rev. Stat. § 1979,
42 U. S. C. § 1983, on behalf of himself and similarly situated
sex offenders, claiming that the law violates, inter alia, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Spe-
cifically, respondent alleged that he is not a “ ‘dangerous sex-
ual offender,’ ” and that the Connecticut law “deprives him
of a liberty interest—his reputation combined with the alter-
ation of his status under state law—without notice or a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.” 271 F. 3d, at 45–46.
The District Court granted summary judgment for respond-
ent on his due process claim. 132 F. Supp. 2d 57 (Conn.
2001). The court then certified a class of individuals subject
to the Connecticut law, and permanently enjoined the law’s
public disclosure provisions.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, 271 F. 3d 38 (CA2 2001),
holding that the Due Process Clause entitles class members
to a hearing “to determine whether or not they are particu-
larly likely to be currently dangerous before being labeled as
such by their inclusion in a publicly disseminated registry.”
Id., at 62. Because Connecticut had not provided such a
hearing, the Court of Appeals enjoined petitioners from
“ ‘disclosing or disseminating to the public, either in printed
or electronic form (a) the Registry or (b) Registry informa-
tion concerning [class members]’ ” and from “ ‘identifying
[them] as being included in the Registry.’ ” Ibid. The
Court of Appeals reasoned that the Connecticut law impli-
cated a “liberty interest” because of: (1) the law’s stigmatiza-
tion of respondent by “implying” that he is “currently dan-
gerous,” and (2) its imposition of “extensive and onerous”
registration obligations on respondent. Id., at 57. From
this liberty interest arose an obligation, in the Court of Ap-
peals’ view, to give respondent an opportunity to demon-
strate that he was not “likely to be currently dangerous.”
Id., at 62. We granted certiorari, 535 U. S. 1077 (2002).
In Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693 (1976), we held that mere
injury to reputation, even if defamatory, does not constitute

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7 Cite as: 538 U. S. 1 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
the deprivation of a liberty interest. Petitioners urge us to
reverse the Court of Appeals on the ground that, under Paul
v. Davis, respondent has failed to establish that petitioners
have deprived him of a liberty interest. We find it unneces-
sary to reach this question, however, because even assuming,
arguendo, that respondent has been deprived of a liberty
interest, due process does not entitle him to a hearing to
establish a fact that is not material under the Connecticut
statute.
In cases such as Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433
(1971), and Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), we held that
due process required the government to accord the plaintiff
a hearing to prove or disprove a particular fact or set of
facts. But in each of these cases, the fact in question was
concededly relevant to the inquiry at hand. Here, however,
the fact that respondent seeks to prove—that he is not cur-
rently dangerous—is of no consequence under Connecticut’s
Megan’s Law. As the DPS Website explains, the law’s re-
quirements turn on an offender’s conviction alone—a fact
that a convicted offender has already had a procedurally
safeguarded opportunity to contest. 271 F. 3d, at 44 (“ ‘Indi-
viduals included within the registry are included solely by
virtue of their conviction record and state law’ ” (emphasis
added)). No other fact is relevant to the disclosure of reg-
istrants’ information. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54–257, 54–258
(2001). Indeed, the disclaimer on the Website explicitly
states that respondent’s alleged nondangerousness simply
does not matter. 271 F. 3d, at 44 (“ ‘[DPS] has made no de-
termination that any individual included in the registry is
currently dangerous’ ”).
In short, even if respondent could prove that he is not
likely to be currently dangerous, Connecticut has decided
that the registry information of all sex offenders—currently
dangerous or not—must be publicly disclosed. Unless re-
spondent can show that that substantive rule of law is defec-
tive (by conflicting with a provision of the Constitution), any

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8 CONNECTICUT DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY v. DOE
Scalia, J., concurring
hearing on current dangerousness is a bootless exercise. It
may be that respondent’s claim is actually a substantive chal-
lenge to Connecticut’s statute “recast in ‘procedural due
process’ terms.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 308 (1993).
Nonetheless, respondent expressly disavows any reliance on
the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
protections, Brief for Respondents 44–45, and maintains, as
he did below, that his challenge is strictly a procedural one.
But States are not barred by principles of “procedural due
process” from drawing such classifications. Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U. S. 110, 120 (1989) (plurality opinion) (em-
phasis in original). See also id., at 132 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in judgment). Such claims “must ultimately be ana-
lyzed” in terms of substantive, not procedural, due process.
Id., at 121. Because the question is not properly before us,
we express no opinion as to whether Connecticut’s Megan’s
Law violates principles of substantive due process.
Plaintiffs who assert a right to a hearing under the Due
Process Clause must show that the facts they seek to estab-
lish in that hearing are relevant under the statutory scheme.
Respondent cannot make that showing here. The judgment
of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Reversed.
Justice Scalia, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion, and add that even if the require-
ments of Connecticut’s sex offender registration law impli-
cate a liberty interest of respondents, the categorical abroga-
tion of that liberty interest by a validly enacted statute
suffices to provide all the process that is “due”—just as a
state law providing that no one under the age of 16 may
operate a motor vehicle suffices to abrogate that liberty in-
terest. Absent a claim (which respondents have not made
here) that the liberty interest in question is so fundamental
as to implicate so-called “substantive” due process, a prop-
erly enacted law can eliminate it. That is ultimately why,

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9 Cite as: 538 U. S. 1 (2003)
Souter, J., concurring
as the Court’s opinion demonstrates, a convicted sex offender
has no more right to additional “process” enabling him to
establish that he is not dangerous than (in the analogous case
just suggested) a 15-year-old has a right to “process” en-
abling him to establish that he is a safe driver.
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion and agree with the observation
that today’s holding does not foreclose a claim that Connecti-
cut’s dissemination of registry information is actionable on a
substantive due process principle. To the extent that libel
might be at least a component of such a claim, our reference
to Connecticut’s disclaimer, ante, at 5, would not stand in the
way of a substantive due process plaintiff. I write sepa-
rately only to note that a substantive due process claim may
not be the only one still open to a test by those in the re-
spondents’ situation.
Connecticut allows certain sex offenders the possibility of
avoiding the registration and reporting obligations of the
statute. A court may exempt a convict from registration
altogether if his offense was unconsented sexual contact,
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54–251(c) (2001), or sexual intercourse
with a minor aged between 13 and 16 while the offender was
more than two years older than the minor, provided the of-
fender was under age 19 at the time of the offense, § 54–
251(b). A court also has discretion to limit dissemination
of an offender’s registration information to law enforcement
purposes if necessary to protect the identity of a victim who
is related to the offender or, in the case of a sexual assault,
who is the offender’s spouse or cohabitor. §§ 54–255(a), (b).*
*To mitigate the retroactive effects of the statute, offenders in these
categories who were convicted between October 1, 1988, and June 30, 1999,
were allowed to petition a court for restricted dissemination of registry
information. §§ 54–255(c)(1)–(4). A similar petition was also available to
any offender who became subject to registration by virtue of a conviction

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10 CONNECTICUT DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY v. DOE
Souter, J., concurring
Whether the decision is to exempt an offender from registra-
tion or to restrict publication of registry information, it must
rest on a finding that registration or public dissemination is
not required for public safety. §§ 54–251(b), 54–255(a), (b).
The State thus recognizes that some offenders within the
sweep of the publication requirement are not dangerous to
others in any way justifying special publicity on the Internet,
and the legislative decision to make courts responsible for
granting exemptions belies the State’s argument that courts
are unequipped to separate offenders who warrant special
publication from those who do not.
The line drawn by the legislature between offenders who
are sensibly considered eligible to seek discretionary relief
from the courts and those who are not is, like all legislative
choices affecting individual rights, open to challenge under
the Equal Protection Clause. See, e. g., 3 R. Rotunda & J.
Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law § 17.6 (3d ed. 1999);
L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16–34 (2d ed. 1988).
The refusal to allow even the possibility of relief to, say, a
19-year-old who has consensual intercourse with a minor
aged 16 is therefore a reviewable legislative determination.
Today’s case is no occasion to speak either to the possible
merits of such a challenge or the standard of scrutiny that
might be in order when considering it. I merely note that
the Court’s rejection of respondents’ procedural due process
claim does not immunize publication schemes like Connecti-
cut’s from an equal protection challenge.
[For opinion of Justice Stevens concurring in the judg-
ment, see post, p. 110.]
prior to October 1, 1998, if he was not incarcerated for the offense, had
not been subsequently convicted of a registrable offense, and had properly
registered under the law. § 54–255(c)(5).