COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS v. UNITED STATES ex rel. CHANDLER

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119 OCTOBER TERM, 2002
Syllabus
COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS v. UNITED STATES
ex rel. CHANDLER
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the seventh circuit
No. 01–1572. Argued January 14, 2003—Decided March 10, 2003
Under the False Claims Act (FCA), “[a]ny person” who, inter alia, “know-
ingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the
United States Government . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval,” 31 U. S. C. § 3729(a)(1), is liable to the Government for a civil
penalty, treble damages, and costs, § 3729(a). Although the Attorney
General may sue under the FCA, a private person, known as a relator,
may also bring a qui tam action “in the name of the Government.”
§ 3730(b). The relator must inform the Justice Department of her inten-
tions and keep the pleadings under seal while the Government decides
whether to intervene and do its own litigating. § 3730(b)(2). If the
claim succeeds, the relator’s share may be up to 30 percent of the pro-
ceeds of the action, plus reasonable expenses, costs, and attorney’s fees.
§ 3730(d). This case involves a National Institute of Drug Abuse re-
search grant to Cook County Hospital for a study that was later adminis-
tered by a nonprofit research institute affiliated with the hospital. Re-
spondent Chandler, who ran the study for the institute, filed this qui
tam action, claiming that Cook County (hereinafter County) and the
institute had submitted false statements to obtain grant funds in viola-
tion of § 3729(a)(1). After this Court held in Vermont Agency of Natu-
ral Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, that States
are not “persons” subject to FCA qui tam actions, the District Court
granted the County’s motion to dismiss the claims against it. The court
held that the County, like a State, could not be subjected to treble dam-
ages, which Stevens described as “essentially punitive,” id., at 784. The
Seventh Circuit distinguished Stevens and reversed.
Held: Local governments are “persons” amenable to qui tam actions
under the FCA. Pp. 125–134.
(a) While § 3729 does not define the term “person,” its meaning has
remained unchanged since the original FCA was passed in 1863. Ste-
vens, supra, at 783, n. 12. There is no doubt that the term then ex-
tended to corporations. Indeed, this Court as early as 1826 in United
States v. Amedy, 11 Wheat. 392, 412, recognized the presumption that
“person” also includes “persons politic and incorporate.” Essentially
conceding that private corporations were taken to be persons when the

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120 COOK COUNTY v. UNITED STATES ex rel. CHANDLER
Syllabus
FCA was passed in 1863, the County argues that municipal corporations
were not so understood until six years later, when the Court decided
Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 Wall. 118. Cowles, however, was not an
extension of principle but a natural recognition of the common under-
standing that municipal corporations and private ones were to be
treated alike in terms of their legal status as persons capable of suing
and being sued. This explains how the Court in Cowles could conclude
“automatically and without discussion” that municipal corporations, like
private ones, “should be treated as natural persons for virtually all pur-
poses of constitutional and statutory analysis.” Monell v. New York
City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 687–688. Of course, the
meaning of “person” recognized in Cowles was only a presumptive one,
but neither the history nor the text of the original FCA provides contex-
tual evidence that Congress intended to exclude municipalities from the
class of “persons” covered by the FCA in 1863. Pp. 125–129.
(b) The False Claims Amendments Act of 1986 did not repeal munici-
pal liability. As part of an effort to modernize the FCA, the 1986
amendments raised the ceiling on damages recoverable under § 3729(a)
from double to treble. Relying on the common law presumption against
punitive damages for municipalities, see Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,
453 U. S. 247, 259–260, and n. 21, and on this Court’s statement in Ste-
vens, supra, at 784, 785, that the change from double to treble damages
turned what had been a “remedial” provision into an “essentially puni-
tive” one, the County argues that, even if municipalities were covered
by the term “person” from 1863 to 1986, Congress’s adoption of a “puni-
tive” remedy entailed the elimination of municipal liability in 1986. It
does not follow from Stevens, however, that the punitive feature of FCA
damages has the force to show congressional intent to repeal implicitly
the existing definition of “person.” To begin with, the FCA’s damages
multiplier has a compensatory function as well as a punitive one. Most
obviously, the statute’s qui tam feature means that as much as 30 per-
cent of the Government’s recovery may go to a private relator who
began the action. Even when there is no qui tam relator to be paid,
liability beyond actual damages may be necessary for full recovery, since
the FCA has no separate provision for prejudgment interest or conse-
quential damages. The force of the treble damages remedy’s “punitive”
nature in arguing against municipal liability is not as robust as it would
be if that remedy were a pure penalty in all cases. What is more, treble
damages certainly does not equate with classic punitive damages, which
leaves the jury with open-ended discretion over the amount, and so
raises two concerns specific to municipal defendants: that local govern-
ment’s taxing power will make it an easy target for an unduly generous

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121 Cite as: 538 U. S. 119 (2003)
Syllabus
jury and that blameless or unknowing taxpayers will be unfairly taxed
for the wrongdoing of local officials. Neither of these concerns is seri-
ous in FCA cases. The presumption against punitive damages thus
brings only limited vigor to the County’s aid. Working against the
County’s position, however, is a different presumption, this one at full
strength: the “cardinal rule . . . that repeals by implication are not fa-
vored.” Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503. Inferring
repeal of municipal liability from the increase in the damages ceiling
from double to triple would be difficult in the abstract, but it is impossi-
ble given that the basic purpose of the 1986 amendments was to make
the FCA a more useful tool against fraud in modern times. Whether
or not this was true in 1863, local governments now often administer or
receive federal funds. It is simply not plausible that Congress intended
to repeal municipal liability sub silentio by the very Act it passed to
strengthen the Government’s hand in fighting false claims. Pp. 129–134.
277 F. 3d 969, affirmed.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Donna M. Lach argued the cause for petitioner. With her
on the briefs were Richard A. Devine, Patrick T. Driscoll,
Jr., Sanjay T. Tailor, Jerold S. Solovy, and Barry Sullivan.
Judson H. Miner argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were George F. Galland, Jr., and Charlotte
Crane.
Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on
the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney
General McCallum, Deputy Solicitor General Clement,
Douglas N. Letter, and Michael E. Robinson.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the City of New
York et al. by Michael A. Cardozo, Leonard J. Koerner, Gail Rubin, Mer-
ita A. Hopkins, A. Scott Chinn, and Grant F. Langley; for the County of
Orange, California, et al. by Walter Dellinger, Jonathan D. Hacker, and
James R. Asperger; for 43 Local Governmental Airport Proprietors by
Scott P. Lewis; for the National Association of Counties et al. by Richard
Ruda, Robert K. Huffman, Miriam R. Nemetz, Charles A. Rothfeld, and
Robert L. Bronston; for the National Association of Public Hospitals and

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122 COOK COUNTY v. UNITED STATES ex rel. CHANDLER
Opinion of the Court
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States
ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765 (2000), we held that States are
not “persons” subject to qui tam actions under the False
Claims Act (FCA), 31 U. S. C. §§ 3729–3733. Here, the ques-
tion is whether local governments are amenable to such
suits, and we hold that they are.
I
Stevens, supra, at 768–770, explains in some detail how
the FCA currently provides for civil penalties against “[a]ny
person” who (so far as it concerns us here) “knowingly pre-
sents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of
the United States Government . . . a false or fraudulent claim
for payment or approval.” § 3729(a)(1). Although the At-
torney General may sue under the FCA, so may a private
person, known as a relator, in a qui tam action brought “in
the name of the Government,” but with the hope of sharing
in any recovery. § 3730(b). The relator must inform the
Department of Justice of her intentions and keep the plead-
ings under seal for 60 days while the Government decides
whether to intervene and do its own litigating. § 3730(b)(2);
see also § 3730(c). If the claim succeeds, the defendant is
liable to the Government for a civil penalty between $5,000
and $10,000 for each violation, treble damages (reducible
to double damages for cooperative defendants), and costs.
Health Systems et al. by Charles Luband; and by the Texas Association
of School Boards Legal Assistance Fund et al. by William J. Boyce and
Warren S. Huang.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for K & R Limited
Partnership et al. by Carl A. S. Coan III and Regina D. Poserina; and for
Taxpayers Against Fraud, the False Claims Act Legal Center, by Charles
J. Cooper, Brian Stuart Koukoutchos, and James Moorman.
Michael P. Dignazio and Francis X. Crowley filed a brief as amicus
curiae for the County of Delaware, Pennsylvania.

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Opinion of the Court
§ 3729(a).1 The relator’s share of the “proceeds of the action
or settlement” may be up to 30 percent, depending on
whether the Government intervened and, if so, how much
the relator contributed to the prosecution of the claim.
§ 3730(d).2 The relator may also get reasonable expenses,
costs, and attorney’s fees. Ibid.
The fraud in this case allegedly occurred in administering
a $5 million grant from the National Institute of Drug Abuse
to Cook County Hospital, owned and operated as the name
implies, with the object of studying a treatment regimen for
pregnant drug addicts. The grant was subject to a variety
of conditions, including the terms of a compliance plan meant
to assure that the study would jibe with federal regulations
for research on human subjects. Administration of the
study was later transferred to the Hektoen Institute for
Medical Research, a nonprofit research organization affiliated
with the hospital. Respondent, Dr. Janet Chandler, ran the
study from September 1993 until the institute fired her in
January 1995.
1 The statutory penalties are adjusted upward for inflation under the
Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101–410,
§ 5, 104 Stat. 891, note following 28 U. S. C. § 2461. The penalty is cur-
rently $5,500 to $11,000. 28 CFR § 85.3(a)(9) (2002).
2 If the Government does not intervene, the relator is entitled to 25 to
30 percent of the proceeds. 31 U. S. C. § 3730(d)(2). If the Government
chooses to intervene, the relator “shall . . . receive at least 15 percent but
not more than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of
the claim, depending upon the extent to which the person substantially
contributed to the prosecution of the action.” § 3730(d)(1). If, however,
the court determines that the action was “based primarily on disclosures
of specific information (other than information provided by the person
bringing the action) relating to allegations or transactions in a criminal,
civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Gov-
ernment Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from
the news media, the court may award such sums as it considers appro-
priate, but in no case more than 10 percent of the proceeds . . . .” Ibid.
(footnote omitted).

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124 COOK COUNTY v. UNITED STATES ex rel. CHANDLER
Opinion of the Court
In 1997, Chandler filed this qui tam action, claiming that
Cook County (hereinafter County) and the institute had sub-
mitted false statements to obtain grant funds in violation of
§ 3729(a)(1).3 Chandler said that the defendants had vio-
lated the grant’s express conditions, had failed to comply
with the regulations on human-subject research, and had
submitted false reports of what she called “ghost” research
subjects. Chandler also alleged that she was fired for re-
porting the fraud to doctors at the hospital and to the grant-
ing agency, rendering her dismissal a violation of both state
law and the whistle-blower provision of the FCA, § 3730(h).4
The Government declined to intervene in the action.
The County moved to dismiss the claims against it, ar-
guing, among other things, that it was not a “person” subject
to liability under the FCA.5 The District Court denied the
motion, reading the term “person” in the FCA to include
state and local governments. United States ex rel. Chan-
dler v. Hektoen Institute for Medical Research, 35 F. Supp.
2d 1078 (ND Ill. 1999). The Court of Appeals dismissed
the County’s interlocutory appeal, and we denied certiorari.
528 U. S. 931 (1999). After Stevens came down, however,
the District Court reconsidered the County’s motion and dis-
missed Chandler’s action. Although the court found “no
reason to alter its conclusion that the County is a ‘person’
for purposes of the FCA,” it held that the County, like a
State, could not be subjected to treble damages, which Ste-
vens, supra, at 784, described not as “remedial” but as “es-
sentially punitive.” 118 F. Supp. 2d 902, 903 (2000). The
3 The hospital was originally a defendant as well but was dismissed from
the case as having no identity independent of the County. 277 F. 3d 969,
971, n. 2 (CA7 2002).
4 Chandler’s retaliation claims against the County were dismissed be-
cause the institute, not the County, was her employer. United States ex
rel. Chandler v. Hektoen Institute for Medical Research, 35 F. Supp. 2d
1078, 1087 (ND Ill. 1999).
5 The institute also moved to dismiss, on different grounds; the denial of
that motion is not before us. 277 F. 3d, at 969, n. 1.

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Court of Appeals, in conflict with two other Circuits,6 distin-
guished Stevens and reversed, 277 F. 3d 969 (CA7 2002). We
granted certiorari, 536 U. S. 956 (2002), and now affirm the
Court of Appeals.
II
While § 3729 does not define the term “person,” we have
held that its meaning has remained unchanged since the orig-
inal FCA was passed in 1863. Stevens, 529 U. S., at 783,
n. 12. There is no doubt that the term then extended to
corporations, the Court in 1826 having expressly recognized
the presumption that the statutory term “person” “ ‘extends
as well to persons politic and incorporate, as to natural per-
sons whatsoever.’ ” United States v. Amedy, 11 Wheat. 392,
412 (1826) (quoting 2 E. Coke, The Second Part of the Insti-
tutes of the Laws of England 736 (1787 ed.) (reprinted in 5B
2d Historical Writings in Law and Jurisprudence (1986)); see
11 Wheat., at 412 (“That corporations are, in law, for civil
purposes, deemed persons, is unquestionable”); accord, Beas-
ton v. Farmers’ Bank of Del., 12 Pet. 102, 135 (1838); see also
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518,
667 (1819) (opinion of Story, J.) (A corporation “is, in short,
an artificial person, existing in contemplation of law, and en-
dowed with certain powers and franchises which, though
they must be exercised through the medium of its natural
members, are yet considered as subsisting in the corporation
itself, as distinctly as if it were a real personage”). This
position accorded with the common understanding among
contemporary commentators that corporations were “per-
sons” in the general enjoyment of the capacity to sue and be
sued. See, e. g., 2 J. Bouvier, A Law Dictionary 332 (6th ed.
1856) (def. 2: The term “person” “is also used to denote a
corporation which is an artificial person”); 1 S. Kyd, A Trea-
6 United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Delaware, 279 F. 3d 219
(CA3 2002); United States ex rel. Garibaldi v. Orleans Parish School Bd.,
244 F. 3d 486 (CA5 2001).

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126 COOK COUNTY v. UNITED STATES ex rel. CHANDLER
Opinion of the Court
tise on the Law of Corporations 13 (1793) (“A corporation
then, or a body politic, or body incorporate, is a collection of
many individuals, united into one body, . . . and vested, by
the policy of the law, with the capacity of acting, in several
respects, as an individual, particularly of taking and grant-
ing property, of contracting obligations, and of suing and
being sued . . .”). While it is true that Chief Justice Mar-
shall’s opinion in Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch
61, 86–87 (1809), declined to rely on the presumption when
it decided the separate issue whether a corporation was a
“citizen” for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction, by
1844 the Deveaux position had been abandoned and a corpo-
ration was understood to have citizenship independent of its
constituent members by virtue of its status as “a person,
although an artificial person.” Louisville, C. & C. R. Co. v.
Letson, 2 How. 497, 558 (1844); see 1 A. Burrill, A Law Dic-
tionary and Glossary 383 (2d ed. 1859) (“A corporation has
been declared to be not only a person, . . . but to be capable
of being considered an inhabitant of a state, and even of
being treated as a citizen, for all purposes of suing and
being sued”).
Essentially conceding that private corporations were
taken to be persons when the FCA was passed in 1863, the
County argues that municipal corporations were not so un-
derstood until six years later, when Cowles v. Mercer
County, 7 Wall. 118 (1869), applied the Letson rule to them.
Cowles, however, was not an extension of principle but a nat-
ural recognition of an understanding going back at least to
Coke, supra, that municipal corporations and private ones
were simply two species of “body politic and corporate,”
treated alike in terms of their legal status as persons capable
of suing and being sued. See, e. g., W. Glover, A Practical
Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations 41 (1837)
(Municipal corporations have, as an attribute “necessarily
and inseparably incident to every corporation,” the ability
“[t]o sue or be sued, . . . and do all other acts as natural

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127 Cite as: 538 U. S. 119 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
persons may”); see also 1 J. Dillon, The Law of Municipal
Corporations 92 (rev. 2d ed. 1873). Indeed, “[t]he archetypal
American corporation of the eighteenth century [was] the
municipality”; only in the early 19th century did private cor-
porations become widespread. M. Horwitz, The Transfor-
mation of American Law, 1780–1860, p. 112 (1977). This his-
tory explains how the Court in Cowles could conclude
“automatically and without discussion” that municipal corpo-
rations, like private ones, “should be treated as natural per-
sons for virtually all purposes of constitutional and statutory
analysis.” Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.,
436 U. S. 658, 687–688 (1978); see Cowles, supra, at 121
(describing the question as one that “presents but little
difficulty”).7
Of course, the meaning of “person” recognized in Cowles
is the usual one, but not immutable, see Monell, supra, at
688, and the County asks us to take a cue from the qualifica-
tion included in the later definition in the Dictionary Act,
Act of Feb. 25, 1871, § 2, 16 Stat. 431, that “the word ‘person’
may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate
. . . unless the context shows that [it was] intended to be
used in a more limited sense.” Cf. J. Angell & S. Ames, A
Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Aggregate 4
(rev. 3d ed. 1846) (“The construction is, that when ‘persons’
are mentioned in a statute, corporations are included if they
fall within the general reason and design of the statute”).
The County invokes two points of context that it takes as
7 The County and some of its supporting amici urge a further distinction
between full-fledged municipal corporations such as towns and cities,
which were incorporated at the request of their inhabitants, and “quasi
corporations” such as counties, which were unilateral creations of the
State. See Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540, 552 (1876).
While the liability of quasi corporations at common law may have differed
from that of municipal corporations, see ibid., both were treated equally
as legal “persons.” Indeed, Cowles itself applied to an Illinois county like
Cook County.

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128 COOK COUNTY v. UNITED STATES ex rel. CHANDLER
Opinion of the Court
indicating that in the FCA Congress intended a more lim-
ited meaning.
First, it says that the statutory text is “inherently incon-
sistent with local governmental liability,” Brief for Petitioner
13, owing to the references of the original enactment to “any
person in the land or naval forces of the United States” and
“any person not in the military or naval forces of the United
States,” together with a provision imposing criminal liability,
including imprisonment, on defendants in the latter category,
see Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, §§ 1, 3, 12 Stat. 696, 697, 698.8
But the old text merely shows that “any person in the land or
naval forces” was directed at natural persons. The second
phrase, covering all other “persons,” could not have been
that limited, or even private corporations would be outside
the FCA’s coverage, a reading that not even the County es-
pouses and one that we seriously doubted in Stevens, 529
U. S., at 782. As for the FCA’s reference to criminal liabil-
ity, “[t]he short answer is that it has not been regarded as
anomalous to require compliance by municipalities with the
substantive standards of . . . federal laws which impose [both
civil and criminal] sanctions upon ‘persons.’ ” Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 400 (1978).
Municipalities may not be susceptible to every statutory pen-
alty, but that is no reason to exempt them from remedies
that sensibly apply. Id., at 400–401; United States v. Union
Supply Co., 215 U. S. 50, 54–55 (1909).
The other contextual evidence cited by the County is the
history of the FCA. We recounted in Stevens that Con-
gress’s primary concern in 1863 was “ ‘stopping the massive
frauds perpetrated by large [private] contractors during the
Civil War.’ ” 529 U. S., at 781 (quoting United States v.
Bornstein, 423 U. S. 303, 309 (1976), but adding “[private]”).
Local governments, the County says, were not players in the
8 The FCA’s civil and criminal provisions were bifurcated in 1878, see
Rainwater v. United States, 356 U. S. 590, 592, n. 8 (1958), and the latter
provisions have since been recodified at 18 U. S. C. § 287.

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game of war profiteering that the FCA was meant to stop.
Of course, this is true, but in no way does it affect the fact
that Congress wrote expansively, meaning “to reach all
types of fraud, without qualification, that might result in fi-
nancial loss to the Government.” United States v. Neifert-
White Co., 390 U. S. 228, 232 (1968). Whatever municipal
corporations may have been doing in 1863, in 2003 local gov-
ernments are commonly at the receiving end of all sorts of
federal funding schemes and thus no less able than individu-
als or private corporations to impose on the federal fisc
and exploit the exercise of the federal spending power.
Cf. Monell, supra, at 685–686 (noting that municipalities can,
“equally with natural persons, create the harms intended to
be remedied [by 42 U. S. C. § 1983]”). In sum, neither his-
tory nor text points to exclusion of municipalities from the
class of “persons” covered by the FCA in 1863.
III
Nor is the application of this reading of the statute af-
fected by the County’s alternative position, based on the evo-
lution of the FCA’s provisions for relief. The County’s argu-
ment leads off, at least, with a sound premise about the
historical tension between municipal liability and damages
imposed as punishment. Although it was well established
in 1863 “that a municipality, like a private corporation, was
to be treated as a natural person subject to suit for a wide
range of tortious activity, . . . this understanding did not
extend to the award of punitive or exemplary damages,”
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247, 259–260 (1981).
Since municipalities’ common law resistance to punitive dam-
ages still obtains, “[t]he general rule today is that no punitive
damages are allowed unless expressly authorized by stat-
ute.” Id., at 260, n. 21.
The County relies on this general statement in asking us
to infer a remarkable consequence unstated in the 1986
amendments to the FCA. As part of an effort to modernize

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130 COOK COUNTY v. UNITED STATES ex rel. CHANDLER
Opinion of the Court
the FCA, Congress then raised the fine from $2,000 to the
current range of $5,000 to $10,000, and raised the ceiling on
damages recoverable under § 3729(a) from double to treble.
False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99–562, § 2(7),
100 Stat. 3153. In Stevens, we spoke of this change as turn-
ing what had been a “remedial” provision into an “essentially
punitive” one. 529 U. S., at 784, 785. The County relies on
this characterization to argue that, even if municipalities
were covered by the term “person” from 1863 to 1986, Con-
gress’s adoption of a “punitive” remedy entailed the elimina-
tion of municipal liability in 1986.
Although we did indeed find the punitive character of the
treble damages provision a reason not to read “person” to
include a State, see id., at 785, it does not follow that the
punitive feature has the force to show congressional intent
to repeal implicitly the existing definition of that word, which
included municipalities. To begin with it is important to re-
alize that treble damages have a compensatory side, serving
remedial purposes in addition to punitive objectives. See,
e. g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 635–636 (1985) (citing Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S. 477, 485–486 (1977));
American Soc. of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel
Corp., 456 U. S. 556, 575 (1982); see also Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U. S. 143, 151
(1987). While the tipping point between payback and pun-
ishment defies general formulation, being dependent on the
workings of a particular statute and the course of particular
litigation, the facts about the FCA show that the damages
multiplier has compensatory traits along with the punitive.
There is no question that some liability beyond the amount
of the fraud is usually “necessary to compensate the Govern-
ment completely for the costs, delays, and inconveniences oc-
casioned by fraudulent claims.” Bornstein, supra, at 315;
see United States v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435, 445 (1989) (not-
ing that the Government’s injury includes “not merely the

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Opinion of the Court
amount of the fraud itself, but also ancillary costs, such as
the costs of detection and investigation, that routinely attend
the Government’s efforts to root out deceptive practices di-
rected at the public purse”). The most obvious indication
that the treble damages ceiling has a remedial place under
this statute is its qui tam feature with its possibility of di-
verting as much as 30 percent of the Government’s recovery
to a private relator who began the action. In qui tam cases
the rough difference between double and triple damages may
well serve not to punish, but to quicken the self-interest
of some private plaintiff who can spot violations and start
litigating to compensate the Government, while benefiting
himself as well. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,
317 U. S. 537, 547 (1943). The treble feature thus leaves the
remaining double damages to provide elements of make-
whole recovery beyond mere recoupment of the fraud.
Cf. Bornstein, 423 U. S., at 315, and n. 11. It may also be
necessary for full recovery even when there is no qui tam
relator to be paid. The FCA has no separate provision for
prejudgment interest, which is usually thought essential to
compensation, see, e. g., Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U. S. 1,
10–11 (2001), and might well be substantial given the FCA’s
long statute of limitations, § 3731(b). Nor does the FCA ex-
pressly provide for the consequential damages that typically
come with recovery for fraud, see Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 549(1)(b), and Comment d (1976).9
Thus, although Stevens recognized that the FCA’s treble
damages remedy is still “punitive” in that recovery will ex-
ceed full compensation in a good many cases, the force of this
9 The treble damages provision was, in a way, adopted by Congress as
a substitute for consequential damages. The Senate version of the bill
proposed consequential damages on top of treble damages, while the
House version proposed consequential damages plus double damages.
See S. Rep. No. 99–345, p. 39 (1986) (hereinafter S. Rep.); H. R. Rep.
No. 99–660, p. 20 (1986). Ultimately, the Senate’s treble figure was
adopted and the consequential damages provision dropped.

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132 COOK COUNTY v. UNITED STATES ex rel. CHANDLER
Opinion of the Court
punitive nature in arguing against municipal liability is not
as robust as if it were a pure penalty in all cases. Treble
damages certainly do not equate with classic punitive dam-
ages, which leave the jury with open-ended discretion over
the amount and so raises two concerns specific to municipal
defendants. One is that a local government’s taxing power
makes it an easy target for an unduly generous jury. See
Newport, 453 U. S., at 270–271. But under the FCA, the
jury is open to no such temptation; if it finds liability, its
instruction is to return a verdict for actual damages, for
which the court alone then determines any multiplier, just
as the court alone sets any separate penalty. § 3729(a); see
277 F. 3d, at 978. There is mitigation, also, for the second
worry, that “blameless or unknowing taxpayers” will be un-
fairly taxed for the wrongdoing of local officials. Newport,
453 U. S., at 267. This very case shows how FCA liability
may expose only local taxpayers who have already enjoyed
the indirect benefit of the fraud, to the extent that the fed-
eral money has already been passed along in lower taxes
or expanded services. Cf. ibid. The question in such cases
is whether the local taxpayer should make up for an un-
deserved benefit, or the federal taxpayer be permanently out
of pocket, a question that can be answered in any given case,
not by an opportunistic qui tam relator, but by a combination
of the judge’s discretion and the Government’s power to in-
tervene and dismiss or settle an action, see § 3730(c)(2).
The presumption against punitive damages thus brings
only limited vigor to the County’s aid. Working against the
County’s position, however, is a different presumption, this
one at full strength: the “cardinal rule . . . that repeals by
implication are not favored.” Posadas v. National City
Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503 (1936). Inferring repeal from legis-
lative silence is hazardous at best, and error seems over-
whelmingly likely in the notion that the 1986 amendments
wordlessly redefined “person” to exclude municipalities.
The County’s argument, it must be remembered, is not

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133 Cite as: 538 U. S. 119 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
merely that the treble damages feature of the 1986 amend-
ments was meant to bypass municipal corporations; the argu-
ment is that the treble damages amendment must be read
to eliminate the FCA’s coverage of municipal corporations
entirely, after being the statutory law for over a century.
This would be a hard case to make in the abstract, but it is
impossible when we consider what is known about the object
of the amendments in 1986.
The basic purpose of the 1986 amendments was to make
the FCA a “more useful tool against fraud in modern times.”
S. Rep., at 2. Because Congress was concerned about per-
vasive fraud in “all Government programs,” ibid., it allowed
private parties to sue even based on information already in
the Government’s possession, see Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U. S. 939, 946 (1997);
increased the Government’s measure of recovery; and
enhanced the incentives for relators to bring suit. Yet the
County urges that in so doing Congress made local govern-
ments, which today often administer or receive federal funds,
immune not only from treble damages but from any liability
whatsoever under the FCA. Congress could have done
that, of course, but it makes no sense to suggest Congress
did it under its breath.10 It is simply not plausible that Con-
gress intended to repeal municipal liability sub silentio by
the very Act it passed to strengthen the Government’s hand
10 Indeed, there is some evidence that Congress affirmatively endorsed
municipal liability when it passed the 1986 amendments. See S. Rep., at
8 (noting that “[t]he term ‘person’ is used in its broad sense to include
partnerships, associations, and corporations . . . as well as States and polit-
ical subdivisions thereof ” (citing, inter alia, Monell v. New York City
Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658 (1978))). Although in Vermont
Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S.
765 (2000), we considered this evidence insufficient to overcome the back-
ground presumption that States are not “persons,” in the present case the
statement belies the County’s argument that Congress meant to change
the contrary presumption applicable to local governments and to remove
municipal liability.

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134 COOK COUNTY v. UNITED STATES ex rel. CHANDLER
Opinion of the Court
in fighting false claims. See Burns v. United States, 501
U. S. 129, 136 (1991).11
IV
The term “person” in § 3729 included local governments in
1863 and nothing in the 1986 amendments redefined it. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
11 The presumption against implied repeal also explains why two of the
County’s subsidiary arguments cannot succeed here, despite the fact that
we gave them credence in Stevens. First, the County contrasts § 3729
with the Civil Investigative Demand provision enacted as part of the 1986
amendments, § 3733, which expressly includes both States and local gov-
ernments in the definition of “person.” In Stevens, supra, at 783–784, we
read that express reference in the later § 3733 to confirm the reading of
the earlier § 3729, which was based on a common understanding in 1863
that “person” did not include a State; but “person” did presumptively in-
clude a municipality in 1863.
The County also argues it is not sensible to expose local governments
to FCA liability but not to liability under the Program Fraud Civil Reme-
dies Act of 1986 (PFCRA), Pub. L. 99–509, 100 Stat. 1934 (codified at 31
U. S. C. § 3801 et seq.), a statute enacted just before the FCA amendments
and “designed to operate in tandem with the FCA.” Stevens, supra, at
786, n. 17. The PFCRA prohibits the same conduct as the FCA and spe-
cifically defines a “person” subject to liability as “any individual, part-
nership, corporation, association, or private organization.” § 3801(a)(6).
Even assuming the County is correct that local governments are not cov-
ered by the PFCRA despite the term “corporation,” this is hardly a
weighty argument for an implied repeal of municipal liability under the
FCA, a separately enacted statute.