WOODFORD, WARDEN v. GARCEAU

538US1 Unit: $U34 [10-26-04 18:53:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN
202 OCTOBER TERM, 2002
Syllabus
WOODFORD, WARDEN v. GARCEAU
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 01–1862. Argued January 21, 2003—Decided March 25, 2003
Amendments made to 28 U. S. C., ch. 153, by the Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) do not apply to cases pending
in federal court on April 24, 1996—AEDPA’s effective date. Lindh v.
Murphy, 521 U. S. 320. Respondent was convicted of first-degree mur-
der and sentenced to death in California state court. After his petition
for state postconviction relief was denied, he moved for the appointment
of federal habeas counsel and a stay of execution in Federal District
Court on May 12, 1995, and later filed a federal habeas application on
July 2, 1996. Although he filed the habeas application after AEDPA’s
effective date, the District Court concluded, inter alia, that it was not
subject to AEDPA because his motions for counsel and a stay were filed
prior to that date. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the application was
not subject to AEDPA, but reversed for reasons not relevant here.
Held: For purposes of applying the Lindh rule, a case does not become
“pending” until an actual application for habeas relief is filed in fed-
eral court. Respondent’s application is subject to AEDPA’s amend-
ments because it was not filed until after AEDPA’s effective date.
Pp. 205–210.
(a) Because of AEDPA’s heavy emphasis on the standards governing
the review of a habeas application’s merits, the Court interprets the
Lindh rule in view of that emphasis. Thus, whether AEDPA applies
to a state prisoner turns on what was before a federal court on AEDPA’s
effective date. If, on that date, the state prisoner had before a federal
court a habeas application seeking an adjudication on the merits of the
prisoner’s claims, then AEDPA does not apply. Otherwise, an applica-
tion filed after AEDPA’s effective date should be reviewed under
AEDPA, even if other filings by that same applicant—e. g., a request for
the appointment of counsel or a motion for a stay of execution—were
presented to a federal court prior to AEDPA’s effective date. A review
of the amended chapter 153 supports this conclusion. For example, 28
U. S. C. § 2254(e)(1) provides that, “[i]n a proceeding instituted by an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made
by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” (Emphasis added.)

538US1 Unit: $U34 [10-26-04 18:53:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN
203 Cite as: 538 U. S. 202 (2003)
Syllabus
Under the Ninth Circuit’s view, that presumption would rarely apply in
a capital case, as § 2254(e)(1) would be applicable only to those capital
prisoners who did not need counsel and did not seek a stay. AEDPA’s
text, however, contains no indication that § 2254(e)(1) was intended to
have such a limited scope. Nor is it reasonable to believe that Congress
meant for a capital prisoner to avoid application of § 2254(e)(1)’s strin-
gent requirements simply by filing a request for counsel or a motion for
a stay before filing an actual habeas application. Finally, the proce-
dural rules governing § 2254 cases reinforce the Court’s view. The Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure apply in the habeas context to the extent
that they are not inconsistent with the Habeas Corpus Rules. Because
nothing in the Habeas Rules contradicts Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 3—“[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint”—the logi-
cal conclusion is that a habeas suit begins with the filing of a habeas
application, the equivalent of a complaint in an ordinary civil case.
Pp. 205–208.
(b) As the task here is to apply Lindh to an action under chapter 153,
respondent’s request to look at provisions in chapter 154 is inapposite.
Moreover, his reliance on McFarland v. Scott, 512 U. S. 849, which in-
volved the interpretation of § 2251, not § 2254, and must be understood
in light of the Court’s concern to protect the right to counsel contained
in 18 U. S. C. § 848(q)(4)(B), and Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S. 236,
which says nothing about whether a request for counsel or motion for a
stay suffices to create a “case” that is “pending” within the Lindh rule’s
meaning, is misplaced. Pp. 208–210.
275 F. 3d 769, reversed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 210. Souter, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined, post,
p. 213.
Janis S. McLean, Supervising Deputy Attorney General
of California, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on
the briefs were Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California,
Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo
Graves, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Clayton S.
Tanaka, Deputy Attorney General.

538US1 Unit: $U34 [10-26-04 18:53:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN
204 WOODFORD v. GARCEAU
Opinion of the Court
Lynne S. Coffin argued the cause for respondent. With
her on the brief were Andrew S. Love and Denise Kendall.*
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U. S. 320 (1997), we held that
amendments made to chapter 153 of Title 28 of the United
States Code by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, do not apply to
cases pending in federal court on April 24, 1996—AEDPA’s
effective date. In this case we consider when a capital ha-
beas case becomes “pending” for purposes of the rule an-
nounced in Lindh.
I
Respondent Robert Garceau brutally killed his girlfriend
Maureen Bautista and her 14-year-old son, Telesforo Bau-
tista. He was convicted of first-degree murder and sen-
tenced to death. The California Supreme Court affirmed re-
spondent’s conviction and sentence, People v. Garceau, 6 Cal.
4th 140, 862 P. 2d 664 (1993), and denied on the merits his
petition for state postconviction relief. We denied certio-
rari. 513 U. S. 848 (1994).
On May 12, 1995, respondent filed a motion for the appoint-
ment of federal habeas counsel and an application for a stay
of execution in the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of California. The District Court promptly
issued a 45-day stay of execution. On June 26, 1995, the
District Court appointed counsel and extended the stay of
execution for another 120 days. On August 1, 1995, the
State filed a motion to vacate the stay, in part because re-
spondent had failed to file a “specification of nonfrivolous
issues,” as required by local court rules. Brief for Respond-
*Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson filed a brief for the Crimi-
nal Justice Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Leon Friedman, Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, and Joshua L. Dratel filed a
brief for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York as amicus
curiae urging affirmance.

538US1 Unit: $U34 [10-26-04 18:53:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN
205 Cite as: 538 U. S. 202 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
ent 2. Respondent cured that defect, and, on October 13,
1995, the District Court denied the State’s motion and or-
dered that the habeas petition be filed within nine months.
Respondent filed his application for habeas relief on July 2,
1996.
Although respondent’s habeas application was filed after
AEDPA’s effective date, the District Court, following Circuit
precedent, concluded that the application was not subject to
AEDPA. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 31–32 (citing Lindh,
supra; Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Central
Dist. of Cal., 163 F. 3d 530, 540 (CA9 1998) (en banc), cert.
denied, 526 U. S. 1060 (1999)). On the merits, however, the
District Court ruled that respondent was not entitled to ha-
beas relief. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed. Like the District Court, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded AEDPA does not apply to respondent’s application.
275 F. 3d 769, 772, n. 1 (2001). Unlike the District Court,
however, the Ninth Circuit granted habeas relief for reasons
that are not relevant to our discussion here. Id., at 777–778.
We granted certiorari. 536 U. S. 990 (2001).
II
As already noted, we held in Lindh that the new provi-
sions of chapter 153 of Title 28 do not apply to cases pending
as of the date AEDPA became effective. Lindh, however,
had no occasion to elaborate on the precise time when a case
becomes “pending” for purposes of chapter 153 because in
that case petitioner’s habeas application had been filed prior
to AEDPA’s effective date. See Lindh, supra, at 323 (noting
that petitioner filed his federal habeas application on July 9,
1992). Since Lindh, the Courts of Appeals have divided on
the question whether AEDPA applies to a habeas application
filed after AEDPA’s effective date if the applicant sought the
appointment of counsel or a stay of execution (or both) prior
to that date. Five Courts of Appeals have ruled that
AEDPA applies, see, e. g., Isaacs v. Head, 300 F. 3d 1232,

538US1 Unit: $U34 [10-26-04 18:53:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN
206 WOODFORD v. GARCEAU
Opinion of the Court
1245–1246 (CA11 2002); Moore v. Gibson, 195 F. 3d 1152,
1160–1163 (CA10 1999); Gosier v. Welborn, 175 F. 3d 504, 506
(CA7 1999); Williams v. Coyle, 167 F. 3d 1036, 1037–1040
(CA6 1999); Williams v. Cain, 125 F. 3d 269, 273–274 (CA5
1997), while the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
held it does not, Calderon, supra, at 539–540. For the rea-
sons stated below, we agree with the majority of the Courts
of Appeals.
Congress enacted AEDPA to reduce delays in the execu-
tion of state and federal criminal sentences, particularly in
capital cases, see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 386
(2000) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (“Congress wished to curb
delays, to prevent ‘retrials’ on federal habeas, and to give
effect to state convictions to the extent possible under law”);
see also id., at 404 (majority opinion), and “to further the
principles of comity, finality, and federalism,” Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U. S. 420, 436 (2000). One of the methods Con-
gress used to advance these objectives was the adoption of
an amended 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). Williams, 529 U. S., at 404
(“It cannot be disputed that Congress viewed § 2254(d)(1) as
an important means by which its goals for habeas reform
would be achieved”). As we have explained before, § 2254(d)
places “new constraint[s] on the power of a federal habeas
court to grant a state prisoner’s application for a writ of ha-
beas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits
in state court.” Id., at 412. Our cases make clear that
AEDPA in general and § 2254(d) in particular focus in large
measure on revising the standards used for evaluating the
merits of a habeas application. See id., at 412–413; Lindh,
supra, at 329 (noting that “amended § 2254(d) . . . governs
standards affecting entitlement to relief ”); see also Early v.
Packer, 537 U. S. 3 (2002) (per curiam) (applying AEDPA’s
standards); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19 (2002) (per
curiam) (same).
Because of AEDPA’s heavy emphasis on the standards
governing the review of the merits of a habeas application,

538US1 Unit: $U34 [10-26-04 18:53:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN
207 Cite as: 538 U. S. 202 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
we interpret the rule announced in Lindh in view of that
emphasis, as have the majority of the Courts of Appeals.
See, e. g., Holman v. Gilmore, 126 F. 3d 876, 880 (CA7 1997)
(“[T]he motion for counsel is not itself a petition, because it
does not call for (or even permit) a decision on the merits.
And it is ‘the merits’ that the amended § 2254(d)(1) is all
about”); Isaacs, supra, at 1245 (same); Coyle, supra, at 1040
(same). Thus, whether AEDPA applies to a state prisoner
turns on what was before a federal court on the date AEDPA
became effective. If, on that date, the state prisoner had
before a federal court an application for habeas relief seeking
an adjudication on the merits of the petitioner’s claims, then
amended § 2254(d) does not apply. Otherwise, an application
filed after AEDPA’s effective date should be reviewed under
AEDPA, even if other filings by that same applicant—such
as, for example, a request for the appointment of counsel or
a motion for a stay of execution—were presented to a federal
court prior to AEDPA’s effective date.
A review of the amended chapter 153 supports our conclu-
sion. For instance, § 2254(e)(1) provides that, “[i]n a pro-
ceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of
a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a
State court shall be presumed to be correct.” (Emphasis
added.) Under the Ninth Circuit’s view, the presumption
established in § 2254(e)(1) would rarely apply in a capital
case. If, as the Ninth Circuit held, a capital habeas case
can be commenced (and, therefore, may become pending for
purposes of Lindh) with the filing of a request for the ap-
pointment of counsel or a motion for a stay, then § 2254(e)(1),
which by its terms applies only to a proceeding “instituted”
by “an application for a writ of habeas corpus,” would not
apply to any capital prisoners whose first filing in federal
court is a request for the appointment of counsel or a motion
for a stay. This would make § 2254(e)(1) applicable only to
those capital prisoners who did not need counsel and did not

538US1 Unit: $U34 [10-26-04 18:53:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN
208 WOODFORD v. GARCEAU
Opinion of the Court
seek a stay. AEDPA’s text, however, contains no indication
that § 2254(e)(1) was intended to have such a limited scope.
Nor is it reasonable to believe that Congress meant for a
capital prisoner to avoid the application of the stringent re-
quirements of § 2254(e)(1) simply by filing a request for coun-
sel or a motion for a stay before filing an actual application
for habeas relief. Other provisions of chapter 153 likewise
support our view. See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 2241(d) (indicating
that the power to grant a writ is not triggered except by
“application for a writ of habeas corpus”); § 2244(a) (provid-
ing that federal judges are not required to “entertain” a sec-
ond or successive “application for a writ of habeas corpus”
except as provided for by statute).
Finally, our conclusion is reinforced by the procedural
rules governing § 2254 cases. Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 3 explains that “[a] civil action is commenced by filing
a complaint.” The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply
in the context of habeas suits to the extent that they are not
inconsistent with the Habeas Corpus Rules. See 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254 Rule 11; Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 81(a)(2); Pitchess v.
Davis, 421 U. S. 482, 489 (1975) (per curiam). Nothing in
the Habeas Corpus Rules contradicts Rule 3. The logical
conclusion, therefore, is that a habeas suit begins with the
filing of an application for habeas corpus relief—the equiva-
lent of a complaint in an ordinary civil case.
III
Respondent asks us to determine the scope of the rule
announced in Lindh by looking at some of the provisions of
chapter 154 of Title 28. But our task in this case is to apply
Lindh to an action under chapter 153; thus, the precise
phrasing of provisions in chapter 154 is inapposite to our
inquiry here.
Moreover, respondent’s argument that our holding in Mc-
Farland v. Scott, 512 U. S. 849 (1994), should inform our deci-
sion here is unpersuasive. To begin with, McFarland in-

538US1 Unit: $U34 [10-26-04 18:53:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN
209 Cite as: 538 U. S. 202 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
volved the interpretation of § 2251, not § 2254, which is at
issue here. And, as the Courts of Appeals have recognized,
see Isaacs, 300 F. 3d, at 1242–1246 (collecting and discussing
authorities), the Court’s ruling in McFarland must be under-
stood in light of the Court’s concern to protect the right to
counsel contained in 21 U. S. C. § 848(q)(4)(B). McFarland,
512 U. S., at 855 (“This interpretation is the only one that
gives meaning to the statute as a practical matter”); id., at
856 (“Requiring an indigent capital petitioner to proceed
without counsel in order to obtain counsel thus would expose
him to the substantial risk that his habeas claims never
would be heard on the merits. Congress legislated against
this legal backdrop in adopting § 848(q)(4)(B), and we safely
assume that it did not intend for the express requirement of
counsel to be defeated in this manner”); id., at 857 (“Even if
the District Court had granted McFarland’s motion for ap-
pointment of counsel and had found an attorney to represent
him, this appointment would have been meaningless unless
McFarland’s execution also was stayed”). Thus, McFarland
cannot carry the day for respondent.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit’s and respondent’s reliance on
Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S. 236 (1998), is misplaced. In
Hohn, we considered whether this Court has jurisdiction to
review a court of appeals’ denial of a certificate of appealabil-
ity (COA). To answer that question we focused on the text
of 28 U. S. C. § 1254, which “confines our jurisdiction to
‘[c]ases in’ the courts of appeals.” Hohn, supra, at 241 (cit-
ing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731, 741–742 (1982)). Al-
though we concluded that an application for a COA consti-
tuted a case within the meaning of § 1254, we did not provide
an all-purpose definition of the term “case.” Thus, while
Hohn might support an argument that respondent’s request
for appointment of counsel and his motion for a stay of execu-
tion began a “case” that could be reviewed on appeal, see,
e. g., Gosier, 175 F. 3d, at 506 (“[A] request for counsel is a
‘case’ in the sense that it is subject to appellate review (and,

538US1 Unit: $U34 [10-26-04 18:53:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN
210 WOODFORD v. GARCEAU
O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment
if need be, review by the Supreme Court)”), it says nothing
about whether a request for counsel or motion for a stay
suffices to create a “case” that is “pending” within the mean-
ing of the Lindh rule.
* * *
In sum, we hold that, for purposes of applying the rule
announced in Lindh, a case does not become “pending” until
an actual application for habeas corpus relief is filed in fed-
eral court. Because respondent’s federal habeas corpus ap-
plication was not filed until after AEDPA’s effective date,
that application is subject to AEDPA’s amendments.1 Ac-
cordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.2
It is so ordered.
Justice O’Connor, concurring in the judgment.
The Court today holds that the post-Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) version of 28
1 Justice O’Connor contends that we may have misapplied our test
because a filing labeled “Specification of Non-Frivolous Issues” placed the
merits of respondent’s claims before the District Court before AEDPA’s
effective date. Post, at 211 (opinion concurring in judgment). That is
simply not so. Respondent’s “Specification of Non-Frivolous Issues”
plainly stated that “[b]ased on a preliminary review of case materials,
counsel believes the following federal constitutional issues exist in this
case and are among the issues that may be raised on [Garceau’s] behalf in
a petition for habeas corpus.” App. to Brief in Opposition 227 (emphasis
added). The clear import of this language is that the filing itself did not
seek any relief on the merits or place the merits of respondent’s claims
before the District Court for decision. Rather, the document simply
alerted the District Court as to some of the possible claims that might be
raised by respondent in the future. Indeed, the habeas corpus application
respondent eventually filed contained numerous issues that were not men-
tioned in the “Specification of Non-Frivolous Issues.”
2 In view of the question on which we granted certiorari, we de-
cline petitioner’s request to rule on the merits of respondent’s habeas
application.

538US1 Unit: $U34 [10-26-04 18:53:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN
211 Cite as: 538 U. S. 202 (2003)
O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment
U. S. C. § 2254 applies to respondent Robert Garceau’s
habeas corpus application because Garceau did not file his
application until after AEDPA’s effective date. I agree
with that holding. I concur only in the judgment, however,
because in my view the Court’s reasoning is broader than
necessary.
The Court states that if “the state prisoner had before
a federal court an application for habeas relief seeking an
adjudication on the merits of the petitioner’s claims, then
amended § 2254(d) does not apply.” Ante, at 207. Under
the facts of this case, however, the Court may have misap-
plied its own rule. As the Court concedes, ante, at 204–205,
the District Court had a pre-AEDPA filing setting forth the
merits of Garceau’s claims. After Garceau filed a motion for
the appointment of counsel, motion for a stay, and motion for
leave to file a habeas application, the District Court stayed
Garceau’s execution. Over the objection of the State, the
District Court held that Garceau had identified nonfrivolous
issues so that a stay of the execution was appropriate. It is
difficult to see how the “merits” were not in front of the
District Court at that time, which was well before AEDPA’s
effective date.
In addition, the Court does not adequately distinguish Mc-
Farland v. Scott, 512 U. S. 849 (1994). Although I dissented
from that case, I also recognize that “the doctrine of stare
decisis is most compelling” when the Court confronts “a pure
question of statutory construction.” Hilton v. South Caro-
lina Public Railways Comm’n, 502 U. S. 197, 205 (1991).
The Court here, however, appears to adopt the reasoning of
the dissent in McFarland. Compare ante, at 208 (“Finally,
our conclusion is reinforced by the procedural rules govern-
ing § 2254 cases”), with McFarland, supra, at 862 (O’Con-
nor, J., dissenting in relevant part) (“The rules governing
§ 2254 cases confirm this conclusion”). I see no need to ques-
tion the underpinnings of McFarland in this case, and I ac-
cept the holding of McFarland that an application for a writ

538US1 Unit: $U34 [10-26-04 18:53:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN
212 WOODFORD v. GARCEAU
O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment
of habeas corpus is not necessary to trigger the beginning of
a habeas proceeding. See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. §§ 2251, 2262.
I agree, however, with the Court’s conclusion that the
post-AEDPA version of § 2254 is applicable to Garceau’s case.
The text of § 2254 itself provides the answer. Both before
and after AEDPA, § 2254 has concerned only applications for
a writ of habeas corpus. Compare § 2254(a) (“The Supreme
Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court
shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas cor-
pus . . .” (emphasis added)) with 28 U. S. C. § 2254(a) (1994
ed.) (same). Indeed, only the filing of an application for a
writ of habeas corpus triggered the former version of
§ 2254(d). See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d) (1994 ed.) (“In any pro-
ceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a
writ of habeas corpus . . .”). Thus, although Garceau’s pre-
application filings trigger a habeas corpus proceeding suffi-
cient to permit the District Court to grant a stay under 28
U. S. C. § 2251 and to engage in other activity related to the
case, these filings do not answer whether the pre- or post-
AEDPA version of § 2254(d) applies here. Because § 2254
has always spoken in terms of “applications,” a case is pend-
ing for § 2254 purposes only when the prisoner files an appli-
cation for a writ of habeas corpus.
I acknowledge that some language in Lindh v. Murphy,
521 U. S. 320 (1997), and in McFarland, supra, can be read
to say that if a habeas case is pending before AEDPA, none
of AEDPA’s amendments apply—including the amendments
to § 2254. But these statements do not answer the question
in this case. If § 2254 applied to habeas proceedings other
than applications for a writ of habeas corpus, the answer
might well be different. Compare 28 U. S. C. § 2251 (a judge,
“before whom a habeas corpus proceeding is pending, may
. . . stay any proceeding”) with § 2254(e)(1) (“In a proceeding
instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus . . .”).
But as the Court correctly points out, ante, at 207–208, § 2254
applies only once a prisoner has filed “an application for a

538US1 Unit: $U34 [10-26-04 18:53:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN
213 Cite as: 538 U. S. 202 (2003)
Souter, J., dissenting
writ of habeas corpus.” § 2254(a). See also §§ 2254(b)(1),
2254(b)(2), 2254(d), 2254(e)(1).
It does not follow from our case law, nor does it follow
from the text of § 2254 or any other habeas provision, that a
habeas applicant can receive the benefit of the pre-AEDPA
version of § 2254 when § 2254 itself cannot be triggered until
the prisoner files an application for a writ of habeas corpus.
A “case” simply could not have existed for purposes of § 2254
until Garceau filed the application itself. Finally, Garceau
has no reliance interest here. The pre-AEDPA version of
§ 2254(d) specifically acknowledged that a habeas applicant
was entitled to the then-existing less-restrictive version of
§ 2254(d) only when the prisoner “instituted” a “proceeding
. . . by an application for a writ of habeas corpus.” 28
U. S. C. § 2254(d) (1994 ed.).
Because 28 U. S. C. § 2254 is triggered only when a pris-
oner files an application for a writ of habeas corpus, and be-
cause Garceau filed his petition after AEDPA’s date, I concur
in the judgment of the Court that the post-AEDPA version
of § 2254(d) governs his claim.
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg and Jus-
tice Breyer join, dissenting.
In modifying 28 U. S. C. § 2254, the Antiterrorism and Ef-
fective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214,
did not specifically identify the state habeas cases that the
amended statute would govern, except in certain capital
cases subject to special rules not applicable here. Lindh v.
Murphy, 521 U. S. 320, 326 (1997), held that in the statute’s
general application, the amendments cover only cases filed
after AEDPA’s effective date. Here we have to take the
further step of deciding when a case is filed for purposes of
the Lindh rule.
The majority focuses on 28 U. S. C. § 2254 alone, which is
fair enough where a habeas petitioner’s first encounter with
the district court occurs in filing the petition for habeas relief

538US1 Unit: $U34 [10-26-04 18:53:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN
214 WOODFORD v. GARCEAU
Souter, J., dissenting
itself. But this is not such a case. Garceau first entered the
federal court to seek appointment of habeas counsel under 21
U. S. C. § 848(q)(4)(B), and his subsequently appointed lawyer
then petitioned under 28 U. S. C. § 2251 for a stay of execu-
tion while preparing a habeas petition. I therefore think
this case calls for the principle that related statutory provi-
sions are to be read together, see, e. g., Coit Independence
Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U. S. 561, 573 (1989) (citing
Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 194 (1857)). AEDPA’s
amendment of § 2254 ought to be understood in light of
§ 2251.
When counsel, appointed to prepare and litigate a habeas
petition under § 2254, seeks a stay of execution under § 2251,
the district court will at some point condition the continua-
tion of any stay on its assessment of the substantiality of the
issues counsel expects to raise in the petition yet to be filed,
a judgment that will call for some consideration of standards
for federal relief in cases governed by § 2254. When a dis-
trict court’s exercise of jurisdiction for habeas purposes oc-
curs during the transition from an earlier to a later version
of § 2254, it makes sense to hold that the version to be ap-
plied in a given case is the one in effect when the habeas
court first takes account of § 2254 standards for habeas relief.
A case should thus be considered filed for purposes of the
Lindh rule by the time the habeas court makes a determina-
tion that takes standards for federal relief into consideration.
When the District Court took its initial look at anticipated
claims in this case, for example, it was clear that the habeas
petition might well be filed before the effective date of the
amendment to § 2254; it was thus appropriate for the District
Court to consider the possible merit of the claim in light
of the earlier, existing law. As a consequence, it would be
reasonable to apply that law throughout. There would not
be much point, after all, in relying on existing law to judge
the merits of a stay, if counsel could not rely on existing law
in preparing the case. Otherwise the court could be staying

538US1 Unit: $U34 [10-26-04 18:53:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN
215 Cite as: 538 U. S. 202 (2003)
Souter, J., dissenting
a case that might be hopeless under the later, more restric-
tive, law; or conversely, would be forcing counsel to stint
on responsible preparation, in order to assure that a peti-
tion subject to the earlier law be filed before AEDPA’s gen-
eral effective date. I would therefore hold that the earlier
version of § 2254 should apply throughout a habeas proceed-
ing if the habeas court that issued a § 2251 stay took its pre-
liminary look at the prospects for habeas success prior to
AEDPA’s effective date.
In this case, that first look occurred six months before the
amendment’s effective date, and I would accordingly hold the
pre-AEDPA law applicable here. I respectfully dissent.