BLACK & DECKER DISABILITY PLAN v. NORD

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Syllabus
BLACK & DECKER DISABILITY PLAN v. NORD
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 02–469. Argued April 28, 2003—Decided May 27, 2003
Petitioner Black & Decker Disability Plan (Plan), an employee welfare
benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA), provides benefits for eligible disabled employees
of Black & Decker Corporation (Black & Decker) and certain of its sub-
sidiaries. Black & Decker is the administrator of the Plan but has dele-
gated authority to Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) to
render initial recommendations on benefit claims. Respondent Nord,
an employee of a Black & Decker subsidiary, submitted a claim for dis-
ability benefits under the Plan, which MetLife denied. At MetLife’s
review stage, Nord submitted letters and supporting documentation
from his physician, Dr. Hartman, and a treating orthopedist to whom
Hartman had referred Nord. These treating physicians stated that
Nord suffered from a degenerative disc disease and chronic pain that
rendered him unable to work. Black & Decker referred Nord to a neu-
rologist for an independent examination. The neurologist concluded
that, aided by pain medication, Nord could perform sedentary work.
MetLife thereafter made a final recommendation to deny Nord’s claim,
which Black & Decker accepted. Seeking to overturn that determina-
tion, Nord filed this action under ERISA. The District Court granted
summary judgment for the Plan, concluding that Black & Decker’s de-
nial of Nord’s claim was not an abuse of the plan administrator’s discre-
tion. The Ninth Circuit reversed and itself granted summary judgment
for Nord. The Court of Appeals explained that the case was controlled
by a recent Ninth Circuit decision holding that, when making benefit
determinations, ERISA plan administrators must follow a “treating
physician rule.” As described by the appeals court, that rule required
a plan administrator who rejects the opinions of a claimant’s treating
physician to come forward with specific reasons for the decision, based
on substantial evidence in the record. The Ninth Circuit found that,
under this rule, the plan administrator had not provided adequate justi-
fication for rejecting the opinions of Nord’s treating physicians.
Held: ERISA does not require plan administrators to accord special defer-
ence to the opinions of treating physicians. The “treating physician
rule” imposed by the Ninth Circuit was originally developed by Courts

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of Appeals as a means to control disability determinations by adminis-
trative law judges under the Social Security Act. In 1991, the Commis-
sioner of Social Security adopted regulations approving and formalizing
use of the rule in the Social Security disability program. Nothing in
ERISA or the Secretary of Labor’s ERISA regulations, however, sug-
gests that plan administrators must accord special deference to the opin-
ions of treating physicians, or imposes a heightened burden of explana-
tion on administrators when they reject a treating physician’s opinion.
If the Secretary found it meet to adopt a treating physician rule by
regulation, courts would examine that determination with appropriate
deference. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837. But the Secretary has not chosen that
course and an amicus brief reflecting the Department of Labor’s posi-
tion opposes adoption of such a rule for disability determinations under
plans covered by ERISA. Whether a treating physician rule would
increase the accuracy of ERISA disability determinations, as the Ninth
Circuit believed it would, is a question that the Legislature or superin-
tending administrative agency is best positioned to address. Finally,
and of prime importance, critical differences between the Social Secu-
rity disability program and ERISA benefit plans caution against import-
ing a treating physician rule from the former area into the latter. By
accepting and codifying such a rule, the Social Security Commissioner
sought to serve the need for efficient administration of an obligatory
nationwide benefits program. In contrast, nothing in ERISA requires
employers to establish employee benefits plans or mandates what kind
of benefits employers must provide if they choose to have such a plan.
Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U. S. 882, 887. Rather, employers have
large leeway to design disability and other welfare plans as they see fit.
In determining entitlement to Social Security benefits, the adjudicator
measures the claimant’s condition against a uniform set of federal cri-
teria. The validity of a claim to benefits under an ERISA plan, on the
other hand, is likely to turn, in large part, on the interpretation of terms
in the plan at issue. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U. S.
101, 115. Deference is due the Labor Secretary’s stated view that
ERISA is best served by preserving the greatest flexibility possible
for operating claims processing systems consistent with a plan’s pru-
dent administration. Plan administrators may not arbitrarily refuse to
credit a claimant’s reliable evidence, including the opinions of a treating
physician. But courts have no warrant to require administrators auto-
matically to accord special weight to the opinions of a claimant’s phy-

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824 BLACK & DECKER DISABILITY PLAN v. NORD
Syllabus
sician; nor may courts impose on administrators a discrete burden of
explanation when they credit reliable evidence that conflicts with a
treating physician’s evaluation. Pp. 829–834.
296 F. 3d 823, vacated and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Lee T. Paterson argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were John R. Ates, Amanda C. Sommer-
feld, and William G. Bruner III.
Lisa Schiavo Blatt argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief
were Solicitor General Olson, Deputy Solicitor General
Kneedler, Howard M. Radzely, Allen H. Feldman, Nathan-
iel I. Spiller, and Mark S. Flynn.
Lawrence D. Rohlfing argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief was Eric Schnapper.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American
Benefits Council by Robert N. Eccles and Jonathan D. Hacker; for the
American Council of Life Insurers et al. by William J. Kayatta, Jr., Mark
E. Schmidtke, and Victoria E. Fimea; for the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL
Player Retirement Plan by Douglas W. Ell, John P. McAllister, and Al-
varo I. Anillo; for the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas
Health and Welfare Fund by Thomas C. Nyhan, James P. Condon, and
John J. Franczyk, Jr.; for the Delta Family-Care Disability and Survivor-
ship Plan et al. by Hunter R. Hughes; for the ERISA Industry Committee
by Caroline M. Brown and John M. Vine; for the National Association of
Manufacturers et al. by Frederick R. Damm, Lira A. Johnson, Jan S.
Amundson, and Quentin Riegel; and for Peabody Energy Corp. et al. by
Mark E. Solomons and Laura Metcoff Klaus.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the AARP by
Mary Ellen Signorille and Melvin R. Radowitz; for the American Medical
Association by Joseph R. Guerra and Jack R. Bierig; for the National
Employment Lawyers Association by Jeffrey Lewis, Jenifer Bosco, Daniel
T. Driesen, and Ronald Dean; and for the National Organization of Social
Security Claimants’ Representatives by Nancy G. Shor, Eric Schnaufer,
Robert E. Rains, and Jon Holder.

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Opinion of the Court
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under a rule adopted by the Commissioner of Social Secu-
rity, in determining whether a claimant is entitled to Social
Security disability benefits, special weight is accorded opin-
ions of the claimant’s treating physician. See 20 CFR
§§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2) (2002). This case presents
the question whether a similar “treating physician rule” ap-
plies to disability determinations under employee benefits
plans covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA or Act), 88 Stat. 832, as amended, 29
U. S. C. § 1001 et seq. We hold that plan administrators are
not obliged to accord special deference to the opinions of
treating physicians.
ERISA and the Secretary of Labor’s regulations under the
Act require “full and fair” assessment of claims and clear
communication to the claimant of the “specific reasons” for
benefit denials. See 29 U. S. C. § 1133; 29 CFR § 2560.503–1
(2002). But these measures do not command plan adminis-
trators to credit the opinions of treating physicians over
other evidence relevant to the claimant’s medical condition.
Because the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit errone-
ously applied a “treating physician rule” to a disability plan
governed by ERISA, we vacate that court’s judgment and
remand for further proceedings.
I
Petitioner Black & Decker Disability Plan (Plan), an
ERISA-governed employee welfare benefit plan, covers em-
ployees of Black & Decker Corporation (Black & Decker) and
certain of its subsidiaries. The Plan provides benefits for
eligible employees with a “disability.” As relevant here, the
Plan defines “disability” to mean “the complete inability . . .
of a Participant to engage in his regular occupation with

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Opinion of the Court
the Employer.” 1 296 F. 3d 823, 826, n. 2 (CA9 2002).
Black & Decker both funds the Plan and acts as plan adminis-
trator, but it has delegated authority to Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company (MetLife) to render initial recommen-
dations on benefit claims. Disability determinations, the
Black & Decker Plan provides, “[are to] be made by the [plan
administrator] based on suitable medical evidence and a re-
view of the Participant’s employment history that the [plan
administrator] deems satisfactory in its sole and absolute dis-
cretion.” Id., at 826, n. 1.
Respondent Kenneth L. Nord was formerly employed by
a Black & Decker subsidiary as a material planner. His job,
classed “sedentary,” required up to six hours of sitting and
two hours of standing or walking per day. Id., at 826.
In 1997, Nord consulted Dr. Leo Hartman about hip and
back pain. Dr. Hartman determined that Nord suffers from
a mild degenerative disc disease, a diagnosis confirmed by a
Magnetic Resonance Imaging scan. After a week’s trial on
pain medication prescribed by Dr. Hartman, Nord’s condition
remained unimproved. Dr. Hartman told Nord to cease
work temporarily, and recommended that he consult an or-
thopedist while continuing to take the pain medication.
Nord submitted a claim for disability benefits under the
Plan, which MetLife denied in February 1998. Nord next
exercised his right to seek further consideration by Met-
Life’s “Group Claims Review.” Id., at 827. At that stage,
Nord submitted letters and supporting documentation from
Dr. Hartman and a treating orthopedist to whom Hartman
had referred Nord. Nord also submitted a questionnaire
form, drafted by Nord’s counsel, headed “Work Capacity
Evaluation.” Black & Decker human resources representa-
1 The Plan sets out a different standard for determining whether an
employee is entitled to benefits for a period longer than 30 months. Be-
cause respondent Nord sought benefits “for up to 30 months,” 296 F. 3d
823, 826 (CA9 2002), the standard for longer term disability is not in play
in this case.

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tive Janmarie Forward answered the questions, as the form
instructed, by the single word “yes” or “no.” One of the six
items composing the “Work Capacity Evaluation” directed
Forward to “[a]ssume that Kenneth Nord would have a mod-
erate pain that would interfere with his ability to perform
intense interpersonal communications or to act appropriately
under stress occasionally (up to one-third) during the day.”
Lodging for Pet. for Cert. L–37. The associated question
asked whether an “individual of those limitations [could]
perform the work of a material planner.” Ibid. Forward
marked a space labeled “no.”
During the MetLife review process, Black & Decker re-
ferred Nord to neurologist Antoine Mitri for an independent
examination. Dr. Mitri agreed with Nord’s doctors that
Nord suffered from a degenerative disc disease and chronic
pain. But aided by pain medication, Dr. Mitri concluded,
Nord could perform “sedentary work with some walking in-
terruption in between.” Id., at L–45. MetLife thereafter
made a final recommendation to deny Nord’s claim.
Black & Decker accepted MetLife’s recommendation and,
on October 27, 1998, so informed Nord. The notification let-
ter summarized the conclusions of Nord’s doctors, the results
of diagnostic tests, and the opinion of Dr. Mitri. See id., at
L–155 to L–156. It also recounted that Black & Decker had
forwarded Dr. Mitri’s report to Nord’s counsel with a request
for comment by Nord’s attending physician. Although Nord
had submitted additional information, the letter continued,
he had “provided . . . no new or different information that
would change [MetLife’s] original decision.” Id., at L–156.
The letter further stated that the Work Capacity Evaluation
form completed by Black & Decker human resources repre-
sentative Forward was “not sufficient to reverse [the Plan’s]
decision.” Ibid.
Seeking to overturn Black & Decker’s determination,
Nord filed this action in Federal District Court “to recover
benefits due to him under the terms of his plan.” 29 U. S. C.

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§ 1132(a)(1)(B). On cross-motions for summary judgment,
the District Court granted judgment for the Plan, concluding
that Black & Decker’s denial of Nord’s claim was not an
abuse of the plan administrator’s discretion.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit roundly re-
versed and itself “grant[ed] Nord’s motion for summary judg-
ment.” 296 F. 3d, at 832. Nord’s appeal, the Ninth Circuit
explained, was controlled by that court’s recent decision in
Regula v. Delta Family-Care Disability Survivorship Plan,
266 F. 3d 1130 (2001). 296 F. 3d, at 829. The Ninth Circuit
had held in Regula that, when making benefit determina-
tions, ERISA plan administrators must follow a “treating
physician rule.” See 266 F. 3d, at 1139–1144. As described
by the appeals court, the rule required an administrator
“who rejects [the] opinions [of a claimant’s treating physician]
to come forward with specific reasons for his decision, based
on substantial evidence in the record.” Id., at 1139. De-
claring that Nord was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that Black & Decker fell
short under the treating physician rule: The plan administra-
tor had not provided adequate justification, the Court of Ap-
peals said, for rejecting opinions held by Dr. Hartman and
others treating Nord on Hartman’s recommendation. 296
F. 3d, at 830–832.
We granted certiorari, 537 U. S. 1098 (2002), in view of
the division among the Circuits on the propriety of judicial
installation of a treating physician rule for disability claims
within ERISA’s domain. Compare Regula, 266 F. 3d, at
1139; Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F. 3d 894, 901 (CA8 1996),
with Elliott v. Sara Lee Corp., 190 F. 3d 601, 607–608 (CA4
1999); Delta Family-Care Disability and Survivorship Plan
v. Marshall, 258 F. 3d 834, 842–843 (CA8 2001); Turner v.
Delta Family-Care Disability and Survivorship Plan, 291
F. 3d 1270, 1274 (CA11 2002). See also Salley v. E. I. Du-
Pont de Nemours & Co., 966 F. 2d 1011, 1016 (CA5 1992)
(expressing “considerable doubt” on the question whether a

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treating physician rule should govern ERISA cases). Con-
cluding that courts have no warrant to order application of
a treating physician rule to employee benefit claims made
under ERISA, we vacate the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and
remand the case for further proceedings.2
II
The treating physician rule at issue here was originally
developed by Courts of Appeals as a means to control disabil-
ity determinations by administrative law judges under the
Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620, 42 U. S. C. § 231 et seq. See
Maccaro, The Treating Physician Rule and the Adjudication
of Claims for Social Security Disability Benefits, 41 Soc. Sec.
Rep. Serv. 833, 833–834 (1993). In 1991, the Commissioner
of Social Security adopted regulations approving and formal-
izing use of the rule in the Social Security disability pro-
gram. See 56 Fed. Reg. 36961, 36968 (codified at 20 CFR
§§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2) (2002)). The Social Security
Administration, the regulations inform, will generally “give
more weight to opinions from . . . treating sources,” and “will
always give good reasons in our notice of determination or
decision for the weight we give your treating source’s opin-
ion.” §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2).
Concluding that a treating physician rule should similarly
govern private benefit plans under ERISA, the Ninth Circuit
said in Regula that its “reasons ha[d] to do with common
sense as well as consistency in [judicial] review of disability
determinations where benefits are protected by federal law.”
266 F. 3d, at 1139. “Just as in the Social Security context,”
the court observed, “the disputed issue in ERISA disability
determinations concerns whether the facts of the benefici-
ary’s case entitle him to benefits.” Ibid. The Ninth Circuit
2 The Plan sought review only of the Court of Appeals’ holding “that an
ERISA disability plan administrator’s determination of disability is sub-
ject to the ‘treating physician rule.’ ” Pet. for Cert. i. We express no
opinion on any other issues.

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perceived “no reason why the treating physician rule should
not be used under ERISA in order to test the reasonableness
of the [plan] administrator’s positions.” Ibid. The United
States urges that the Court of Appeals “erred in equating
the two [statutory regimes].” Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 23. We agree.3
“ERISA was enacted to promote the interests of employ-
ees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans, and to
protect contractually defined benefits.” Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U. S. 101, 113 (1989) (internal quo-
tation marks and citations omitted). The Act furthers these
aims in part by regulating the manner in which plans process
benefits claims. Plans must “provide adequate notice in
writing to any participant or beneficiary whose claim for ben-
efits under the plan has been denied, setting forth the specific
reasons for such denial, written in a manner calculated to
be understood by the participant.” 29 U. S. C. § 1133(1).
ERISA further requires that plan procedures “afford a rea-
3 The treating physician rule has not attracted universal adherence out-
side the Social Security context. Some courts have approved a rule simi-
lar to the Social Security Commissioner’s for disability determinations
under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U. S. C.
§ 901 et seq., see, e. g., Pietrunti v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensa-
tion Programs, 119 F. 3d 1035, 1042 (CA2 1997), and the Secretary of
Labor has adopted a version of the rule for benefit determinations under
the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U. S. C. § 901 et seq., see 20 CFR
§ 718.104(d)(5) (2002). One Court of Appeals, however, has rejected a
treating physician rule for the assessment of claims of entitlement to vet-
erans’ benefits for service-connected disabilities, see White v. Principi,
243 F. 3d 1378, 1381 (CA Fed. 2001), and another has rejected such a rule
for disability determinations under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974,
45 U. S. C. § 231 et seq., see Dray v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 10 F. 3d
1306, 1311 (CA7 1993). Furthermore, there appears to be no uniform
practice regarding application of a treating physician rule under state
workers’ compensation statutes. See Conradt v. Mt. Carmel School, 197
Wis. 2d 60, 69, 539 N. W. 2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1995) (“Conradt misrepre-
sents the state of the law when she claims that a majority of states have
adopted the ‘treating physician rule.’ ”).

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sonable opportunity . . . for a full and fair review” of disposi-
tions adverse to the claimant. § 1133(2). Nothing in the
Act itself, however, suggests that plan administrators must
accord special deference to the opinions of treating physi-
cians. Nor does the Act impose a heightened burden of ex-
planation on administrators when they reject a treating phy-
sician’s opinion.
ERISA empowers the Secretary of Labor to “prescribe
such regulations as he finds necessary or appropriate to
carry out” the statutory provisions securing employee bene-
fit rights. § 1135; see § 1133 (plans shall process claims “[i]n
accordance with regulations of the Secretary”). The Secre-
tary’s regulations do not instruct plan administrators to ac-
cord extra respect to treating physicians’ opinions. See 29
CFR § 2560.503–1 (1997) (regulations in effect when Nord
filed his claim); 29 CFR § 2560.503–1 (2002) (current regula-
tions). Notably, the most recent version of the Secretary’s
regulations, which installs no treating physician rule, issued
more than nine years after the Social Security Administra-
tion codified a treating physician rule in that agency’s regula-
tions. Compare 56 Fed. Reg. 36932, 36961 (1991), with 65
Fed. Reg. 70265 (2000).
If the Secretary of Labor found it meet to adopt a treat-
ing physician rule by regulation, courts would examine that
determination with appropriate deference. See Chevron
U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U. S. 837 (1984). The Secretary has not chosen that course,
however, and an amicus brief reflecting the position of the
Department of Labor opposes adoption of such a rule for
disability determinations under plans covered by ERISA.
See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 7–27. Al-
though Congress “expect[ed]” courts would develop “a fed-
eral common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-
regulated plans,” Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S.
41, 56 (1987), the scope of permissible judicial innovation is
narrower in areas where other federal actors are engaged,

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cf. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304, 317–332 (1981) (be-
cause Congress had enacted a comprehensive regulatory pro-
gram dealing with discharge of pollutants into the Nation’s
waters, the State could not maintain a federal common-law
nuisance action against the city based on the latter’s pollu-
tion of Lake Michigan).
The question whether a treating physician rule would “in-
creas[e] the accuracy of disability determinations” under
ERISA plans, as the Ninth Circuit believed it would, Regula,
266 F. 3d, at 1139, moreover, seems to us one the Legislature
or superintending administrative agency is best positioned
to address. As compared to consultants retained by a plan,
it may be true that treating physicians, as a rule, “ha[ve] a
greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an
individual.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Nor do we question the Court of Appeals’ concern
that physicians repeatedly retained by benefits plans may
have an “incentive to make a finding of ‘not disabled’ in order
to save their employers money and to preserve their own
consulting arrangements.” Id., at 1143. But the assump-
tion that the opinions of a treating physician warrant greater
credit than the opinions of plan consultants may make scant
sense when, for example, the relationship between the claim-
ant and the treating physician has been of short duration, or
when a specialist engaged by the plan has expertise the
treating physician lacks. And if a consultant engaged by a
plan may have an “incentive” to make a finding of “not dis-
abled,” so a treating physician, in a close case, may favor a
finding of “disabled.” Intelligent resolution of the question
whether routine deference to the opinion of a claimant’s
treating physician would yield more accurate disability de-
terminations, it thus appears, might be aided by empirical
investigation of the kind courts are ill equipped to conduct.
Finally, and of prime importance, critical differences be-
tween the Social Security disability program and ERISA
benefit plans caution against importing a treating physician

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rule from the former area into the latter. The Social Se-
curity Act creates a nationwide benefits program funded
by Federal Insurance Contributions Act payments, see 26
U. S. C. §§ 3101(a), 3111(a), and superintended by the Com-
missioner of Social Security. To cope with the “more than
2.5 million claims for disability benefits [filed] each year,”
Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U. S.
795, 803 (1999), the Commissioner has published detailed reg-
ulations governing benefits adjudications. See, e. g., id., at
803–804. Presumptions employed in the Commissioner’s
regulations “grow out of the need to administer a large bene-
fits system efficiently.” Id., at 804. By accepting and codi-
fying a treating physician rule, the Commissioner sought to
serve that need. Along with other regulations, the treating
physician rule works to foster uniformity and regularity in
Social Security benefits determinations made in the first in-
stance by a corps of administrative law judges.
In contrast to the obligatory, nationwide Social Security
program, “[n]othing in ERISA requires employers to estab-
lish employee benefits plans. Nor does ERISA mandate
what kind of benefits employers must provide if they choose
to have such a plan.” Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U. S.
882, 887 (1996). Rather, employers have large leeway to de-
sign disability and other welfare plans as they see fit. In
determining entitlement to Social Security benefits, the adju-
dicator measures the claimant’s condition against a uniform
set of federal criteria. “[T]he validity of a claim to benefits
under an ERISA plan,” on the other hand, “is likely to turn,”
in large part, “on the interpretation of terms in the plan at
issue.” Firestone Tire, 489 U. S., at 115. It is the Secre-
tary of Labor’s view that ERISA is best served by “preserv-
[ing] the greatest flexibility possible for . . . operating claims
processing systems consistent with the prudent administra-
tion of a plan.” Department of Labor, Employee Benefits
Security Administration, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_
claims_proc_reg.html, Question B–4 (as visited May 6, 2003)

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834 BLACK & DECKER DISABILITY PLAN v. NORD
Opinion of the Court
(available in Clerk of Court’s case file). Deference is due
that view.
Plan administrators, of course, may not arbitrarily refuse
to credit a claimant’s reliable evidence, including the opinions
of a treating physician. But, we hold, courts have no war-
rant to require administrators automatically to accord special
weight to the opinions of a claimant’s physician; nor may
courts impose on plan administrators a discrete burden of
explanation when they credit reliable evidence that conflicts
with a treating physician’s evaluation.4 The Court of Ap-
peals therefore erred when it employed a treating physician
rule lacking Department of Labor endorsement in holding
that Nord was entitled to summary judgment.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
4 Nord asserts that there are two treating physician rules: a “proce-
dural” rule, which requires a hearing officer to explain why she rejected
the opinions of a treating physician, and a “substantive” rule, which re-
quires that “more weight” be given to the medical opinions of a treating
physician. Brief for Respondent 12–13 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). In this case, Nord contends, the Court of Appeals applied only the
“procedural” version of the rule. Id., at 13. We are not certain that
Nord’s reading of the Court of Appeals decision is correct. See 296 F. 3d,
at 831 (faulting the Plan for, inter alia, having “[n]o evidence . . . that
Nord’s treating physicians considered inappropriate factors in making
their diagnosis or that Nord’s physicians lacked the requisite expertise to
draw their medical conclusions”). At any rate, for the reasons explained
in this opinion, we conclude that ERISA does not support judicial im-
position of a treating physician rule, whether labeled “procedural” or
“substantive.”