LAMIE v. UNITED STATES TRUSTEE

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526 OCTOBER TERM, 2003
Syllabus
LAMIE v. UNITED STATES TRUSTEE
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit
No. 02–693. Argued November 10, 2003—Decided January 26, 2004
Before 1994, § 330(a) of the Bankruptcy Code authorized a court to “award
to a trustee, to an examiner, to a professional person employed under
section 327 . . . , or to the debtor’s attorney” “(1) reasonable compensa-
tion for . . . services rendered by such trustee, examiner, professional
person, or attorney . . . .” (Emphasis added to highlight text later
deleted.) In 1994 Congress amended the Code with a reform Act. The
Act altered § 330(a) by deleting “or to the debtor’s attorney” from what
was § 330(a) and is now § 330(a)(1). This change created an apparent
legislative drafting error in the current section. The section is left
with a missing “or” that infects its grammar. And its inclusion of “at-
torney” in what was § 330(a)(1) and is now § 330(a)(1)(A) defeats the
neat parallelism that otherwise marks the relationship between current
§§ 330(a)(1) (“trustee, . . . examiner, [or] professional person”) and
330(a)(1)(A) (“trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney”). In
this case, petitioner filed an application with the Bankruptcy Court
seeking attorney’s fees under § 330(a)(1) for the time he spent working
on behalf of a debtor in a Chapter 7 proceeding. The Government ob-
jected to the application. It argued that § 330(a) makes no provision
for the estate to compensate an attorney who is not employed by the
estate trustee and approved by the court under § 327. Petitioner ad-
mitted he was not employed by the trustee and approved by the court
under § 327, but nonetheless contended § 330(a) authorized a fee award
to him because he was a debtor’s attorney. In denying petitioner’s ap-
plication, the Bankruptcy Court, District Court, and Fourth Circuit all
held that in a Chapter 7 proceeding § 330(a)(1) does not authorize pay-
ment of attorney’s fees unless the attorney has been appointed under
§ 327.
Held: Under the Code’s plain language, § 330(a)(1) does not authorize com-
pensation awards to debtors’ attorneys from estate funds, unless they
are employed as authorized by § 327. If the attorney is to be paid from
estate funds under § 330(a)(1) in a Chapter 7 case, he must be employed
by the trustee and approved by the court. Pp. 533–542.
(a) Petitioner argues that this Court must look to legislative history
to determine Congress’ intent because the existing statutory text is

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ambiguous in light of its predecessor. He claims that subsection (A)’s
“attorney” is facially irreconcilable with the section’s first part since the
two parts’ lists were previously parallel. He claims also that only a
drafting error can explain the missing conjunction “or” between “an
examiner” and “a professional person” since the text was previously
grammatically correct. The starting point in discerning congressional
intent, however, is the existing statutory text, Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
Jacobson, 525 U. S. 432, and not predecessor statutes. So this Court
begins with the present statute. Pp. 533–534.
(b) That the present statute is awkward, and even ungrammatical,
does not make it ambiguous on the point at issue. A debtor’s attorney
not engaged under § 327 does not fall within the eligible class of per-
sons that the first part of § 330(a)(1) authorizes to receive compensa-
tion: trustees, examiners, and § 327 professional persons. Subsection
(A) allows compensation for services rendered by four types of persons
(the same three plus attorneys), but unless an applicant is in one of the
classes named in the first part, the kind of service rendered is irrelevant.
The missing “or” does not change this conclusion. Numerous federal
statutes inadvertently lack a conjunction, but are read for their plain
meaning. Here, the missing “or” neither alters the text’s substance nor
obscures its meaning. Subsection (A)’s nonparalleled fourth category
also does not cloud the statute’s meaning. “Attorney” can be straight-
forwardly read to refer to those attorneys who qualify as § 327 pro-
fessional persons. Likewise, neighboring § 331, which permits both
debtors’ attorneys and § 327 professional persons to receive interim
compensation, most straightforwardly refers to § 327 debtors’ attorneys.
This reading may make “attorney” in § 330(a)(1)(A) surplusage, but sur-
plusage does not always produce ambiguity. When there are two ways
to read the text—either attorney is surplusage, which makes the text
plain, or attorney is nonsurplusage, which makes the text ambiguous—
applying a rule against surplusage is inappropriate. Pp. 534–536.
(c) The plain meaning that § 330(a)(1) sets forth does not lead to ab-
surd results. Petitioner’s arguments—that this Court’s interpretation
will lead to a departure from the principle of prompt and effectual ad-
ministration of bankruptcy law and attributes to Congress an intent to
eliminate compensation essential to debtors’ receipt of legal services—
overstate § 330(a)(1)’s effect. Compensation remains available through
various permitted means. Compensation for debtors’ attorneys in
Chapter 12 and 13 bankruptcies, for example, is not much disturbed
by § 330 as a whole. Moreover, compensation for debtors’ attorneys in
Chapter 7 proceedings is not altogether prohibited. Sections 327 and

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528 LAMIE v. UNITED STATES TRUSTEE
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330, taken together, allow Chapter 7 trustees to engage attorneys, in-
cluding debtors’ counsel, and allow courts to award them fees. Section
327’s limitation on a debtor’s incurring debts for professional services
without the trustee’s approval also advances the trustee’s responsibility
for preserving the Chapter 7 estate. Add to this the apparent sound
functioning of the bankruptcy system in the Fifth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits, which have both adopted the plain meaning approach, and peti-
tioner’s arguments become unconvincing. And § 330(a)(1) does not pre-
vent a debtor from engaging in the common practice of paying counsel
compensation in advance to ensure that a bankruptcy filing is in order.
Pp. 536–538.
(d) With a plain, nonabsurd meaning in view, this Court will not read
“attorney” in § 330(a)(1)(A) to refer to “debtors’ attorneys,” in effect
enlarging the statute’s scope. See Iselin v. United States, 270 U. S. 245,
251. This Court’s unwillingness to soften the import of Congress’ cho-
sen words even if it believes the words lead to a harsh outcome is long-
standing. Pp. 538–539.
(e) Though it is unnecessary to rely on the 1994 Act’s legislative his-
tory, it is instructive to note that the history creates more confusion
than clarity about the congressional intent. History and policy consid-
erations lend support both to petitioner’s interpretation and to the hold-
ing reached here. This uncertainty illustrates the difficulty of relying
on legislative history and the advantage of resting on the statutory
text. Pp. 539–542.
290 F. 3d 739, affirmed.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
joined, and in which Scalia, J., joined except for Part III. Stevens, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Souter and
Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 542.
Thomas C. Goldstein argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were John M. Lamie, pro se, Amy
Howe, G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., John A. E. Pottow, and Craig
Goldblatt.
Lisa S. Blatt argued the cause for respondent. With her
on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attor-
ney General Keisler, and Deputy Solicitor General Hungar.

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Opinion of the Court
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.*
Section 330(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C.
§ 330(a)(1), regulates court awards of professional fees, in-
cluding fees for services rendered by attorneys in connection
with bankruptcy proceedings. Petitioner, a bankruptcy at-
torney, sought compensation under the section for legal serv-
ices he provided to a bankrupt debtor after the proceeding
was converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. His application
for fees was denied by the Bankruptcy Court, the District
Court, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit. Each court held that in a Chapter 7 pro-
ceeding § 330(a)(1) does not authorize payment of attorney’s
fees unless the attorney has been appointed under § 327 of
the Code. See 11 U. S. C. §§ 327 and 701 et seq. Petitioner
was not so appointed, and his fee request was denied. Hav-
ing granted the petition for certiorari to review this holding,
we now affirm.
I
In 1994 Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code. Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1994 (Act), 108 Stat. 4106. The sub-
ject of professional fees was addressed and comprehen-
sive changes were made. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy
¶ 330.LH[5], pp. 330–75 to 330–76 (rev. 15th ed. 2003). Most
of the changes served to clarify the standards for the award
of professional fees; but various courts disagree over the
proper interpretation of the portion of the statute relevant
to this dispute, concerning attorney’s fees.
The Act replaced the predecessor section to the one in
issue here. Compare 108 Stat. 4130–4131 (§ 224(b) of the
Act amending 11 U. S. C. § 330(a)) with 11 U. S. C. § 330(a)
(1988 ed.). Before the 1994 Act, § 330(a) had read as follows:
“(a) After notice to any parties in interest and to the
United States trustee and a hearing, and subject to sec-
*Justice Souter and Justice Breyer join this opinion in its entirety.
Justice Scalia joins this opinion except for Part III.

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tions 326, 328, and 329 of this title, the court may award
to a trustee, to an examiner, to a professional person
employed under section 327 or 1103 of this title, or to
the debtor’s attorney—
“(1) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary
services rendered by such trustee, examiner, profes-
sional person, or attorney . . . and by any paraprofes-
sional persons employed by such trustee, professional
person, or attorney . . . ; and
“(2) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.”
Ibid. (emphasis added to highlight text later deleted).
Pursuant to the 1994 Act, 11 U. S. C. § 330(a)(1) now reads
as follows:
“(a)(1) After notice to the parties in interest and the
United States Trustee and a hearing, and subject to sec-
tions 326, 328, and 329, the court may award to a trustee,
an examiner, a professional person employed under sec-
tion 327 or 1103—
“(A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary
services rendered by the trustee, examiner, professional
person, or attorney and by any paraprofessional person
employed by any such person; and
“(B) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.”
As can be noted, the 1994 enactment’s principal, substantive
alteration was its deletion of the five words at the end of
what was § 330(a) and is now § 330(a)(1): “or to the debtor’s
attorney.”
The deletion created an apparent legislative drafting error.
It left current § 330(a)(1) with a missing “or” that infects its
grammar (i. e., “an examiner, [or] a professional person . . .”).
Furthermore, the Act’s inclusion of the word “attorney” in
§ 330(a)(1)(A) defeats the neat parallelism that otherwise
marks the relationship between §§ 330(a)(1) and 330(a)(1)(A)
(i. e., in § 330(a)(1): “trustee, . . . examiner, [or] professional
person”; in § 330(a)(1)(A): “trustee, examiner, professional

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person, or attorney”) and so casts some doubt on the proper
presence of “attorney.” That the pre-1994 text had no
grammatical error and was parallel in its structure strength-
ens the sense that error exists in the new text.
The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits,
when asked to interpret current § 330(a)(1), concluded that
its language was plain irrespective of these quirks and his-
tory. Under the statutory language as written, those courts
held, fees may be awarded to attorneys for services rendered
only to the extent they are payments to “a professional per-
son employed under section 327,” see, e. g., § 327(a) (authoriz-
ing an appointed trustee in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy action
to “employ one or more attorneys . . . to represent or assist
the trustee in carrying out the trustee’s duties under this
title”); § 327(e) (authorizing an appointed trustee in a Chap-
ter 7 bankruptcy action to “employ, for a specified special
purpose, other than to represent the trustee in conducting
the case, an attorney that has represented the debtor, . . .”).
See In re Pro-Snax Distributors, Inc., 157 F. 3d 414 (CA5
1998); In re American Steel Product, Inc., 197 F. 3d 1354
(CA11 1999). The Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third,
and Ninth Circuits, in contrast, concluded that the text’s ap-
parent errors rendered the section ambiguous, requiring con-
sideration of the provision’s legislative history. That his-
tory, those courts held, shows Congress intended § 330(a)(1)
to continue to allow compensation of Chapter 7 debtors’
attorneys, irrespective of qualification under § 327. In re
Ames Dept. Stores, Inc., 76 F. 3d 66 (CA2 1996); In re Top
Grade Sausage, Inc., 227 F. 3d 123 (CA3 2000); In re Century
Cleaning Services, Inc., 195 F. 3d 1053 (CA9 1999). See also
3 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra, ¶ 330.LH[5], at 330–75 to
330–76.
This interpretive divide became relevant to petitioner in
his representation of Equipment Services, Inc. (ESI). ESI
retained petitioner to prepare, file, and prosecute a Chapter
11 bankruptcy proceeding on its behalf. He did so, all the

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while representing ESI with the approval of the court under
§ 327. See In re Equipment Services, Inc., 290 F. 3d 739,
742 (CA4 2002) (case below). See also 11 U. S. C. § 1107(a)
(authorizing debtor-in-possession to exercise the statutory
rights and powers of an estate trustee, including to retain
counsel under § 327). Three months into the Chapter 11
reorganization, the United States Trustee (Government)
filed a motion to convert the action into a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion proceeding. The court granted the Government’s mo-
tion and appointed an estate trustee pursuant to § 701, 11
U. S. C. § 701(a). This terminated ESI’s status as debtor-in-
possession and so terminated petitioner’s service under § 327
as an attorney for the debtor-in-possession. Yet petitioner
continued to provide legal services to ESI, the debtor, even
though he did not have the trustee’s authorization to do so.
He prepared reports detailing debts incurred and property
acquired since the initial filing; he amended asset schedules;
and he appeared at a hearing on an adversary complaint.
In due course petitioner filed an application seeking fees
under § 330(a)(1) for the time he spent on ESI’s behalf after
the Chapter 7 conversion. The Government objected to the
application. It argued that § 330(a)(1) makes no provision
for the estate to compensate an attorney not authorized
under § 327. The court agreed and denied the fees. In re
Equipment Services, Inc., 253 B. R. 724 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Va.
2000). (Petitioner was paid fees for the services he provided
to ESI before conversion of the proceeding to Chapter 7 and
when ESI was the debtor-in-possession. The parties do not
contest those fees.)
Petitioner unsuccessfully sought reversal of the Bank-
ruptcy Court’s determination, first from the District Court,
see In re Equipment Services, Inc., 260 B. R. 273 (WD Va.
2001), then from the Court of Appeals, see 290 F. 3d 739
(CA4 2002). Both courts concluded the plain language of
§ 330(a)(1) controlled and that attorneys who provide serv-
ices to debtors in Chapter 7 proceedings must be hired by

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the trustee under § 327 to be eligible for compensation. The
Court of Appeals acknowledged that its holding deepened
the divide among the various Circuits, but held fast to the
statute’s plain language, “particularly because application of
that plain language supports a reasonable interpretation of
the Bankruptcy Code,” id., at 745. We granted the petition
for certiorari, 538 U. S. 905 (2003), and now resolve the issue.
II
Petitioner argues that the existing statutory text is am-
biguous and so requires us to consult legislative history
to determine whether Congress intended to allow fees for
services rendered by a debtor’s attorney in a Chapter 7
proceeding, where that attorney is not authorized under
§ 327. He makes the case for ambiguity, for the most part,
by comparing the present statute with its predecessor.
Thus, he says the statute is ambiguous because subsection
(A)’s “attorney” is “facially irreconcilable” with the section’s
first part since
“[e]ither Congress inadvertently omitted the ‘debtor’s
attorney’ from the ‘payees’ list, on which the court of
appeals relied, or it inadvertently retained the reference
to the attorney in the latter, ‘payees’ list.” Brief for
Petitioner 17.
Similarly, with respect to the missing conjunction “or” he
says,
“[t]here is no apparent reason, other than a drafting
error, that Congress would have rewritten the statute
to produce a grammatically incorrect provision.” Ibid.
This is the analysis followed by the Courts of Appeals that
hold the statute is ambiguous. See In re Top Grade Sau-
sage, supra, at 129 (noting in its search for ambiguity that
“[p]rior to amendment, it was undisputed that the repetition
of officers in § 330(a)(1)(A) was meant to parallel the officers

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previously listed in § 330(a)(1)”); see also In re Century
Cleaning Services, 195 F. 3d, at 1057–1058 (engaging in same
resort to previous enactment to inquire as to the current
text’s ambiguity). One determines ambiguity, under this
contention, by relying on the grammatical soundness of the
prior statute. That contention is wrong.
The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the
existing statutory text, see Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson,
525 U. S. 432, 438 (1999), and not the predecessor statutes.
It is well established that “when the statute’s language is
plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the dis-
position required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it
according to its terms.” Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
Union Planters Bank, N. A., 530 U. S. 1, 6 (2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair
Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 241 (1989), in turn quoting
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 485 (1917)). So
we begin with the present statute.
A
The statute is awkward, and even ungrammatical; but that
does not make it ambiguous on the point at issue. In its
first part, the statute authorizes an award of compensation
to one of three types of persons: trustees, examiners, and
§ 327 professional persons. A debtor’s attorney not engaged
as provided by § 327 is simply not included within the class
of persons eligible for compensation. In subsection (A) the
statute further defines what type of compensation may be
awarded: compensation that is reasonable; and for actual,
necessary services; and rendered by four types of persons
(the same three plus attorneys). Unless the applicant for
compensation is in one of the named classes of persons in the
first part, the kind of service rendered is irrelevant.
The missing conjunction “or” does not change our conclu-
sion. The Government points to numerous federal statutes
that inadvertently lack a conjunction. They are read, none-

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theless, for their plain meaning. See Brief for Respondent
17, n. 4. Here, the missing conjunction neither alters the
text’s substance nor obscures its meaning. This is not a case
where a “not” is missing or where an “or” inadvertently sub-
stitutes for an “and.” The sentence may be awkward; yet it
is straightforward.
Subsection (A)’s nonparalleled fourth category of persons
who can render compensable services does not cloud the stat-
ute’s meaning. Petitioner reasons that since the section is a
single sentence, and since it appears to strive for parallelism
between those authorized to receive fees and those whose
services are compensable, there is an ambiguity as to what
“attorney” in § 330(a)(1)(A) refers to in § 330(a)(1). He also
points to neighboring § 331, which provides for both debtors’
attorneys and § 327 professional persons to receive interim
compensation after an order for relief is entered but before
an application for § 330 fees is filed. He argues that since
§ 331 contemplates debtors’ attorneys’ receiving interim
compensation there is reason to conclude that “attorney”
in § 330(a)(1)(A) refers to debtors’ attorneys in § 330(a)(1),
though they go unmentioned in that clause.
Subsection (A)’s “attorney,” however, can be read in a
straightforward fashion to refer to those attorneys whose
fees are authorized by § 330(a)(1): attorneys qualified as § 327
professional persons, that is, in a Chapter 7 context, those
employed by the trustee and approved by the court. See
§ 327(a) (appointed trustee may “employ one or more attor-
neys . . . to represent or assist the trustee in carrying out
the trustee’s duties under this title); § 327(e) (appointed
trustee may “employ, for a specified special purpose, other
than to represent the trustee in conducting the case, an at-
torney that has represented the debtor, . . .”). Likewise,
§ 331’s reference to interim compensation for debtors’ attor-
neys most straightforwardly refers to debtors’ attorneys au-
thorized under § 327.

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It must be acknowledged that, under our reading of the
text, the word “attorney” in subsection (A) may well be sur-
plusage. Subsection (A)’s reference to § 327 professional
persons undoubtedly includes attorneys, as much as does
§ 330(a)(1)’s reference to professional persons. That is not
controlling, however. Surplusage does not always produce
ambiguity and our preference for avoiding surplusage con-
structions is not absolute. See Chickasaw Nation v. United
States, 534 U. S. 84, 94 (2001) (the preference “is sometimes
offset by the canon that permits a court to reject words ‘as
surplusage’ if ‘inadvertently inserted or if repugnant to the
rest of the statute’ ”). Where there are two ways to read
the text—either attorney is surplusage, in which case the
text is plain; or attorney is nonsurplusage (i. e., it refers to
an ambiguous component in § 330(a)(1)), in which case the
text is ambiguous—applying the rule against surplusage is,
absent other indications, inappropriate. We should prefer
the plain meaning since that approach respects the words of
Congress. In this manner we avoid the pitfalls that plague
too quick a turn to the more controversial realm of legisla-
tive history.
B
The plain meaning that § 330(a)(1) sets forth does not lead
to absurd results requiring us to treat the text as if it were
ambiguous. See supra, at 534 (citing Hartford Underwrit-
ers). Petitioner disagrees and argues that our interpreta-
tion will “entail an inexplicable, wholesale departure from
. . . the guiding principle of the ‘prompt and effectual admin-
istration’ of federal bankruptcy law.” Brief for Petitioner
30. He says that our reading “attribute[s] to Congress an
illogical, penny-wise and pound-foolish determination to
eliminate entirely—as a purportedly asset-preserving meas-
ure—compensation that is essential to debtors’ receipt of
legal services.” Id., at 35.
These arguments overstate the effect of § 330(a)(1). Un-
der the text’s instruction compensation remains available to

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debtors’ attorneys through various permitted means. First,
while § 330(a)(1) requires proper authorization for payment
to attorneys from estate funds in Chapter 7 filings, it does
not extend throughout all bankruptcy law. Compensation
for debtors’ attorneys in Chapter 12 and 13 bankruptcies,
for example, is not much disturbed by § 330 as a whole.
See, e. g., 11 U. S. C. § 330(a)(4)(B) (“In a chapter 12 or
chapter 13 case in which the debtor is an individual, the
court may allow reasonable compensation to the debtor’s
attorney”).
Compensation for debtors’ attorneys working on Chapter
7 bankruptcies, moreover, is not altogether prohibited. Sec-
tions 327 and 330, taken together, allow Chapter 7 trustees
to engage attorneys, including debtors’ counsel, and allow
courts to award them fees. See §§ 327(a) and (e). Section
327’s limitation on debtors’ incurring debts for professional
services without the Chapter 7 trustee’s approval is not ab-
surd. In the context of a Chapter 7 liquidation it advances
the trustee’s responsibility for preserving the estate.
If we add to all this the apparent sound functioning of
the bankruptcy system under the plain meaning approach,
petitioner’s arguments become unconvincing. Seeming
order has attended the rule’s application for five years in the
Fifth Circuit and for four years in the Eleventh Circuit. See
In re American Steel Product, Inc., 197 F. 3d 1354 (CA11
1999); In re Pro-Snax Distributors, Inc., 157 F. 3d 414 (CA5
1998). It appears to be routine for debtors to pay reason-
able fees for legal services before filing for bankruptcy to
ensure compliance with statutory requirements. See gener-
ally Collier Compensation, Employment and Appointment of
Trustees and Professionals in Bankruptcy Cases ¶ 3.02[1],
p. 3–2 (2002) (“In the majority of cases, the debtor’s counsel
will accept an individual or a joint consumer chapter 7 case
only after being paid a retainer that covers the ‘standard fee’
and the cost of filing the petition”). So our interpretation
accords with common practice. Section 330(a)(1) does not

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538 LAMIE v. UNITED STATES TRUSTEE
Opinion of the Court
prevent a debtor from engaging counsel before a Chapter 7
conversion and paying reasonable compensation in advance
to ensure that the filing is in order. Indeed, the Code antici-
pates these arrangements. See, e. g., § 329 (debtors’ attor-
neys must disclose fees they receive from a debtor in the
year prior to its bankruptcy filing and courts may order ex-
cessive payments returned to the estate).
C
Petitioner’s argument stumbles on still harder ground in
the face of another canon of interpretation. His interpreta-
tion of the Act—reading the word “attorney” in § 330(a)
(1)(A) to refer to “debtors’ attorneys” in § 330(a)(1)—would
have us read an absent word into the statute. That is, his
argument would result “not [in] a construction of [the] stat-
ute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it by the court, so that
what was omitted, presumably by inadvertence, may be in-
cluded within its scope.” Iselin v. United States, 270 U. S.
245, 251 (1926). With a plain, nonabsurd meaning in view,
we need not proceed in this way. “There is a basic differ-
ence between filling a gap left by Congress’ silence and re-
writing rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically
enacted.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U. S. 618,
625 (1978).
Our unwillingness to soften the import of Congress’ cho-
sen words even if we believe the words lead to a harsh out-
come is longstanding. It results from “deference to the
supremacy of the Legislature, as well as recognition that
Congressmen typically vote on the language of a bill.”
United States v. Locke, 471 U. S. 84, 95 (1985) (citing Rich-
ards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 9 (1962)).
Adhering to conventional doctrines of statutory interpre-
tation, we hold that § 330(a)(1) does not authorize compensa-
tion awards to debtors’ attorneys from estate funds, unless
they are employed as authorized by § 327. If the attorney
is to be paid from estate funds under § 330(a)(1) in a Chapter

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7 case, he must be employed by the trustee and approved by
the court.
III
Though we find it unnecessary to rely on the legislative
history behind the 1994 enactment of § 330(a)(1), we find it
instructive that the history creates more confusion than clar-
ity about the congressional intent. History and policy con-
siderations lend support both to petitioner’s interpretation
and to the holding we reach based on the plain language of
the statute.
Petitioner, for instance, cites evidence supporting the con-
clusion that a scrivener’s error obscures what was Congress’
real intent. For over 100 years debtors’ attorneys have
been considered by Congress and the courts to be an integral
part of the bankruptcy process. See Bankruptcy Act of
1898, ch. 541, §§ 59(d) and 64(b), 30 Stat. 561, 563. See also
In re Kross, 96 F. 816 (SDNY 1899). It is fair to doubt that
Congress would so rework their longstanding role with-
out announcing the change in the congressional record.
Cf. Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U. S. 213, 221 (1998) (“We . . .
will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy
practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended
such a departure” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
The legislative processes behind the change also lend some
support to petitioner’s claim. In 1994 the original proposed
draft of new § 330(a)(1) featured two changes: stylistic
changes throughout the section and the addition of a new
provision giving the Government a right to object to fee
applications. See S. 540, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), re-
printed in S. Rep. No. 103–168 (1993). The right to object
provision was added at § 330(a)(1)’s end. Thus it came im-
mediately after the critical text “or to the debtor’s attorney,”
which the draft edited to read “or the debtors [sic] attor-
ney.” Ibid. Before voting the Act into law, however, Con-
gress amended the proposed draft. See 140 Cong. Rec. 8383

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540 LAMIE v. UNITED STATES TRUSTEE
Opinion of the Court
(1994) (setting out amendment 1645 to S. 540). Amendment
1645 made only two changes to § 330(a)(1): It deleted the
Government’s right to object provision and the critical words
(“or the debtors [sic] attorney”). The rest of the original
proposed draft remained intact. Legislative history ex-
plains the first deletion, for the provision was installed else-
where, as new § 330(a)(2). Nothing, however, explains the
second. That the Government’s right to object was deleted
and reinstated (i. e., reorganized), while the words at issue,
which had preceded the moved provision, were deleted with
no notation in the legislative history suggests the scrivener
just reached too far in his deletion. These factors combined
to convince a leading treatise on bankruptcy law, Collier, that
the deletion was a scrivener’s error and ought not have any
effect. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 330.LH[5], at 330–75
to 330–76.
There are other aspects of the legislative record, however,
that undermine this interpretation. These considerations
suggest Congress may have intended the change the scriv-
ener worked. For example, amendment 1645 was part of
a reform Act designed to curtail abuses in fee awards, ac-
cording to statements by the amendment’s sponsor. See
140 Cong. Rec., at 28753 (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
These abuses were not ghosts seen only by Congress. Some
bankruptcy courts had reached the same conclusion. See,
e. g., In re NRG Resources, Inc., 64 B. R. 643 (Bkrtcy. Ct.
WD La. 1986). The deletion at issue furthered this reform
by ensuring that Chapter 7 debtors’ attorneys would receive
no estate compensation absent the trustee’s authorization of
their work. This objective is not inconsistent with the in-
terest of involving debtors’ attorneys in bankruptcy proceed-
ings. As noted, the Act still allows debtors’ attorneys to be
compensated in different ways. See supra, at 536–539.
Amendment 1645, viewed in its entirety, gives further rea-
son to think Congress may have intended the change. The
amendment added a new section that authorizes fee awards

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541 Cite as: 540 U. S. 526 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
to debtors’ attorneys in Chapter 12 and 13 bankruptcies.
140 Cong. Rec., at 8383 (setting out new 11 U. S. C. § 330(a)
(4)(B)). Since the amendment’s deletion of “or the debtors
[sic] attorney” from the original proposed draft affected
Chapter 12 and 13 debtors’ attorneys as much as Chapter 7
debtors’ attorneys, § 330(a)(4)(B) shows a special intent to
authorize the formers’ fee awards in the face of the new,
broad exclusion.
If Congress’ action does not prove the point, the House of
Representatives’ inaction may. The House passed the Act
after having the deletion, as well as its impact, called to its
attention. See Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 551
(1994). The National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy
Attorneys (NACBA), which represents those lawyers most
likely to be affected by § 330(a)(1)’s change, declined to object
to the deletion. Ibid. (noting the deletion but stating that
the NACBA did “not oppose” amendment 1645’s passage).
This alert, followed by the Legislature’s nonresponse, should
support a presumption of legislative awareness and inten-
tion. The Act may now contain surplusage, along with
grammatical error; but that may have been the result of try-
ing to make the substantive change with the fewest possible
textual alterations or of an error by the scrivener in carrying
out the change.
These competing interpretations of the legislative history
make it difficult to say with assurance whether petitioner or
the Government lays better historical claim to the congres-
sional intent. The alert to the change in policy was given,
to be sure, before the House passed the final version, but
that particular circumstance cannot bear too much weight.
The alert was not the subject of testimony from any witness
at the congressional hearing. It consisted of but two sen-
tences contained within 472 pages of written statements de-
livered to the legislative subcommittee for its August 17,

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542 LAMIE v. UNITED STATES TRUSTEE
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
1994, hearing day. Those 472 pages were added to 236
pages of prepared statements and testimony transcribed
from the day’s testifying witnesses. Within the NACBA’s
filing, the two relevant sentences appear on the 18th page of
the 27-page report. Nothing in the legislative history con-
firms that this particular point bore on the congressional de-
liberations or was given specific consideration.
These uncertainties illustrate the difficulty of relying on
legislative history here and the advantage of our determina-
tion to rest our holding on the statutory text.
* * *
If Congress enacted into law something different from
what it intended, then it should amend the statute to con-
form it to its intent. “It is beyond our province to rescue
Congress from its drafting errors, and to provide for what
we might think . . . is the preferred result.” United States
v. Granderson, 511 U. S. 39, 68 (1994) (concurring opinion).
This allows both of our branches to adhere to our respected,
and respective, constitutional roles. In the meantime, we
must determine intent from the statute before us. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, joined by
Justice Souter and Justice Breyer, concurring.
As the majority recognizes, ante, at 539–540, a leading
bankruptcy law treatise concluded that the 1994 amendments
to § 330(a)(1) contained an unintended error. 3 Collier on
Bankruptcy ¶ 330.LH[5], pp. 330–75 to 330–76 (rev. 15th ed.
2003). Whenever there is such a plausible basis for believ-
ing that a significant change in statutory law resulted from
a scrivener’s error, I believe we have a duty to examine leg-

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543 Cite as: 540 U. S. 526 (2004)
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
islative history.1 In this case, that history reveals that the
National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys
(NACBA) not only called the assumed drafting error to Con-
gress’ attention in a timely fashion, but also deemed the
error unworthy of objection.2 This evidence convinces me
that the Court’s reading of the text, which surely is more
natural than petitioner’s, is correct. I therefore concur in
the judgment.
1 As Chief Justice Marshall stated, “Where the mind labours to discover
the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be
derived . . . .” United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386 (1805).
2 See ante, at 541. Specifically, three months after the Senate passed
the relevant amendment, the NACBA submitted written comments to the
House Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law, which was con-
sidering the change. Those comments first noted that the amended ver-
sion of § 330(a)(1) “appears to have some minor drafting errors, including
the apparently inadvertent removal of debtors’ attorneys from the list
of professionals whose compensation awards are covered.” Bankruptcy
Reform: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial
Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 551
(1994). With no proviso that these alleged errors be corrected, the
NACBA then expressly did “not oppose” passage of the amendment.
Ibid. (emphasis added).