HOUSEHOLD CREDIT SERVICES, INC., et al. v. PFENNIG

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232 OCTOBER TERM, 2003
Syllabus
HOUSEHOLD CREDIT SERVICES, INC., et al. v.
PFENNIG
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 02–857. Argued February 23, 2004—Decided April 21, 2004
The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) regulates, inter alia, the disclosures
that credit card issuers must make to consumers, 15 U. S. C. § 1637(a),
and provides consumers with a civil remedy for creditors’ failure to com-
ply, § 1640. Among other things, the creditor’s periodic balance state-
ment to the consumer must include “[t]he amount of any finance charge,”
§ 1637(b)(4), which is defined as an amount “payable directly or indi-
rectly by the [consumer], and imposed directly or indirectly by the credi-
tor as an incident to the extension of credit,” § 1605(a). Section
1604(a) expressly gives to the Federal Reserve Board (Board) expansive
authority to prescribe regulations containing “such classifications, dif-
ferentiations, or other provisions” as, in the Board’s judgment, “are nec-
essary or proper to effectuate [TILA’s] purposes . . . , to prevent circum-
vention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance therewith.” The
Board’s Regulation Z interprets § 1605(a)’s “finance charge” definition to
exclude “charges . . . for exceeding a credit limit” (over-limit fees).
Respondent holds a credit card issued by one of the petitioner finan-
cial institutions and in which the other holds an interest. Although the
parties’ agreement set respondent’s credit limit at $2,000, she was able
to make charges exceeding that limit, subject to a $29 over-limit fee for
each month in which her balance exceeded $2,000. While her monthly
billing statement disclosed the over-limit fees, the amount was not in-
cluded as part of the “finance charge,” consistent with Regulation Z.
Respondent filed suit alleging that petitioners violated TILA by failing
to classify over-limit fees as “finance charges,” but the District Court
granted petitioners’ motion to dismiss on the ground that Regulation Z
specifically excludes such fees. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that
the exclusion conflicts with § 1605(a)’s plain language. Noting, first,
that, as a remedial statute, TILA must be liberally interpreted in favor
of consumers, the court then concluded that the over-limit fees in this
case were imposed “incident to an extension of credit” and therefore
fell squarely within § 1605’s language. That conclusion turned on the
distinction the court drew between unilateral acts of default, which
would not generate a “finance charge,” and acts of default resulting from
an agreement between the creditor and the consumer, which would.

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Held: Regulation Z is not an unreasonable interpretation of § 1605.
Pp. 238–245.
(a) Because respondent does not challenge the Board’s authority
under § 1604(a) to issue binding regulations, this Court faces only two
questions. It asks, first, whether “Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue,” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842, in which case courts, as well
as the Board, “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress,” id., at 842–843. However, whenever Congress has “ex-
plicitly left a gap for the [implementing] agency to fill,” the agency’s
regulation is “given controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id., at 843–844. Pp. 238–239.
(b) TILA itself does not explicitly address whether over-limit fees are
included within the “finance charge” definition. The Sixth Circuit did
not attempt to clarify the scope of § 1605(a)’s critical term “incident to
the extension of credit.” Because the phrase “incident to” does not
make clear whether a substantial (as opposed to a remote) connection is
required between an antecedent and its object, cf. Holly Farms Corp.
v. NLRB, 517 U. S. 392, 402, n. 9, it cannot be concluded that the term
“finance charge,” standing alone, unambiguously includes over-limit
fees. Moreover, an examination of TILA’s related provisions, as well
as the full text of § 1605 itself, casts doubt on the Sixth Circuit’s inter-
pretation. A consumer holding an open-end credit plan may incur two
types of charges—finance charges and “other charges which may be
imposed as part of the plan.” §§ 1637(a)(1)–(5). TILA does not make
clear which charges fall into each category, but its recognition of at least
two categories establishes that Congress did not contemplate that all
charges made in connection with an open-end credit plan would be con-
sidered “finance charges.” And where TILA explicitly addresses over-
limit fees, it defines them as fees imposed “in connection with an exten-
sion of credit,” § 1637(c)(1)(B)(iii), rather than “incident to an extension
of credit,” § 1605(a). Furthermore, none of § 1605’s specific examples
of charges that fall within the “finance charge” definition includes
over-limit or comparable fees. Thus, § 1605(a) is, at best, ambiguous.
Pp. 239–242.
(c) Regulation Z’s exclusion of over-limit fees from “finance charge[s]”
is in no way manifestly contrary to § 1605. Regulation Z defines
“finance charge” as “the cost of consumer credit,” excluding as less rele-
vant to determining such cost a number of specific payments, including
over-limit fees, that do not automatically recur or are imposed only
when a consumer defaults on a credit agreement. Because over-limit
fees are imposed only in the latter circumstance, they can reasonably be

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234 HOUSEHOLD CREDIT SERVICES, INC. v. PFENNIG
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characterized as a penalty for defaulting on the credit agreement, and
the Board’s decision to exclude them from “finance charge[s]” is reason-
able. Despite the Board’s rational decision to adopt a uniform rule ex-
cluding from the term “finance charge” all penalties imposed for exceed-
ing the credit limit, the lower court adopted a case-by-case approach
contingent on whether an act of default was “unilateral.” That ap-
proach would prove unworkable to creditors and, more importantly, lead
to significant confusion for the consumer, who would be able to decipher
if a charge is more properly a “finance charge” or an “other charge” only
by recalling the details of the particular transaction that caused him to
exceed his credit limit. In most cases, the consumer would not even
know the relevant facts, which are contingent on the nature of the au-
thorization given by the creditor to the merchant. Here, the Board
accomplished all of the objectives set forth in § 1604(a)’s broad delega-
tion of rulemaking authority when it set forth a clear, easy to apply (and
easy to enforce) rule that highlights the charges the Board determined
to be most relevant to a consumer’s credit decisions. Pp. 242–245.
295 F. 3d 522, reversed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Louis R. Cohen, Christopher R. Lip-
sett, Richard C. Pepperman II, and William G. Porter.
Barbara B. McDowell argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the
brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Clement, Matthew
D. Roberts, James V. Mattingly, Jr., and Katherine H.
Wheatley.
Sylvia Antalis Goldsmith argued the cause for respond-
ent. With her on the brief were John T. Murray, Joseph F.
Murray, and Brian K. Murphy.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American
Bankers Association et al. by Drew S. Days III, Beth S. Brinkmann, and
Seth M. Galanter; and for William P. Schlenk by Richard A. Cordray,
Mark D. Fischer, and Mark McClure Sandmann.

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Opinion of the Court
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
Congress enacted the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 82
Stat. 146, in order to promote the “informed use of credit”
by consumers. 15 U. S. C. § 1601(a). To that end, TILA’s
disclosure provisions seek to ensure “meaningful disclosure
of credit terms.” Ibid. Further, Congress delegated ex-
pansive authority to the Federal Reserve Board (Board)
to enact appropriate regulations to advance this purpose.
§ 1604(a). We granted certiorari, 539 U. S. 957 (2003), to de-
cide whether the Board’s Regulation Z, which specifically
excludes fees imposed for exceeding a credit limit (over-limit
fees) from the definition of “finance charge,” is an unreason-
able interpretation of § 1605. We conclude that it is not, and,
accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit.
I
Respondent, Sharon Pfennig, holds a credit card initially
issued by petitioner Household Credit Services, Inc. (House-
hold), but in which petitioner MBNA America Bank, N. A.,
now holds an interest through the acquisition of Household’s
credit card portfolio. Although the terms of respondent’s
credit card agreement set respondent’s credit limit at $2,000,
respondent was able to make charges exceeding that limit,
subject to a $29 “over-limit fee” for each month in which her
balance exceeded $2,000.
TILA regulates, inter alia, the substance and form of dis-
closures that creditors offering “open end consumer credit
plans” (a term that includes credit card accounts) must make
to consumers, § 1637(a), and provides a civil remedy for con-
sumers who suffer damages as a result of a creditor’s failure
to comply with TILA’s provisions, § 1640.1 When a creditor
1 An “open end credit plan” is a plan under which a creditor “reasonably
contemplates repeated transactions, which prescribes the terms of such
transactions, and which provides for a finance charge which may be com-
puted from time to time on the outstanding unpaid balance.” 15 U. S. C.
§ 1602(i).

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and a consumer enter into an open-end consumer credit plan,
the creditor is required to provide to the consumer a state-
ment for each billing cycle for which there is an outstanding
balance due. § 1637(b). The statement must include the ac-
count’s outstanding balance at the end of the billing period,
§ 1637(b)(8), and “[t]he amount of any finance charge added
to the account during the period, itemized to show the
amounts, if any, due to the application of percentage rates
and the amount, if any, imposed as a minimum or fixed
charge,” § 1637(b)(4). A “finance charge” is an amount “pay-
able directly or indirectly by the person to whom the credit
is extended, and imposed directly or indirectly by the credi-
tor as an incident to the extension of credit.” § 1605(a).
The Board has interpreted this definition to exclude
“[c]harges . . . for exceeding a credit limit.” See 12 CFR
§ 226.4(c)(2) (2004) (Regulation Z). Thus, although respond-
ent’s billing statement disclosed the imposition of an over-
limit fee when she exceeded her $2,000 credit limit, consist-
ent with Regulation Z, the amount was not included as part
of the “finance charge.”
On August 24, 1999, respondent filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio on behalf of a purported nationwide class of all consum-
ers who were charged or assessed over-limit fees by petition-
ers. Respondent alleged in her complaint that petitioners
allowed her and each of the other putative class members to
exceed their credit limits, thereby subjecting them to over-
limit fees. Petitioners violated TILA, respondent alleged,
by failing to classify the over-limit fees as “finance charges”
and thereby “misrepresented the true cost of credit” to
respondent and the other class members. Class Action
Complaint in No. C2–99 815, ¶¶ 34–39, App. to Pet. for Cert.
A39–A40. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on
the ground that Regulation Z specifically excludes over-
limit fees from the defınition of “fınance charge.” 12 CFR

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§ 226.4(c)(2) (2004). The District Court agreed and granted
petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
On appeal, respondent argued, and the Court of Appeals
agreed, that Regulation Z’s explicit exclusion of over-limit
fees from the definition of “finance charge” conflicts with the
plain language of 15 U. S. C. § 1605(a). The Court of Appeals
first noted that, as a remedial statute, TILA must be lib-
erally interpreted in favor of consumers. 295 F. 3d 522,
528 (CA6 2002). The Court of Appeals then concluded that
the over-limit fees in this case were imposed “incident to
the extension of credit” and therefore fell squarely within
§ 1605’s definition of “finance charge.” Id., at 528–529. The
Court of Appeals’ conclusion turned on the distinction be-
tween unilateral acts of default and acts of default resulting
from consumers’ requests for additional credit, exceeding a
predetermined credit limit, that creditors grant. Under the
Court of Appeals’ reasoning, a penalty imposed due to a uni-
lateral act of default would not constitute a “finance charge.”
Id., at 530–531. Respondent alleged in her complaint, how-
ever, that petitioners “allowed [her] to make charges and/or
assessed [her] charges that allowed her balance to exceed
her credit limit of two thousand dollars,” App. to Pet. for
Cert. A39, ¶ 34, putting her actions under the category of
acts of default resulting from consumers’ requests for addi-
tional credit, exceeding a predetermined credit limit, that
creditors grant. The Court of Appeals held that because
petitioners “made an additional extension of credit to [re-
spondent] over and above the alleged ‘credit limit,’ ” id., ¶ 35,
and charged the over-limit fee as a condition of this addi-
tional extension of credit, the over-limit fee clearly and un-
mistakably fell under the definition of a “finance charge.”
295 F. 3d, at 530. Based on its reading of respondent’s alle-
gations, the Court of Appeals limited its holding to “those
instances in which the creditor knowingly permits the credit
card holder to exceed his or her credit limit and then imposes

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a fee incident to the extension of that credit.” Id., at 532,
n. 5.2
II
Congress has expressly delegated to the Board the author-
ity to prescribe regulations containing “such classifications,
differentiations, or other provisions” as, in the judgment of
the Board, “are necessary or proper to effectuate the pur-
poses of [TILA], to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof,
or to facilitate compliance therewith.” § 1604(a). Thus, the
Court has previously recognized that “the [Board] has
played a pivotal role in ‘setting [TILA] in motion. . . .’ ”
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U. S. 555, 566 (1980)
(quoting Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States,
288 U. S. 294, 315 (1933)). Indeed, “Congress has specifically
designated the [Board] and staff as the primary source for
interpretation and application of truth-in-lending law.” 444
U. S., at 566. As the Court recognized in Ford Motor Credit
Co., twice since the passage of TILA, Congress has made
this intention clear: first by providing a good-faith defense
to creditors who comply with the Board’s rules and regula-
tions, 88 Stat. 1518, codified at 15 U. S. C. § 1640(f), and, sec-
ond, by expanding this good-faith defense to creditors who
conform to “any interpretation or approval by an official or
employee of the Federal Reserve System duly authorized by
the Board to issue such interpretations or approvals,” 90
Stat. 197, codified as amended, at § 1640(f). 444 U. S., at
566–567.
Respondent does not challenge the Board’s authority to
issue binding regulations. Thus, in determining whether
2 To the extent that respondent sought monetary relief, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of respondent’s TILA
claim because § 1640(f) provides a good-faith defense to creditors who act
in conformity with rules promulgated by the Board. 295 F. 3d, at
532–533.

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Regulation Z’s interpretation of TILA’s text is binding on
the courts, we are faced with only two questions. We first
ask whether “Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842 (1984). If
so, courts, as well as the agency, “must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id., at 842–
843. However, whenever Congress has “explicitly left a gap
for the agency to fill,” the agency’s regulation is “given con-
trolling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or mani-
festly contrary to the statute.” Id., at 843–844.
A
TILA itself does not explicitly address whether over-limit
fees are included within the definition of “finance charge.”
Congress defined “finance charge” as “all charges, payable
directly or indirectly by the person to whom the credit is
extended, and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor
as an incident to the extension of credit.” § 1605(a). The
Court of Appeals, however, made no attempt to clarify the
scope of the critical term “incident to the extension of
credit.” The Court of Appeals recognized that, “ ‘[i]n ascer-
taining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look
to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the
language and design of the statute as a whole.’ ” 295 F. 3d,
at 529–530 (quoting K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U. S.
281, 291 (1988)). However, the Court of Appeals failed to
examine TILA’s other provisions, or even the surrounding
language in § 1605, before reaching its conclusion. Because
petitioners would not have imposed the over-limit fee had
they not “granted [respondent’s] request for additional
credit, which resulted in her exceeding her credit limit,” the
Court of Appeals held that the over-limit fee in this case
fell squarely within § 1605(a)’s definition of “finance charge.”
295 F. 3d, at 528–529. Thus, the Court of Appeals rested

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its holding primarily on its particular characterization of the
transaction that led to the over-limit charge in this case.3
The Court of Appeals’ characterization of the transaction
in this case, however, is not supported even by the facts as
set forth in respondent’s complaint. Respondent alleged in
her complaint that the over-limit fee is imposed for each
month in which her balance exceeds the original credit limit.
App. to Pet. for Cert. A39, ¶ 35. If this were true, however,
the over-limit fee would be imposed not as a direct result of
an extension of credit for a purchase that caused respondent
to exceed her $2,000 limit, but rather as a result of the fact
that her charges exceeded her $2,000 limit at the time re-
spondent’s monthly charges were officially calculated. Be-
cause over-limit fees, regardless of a creditor’s particular
billing practices, are imposed only when a consumer exceeds
his credit limit, it is perfectly reasonable to characterize an
over-limit fee not as a charge imposed for obtaining an exten-
sion of credit over a consumer’s credit limit, but rather as a
penalty for violating the credit agreement.
The Court of Appeals thus erred in resting its conclusion
solely on this particular characterization of the details of
credit card transactions, a characterization that is not clearly
compelled by the terms and definitions of TILA, and one
with which others could reasonably disagree. Certainly, re-
gardless of how the fee is characterized, there is at least
some connection between the over-limit fee and an extension
of credit. But, this Court has recognized that the phrase
3 Respondent does not attempt to defend the Court of Appeals’ reason-
ing in this Court and has abandoned her principal argument on appeal—
that Regulation Z conflicts with the plain language of § 1605. Instead,
respondent maintains that the Board’s exclusion of over-limit fees in Reg-
ulation Z is not challenged in this case because Regulation Z does not
cover over-limit fees imposed for authorized extensions of credit. Be-
cause respondent did not advance this theory in the Court of Appeals, and
did not raise it in her brief in opposition accompanied by an appropriate
cross-petition, see Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U. S.
355, 364 (1994), we decline to consider it here.

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“incident to or in conjunction with” implies some necessary
connection between the antecedent and its object, although
it “does not place beyond rational debate the nature or ex-
tent of the required connection.” Holly Farms Corp. v.
NLRB, 517 U. S. 392, 403, n. 9 (1996) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In other words, the phrase “incident to”
does not make clear whether a substantial (as opposed to a
remote) connection is required. Thus, unlike the Court of
Appeals, we cannot conclude that the term “finance charge”
unambiguously includes over-limit fees. That term, stand-
ing alone, is ambiguous.
Moreover, an examination of TILA’s related provisions, as
well as the full text of § 1605 itself, casts doubt on the Court
of Appeals’ interpretation of the statute. A consumer hold-
ing an open-end credit plan may incur two types of charges—
finance charges and “other charges which may be imposed as
part of the plan.” §§ 1637(a)(1)–(5). TILA does not make
clear which charges fall into each category. But TILA’s rec-
ognition of at least two categories of charges does make clear
that Congress did not contemplate that all charges made in
connection with an open-end credit plan would be considered
“finance charges.” And where TILA does explicitly address
over-limit fees, it defines them as fees imposed “in connec-
tion with an extension of credit,” § 1637(c)(1)(B)(iii), rather
than “incident to the extension of credit,” § 1605(a). Fur-
thermore, none of § 1605’s specific examples of charges that
fall within the definition of “finance charge” includes over-
limit or comparable fees. See, e. g., § 1605(a)(2) (“[s]ervice or
carrying charge”); § 1605(a)(3) (loan fee or similar charge);
§ 1605(a)(6) (mortgage broker fees).4
4 Additionally, by specifically excepting charges from the term “finance
charge” that would otherwise be included under a broad reading of “inci-
dent to the extension of credit,” see § 1605(a) (charges of a type payable in
a comparable cash transaction); ibid. (fees imposed by third-party closing
agents); § 1605(d)(1) (fees and charges relating to perfecting security inter-
ests); § 1605(e) (fees relating to the extension of credit secured by real

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242 HOUSEHOLD CREDIT SERVICES, INC. v. PFENNIG
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As our prior discussion indicates, the best interpretation
of the term “finance charge” may exclude over-limit fees.
But § 1605(a) is, at best, ambiguous, because neither § 1605(a)
nor its surrounding provisions provides a clear answer.
While we acknowledge that there may be some fees not ex-
plicitly addressed by § 1605(a)’s definition of “finance charge”
but which are unambiguously included in or excluded by that
definition, over-limit fees are not such fees.
B
Because § 1605 is ambiguous, the Board’s regulation imple-
menting § 1605 “is binding in the courts unless procedurally
defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U. S. 218, 227 (2001).
Regulation Z’s exclusion of over-limit fees from the term
“finance charge” is in no way manifestly contrary to § 1605.
Regulation Z defines the term “finance charge” as “the cost
of consumer credit.” 12 CFR § 226.4 (2004). It specifi-
cally excludes from the definition of “finance charge” the
following:
“(1) Application fees charged to all applicants for credit,
whether or not credit is actually extended.
“(2) Charges for actual unanticipated late payment, for
exceeding a credit limit, or for delinquency, default, or
a similar occurrence.
“(3) Charges imposed by a financial institution for pay-
ing items that overdraw an account, unless the payment
of such items and the imposition of the charge were pre-
viously agreed upon in writing.
“(4) Fees charged for participation in a credit plan,
whether assessed on an annual or other periodic basis.
property), Congress appears to have excluded such an expansive interpre-
tation of the term.

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“(5) Seller’s points.
“(6) Interest forfeited as a result of an interest reduc-
tion required by law on a time deposit used as security
for an extension of credit.
“(7) [Certain fees related to real estate.]
“(8) Discounts offered to induce payment for a purchase
by cash, check, or other means, as provided in section
167(b) of the Act.” § 226.4(c) (emphasis added).
The Board adopted the regulation to emphasize “disclosures
that are relevant to credit decisions, as opposed to disclo-
sures related to events occurring after the initial credit
choice,” because “the primary goals of [TILA] are not partic-
ularly enhanced by regulatory provisions relating to changes
in terms on outstanding obligations and on the effects of the
failure to comply with the terms of the obligation.” 45 Fed.
Reg. 80649 (1980). The Board’s decision to emphasize disclo-
sures that are most relevant to a consumer’s initial credit
decisions reflects an understanding that “[m]eaningful dis-
closure does not mean more disclosure,” but instead “de-
scribes a balance between ‘competing considerations of com-
plete disclosure . . . and the need to avoid . . . [informational
overload].’ ” Ford Motor Credit Co., 444 U. S., at 568 (quot-
ing S. Rep. No. 96–73, p. 3 (1979)). Although the fees ex-
cluded from the term “finance charge” in Regulation Z (e. g.,
application charges, late payment charges, and over-limit
fees) might be relevant to a consumer’s credit decision, the
Board rationally concluded that these fees—which are not
automatically recurring or are imposed only when a con-
sumer defaults on a credit agreement—are less relevant to
determining the true cost of credit. Because over-limit fees,
which are imposed only when a consumer breaches the terms
of his credit agreement, can reasonably be characterized as
a penalty for defaulting on the credit agreement, the Board’s
decision to exclude them from the term “finance charge” is
surely reasonable.

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244 HOUSEHOLD CREDIT SERVICES, INC. v. PFENNIG
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In holding that Regulation Z conflicts with § 1605’s defini-
tion of the term “finance charge,” the Court of Appeals ig-
nored our warning that “judges ought to refrain from sub-
stituting their own interstitial lawmaking for that of the
[Board].” Ford Motor Credit Co., supra, at 568. Despite
the Board’s rational decision to adopt a uniform rule exclud-
ing from the term “finance charge” all penalties imposed for
exceeding the credit limit, the Court of Appeals adopted a
case-by-case approach contingent on whether an act of de-
fault was “unilateral.” Putting aside the lack of textual sup-
port for this approach, the Court of Appeals’ approach would
prove unworkable to creditors and, more importantly, lead
to significant confusion for consumers. Under the Court of
Appeals’ rule, a consumer would be able to decipher if a
charge is considered a “finance charge” or an “other charge”
each month only by recalling the details of the particular
transaction that caused the consumer to exceed his credit
limit. In most cases, the consumer would not even know
the relevant facts, which are contingent on the nature of the
authorization given by the creditor to the merchant. More-
over, the distinction between “unilateral” acts of default and
acts of default where a consumer exceeds his credit limit
(but has not thereby renegotiated his credit limit and is still
subject to the over-limit fee) is based on a fundamental mis-
understanding of the workings of the credit card industry.
As the Board explained below, a creditor’s “authorization” of
a particular point-of-sale transaction does not represent a
final determination that a particular transaction is within a
consumer’s credit limit because the authorization system is
not suited to identify instantaneously and accurately over-
limit transactions. Brief for Board of Governors of Federal
Reserve System as Amicus Curiae in No. 00–4213 (CA6),
pp. 7–9.
Congress has authorized the Board to make “such classifi-
cations, differentiations, or other provisions, and [to] provide
for such adjustments and exceptions for any class of transac-

541US1 Unit: $U38 [05-21-06 17:55:48] PAGES PGT: OPIN
245 Cite as: 541 U. S. 232 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
tions, as in the judgment of the Board are necessary or
proper to effectuate the purposes of [TILA], to prevent cir-
cumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance
therewith.” § 1604(a). Here, the Board has accomplished
all of these objectives by setting forth a clear, easy to apply
(and easy to enforce) rule that highlights the charges the
Board determined to be most relevant to a consumer’s credit
decisions. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is there-
fore reversed.
It is so ordered.